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In recent years, many kinds of interventions have been developed that seek to reduce susceptibility to misinformation. In two preregistered longitudinal studies (N1 = 503, N2 = 673), we leverage two previously validated "inoculation" interventions (a video and a game) to address two important questions in misinformation interventions research: (1) whether displaying additional stimuli (such as videos unrelated to misinformation) alongside an intervention interferes with its effectiveness, and (2) whether administering an immediate posttest (in the form of a social media post evaluation task after the intervention) plays a role in the longevity of the intervention. We find no evidence that other stimuli interfere with intervention efficacy, but strong evidence that immediate posttests strengthen the learnings from the intervention. In study 1, we find that 48 h after watching a video, participants who received an immediate posttest continued to be significantly better at discerning untrustworthy social media posts from neutral ones than the control group (d = 0.416, p =.007), whereas participants who only received a posttest 48 h later showed no differences with a control (d = 0.010, p =.854). In study 2, we observe highly similar results for a gamified intervention, and provide evidence for a causal mechanism: immediate posttests help strengthen people's memory of the lessons learned in the intervention. We argue that the active rehearsal and application of relevant information are therefore requirements for the longevity of learning‐based misinformation interventions, which has substantial implications for their scalability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces a theoretical model of truth and honesty from a psychological perspective. We examine its application in political discourse and discuss empirical findings distinguishing between conceptions of honesty and their influence on public perception, misinformation dissemination, and the integrity of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corrected misinformation can continue to influence inferential reasoning. It has been suggested that such continued influence is partially driven by misinformation familiarity, and that corrections should therefore avoid repeating misinformation to avoid inadvertent strengthening of misconceptions. However, evidence for such familiarity backfire effects is scarce. We tested whether familiarity backfire may occur if corrections are processed under cognitive load. Although misinformation repetition may boost familiarity, load may impede integration of the correction, reducing its effectiveness and therefore allowing a backfire effect to emerge. Participants listened to corrections that repeated misinformation while in a driving simulator. Misinformation familiarity was manipulated through the number of corrections. Load was manipulated through a math task administered selectively during correction encoding. Multiple corrections were more effective than a single correction; cognitive load reduced correction effectiveness, with a single correction entirely ineffective under load. This provides further evidence against familiarity backfire effects and has implications for real-world debunking. General Audience Summary: Misinformation can continue to influence an individual's reasoning even after a correction. This is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). It has previously been suggested that this effect occurs (at least partially) due to the familiarity of the misinformation. This has led to recommendations to avoid repeating the misinformation within a correction, as this may increase misinformation familiarity and thus, ironically, false beliefs. However, it has proven difficult to find strong evidence for such familiarity backfire effects. One situation that may produce familiarity-driven backfire is if misinformation is repeated within a correction while participants are distracted—misinformation repetition may automatically boost its familiarity, while the distraction may impede proper processing and integration of the correction. In this study, we investigated how misinformation repetition during distraction affected the CIE. The present study extends the generalizability of traditional misinformation research by asking participants to listen to misinformation and corrections while in a driving simulator. Misinformation familiarity was manipulated through the number of corrections provided that contained the misinformation. Distraction was applied not only through the background task of driving in the simulator, but also manipulated through a secondary math task, which was administered selectively during the correction-encoding phase, and which required manual responses on a cockpit-mounted tablet. As hypothesized, cognitive load reduced the effectiveness of corrections. Furthermore, we found no evidence of familiarity backfire effects, with multiple corrections being more effective in reducing misinformation reliance than a single correction. When participants were distracted, a single correction was entirely ineffective, and multiple corrections were required to achieve a reduction in misinformation reliance. This provides further evidence against familiarity backfire effects under conditions maximally favorable to their emergence and implies that practitioners can debunk misinformation without fear of inducing ironic backfire effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Misinformed beliefs are difficult to change. Refutations that target false claims typically reduce false beliefs, but tend to be only partially effective. In this study, a social norming approach was explored to test whether provision of peer norms could provide an alternative or complementary approach to refutation. Three experiments investigated whether a descriptive norm—by itself or in combination with a refutation—could reduce the endorsement of worldview-congruent claims. Experiment 1 found that using a single-point estimate to communicate a norm affected belief but had less impact than a refutation. Experiment 2 used a verbally