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We investigate the compensation of counterparty exposure in the prices of structured products. Our analysis reveals that product issuers did not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default. Post‐Lehman, retail prices have no longer neglected this risk. We also measure retail investor attention towards issuer credit risk. For a given level of issuer credit risk, counterparty exposure is compensated more when attention is higher. Furthermore, issuers tend to construct products with larger counterparty exposure. Overall, our results shed light on the conditions under which financial engineering generates neglected risk.

Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management increases investor responses to future earnings surprises. Importantly, this effect occurs in industries where investor trust has recently been violated, and where managers would in the past have had incentives and opportunities to misrepresent earnings. Overall, investors seem to interpret the extent to which management resists temptations for misreporting as a "litmus test" of trustworthiness.

Market reactions to the 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) provide new insights into how real shocks and financial policies drive firm value. Initially, internationally oriented firms, especially those more exposed to trade with China, underperformed. As the virus spread to Europe and the United States, corporate debt and cash holdings emerged as important value drivers, relevant even after the Fed intervened in the bond market. The content and tone of conference calls mirror this development over time. Overall, the results illustrate how anticipated real effects from the health crisis, a rare disaster, were amplified through financial channels. (JEL G01, G12, G14, G32, F14) Received: May 27, 2020; editorial decision June 16, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We argue that incentives to take equity risk (”equity incentives”) only partially capture incentives to take asset risk (“asset incentives”). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk-shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives. Employing measures of asset incentives that account for leverage, we find that asset risk-taking incentives can be large compared to incentives to increase firm value. Stock holdings can induce substantial risk-taking incentives, contrary to the assumption that only stock options drive risk-taking. Finally, asset incentives help explain asset risk-taking of U.S. financial institutions before the 2007/08 crisis.

The Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) slashed corporations’ median effective tax rates from 31.7% to 20.8%. Nevertheless, 15% of firms experienced an increase. One fifth of firms recorded nonrecurring tax costs or benefits exceeding 3% of total assets. Proxies that existing studies employ to assess the TCJA’s impacts account for just half of actual impacts. Stock prices impounded those proxies during the legislative process. Total impacts were impounded the following year, once firms published their financials. These results indicate that investors find it hard to predict even large and immediate changes to company cash flows due to unfamiliar events.

Market reactions to the 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) provide new insights into how real shocks and financial policies drive firm value. Initially, internationally oriented firms, especially those more exposed to trade with China, underperformed. As the virus spread to Europe and the United States, corporate debt and cash holdings emerged as important value drivers, relevant even after the Fed intervened in the bond market. The content and tone of conference calls mirror this development over time. Overall, the results illustrate how anticipated real effects from the health crisis, a rare disaster, were amplified through financial channels.

Donald Trump's surprise election shifted expectations: corporate taxes would be lower and trade policies more restrictive. Relative stock prices responded appropriately. High-tax firms and those with large deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) gained; those with significant deferred tax assets from net operating loss carryforwards (NOL DTAs) lost. Domestically focused companies fared better than internationally oriented firms. A price contribution analysis shows that easily assessed consequences (DTLs, NOL DTAs, tax rates) were priced faster than more complex issues (net DTLs, foreign exposure). In sum, the analysis demonstrates that expectations about tax rates greatly impact firm values.

Low-carbon mutual funds allow investors to purchase lower exposure to climate change risk at the cost of lower sectoral diversification. On balance, this proposition proves to be appealing for investors, as seen from the effect on fund flows of the introduction of Morningstar's "Low Carbon Designation", and of subsequent updates. Active funds that missed the label at its initial release later shifted their holdings towards less carbon-intensive firms. The competition of intermediaries for investment flows along climate performance can thus have far-reaching consequences for investors.

Massive dollars shuttled back and forth among firms on the twisted path to and passage of the 2017 tax reform. Prices of individual stocks responded to the difference between initial and revised expectations. From the bill's initiation in the House to final passage, high-tax firms gained significantly, given the dramatic cut from 35 percent to 21 percent in the corporate tax rate. Internationally-oriented firms suffered notably, since investors assessed that the surprisingly high repatriation tax outweighed the benefits from territorial taxation. Daily price movements show that the aggregate market responded positively to lower expected taxes.

Donald Trump's 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations on U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden's 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms' stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a "boomerang" in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump's term. The 2020 election marked its arrival.

