Search

The early part of the twenty-first century saw a revolution in the field of Homeland Security. The 9/11 attacks, shortly followed thereafter by the Anthrax Attacks, served as a wakeup call to the United States and showed the inadequacy of the current state of the nation's Homeland Security operations.Biodefense, and as a direct result Biosurveillance, changed dramatically after these tragedies, planting the seeds of fear in the minds of Americans.They were shown that not only could the United States be attacked at any time, but the weapon could be an invisible disease-causing agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agroterrorism is a collective term that describes an intentional criminal attack against crops or mankind using viral, bacterial, fungal, or insect-borne agents. Agroterrorism also includes attacks against animals using infectious pathogens such as Burkholderia mallei (glanders), Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), viral avian influenza, foot and mouth disease, and several equine encephalitis viruses. Agents that could be used against crops include the causative agents of wheat blast, rice blast, rice brown spot disease, and wheat stem rust. The primary goal of terrorists using agroterrorism is to spread fear and cause massive economic loss. Subsequent goals include causing disease and death to humans and animals. The use of bioterrorism agents is a much more practical approach than using explosives, for example, to achieve those results since many of these biological agents are commonly found naturally in the environment and are difficult to detect with modern technology. The effective use of biological warfare dates back centuries and can still can be employed by terrorist groups, lone wolves, and political and religious groups to cause death and mayhem on a grand scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: During the last few decades, the media, government leaders, scholars and national security analysts have all called attention to the potential threat presented by terrorism. In general, analyses have focused on the use of biological agents to kill or injure people. Consequently, the intentional contamination of crops by biological agents has received less attention in the media and counter-terrorism efforts when compared to possible attacks on civilian populations. However, in many countries, agricultural systems are one of the main economic sectors contributing to political stability, and the present literature lacks examples of terrorist attacks to agricultural systems. This paper is one of the first to discuss a concrete case of the appearance of a plant pathogen in an economically important region, possibly motivated by agro-terrorism. We highlight the differences between agro-terrorism and biocrime, and the causes and the consequences of the intentional introduction of pathogens as a means of causing economic damage. In particular, we argue that agro-terrorism and biocrime are both intentional criminal acts of introducing pathogens into agricultural systems to cause economic damage, but only agro-terrorism does so to advance a political agenda. Also, we argue that agro-terrorism can be difficult to distinguish from biocrime, and even if the intentional introduction of a pathogen is a political act of agro-terrorism, the consequences may or may not follow the desired script contemplated by the perpetrators, as pest outbreaks can entrain unintended economic, political and ecological consequences. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Agroterrorism and food terrorism have been identified as important homeland security issues by officials in the public health, government, and food industry sectors of the U.S. Intentional contamination of food has already occurred both abroad and in North America. Outbreak investigation and control measures in response to intentional contamination differ from those employed in cases of naturally occurring contamination. Operations-based exercise efforts specific to bioterrorism events are essential to train public health personnel and first responders to consider the possibility of deliberate contamination during an outbreak investigation. A recent search of the Rand Corporation's Public Health Preparedness database identified no operations-based (functional or full-scale) exercises involving foodborne contamination with a biological or chemical agent. This manuscript describes a functional exercise developed and conducted by the University of Illinois, College of Veterinary Medicine, Section of Community Health and Preventive Medicine. The functional exercise simulated a food-borne terrorism event and was designed to evaluate the efficacy of the Food Emergency Response Plan (FERP) of the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), Division of Food, Drugs and Dairies (DFDD). The exercise was held on November 18th and 19th, 2008 at the College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL. Based on this and previous exercises and training programs developed and conducted by CHPM, it is apparent that the more exercise designers, evaluators and public health and support agency participants move away from discussion based exercises and towards operations based exercises, the more strengths and deficiencies in preparation and response of participating agencies are revealed. Although public health agencies have begun training personnel and partner agencies to consider intentional contamination of food during an outbreak investigation, the relative lack of widespread operations-based exercises to assess preparedness in response to an intentional incident of foodborne contamination seems to be an important deficiency in homeland security. Additional funding to create opportunities for public health and first responder personnel to participate in operations-based bioterrorism response exercises is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agro terrorism is a threat facing the public today. National response systems are not yet able to perform efficiently and effectively to address this threat. Any locality can be targeted, and the immediate response will come from local entities, regardless of how adequately prepared they are to respond. Knowing that acts of agro terrorism are both expected and feasible today, we must alter our prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response, attribution, recovery, and mitigation programs and base them on a better understanding of the threat. There are a number of things we can do in advance of agro terrorism, none of which is impossible or beyond our current means and abilities. Additionally, we must keep in mind that although our response to acts of agro terrorism will be local, these local efforts will take place in and be affected by the global agricultural context. The global community will, in fact, be the source of our relief. We must strive now to plan accordingly, and undertake the necessary diplomatic, political, and interpersonal activities well in advance of an act of agro terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-11 September security environment has led to a reevaluation of the nature of national security and national security systems. Bioterrorism in the form of attacks against the agricultural sector, particularly in the form of foot-and-mouth disease, could prove attractive to some groups should other targets and means of attack become more difficult. This article considers three cases, one of bioterrorism and two of agricultural disease outbreaks. Using complex adaptive system principles it suggests a strategy and socio-technical system design, adaptive hardening, appropriate to the challenge posed by terrorist-induced foot-and-mouth disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An abstract of the article "AgGard: A nexus for poultry health, agricultural security and national security," by R. Norton and M. Eubanks is presented.