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The author surveys the review of Japan's defense programs and several other key defense-related documents the Liberal Democratic government initiated in 2013. She focuses on the pivotal points of Japan's Defense White Paper and on the current state and prospects of military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using hitherto underutilized Japanese material, this paper systematically analyzes two competing theories of military doctrine formation that account for the construction of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), postwar Japan’s first military doctrine. It demonstrates that, on balance, available evidence on the policy preference of two key civilian policymakers, Michio Sakata and Takuya Kubo, is more consistent with the interpretation drawn from Posen’s balance‐of‐power theory than with that from Kier’s domestic culturalist theory. While by no means ignored by these policymakers, domestic political concerns neither dominantly shaped, nor gave a specific direction to their policy action. Rather, the policymakers were motivated to formulate the best response possible to Japan’s new international strategic conditions. This finding relates the hitherto neglected significance of the NDPO case to the larger, ongoing realist–constructivist debate on the formation of military doctrine. It also leads us to a more sophisticated understanding of NDPO formation, which focuses on the process of how a combination of political leadership and ideas triggered the breakthrough in Japanese security policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper presents examples of collaboration between anime producers and the Japan Self-Defense Force. By situating the transitions within the context of the broader trends in collaboration between anime producers and locations (namely, the development of contents tourism), the key turning point in anime producer — JSDF collaboration is be identified and explained. Then, the reasons why in recent years JSDF has been actively collaborating with the production of pop culture contents in the realms of fantasy and fiction with an anime fanbase will be discussed. What is happening in Japan today is a fantasization (= contentsization) and consumption of the military, rather than a 'drift to the right' or resurgence of militarism. The pressures to produce military or 'moe military' anime are driven by the market rather than the military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States (US) in the short and long run and to investigate whether Japan is a follower or a free rider of the “US” over the 1975–2009 period. Given that mutual aid between Japan and the US has been maintained, the empirical results suggest that Japanese defense has a stable relationship with US defense. Furthermore, the results reveal that Japan is not a free rider but rather a follower in the period under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In contemporary international security, some powers try to challenge the status quo through gradual, sub-threshold expansion without resorting to the explicit use of force. Examples of such sub-threshold challenges can be seen in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Eastern Europe. They are now referred to as 'gray zone' or 'hybrid threat'. For a long time deterrence theory, a core component of strategic studies, has largely neglected such sub-threshold challenges. The exceptional part of that is empirical school's findings, including fait accompli, limited probe, and controlled pressure. They perfectly match with the current threats and help developing conceptual framework to deter these kind of threats. Based on these findings, this paper attempted to illustrate three principles for gray zone deterrence: combination of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, mobilization of the whole government assets, and keeping open the window to escalation and analyze, Japan's efforts to develop conceptual framework for gray zone deterrence. Since Japan's efforts to develop conceptual framework of gray zone deterrence dates further back than other part of the world, as the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010, a case study on Japan would provide useful insights for gray zone deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having passed successive legislation in the past two decades to expand its use of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), Japan has emerged from its post-war ‘pacifist’ shackles to assume a range of security roles that are typically associated with so-called ‘normal nations’. This article addresses how these have been crystallized in the form of an indefinitely-termed overseas base on the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. Careful examination of pertaining Diet minutes, media discourse and government ministry papers suggests that the risks identified with this facility’s realization and status have been fundamentally recalibrated, allowing its presence and operational diversification to go largely unnoticed and unopposed - both domestically and overseas - despite representing a seemingly radical departure from common sense interpretations of Japan’s antimilitarist constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the policy choices of Germany and Japan for contributing to international security and stability in Afghanistan. Both countries have been closely involved with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 2001. It is argued that the policy choice of Japan with a low military element and high civilian element differs significantly from the German military centered approach. An analysis of the goals and motives behind the foreign policy choices reveals that in Germany the military involvement has been justified with humanitarian reasons, national self interests and the right to 'unlimited' sovereignty. This logic has ultimately led to the acceptance of civilian casualties and participation into offensive counterinsurgency operations. It is suggested that elite driven discourses have determined foreign policy strategy. In the case of Japan the paper claims that the conservative LDP elite had been pushing for intensified military involvement which materialized in the dispatch of military vessels to the Indian Ocean and ground forces to Iraq. Similar to Germany these moves towards gaining international reputation were rooted in domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Takashi Inoguchi on the current debates and possible developments in Japanese foreign policy and another by Takamichi Mito on the constitutional restraints and their implications for Japanese foreign and defense policies.