presented distribution of four values to communicate a norm, which was largely ineffective. Experiment 3 used a graphically presented social norm with 25 values, which was found to be as effective at reducing claim belief as a refutation, with the combination of both interventions being most impactful. These results provide a proof of concept that normative information can aid in the debunking of false or equivocal claims, and suggests that theories of misinformation processing should take social factors into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vaccination coverage needs to reach more than 80% to resolve the COVID-19 pandemic, but vaccine hesitancy, fuelled by misinformation, may jeopardize this goal. Unvaccinated older adults are not only at risk of COVID-19 complications but may also be misled by false information. Prebunking, based on inoculation theory, involves 'forewarning people [of] and refuting information that challenges their existing belief or behavior'. To assess the effectiveness of inoculation communication strategies in countering disinformation about COVID-19 vaccines among Canadians aged 50 years and older, as measured by their COVID-19 vaccine intentions. Applying an online experiment with a mixed pre–post design and a sample size of 2500 participants, we conducted a national randomized survey among English and French-speaking Canadians aged 50 years and older in March 2021. Responses to two different disinformation messages were evaluated. Our primary outcome was the intention to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, with attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccine a secondary outcome. The McNemar test and multivariate logistic regression analysis on paired data were conducted when the outcome was dichotomized. Wilcoxon sign rank test and Kruskal–Wallis were used to test difference scores between pre- and post-tests by condition. Group comparisons between those who received only disinformation and those who received the inoculation message show that prebunking messages may safeguard intention to get vaccinated and have a protective effect against disinformation. Prebunking messages should be considered as one strategy for public health communication to combat misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce this special issue on Thinking about Climate Change by reflecting on the role of psychology in responding adaptively to catastrophic global threats. By way of illustration we compare the threat posed by climate change with the extinction-level threat considered in the recent film Don't Look Up [McKay, A. (Director). (2021). Don't Look Up [Film]. Hyperobject Industries]. Human psychology is a critical element in both scenarios. The papers in this special issue discuss the importance of clear communication of scientific information, the dangers of misinformation and the possible role played by motivated reasoning, all themes that are taken up in the film. Ultimately, though, it is not enough to consider psychological factors in isolation: we must also acknowledge that cognitive flaws and psychological motivations are exploited by vested interests that profit from delaying climate action. A global response to a global crisis requires us to 'look up' to recognise the threat and to 'look around' to go beyond specialist disciplines and national boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the common attributes of political conflicts in which scientific findings have a central role, using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, but also drawing on long-standing conflicts over climate change and vaccinations. We analyze situations in which the systematic spread of disinformation or conspiracy theories undermines public trust in the work of scientists and prevents policy from being informed by the best available evidence. We also examine instances in which public opposition to scientifically grounded policy arises from legitimate value judgments and lived experience. We argue for the public benefit of quick identification of politically motivated science denial, and inoculation of the public against its ill effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is in retreat around the globe. Many commentators have blamed the Internet for this development, whereas others have celebrated the Internet as a tool for liberation, with each opinion being buttressed by supporting evidence. We try to resolve this paradox by reviewing some of the pressure points that arise between human cognition and the online information architecture, and their fallout for the well-being of democracy. We focus on the role of the attention economy, which has monetised dwell time on platforms, and the role of algorithms that satisfy users' presumed preferences. We further note the inherent asymmetry in power between platforms and users that arises from these pressure points, and we conclude by sketching out the principles of a new Internet with democratic credentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been increasing concern with the growing infusion of misinformation, or "fake news", into public discourse and politics in many western democracies. Our article first briefly reviews the current state of the literature on conventional countermeasures to misinformation. We then explore proactive measures to prevent misinformation from finding traction in the first place that is based on the psychological theory of "inoculation". Inoculation rests on the idea that if people are forewarned that they might be misinformed and are exposed to weakened examples of the ways in which they might be misled, they will become more immune to misinformation. We review a number of techniques that can boost people's resilience to misinformation, ranging from general warnings to more specific instructions about misleading (rhetorical) techniques. We show that based on the available evidence, inoculation appears to be a promising avenue to help protect people from misinformation and "fake news". