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Chinese engagement in South-East Asian dam projects is usually conceptualized by scholars as directly driven by China’s political leadership as part of a larger package whose terms would only be favourable to the Chinese party. This article argues against this notion, conceptualizing Chinese engagement in South-East Asian dam projects as engagement that can also be directly driven by a Chinese dam developer in a standalone project whose terms are favourable to all contractual parties involved. The cases of the Mong Ton and Hat Gyi dams on Myanmar’s Salween River, which feature the involvement of the Chinese dam developers China Three Gorges Corporation and Sinohydro, are presented as evidence for this latter conceptualization.

Chinese dam developers claim to construct at least every second dam worldwide. However, scholarly literature comprehensively investigating the social safeguard norms in these projects is rare. This paper analyses social safeguard norms in Chinese-led dam projects in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, hotspots of Chinese-led dam construction. We find that social safeguard norms adopted have significantly changed in the past 15 years. While Chinese dam developers claimed to adopt standards of the host countries upon the launch of China's Going Out Policy in 2001, with occasional adoption of more demanding Chinese standards, they did not adopt international norms. In recent years, however, they increasingly take into account international norms. We argue that the root cause for this change is social mobilization, with the suspension of the Myitsone Dam in 2011 as a particular game changer. Enhanced social safeguard legislation in host countries and China, stricter rules of Chinese funders and cooperation of Chinese dam developers with international players have also facilitated this change.

Scholars investigating activism against large dam developments in Asia usually focus on those campaigning, but not on those the campaigns are aimed at–the dam developers. Yet the developers’ perspective is crucial to comprehensively understand the dynamics of social and environmental activism in South-East Asia as well as its implications for the region’s energy landscape. This article analyzes the interplay of activists and Chinese dam developers in Myanmar via case studies of the Myitsone Dam and the Mong Ton Dam. The research is based on direct scholarly interaction with both activists and dam developers. It presents evidence of change from both sides: activists have professionalized in recent years; and Chinese dam developers now attempt to engage with civil society, albeit with limited success in the two cases studied. Yet, even with these changes, conflict over dam development persists, and the country may soon face severe limitations on development options for improving energy security. The case of Bhutan is also discussed to illustrate the potential of developing Myanmar’s hydropower resources.