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper investigates how public trust in the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) changed after 2004 when it was sent to Iraq in support of the USA. Because Japan’s Constitution clearly prohibits the use of military forces unless for self-defense purposes, public opinion was divided. I find that liberals’ distrust in the JSDF grew after the deployment in Iraq relative to moderates. Somewhat surprisingly, the trust among conservatives also declined relative to moderates after the deployment in Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After the end of the Cold War, Japan became very active in its security policy. How can we explain this phenomenon? This essay argues that (neo-) realist settings (the end of the Cold War, the Taepodong missile launch) have triggered changes in Japanese domestic security culture, which subsequently affected Japanese security policy. In spite of rationalist theorists' criticism of the constructivist approach for not being able to clarify independent and dependent variables, this essay attempts to elucidate the relationship between security culture and policies thereof. By utilizing "cultural process-tracing," this paper investigates how cultural elements become linked and internalized into policymaker-level and illustrates the causal relationship between these two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's constitutional revision and resultant remilitarization can affect the balance of power in the international system beyond its national borders. This paper critically analyzes the constitutional revision debate in contemporary Japan and the implications for Japan's foreign relations if or when it becomes constitutional for the island nation to possess military forces. It argues that justification for constitutional revision is based on political myth rather than historical reality and rational analysis, and also that a militarized Japan will not enhance its independence or international prestige. Rather, there is the great fear that a new Japan will be further subordinated to the United States as a critical part of the latter's global strategy and defense mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1990s Japan's defense policy has been under incremental significant change, revealed mainly in the legislative field. This paper explores the extent to which Japan's defense policy is changing in military terms. Analysis of Japan's latest security posture in Iraq (2003-2006) brings to light changes in Japan's overall defense policy in terms of defense priorities and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that closer defense cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and United States forces under the 1997 Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation has brought about an issue of exercise of the right to collective self-defense, which might infringe on Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. The article explores Japan's options in cases of emergencies such as those in Japan, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean peninsula and concludes that Japan has no choice but to follow U.S. policy as long as it maintains a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. The United States fully understands the importance of Japan's strategic location to its security, particularly Okinawa's. From Okinawa, U.S. forces could easily cover the Korean peninsula, China, and Taiwan. Therefore, the United States will not give up its bases in Japan, and so the argument of a "fear of abandonment" on the side of Japan is a myth. The article further examines the importance of the 2001 dispatch of the Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean and the 2004 dispatch of the Ground SDF to Iraq from the viewpoint of the right to collective self-defense and Article 9. It also analyzes Japan's recent defense efforts. utilizing the concepts of alliance dilemma and complex security dilemma. Finally, the article concludes that a new Japan with the right to collective self-defense would become more assertive in conducting its foreign policy using the SDF overseas. Such a Japan would have an impact on security in East Asia, causing a problem for China and both Koreas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reassess the dominant images of popular militarism or stoic suffering in wartime Japan, this paper takes a street-level view of provincial society during the major conflict with Russia, 1904–1905. It focuses on three main sites of wartime contact between the community and the military: the rail station, the cinema, and the cemetery. By mining local press reports and especially letters to the press from local people, it exposes the diversity of public attitudes towards the war, the military and those in authority; these attitudes include a healthy cynicism and satire towards elites or propaganda, as well as a readiness to express discontent rather than suffer in silence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Alustath is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under what conditions do policy disagreements cause parties to split? Before the general elections in 2017 in Japan, the Minshin, the largest opposition party, split, and the major opposition camp collapsed into three parties. Disagreement about defense policy was rapidly politicized by the founding leader of a new party, Hope. Some members were motivated to switch to Hope and split the Minshin. Why did the disagreement about defense policy, which had long existed but was inactive, become an issue that led to a major split? To answer these questions, we used Aldrich–Mckelvey and Blackbox transpose scalings to analyze the data from an expert survey about issue positions and the salience of party policies. The variance in experts' responses was also examined to consider whether parties consistently and clearly distinguish their policy positions. Party positions on defense policy were clearly distinguished and revealed a split among splinter parties. However, the party positions clearly converged on the environment, decentralization, and other policies in a two-dimensional space, which indicated the unity of the major opposition camp. Moreover, different item functioning (DIF) analysis revealed a high variance (i.e., negative weight) on the issue salience of defense policy, which indicated its politicization immediately before the split. Overall results indicated that the politicization of defense policy contributed to weakening party cohesion and the party was split over disagreement about it. This implies that party switching is caused by policy disagreement but also hinges critically on which policy is politicized as an issue for party unity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The document titled "Index" provides a comprehensive list of various topics and individuals mentioned in the Adelphi Series journal. It covers a wide range of subjects related to global politics, including political figures, international organizations, and significant events. The given text focuses on Japan's defense and foreign policy, listing various terms, names, and organizations related to this topic. It also mentions international figures. Lastly, the document contains a list of names, places, and organizations related to international relations and politics, providing an overview of key players and events in global politics. [Extracted from the article]