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political misinformation poses a major threat to democracies worldwide, often inciting intense disputes between opposing political groups. Despite its central role for informed electorates and political decision making, little is known about how aware people are of whether they are right or wrong when distinguishing accurate political information from falsehood. Here, we investigate people's metacognitive insight into their own ability to detect political misinformation. We use data from a unique longitudinal study spanning 12 waves over 6 months that surveyed a representative U.S. sample (N = 1,191) on the most widely circulating political (mis)information online. Harnessing signal detection theory methods to model metacognition, we found that people from both the political left and the political right were aware of how well they distinguished accurate political information from falsehood across all news. However, this metacognitive insight was considerably lower for Republicans and conservatives—than for Democrats and liberals—when the information in question challenged their ideological commitments. That is, given their level of knowledge, Republicans' and conservatives' confidence was less likely to reflect the correctness of their truth judgments for true and false political statements that were at odds with their political views. These results reveal the intricate and systematic ways in which political preferences are linked to the accuracy with which people assess their own truth discernment. More broadly, by identifying a specific political asymmetry—for discordant relative to concordant news—our findings highlight the role of metacognition in perpetuating and exacerbating ideological divides. Public Significance Statement: This preregistered study suggests that people from both the political left and the political right are aware of how well they distinguish accurate political information from falsehood across all news. However, this metacognitive insight was considerably lower for Republicans and conservatives—than for Democrats and liberals—when they faced statements that challenged their ideological commitments. People's awareness of the accuracy and fallibility of their own knowledge thus partly differs across ideological divides, which may fuel broader societal trends such as political polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much concern with the abundance of misinformation in public discourse. Although misinformation has always played a role in political debate, its character has shifted from support for a specific position to a 'shock and chaos' stream of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Exposure to conspiracy theories can have considerable adverse impact on society. I argue that scholars therefore have a responsibility to combat conspiracy theories and misinformation generally. Exercising this responsibility requires an understanding of the varied rhetorical roles of conspiracy theories. Here I focus on instances in which people reject unequivocal scientific evidence and invoke conspiracy theories, or radical anti-institutional positions, based on ideological imperatives. I argue that those positions do not always reflect true attitudes. Instead, people may deploy extreme rhetoric as a pragmatic tool of political expression. I investigate this possibility by focusing on the role of conspiracy theories in the rejection of science. Conspiracist cognition and rhetoric violate the epistemic standards that underpin science. Ironically, this violation of epistemic standards renders conspiracy theories useful as a rationally deployed tool that serves political purposes. I present a study that confirms that conspiracy theories can be deployed to support worldview-motivated denial of science. I provide suggestions how scholars can debunk or defang conspiratorial rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even if people acknowledge that misinformation is incorrect after a correction has been presented, their feelings towards the source of the misinformation can remain unchanged. The current study investigated whether participants reduce their support of Republican and Democratic politicians when the prevalence of misinformation disseminated by the politicians appears to be high in comparison to the prevalence of their factual statements. We presented U.S. participants either with (1) equal numbers of false and factual statements from political candidates or (2) disproportionately more false than factual statements. Participants received fact‐checks as to whether items were true or false, then rerated both their belief in the statements as well as their feelings towards the candidate. Results indicated that when corrected misinformation was presented alongside equal presentations of affirmed factual statements, participants reduced their belief in the misinformation but did not reduce their feelings towards the politician. However, if there was considerably more misinformation retracted than factual statements affirmed, feelings towards both Republican and Democratic figures were reduced—although the observed effect size was extremely small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the refutation of equivocal claims using counterarguments. Common sense suggests that more counterarguments should be more effective at inducing belief change. However, some researchers have argued that in persuasive reasoning, using too many arguments might lead to counterproductive skepticism and reactance. Thus, there have been calls to actively curtail the number of counterarguments used in refutations to avoid risking an "overkill backfire effect"—an ironic strengthening of beliefs from too many counterarguments. In three experiments, we tested whether calls to limit the number of counterarguments are justified. We found that a larger number of counterarguments (between four and six) led to as much or more belief reduction compared to a smaller number of (two) counterarguments. This was not merely an effect arising from a simple numerosity heuristic, as counterarguments had to be relevant to affect beliefs: irrelevant counterarguments failed to reduce beliefs even though perceived as moderately persuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terms “post-truth” and “fake news” have become increasingly prevalent in public discourse over the last year. This article explores the growing abundance of misinformation, how it influences people, and how to counter it. We examine the ways in which misinformation can have an adverse impact on society. We summarize how people respond to corrections of misinformation, and what kinds of corrections are most effective. We argue that to be effective, scientific research into misinformation must be considered within a larger political, technological, and societal context. The post-truth world emerged as a result of societal mega-trends such as a decline in social capital, growing economic inequality, increased polarization, declining trust in science, and an increasingly fractionated media landscape. We suggest that responses to this malaise must involve technological solutions incorporating psychological principles, an interdisciplinary approach that we describe as “technocognition.” We outline a number of recommendations to counter misinformation in a post-truth world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We welcome the nine constructive and insightful commentaries on our target article. The commentaries proposed a number of creative, evidence-based applications of the principles we proposed. Here we identify common themes among the commentaries, including one relating to the political intentionality underlying much disinformation that we only partially addressed and that thus had remained shrouded in mist. We synthesize the suggestions from the commentary into a proposal that may help overcome the post-truth malaise, provided a final obstacle can be overcome. This obstacle is the gorilla in the room: Policy making in the United States is largely independent of the public's wishes but serves the interests of economic elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People frequently rely on information even after it has been retracted, a phenomenon known as the continued-influence effect of misinformation. One factor proposed to explain the ineffectiveness of retractions is that repeating misinformation during a correction may inadvertently strengthen the misinformation by making it more familiar. Practitioners are therefore often encouraged to design corrections that avoid misinformation repetition. The current study tested this recommendation, investigating whether retractions become more or less effective when they include reminders or repetitions of the initial misinformation. Participants read fictional reports, some of which contained retractions of previous information, and inferential reasoning was measured via questionnaire. Retractions varied in the extent to which they served as misinformation reminders. Retractions that explicitly repeated the misinformation were more effective in reducing misinformation effects than retractions that avoided repetition, presumably because of enhanced salience. Recommendations for effective myth debunking may thus need to be revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dissemination and control of information are indispensable ingredients of violent conflict, with all parties involved in a conflict or at war seeking to frame the discussion on their own terms. Those attempts at information control often involve the dissemination of misinformation or disinformation (i.e., information that is incorrect by accident or intent, respectively). We review the way in which misinformation can facilitate violent conflicts and, conversely, how the successful refutation of misinformation can contribute to peace. We illustrate the relevant cognitive principles by examining two case studies. The first, a retrospective case, involves the Iraq War of 2003 and the "War on Terror." The second, a prospective case, points to likely future sources of conflict arising from climate change and its likely consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information that is presumed to be true at encoding but later on turns out to be false (i.e., misinformation) often continues to influence memory and reasoning. In the present study, we investigated how the strength of encoding and the strength of a later retraction of the misinformation affect this continued influence effect. Participants read an event report containing misinformation and a subsequent correction. Encoding strength of the misinformation and correction were orthogonally manipulated either via repetition (Experiment 1) or by imposing a cognitive load during reading (Experiment 2). Results suggest that stronger retractions are effective in reducing the continued influence effects associated with strong misinformation encoding, but that even strong retractions fail to eliminate continued influence effects associated with relatively weak encoding. We present a simple computational model based on random sampling that captures this effect pattern, and conclude that the continued influence effect seems to defy most attempts to eliminate it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Misinformation often continues to influence inferential reasoning after clear and credible corrections are provided; this effect is known as the continued influence effect. It has been theorized that this effect is partly driven by misinformation familiarity. Some researchers have even argued that a correction should avoid repeating the misinformation, as the correction itself could serve to inadvertently enhance misinformation familiarity and may thus backfire, ironically strengthening the very misconception that it aims to correct. While previous research has found little evidence of such familiarity backfire effects, there remains one situation where they may yet arise: when correcting entirely novel misinformation, where corrections could serve to spread misinformation to new audiences who had never heard of it before. This article presents three experiments (total N = 1718) investigating the possibility of familiarity backfire within the context of correcting novel misinformation claims and after a 1-week study-test delay. While there was variation across experiments, overall there was substantial evidence against familiarity backfire. Corrections that exposed participants to novel misinformation did not lead to stronger misconceptions compared to a control group never exposed to the false claims or corrections. This suggests that it is safe to repeat misinformation when correcting it, even when the audience might be unfamiliar with the misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the misinformation about coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) which has been linked to reduced willingness to get vaccinated against the disease and lower intentions to comply with public health measures. It also discusses that a growing body of research has looked at whether shifting people's attention toward accuracy can have a positive influence on their news sharing decisions.

