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We examine insider selling for initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 1868 IPOs between 1988 and 2012. We find that overvalued IPOs have higher probability of offering secondary shar...

Using a sample of 4441 IPOs from the US, we find that IPO firms with larger proportional offering size have lower valuation. The sizes of both primary share offering and secondary share offering are negatively related to IPO firm valuation. The valuation measures are positively related to the levels of capital expenditure and R&D before IPO, lending support to explanations based on Jensen (JAMA 76:323–329, 1986)’s free cash flow hypothesis. We also find evidence consistent with negative signals from larger secondary share offering size. Results of tests about long-run IPO stock performance do not support the hypothesis that IPO stock demand curve is downward sloping.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to answer the following three questions about the new capital raised in initial public offerings (IPOs): why do some IPO companies raise a lot of new capital while some others do not? Where do the IPO companies use the new capital they raise in IPOs? How does the use of new capital affect the operating performance of IPO companies?Design/methodology/approachMatching firm approach, univariate and regression tests.FindingsThis paper finds that companies with higher research and development (R&D) spending, higher capital expenditure, lower working capital and more long-term debt tend to raise more capital in IPOs. These firms also spend more on R&D and capital expenditure. The results also suggest that the more the new capital firms raise in IPOs, the lower operating performance they have in subsequent years. However, firms spending more new capital on R&D and capital expenditure seem to perform better.Originality/valueThese results help us understand the behavior of IPO firms.

We examine private issuance of public equity (PIPE) in China, and our results suggest that PIPE investors benefit from the price manipulation before and after issuance. These investors tend to cash out after lockup expiration and make large profits. We also find evidence that the trading of PIPE investors after lockup expiration is informed. Tests about the abnormal returns in the three years after lockup expiration suggest that at least part of the benefits PIPE investors receive come from wealth transfer from outside investors. Overall, PIPE issuers in China seem to use an opaque mechanism to compensate PIPE investors.

Assuming that initial public offering (IPO) issuers can value their own firms more accurately, we test the hypothesis that the stock markets tend to overvalue IPOs. Using the lower limit of initial filing price range as issuers’ reservation price, we estimate the premiums of IPO first day closing price and first month closing price over the reservation price using 3,138 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1983 to 2012. We find that the price premiums are positively related to proxies for market over-optimism and uncertainty. IPOs with higher price premiums have worse stock performance in the long run. The results are robust to various economic specifications. The findings are consistent with the argument that the stock markets get over- optimistic about IPOs from time to time.

We fi nd that IPO underpricing is positively related to post-IPO growth in sales and EBITDA, but is not signifi cantly related to growth in earnings. Our evidence suggests that accrual reversals or earnings management may cause this inconsistency. We interpret the growth rates of sales and EBITDA as measures of fi rm quality, and conclude that our evidence supports the notion that IPO fi rms with greater underpricing are of better quality. Our tests on analysts’ earnings forecast errors show that analysts are less positively biased in their earnings forecasts for IPO fi rms that have greater underpricing. In this paper we examine the relation between initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and postIPO growth rates of accounting performance variables. Previous research on IPOs suggests that IPO underpricing is related to the quality of the IPO fi rms (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, Welch, 1989, Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, and Rock, 1986). If we use growth rates of accounting performance variables (such as earnings) as measures of fi rm quality, then this suggestion implies a positive relation between IPO underpricing and growth rates. Our hypothesis is that IPO fi rms with greater underpricing should have higher post-IPO growth rates of accounting performance variables. However, rather than just concentrate on growth in earnings, we also include growth in EBITDA and growth in sales. Relative to earnings, these latter variables are more diffi cult for managers to manipulate. Thus, to reduce the possible contamination of our analysis by earnings management strategies, we consider the growth rates of earnings, EBITDA, and sales, and how they relate to IPO underpricing. Consistent with our hypothesis, we fi nd that underpricing is positively related to growth in sales and EBITDA in the fi ve years following an IPO. These results suggest that the IPOs with greater underpricing have higher quality. We also fi nd that IPO growth rates in earnings are much lower than the growth rates in sales and EBITDA. Further tests show that this inconsistency is likely caused by earnings management at the time of the IPO, which infl ates earnings initially and thus reduces earnings growth rates in subsequent years. This result suggests that earnings growth rates may not be accurate measures of IPO fi rm quality compared to sales and EBITDA growth rates. We fi nd that the fi rms with greater underpricing experience larger decreases in accruals after the fi rst year. This fi nding implies that earnings management may also reduce the correlation between IPO underpricing and earnings growth rates. We examine the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts to determine how analysts react to the relation between IPO growth rates and IPO underpricing. If analysts are misled by earnings We thank Mark Huson, participants at the 2005 Northern Finance Association Conference, and, in particular, Bill Christie (the Editor) and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Thompson Financial for providing earnings forecast data, available through I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimate System).

We attempt to answer the following three questions about the new capital raised in IPOs: Why do some IPO companies raise a lot of new capital while some others don’t? Where do the IPO companies use the new capital they raise in IPO? How does the use of new capital affect the operating performance of IPO companies? We find that companies with higher R&D spending, higher capital expenditure, lower working capital and more long term debt tend to raise more capital in IPOs. These firms also spend more on R&D and capital expenditure. The more new capital firms raise in IPOs, the lower sales growth rate they have. However, firms spending a higher proportion of new capital on R&D seem to have higher sales growth rate.

In this paper we examine the relationship between IPO analyst forecasts and two key IPO characteristics: retention and underpricing. We find that analysts predict higher long-term growth rates for IPOs with higher retention and/or higher underpricing. Analysts revise their growth forecasts downward further for IPOs with higher underpricing. However, the annual earnings forecasts are less over-optimistic for these IPOs. Retention is positively related to actual growth in sales. Underpricing is positively related to actual growth rate in sales and EBITDA but not significantly related to actual growth in earnings.

This paper proposes that in an initial public offering (IPO), pre-IPO owners make decisions regarding share retention, share lockup, and underpricing to improve liquidity, which in turn increases the value of shares they retain. We suggest that underpricing will increase the number of investors following the stock and foster more trading in both the short run and the long run. Liquidity is negatively related to the proportion of shares retained by pre-IPO owners, ceteris paribus, so we predict that IPO underpricing is positively related to the proportion of shares retained, as an offset. Our predictions are supported by empirical evidence. In addition, we find that, for IPOs with a lockup restriction, underpricing is more substantial and the positive relation between share retention and underpricing is much stronger. We also explore the relation between underpricing and aftermarket trading volume. We find that the relationship between underpricing and trading volume is stronger for IPOs with lockup. IPOs with lockup have higher trading volume, and a significant part of this difference is associated with the effect of underpricing. The evidence supports the argument that for IPOs with lockup, underpricing improves liquidity more effectively; thus its use is more closely associated with share retention.