Search

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities.

The authors propose a pedagogical apparatus embodying a solid microfoundation with emphasis on the public's choice between currency and demand deposits being an optimal decision. On the basis of the pedagogical exposition, the authors explain how money supply is related to the combined behaviors of the central bank, commercial banks, and the public.

By presenting an efficiency wage model embodying intertemporal optimization, this paper proposes a channel to illustrate the willingness of firm's abatement activities. The idea is that worker's efficiency on working is positively related to his stock of health capital, and that abatement will raise the flow of health. The firm thus will treat the abatement expenditure as an environmental investment since it will raise the stock of health capital, and hence the working efficiency in the future. In addition, our model predicts that, when the authorities raise the subsidy on firm's abatement expenditure, the firm will raise both employment and abatement expenditures and lower its wage offer.