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Copyright of Europarecht (05312485) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the capacity of the German Army to establish key conditions for successful tactical- and operational-level adaptation, innovation and emulation. In doing so, it explores the factors which stimulate and block adaptation, innovation and emulation. The article points to the need for accounts of German foreign, defence and security policy to pay greater attention to the intra-organisational barriers to effective policy implementation. Finally, it highlights avenues for future empirical and theoretical research on military change, especially the need for greater understanding of the role of learning processes in linking military adaptation in the field to wider organisational learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This year will mark the end of an important stage in German political life, which has been dominated for more than a decade and a half by a coalition government led by Chancellor Angela Merkel and dominated by the Christian Democrats. Angela Merkel's legacy will depend heavily on the evolution of Germany's new political configuration, starting this autumn and will create challenges for the next federal chancellor, who will have to lead the future German executive for the next four years. In the context of new security challenges in Europe, in which Russia's expansionist tendencies at the eastern border and in the Black Sea are growing, Germany is deeply committed to "revitalizing" the transatlantic relationship with its main US ally, at least at pre-Trump's era, but also to become more actively involved in international politics, with the goal of becoming a "key player" in strengthening global and multilateral institutions, but also for his assertion as a leader, both internationally and especially within the EU. Last but not least, Germany is campaigning for increased EU -NA TO cooperation, an important element in strengthening European defense and security. Based on these objectives, the German Federal Government and the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Defense are increasingly concerned about the need for an in-depth analysis of Germany's security situation, while adapting to the new conditions of security and defense policy, as well as for adapting the objective, missions and organization of the Bundeswehr to the new conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia’s challenge to the post-cold war order, and the rise of Islamic State have resulted in a call for increased military spending among NATO members. Despite the increased demand for UN peace operations, any expansion is unlikely to benefit the world organisation. Instead we see an increasing reliance upon regional organisations like the African Union, European Union and NATO, in particular, for robust peace operations. An analysis of Western states (France, Germany and the USA) suggests that future investments in weaponry, technology and staff will primarily benefit NATO and the EU, but not the United Nations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article provides a comparison of the various military commitments, armed forces levels and military defence expenditures of various countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Russia as of February 2015. Selected non-state armed groups are mentioned, including the Kurdistan Regional Government's Peshmerga forces, the Boko Haram militant group, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham terrorist organization. Defence spending statistics for Great Britain, Turkey, and Japan are assessed.

Copyright of Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The German armed forces are undergoing an unprecedented reform whose revolutionary nature has so far been poorly understood internationally. Bjoern Seibert explains the context, goals and process that led to the reform, analyses the political debate that surrounded it, and lays out the details of what is the most far-reaching reform effort since the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The current transformation of the German Armed Forces will probably result in a military that is better equipped and capable of deploying more soldiers. However, there is no clear provision specifying in what sort of missions and within what politicomilitary framework it will engage in the future. Equally, the envisaged transformation precedes any coherent strategy development and defense policy reformulation on the national or international level. It also focuses narrowly on the aspect of efficiency, while a focus on effectiveness and flexibility would be more appropriate. With regard to NATO, the EU and other partners, the current transformation appears ambivalent: while the transformation will probably make more resources available for expeditionary missions, the requirements of classic defensive capabilities are more-or-less ignored. The defense budget cuts which triggered the current transformation process cannot be met if the current transformation proceeds as planned. The consequences of this transformation for the civil--military relationship, which has been of crucial importance for German defense policy ever since rearmament in the 1950s, have not been sufficiently considered. Demands for more public awareness alongside support for and critical monitoring of the military are not new and face the reality of a benign lack of public interest at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the way in which Germany's participation in the international intervention in Afghanistan has shaped and transformed the country's politics of defence and deriving policies. It argues that in the wake of operational challenges posed by the insurgency in northern Afghanistan since 2007, and in particular the increasing rate of German combat fatalities, established post-Cold War dogmas of German politics are becoming subject to erosion. Developments in the Kunduz region of northern Afghanistan, with the tanker bombing of 4 September 2009 as its apex, have had a catalyst function in this process. In particular, strategic, operational and tactical requirements for counterinsurgency operations have had significant politico-strategic repercussions for the country's defence and security policy more generally. As a result, in recent years the Bundeswehr has begun to undergo a far-reaching structural process of military adaptation and innovation. The article explains and analyses this phenomenon of political change and military learning in the context of political paralysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses regional security issues in Europe and surveys the military strategies and capabilities of various European nations including German, France, and Albania. Coverage includes both members and non-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Discussion is augmented by charts and tabular data that provide the manpower, organization, and equipment for the army, navy, air force, marines, naval aviation, and paramilitary forces of respective nations. Existing deployments of forces are also noted.

Copyright of Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft (Springer Science & Business Media B.V.) is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cultures et Conflits is the property of Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Revue Cultures & Conflits and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Examines the efforts to reform the German Armed Forces or the Bundeswehr from 1990 to 2003. Need for a fundamental realignment of Germany's military structures and capacities; Endeavors to reform characterized by controversy and hampered by financial uncertainties; Existence of a substantial inconsistency between Germany's stated security policy goals and growing openness to use armed forces on the one hand and the Bundeswehr's actual physical material capabilities on the other.

Compares three reports commissioned to examine the proposal to bring the German Bundeswehr into an era of crisis prevention and crisis management. State of the German armed forces; Details of the reform proposals of Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping; Analysis of the points of agreement and contention of the reports; Recommendations of the report by former German President Richard von Weizs aumi cker regarding compulsory military service.

States that the Soviet Union still owes East Germany about a billion marks' worth of weaponry included in contracts that would be nullified by German unification. The East German armed forces, which are about to be dissolved, are the reluctant recipients of a bonanza of Soviet weaponry, as the Soviet Union rushes to collect the equivalent of a billion marks by fulfilling their side of some defense contracts before the agreements are nullified by German unification. But East Germany has no use for most of the weapons on order. According to the London Financial Times (July 31, 1990), the East Germans are stuck with contracts for a list of weapons that include Soviet antitank defense systems, machine guns, and small, missile-equipped boats. The government is also liable for commercial penalties for cancelling other contracts worth 2.3 billion marks. Matthias Gehler, an East German government spokesman, indicated that the high cost of safe disposal is an important factor in the squabble.

Focuses on Germany's strategic reorientation of its Armed Forces to allow it to meet future challenges. Launch of a capability-oriented defense review; Proposal of multinational, joint, and common funding as a vehicle for the Defense Capabilities Initiative's enhanced implementation; Emphasis on strategic transport, strategic reconnaissance, and command and control.