• A reversal of narrative polarity results in a reverse-CIE. • Negation-only conditions may be more relevant than control conditions for the CIE. • In general, attitudes do not interact with the effectiveness of corrections. Misinformation – information that is false or inaccurate – can continue to influence people's memory and reasoning even after it has been corrected. Researchers have termed this the continued influence effect (CIE). However, to date, research has focused exclusively on examining the CIE in a single polarity, namely the ongoing effect of initially affirmed material that is later negated. No research has yet examined how reliance on outdated information may be affected if this polarity is reversed, that is, if initially-negated information is reinstated. It also remains unclear how participants' pre-existing beliefs may impact the acceptance of a correction, with prior evidence showing conflicting results. To investigate these questions, across two experiments we presented participants scoring high versus low on measures of relevant attitudes with fictional news reports that contained a piece of critical attitude-relevant information. This information was either true throughout, false throughout, initially-affirmed then retracted, or initially-negated then reinstated. Participants' reliance on the critical information was subsequently measured with the use of inferential-reasoning items. Reinstatement of initially-negated information was insufficient to bring reliance on that information to a baseline level – that is, reliance on information presented as true throughout was greater than reliance on negated and then reinstated information. This result was symmetrical with the conventional CIE observed with a reversed polarity. The effect of participants' pre-existing attitudes on continued reliance was equivocal. The results therefore suggest that the CIE is not contingent on polarity, raising questions about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Upon receiving a correction, initially presented misinformation often continues to influence people's judgment and reasoning. Whereas some researchers believe that this so-called continued influence effect of misinformation (CIEM) simply arises from the insufficient encoding and integration of corrective claims, others assume that it arises from a competition between the correct information and the initial misinformation in memory. To examine these possibilities, we conducted two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. In each study, participants were asked to (a) read a series of brief news reports that contained confirmations or corrections of prior information and (b) evaluate whether subsequently presented memory probes matched the reports' correct facts rather than the initial misinformation. Both studies revealed that following correction-containing news reports, participants struggled to refute mismatching memory probes, especially when they referred to initial misinformation (as opposed to mismatching probes with novel information). We found little evidence, however, that the encoding of confirmations and corrections produced systematic neural processing differences indicative of distinct encoding strategies. Instead, we discovered that following corrections, participants exhibited increased activity in the left angular gyrus and the bilateral precuneus in response to mismatching memory probes that contained prior misinformation, compared to novel mismatch probes. These findings favour the notion that people's susceptibility to the CIEM arises from the concurrent retention of both correct and incorrect information in memory. Highlights • Investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the encoding and retrieval of confirmatory and corrective information. • No differences in neural activity were observed between the encoding of confirmations and corrections of prior information. • Bilateral parietal activity was unique to the presentation of misinformation-related cues following correction reports. • Results provide initial support for the concurrent-storage hypothesis of the CIEM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that information that is initially thought to be correct but then revealed to be false, often continues to influence human judgement and decision making despite people being aware of the retraction. Yet little research has examined the underlying neural substrates of this phenomenon, which is known as the ‘continued influence effect of misinformation’ (CIEM). It remains unclear how the human brain processes critical information that retracts prior claims. To address this question in further detail, 26 healthy adults underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while listening to brief narratives which either involved a retraction of prior information or not. Following each narrative, subjects’ comprehension of the narrative, including their inclination to rely on retracted information, was probed. As expected, it was found that retracted information continued to affect participants’ narrative-related reasoning. In addition, the fMRI data indicated that the continued influence of retracted information may be due to a breakdown of narrative-level integration and coherence-building mechanisms implemented by the precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]