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In the event of a conflict or contingency on the Korean Peninsula, one of the five People’s Liberation Army (PLA) theater commands is responsible for implementing China’s military strategy and operations in Korea—the Northern Theater Command (NTC). What capabilities does China deploy to the NTC? How does it compare to the other theater commands? And do NTC’s military capabilities change the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula? Using the most up-to-date data, this paper offers, first, a theater-level comparative analysis of the PLA and, second, a quantitative assessment of how China’s NTC capabilities affect the military balance of power between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea on the other. Of PLA’s five theater commands, the paper finds that the NTC has maintained the largest and heaviest ground force, the largest air force, and the second most powerful naval fleet. When NTC military capabilities are added to the existing military balance between North Korean forces and the U.S.– South Korean alliance forces, the United States and South Korea’s air supremacy is challenged and naval dominance is overturned. This is especially the case in the West Sea of Korea, the Yellow Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to redefine the concept and status of hybrid warfare through a comprehensive analysis and discussion of various aspects of future warfare. Also the definition of the construct of the hybrid threat and an analysis of the applicability of hybrid warfare in the Korean Peninsula Theater (KPT) is provided in this paper. In addition, on the premise of hybrid threats in the KPT, this paper sets the overall direction of the capability and methods of strategic concept development and concept realization. It suggests a possible direction of improvements for establishing effective and practical, united means for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces. In this respect, this paper aims to contribute to creating and proliferating general consensus on balanced, evolutionary development for the inception and employment of appropriate strategy against possible hybrid threats it the KPT. It is also expected that this will assist in establishing or improving the government policy in connection with hybrid threats and in promoting consistency in works related to hybrid threats by setting an appropriate direction for such policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that the two Koreas' intentions and actions on the cyber front point toward the possibility that they have engaged in cyber warfare against each other. From South Korea's standpoint, a key concern has been North Korea's advanced cyber warfare capabilities and alleged involvement of its substantial workforce in the Internet's dark side activities. These issues need to be looked at the backdrop of the North's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. This paper draws principally upon theories and concepts from military strategy and warfare to examine the contexts, mechanisms, and processes associated with the cyber warfare in the Korean peninsula. We also compare the two Koreas in terms of various forms of asymmetries in cyber warfare and cyber attacks. Also highlighted in the paper are South Korea's recent initiatives and actions to enhance cyber-offense and cyber-defense capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notwithstanding the perennial body of literature covering the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate over the past two decades, the vast majority of writings have been silent or ignored the implications of the RMA diffusion on the security and defense policies of advanced small states and middle powers. This paper bridges this knowledge gap by tracing the impact of the RMA diffusion and its adaptation in the Republic of Korea's military modernization processes. The principal argument is that for over two decades South Korea has been rethinking its defense strategies, while searching for relevant operational concepts that would allow greater flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy that address existing as well as future-oriented defense requirements. In the process, the ROK military has pursued RMA-oriented force modernization in order to acquire advanced military capabilities to counter the widening spectrum of threats, mitigate technological and interoperability gaps with U.S. forces, and eventually attain a self-reliant defense posture. In this context, South Korea's RMA trajectory shows patterns of speculation and experimentation in terms of concepts, doctrine, and technology; however, with relatively incremental implementation in the use of force. Accordingly, there has not been a distinct Korean RMA-oriented conceptual strategic innovation toward a new theory of war; nor has the Korean RMA trajectory reflected a disruptive paradigm shift in warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how crises in Korea, as well as rivalry between the U.S. and China, are influencing military strategies in Asia. The sinking of the South Korean Navy warship “Cheonan” by North Korea in March 2010 and the North Korean attacks on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 have evoked different responses from China and the U.S. While China states that it wants to facilitate peaceful development in the region, the author attests that its long-term goal is to secure influence and exert power. The paper urges that the U.S. seek to maintain primacy in Asia for strategic purposes.

The article presents information on a study regarding the culture of military strategies and the military modernization in South Korea. Iin the post cold war era, peer competition and weapons purchases have emerged as a new strategy among the third world countries. To accommodate the new weapons, force modernization became functional for the military forces in Asia. The accelerated pace of arms acquisitions in the region resulted in the beginning of new international relations in the post cold war era. The research on the cultural context of South Korean force modernization focuses on different predictions about the future of armed forces in connection with the Asian security.

This article uses hybrid warfare as a framework for examining North Korean operations on the Korean Peninsula and the South Korean reaction to such operations. It argues that North Korea has long employed a hybrid approach to achieve a wide number of political and strategic objectives. However, the deterrence-based strategic reality on the Korean Peninsula in combination with North Korea's increasing relative weaknesses has rendered this approach self-defeating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea’s military has invested heavily in capabilities to counter the asymmetric threat posed by the North – and given Israel’s recent success in this regard against Hamas, it is not surprising that South Korea is seeking to learn lessons from its ally’s experience. However, Soon Ho Lee explains why the Israeli approach to counter-asymmetric warfare cannot be directly applied to a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula, due to its likely scale and the limitations of contemporary technology, as well as North Korea’s efforts to fortify strategic targets within its territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]