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The article describes the policies that could have caused the insolvency of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the financial crisis. It notes that it was U.S. Congress that planted the seeds of the crisis in 1992 through its enactment of affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It points out that the regulation of the financial system through the Dodd-Frank Act created uncertainty and dissipated the appetite for risk taking.

After so many tales of scandal and sharp practice in the corporate U.S., June 2003 brought the familiar signs of yet another. The top three executives of Freddie Mac, a quasi-public, quasi-governmental company that underwrites 15-20 percent of the United States' mortgage market, departed abruptly. The stated cause was problems revealed by an audit begun after Freddie Mac was forced to hire a new accountant to replace Arthur Andersen, the firm destroyed by its shoddy work for Enron Corporation and others. Congress announced that it would hold hearings on the company's accounting. The market's faith in the willingness of the government to bail out Freddie Mac has grown with the size and complexity of the company and its associated risks. Should Freddie Mac take too many risks and blow up, taxpayers, not shareholders, will probably foot the bill.

Reports the rate of the purchase of residential loans by government sponsored enterprises (GSE) in the United States. Amount of mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae Corp.; Details on first quarter purchases by Freddie Mac; Forecast for the GSE.

The article reports on the consideration of the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) which regulates government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) to sell modified mortgage loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold in their huge mortgage portfolios in the U.S.

This article reports on the U.S. mortgage industry and reform in 2008 for the housing finance providers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, known as Government Sponsored Entities. The providers will face stricter regulations related to standards, asset disposal, growth, and capital. The article also discusses housing prices and mortgage issues in the U.S.

The article provides updates concerning subprime market in the U.S. give government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) advocates have hoped that the turmoil in the subprime market will hinder Congress to pass legislation which imposes higher-capital requirements on Fannie Mae and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. According to consultant Howard Glaser, the meltdown in the subprime market reminds people of the stabilizing role the GSE play in the prime market and the risks in the non-GSE sector.

The article informs that Fannie Mae announced that it misclassified $10.3 billion in loan purchases during the years 2003 and 2004, counting single-family acquisitions as multifamily and vice versa in the U.S. The government-sponsored enterprise, is working its way through an $11 billion accounting scandal. It said the misclassification will not impact earnings. A company spokeswoman told the periodical the problem was caused by a coding mistake. The spokeswoman added that the company will no longer specify its loan purchases as single family or multifamily on a monthly basis, offering that information only quarterly.

Presents the mission and future plans of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac), according to the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE) Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard Syron. Recruitment of a senior management team that would help deliver the company's priorities; Attempt of the GSE to build its accounting system and improve its internal controls.

Presents an excerpt of a speech by a Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, delivered before the U.S. Agriculture Committee. Mission of a government sponsored enterprise, like the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corp. (Farmer Mac); Advantages of Farmer Mac from other GSE; Evaluation of Farmer Mac's statutory purpose.

Focuses on the changes to the U.S. government-sponsored enterprise Freddie Mac's MultiLender swap program which would create larger, more predictable and liquid Gold pools. Reluctance of investors to buy Golds due to liquidity differentials; Capability of lenders who use their MultiLender programs to swap conventional 15-year and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages for Giant PCs; Program enhancements.

Assesses the impact of the U.S. Treasury's desire for stricter capital standards and regulation of government-sponsored enterprises. Background on the agencies, including the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac) and the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae); Attempts Donald Riegle, chairman of the Senate banking committee, to introduce legislation to appoint an independent regulator to oversee the agencies; Details of attempts by the Treasury to improve its monitoring of the agencies.

The author suggests that the U.S. mortgage market system remains unchanged even after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to purchase and secure loans and subprime borrowers are able to obtain financing. The difference, however, is that the more risky lending has been taken over by the U.S. Federal Housing Administration.

The U.S. Federal Reserve Board pulled no punches in a staff analysis of the government benefits provided to businessmen Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, arguing they have done little to lower mortgage costs or boost homeownership. The federal benefits give the government-sponsored enterprises a leg up on private-sector rivals, enrich shareholders, and prop up the companies' stock prices. The conclusions directly contradict long-standing advertising campaigns by both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which attempt to equate their business with promoting the American dream of homeownership. According to a study, Fannie and Freddie actions reduce mortgage interest rates by just 7 basis points, or well shy of the 25 basis points estimated by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office in October 2003. The average funding advantage over private-sector competitors from 1998 through mid-2003 was roughly 40 basis points.

Reports that Fannie Mae selected Daniel H. Mudd to be its new president and chief executive. Mudd's priorities, including completing Fannie's earnings restatement, enhancing its capital position and fighting for legislation to revamp regulations for government sponsored enterprises; Comments from Stephen B. Ashley, the chairman of Fannie's board, on why they selected an insider.

Reports on a Senate Banking Committee hearing questioning chief executive of Fannie Mae, Daniel Mudd, and Freddie Mac chairman, Richard Syron. Questions regarding the companies' credibility, the size of their mortgage portfolios, and the fairness of their guarantee fees; Claim by Mudd and Syron that their companies use their portfolios to foster affordable housing, and do not charge smaller lenders more to purchase their mortgages; Acknowledgement by Mudd and Syron that their companies have exaggerated the risks of reform legislation and have contradicted themselves.

Reports that Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprise, sold an unusually large amount of securities issues by others in February of 2005. Reporting of $1.7 billion in sales and other activities in Feb. as opposed to $59 million in Jan.; Comment from a spokesperson that Freddie Mac sells non-Freddie Mac mortgage-related securities when it is deemed appropriate; Counting of credit-related impairments that reduce the fair value of a security below its unpaid principal balance in the computing of sales figures, a first-time for Freddie Mac.