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws an analogy between post Cold War American policy in Iraq and prewar Japanese policy for the region of Manchuria (northeastern China), arguing that both the United States and Japan became obsessed with "solving" a perceived foreign policy "problem" that had plagued them for decades. In both cases, the "problem" grew in proportion to the fear that domestic radicals and ideologues were successful in instilling in their fellow citizens. However, the perception of threat often existed in an inverse relationship to any actual threat presented to national interests. The rising level of fear-as well as the posting of ideologues to serve in key policy positions-resulted in efforts by both prewar Japan and post Cold War America to "solve" its perceived problem through the use of military force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses defense ownership and the different campaigns for ownership in the security policies of South Korea and Japan. Defense ownership is defined as the possession of military assets necessary for national and international security. The ownership campaign of South Korea focuses on national autonomy while Japan emphasizes international reputation. It is stated that the ownership campaigns of the two countries can be understood within the context of national identity issues.

Japan is traditionally viewed as a weak military power. When considered in light of Barry Posen's Command of the Commons model, Japan can be seen as a major power and of particular significance to East Asia. Japan has a "regional" command of the commons. In other words, Japan is predominant in the air, sea and space in East Asia and can use those areas at will against opponents. Japan's command of the commons rests on the power of its navy, which is one of the world's most modern and powerful, and its air force, which is competitive. From a regional perspective there is no competitor aside from the United States, which is an ally. Much of Japan's military power rests on the American alliance which provides technology and complimentary forces. This paper's contention has important policy implications. If Japan is powerful, then the United States should work to more closely integrate its military operations with those of Japan in order to leverage Japanese strength. Chinese reaction to date has not been strong, which indicates that China may be less concerned about increases in material Japanese power than is commonly supposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the increase in Japanese military spending and the reasons for this shift in policy. The 1980 Defense White Paper has communicated to the Japanese government that their Self Defense Forces are inadequate to meet current needs. Despite this, the author posits that Japan, while increasing its defense budget, will still depend on a strong relationship with the U.S. as a strategic deterrent. This means that Japan will continue to follow the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

The article provides an introduction to the journal "Inter-Asia Cultural Studies" of November 2003. The first paper, by Park Keunho, "The Vietnam War and the "Miracle of East Asia", focuses on South Korea and examines the relationship between the Vietnam War and the rapid economic development of Asia. "Okinawa's Postwar" by Toriyama Atsushi demonstrates how the mainland Japanese at the end of the Second World War forgot Okinawa and how the US took advantage of such Japanese national amnesia by turning Okinawa into its permanent military base. Tanaka Yasuhiro in his "The Media Representation of Okinawa" illustrates how the image of Okinawa as a southern paradise has been reproduced in the postwar Japanese media.

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Asian Politics & Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the efforts of Japan and Australia to enhance the naval capability of third countries-specifically the Philippines-threatened by the rise of China. Considered as middle powers, both countries are members of two associations of maritime democracies, namely: the Democratic Security Diamond (DSD), and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Since the formation of their special strategic partnership, Japan and Australia have jointly assisted in building up the capabilities of the Philippine Navy (PN), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The recent dramatic shift in Philippine foreign policy direction fosters this triangular security relationship. On the one hand, President Rodrigo Duterte, in distancing the Philippines from the United States (the country's traditional ally) favors closer security ties with Japan and Australia. On the other hand, Japan and Australia want to prevent the Philippines from gravitating closer to China's orbit of influence and power. Gradually, however, this development can either modify or erode the American hub-and-spoke system of alliance in East Asia and increase the spoke-to-spoke links leading to the creation of minilateral and plurilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the evolving role of the Japanese Diet in defence policy-making through the lens of its legislative authority and its ability to oversee defence policy. It argues that the Diet's legislative authority and oversight ability in this domain has traditionally been defined and influenced by the Japanese constitution, especially article 9. However, since the 1990s, the missions of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) have expanded, and the role of the Diet has become more proactive in its authorizing capacity. With the 2015 peace and security legislation, the Diet's exercise of authority based on enacting new legislation may have reached a plateau. With comprehensive legislation in place, in theory the Diet's role in defence policy should shift from legislating to operating as an oversight body ensuring democratic (political) control of the military. With the scope of action for the SDF expanding, including it becoming a more important tool of deterrence, the Diet's ability to oversee defence policy matters also becomes increasingly important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that as opposed to the conventional wisdom of Japan’s hedging policy, Japan has been constantly taking balancing behavior vis-à-vis China since the end of the Cold War; however, the incremental shift to explicit balancing began after the 2010SenkakuBoat Collision Incident. The shift was accelerated by the 2012 Japanese Government Purchase of theSenkakuIslands. Since then, Japan has attempted to engage in both internal and external balancing by taking more security burden-sharing with the United States through the relaxation of Japan’s constitutional and political constraints on its military capabilities and the enhancement of security linkages with other regional states, such as Australia and India. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]