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This article analyses India's Ministry of Defence and its influence on civil-military relations. It argues that, until very recently, the strategic intent of the defence ministry has primarily focused on civilian control over the military. The resultant institutional structure of civilian control compromised the effectiveness of the Indian military. This was due to several features of the country's model of civilian control, including a lack of civilian expertise, bureaucratic procedures underlying civil-military interactions as well as military autonomy. Acknowledging these problems, the government has currently embarked on reforms to maximize military power. It is doing so mainly by infusing military expertise at the ministerial level. However, this may upend the civil-military dynamic in India and the success of this initiative remains to be seen. Conceptually, this article examines a possibly pernicious effect of a civilian dominated ministry and highlights the importance of expertise in enhancing both control and military effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the ways in which civil–military relations shape professional military education (PME). Its main argument is that military education benefits from a civil–military partnership. In doing so, the article examines the role of civil–military relations in shaping PME in India. While describing the evolution of military education in India, it analyzes its weaknesses and argues that this is primarily due to its model of civil–military relations, with a limited role for civilians. Theoretically, this argument challenges Samuel Huntington’s notion of “objective control”—which envisaged a strict separation between the civil and military domains. Conceptually, this article argues for a greater dialogue on military education among civilians, both policy makers and academics, and military officers and not to leave it to the military’s domain—as is currently the practice in most countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]