The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States of America on 11/8/2016 came as a surprise. Markets responded swiftly and decisively. This note investigates both the initial stock market reaction to the election, and the longer-term reaction through the end of 2016. We find that the individual stock price reactions to the election – that is, the market’s vote – reflect investor expectations on economic growth, taxes, and trade policy. Heavy industry and banking were relative winners, whereas healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and apparel were among the relative losers. High-beta stocks and companies with a hitherto high tax burden benefited from the election. Although internationally-oriented companies may profit under some plans of the new administration, several other arguments suggest a more favorable climate for domestically-oriented companies. Investors have found the domestic-favoring arguments to be stronger. While investors incorporated the expected consequences of the election for US growth and tax policy into prices relatively quickly, it took them more time to digest the consequences of shifts in trade policy on firms’ prospects. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Wealth management constitutes an important aspect of today's banking world, but very little is known about what explains the differences among banks in their ability to attract new assets under management. Using a unique panel database of Swiss private banks, we test the hypothesis that the performance of a bank in attracting new money depends on two input factors: skill and reputation. We first estimate the unobservable skill of a bank as a deviation of observed cost efficiency from expected efficiency. In a second step, we find that relatively skilled banks -- that is, banks that are more cost-efficient than predicted by their input factors -- also perform better in attracting net new money. We also find that negative media coverage (such as in the context of fraudulent business practices related to tax evasion) strongly diminishes the future ability to attract assets under management, especially at small banks. Thus, adding to the explicit fines that many Swiss banks had to pay in the course of the U.S. Department of Justice's investigations, there are substantial implicit and reputational costs to banks. Consistent with the notion that trust plays an important role, banks with a higher service intensity (number of employees per assets under management) attract more future funds; by contrast, investment performance for clients seems not to explain future net new money growth.

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. “Tone surprise” – the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm’s recent economic performance and CEO fixed effects – predicts future earnings and analyst uncertainty. Prices move more, as hypothesized, in firms where tone surprise predicts more strongly. Experienced analysts respond appropriately in revising their forecasts; inexperienced analysts overreact (underreact) to tone surprises in presentations (answers). Post-call price drift, like post-earnings announcement drift, suggests less-than-full-use of information embedded in managerial tone.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Conference call tone predicts future earnings and uncertainty. “Tone disappointment” (excessive negativity) predicts more strongly than “tone delight” (excessive positivity). However, analysts and investors respond more quickly to delight than disappointment. Consequently, stock prices drift downward after their initial reaction to tone disappointment. Tone surprises move stock prices more in those firms where tone surprise predicts earnings and uncertainty more strongly. These results hold even after controlling for negativity of words in the earnings press release, analyst expectations, the firm’s recent performance, and CEO fixed effects. Together, these coherent results suggest that market participants distill value-relevant information from conference calls.

This paper investigates neglected risk in structured products. We compare retail prices of structured products with prices available to institutional investors to replicate the same products. Issuers do not compensate retail investors for counterparty exposure before the Lehman default even when replication prices reflect this risk. After Lehman, retail investors no longer neglect issuer credit risk, and issuers compensate counterparty exposure. Retail investor attention crucially determines the occurrence of neglected risk. Additionally, issuers have a propensity to construct products with larger counterparty exposure. Overall, our results shed light on the conditions under which financial engineering generates neglected risk.

This paper develops a structural equilibrium model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, incorporating the fact that firms are heterogeneous in their asset composition. Compared to firms that are mainly composed of invested assets, firms with growth options have higher costs of debt because they are more volatile and have a greater tendency to default during recession when marginal utility is high and recovery rates are low. Our model matches empirical facts regarding credit spreads, default probabilities, leverage ratios, equity premiums, and investment clustering. Importantly, it also makes predictions about the cross-section of all these features.

We argue that incentives to take equity risk ("equity incentives") only partially capture incentives to take asset risk ("asset incentives"). This is because leverage, while central to the theory of risk-shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives. Employing measures of asset incentives that account for leverage, we find that asset risk-taking incentives can be large compared to incentives to increase firm value. Moreover, stock holdings can induce substantial risk-taking incentives, qualifying common beliefs regarding the central role of stock options. Finally, only asset incentives explain asset risk-taking of U.S. financial institutions before the 2007/08 crisis.

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often. In contrast, many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, that is, they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability. (JEL: F3, O1)

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it more often. In contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, i.e. they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.