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In recent years, there has been a sharp growth in political and sociological interest in the British military. Set against the backdrop of the armed forces’ increasing presence in everyday life, alongside the organizations’ ongoing restructuring, the current paper focuses on the MoD’s problematic attempts to recruit 30,000 reservists by 2020; what has become known as theFuture Reserves 2020programme (FR2020). We argue that these changes are driven in part by the need to cut costs in defence. However, we also suggest that they are a reflection of the changing nature of modern military organisation, and the manner in which armed forces engage with the societies of which they are a part, and with the citizens that make up that society. We locate FR2020 programme in the context of a wider narrative about the changing nature of military organisation in contemporary western democracies, identifying structural, circumstantial and normative reasons for change. We also examine the specific challenges of implementing FR2020 in practice, including issues of recruitment and retention, integration and support, and relations with families and employers, drawing on the experience of comparator countries to do so. We conclude by considering the implications of these changes, both for the future of UK armed forces, and for the evolving nature of military-society relations in Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The UK faces a pressing defence dilemma. The declaratory goals of defence policy are struggling to match the demands made by operational commitments and the financial and organizational capacities. The article examines how and why this situation has come about. While recognizing that existing calls for higher defence spending, reform of the Ministry of Defence, efficiency gains or a renewal of the so-called military covenant between the military and society may address discrete elements of the defence dilemma in Britain, it argues that current problems derive from a series of deeper tensions in the nexus of British defence more widely defined. These include a transnationalization of strategic practice, in ways that both shape and constrain the national defence policy process; the institutional politics of defence itself, which encourage different interpretations of interest and priority in the wider strategic context; and finally the changing status of defence in the wider polity, which introduces powerful veto points into the defence policy process itself. It argues that while a series of shocks may have destabilized existing policy, prompted ad hoc organizational adaptation in the armed forces and led to incremental cost saving measures from the government, a ‘dominant crisis narrative’—in the form of a distinctive and generally agreed programme of change—has yet to emerge. The article concludes by looking forward to a future strategic defence review, highlighting the critical path dependencies and veto points which must be addressed if transformative change in British defence is to take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European armed forces are currently undergoing a profound series of shifts in relation to their core roles. These changes are increasingly challenging long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured and organized. This article argues that these changes have not primarily occurred in response to an objective, functional reassessment of the nature of the threat, as is assumed in much of the civil—military relations literature. Instead, new military roles are emerging as a consequence of domestic and international socio-political infl uences that shape states' perceptions of what their armed forces should look like and the purposes they should serve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2000, Serbia–Montenegro has faced a threefold challenge in reforming its civil–military relations: First, establishing the principle of civilian control over the armed forces and democratising the nature of this control; Second implementing a comprehensive programme of military modernisation and organisation reform; Finally, managing an evolving and sometimes troubled relationship with the West—particularly over the issue of war crimes. This paper argues that while progress has been made in all three of these areas, reform remains hampered both by the persistent legacies of the Miloevió period and the continuing failure to resolve the question of legitimate statehood in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This wider context has helped to push military reform to the back of the political agenda and left the process in the hands of the armed forces themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the relative homogeneity of communist civil–military relations postcommunist Europe has been replaced by significant diversity. Those states that have joined NATO and the EU have consolidated democratic civilian control of their militaries, re-oriented their defence policies towards peacekeeping and intervention operations beyond their borders and are fashioning new military–society relationships. In contrast, in Russia, Ukraine and most of the other former Soviet republics the military has become part of the nexus of semi- or outright authoritarian presidential rule, while severe economic and social problems are resulting in a dramatic downgrading of the military's professional and operational competence and severely inhibiting the prospects for meaningful military reform. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, civil–military reform is gathering pace, but continues to struggle with twin legacies of war and authoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that since 2000 successive Croatian governments have shown themselves increasingly dedicated to reforming civil–military relations. However, their efforts have been hampered by four key obstacles. First, the need to implement defence reforms in the context of an unwieldy set of civil–military relationships, political and institutional rivalries, a lack of civil and military defence expertise and a continuing legacy of politicisation. Second, the need to cut defence spending as a proportion of the overall budget whilst taking on new military roles and improving the capability of the armed forces. Third, the need to balance the demands of the NATO accession process while implementing a balanced and fundamental reform of the armed forces as a whole. Finally, the need to implement root and branch personnel reforms and downsizing in the OSRH while simultaneously recruiting and retaining quality personnel and addressing the wider social issue of unemployment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]