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This article analyzes the lobbying behavior of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during international climate change negotiations. With limited resources, these NGOs need to strategically invest their resources to maximize impact. A key decision concerns the target of lobbying efforts: Whom do ngos lobby, and why? Two possible explanations are contrasted: influence and responsiveness. Accordingly, NGOs can focus on responsive targets that are likely to bring NGO input to the table or they can focus on influential targets whose voice is heard at the negotiation table. These two explanations are tested using data from a survey of NGOs active in international climate change negotiations. I find that NGOs strategically target their lobbying efforts, approaching both responsive and, more importantly, influential delegations. However, given that ngos primarily contact their home delegation, as well as the president of the negotiation session, further information on the nature and content of contacts between NGOs and government delegations is necessary for understanding NGO-government interactions in international climate change negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is a substantial amount of research that studies how environmental interest groups/non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) influence international environmental negotiations, both the theoretical work and the empirical evidence were not yet able to answer comprehensively if this makes it more likely that states, in turn, commit to stronger environmental agreements. This article seeks to contribute to clarifying this. First, the authors argue that a higher degree of ENGO access to official negotiations and a larger number of ENGOs actively participating during bargaining processes can facilitate outcomes of environmental negotiations. The authors then analyze quantitative data on international environmental regimes and their members' commitment levels from 1946 to 1998 and obtain robust support for their claims. However, the rationale on the introduced explanatory factors also implies that the impact of ENGO access on states' commitment levels should vary conditional on the number of ENGOs actively participating. The paper finds evidence for such an interaction, although the results go against our expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small island states have been able to obtain some remarkable achievements in the climate change negotiations by building a cohesive coalition, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Its cohesion, however, has been affected by changes in the UNFCCC process. The increase both in the number of issues on the climate agenda and the number of negotiation groups may have helped or hindered compromise and finding common ground. To track how AOSIS has fared in the climate change regime, the activities and positions of AOSIS, and of individual AOSIS members over three distinct periods (1995–2000, 2001–2005, 2006–2011) in the climate change regime, are compared. It is found that group activity has declined in relative terms and although there is overall agreement regarding mitigation and adaptation, there is less consensus regarding forestry (e.g. LULUCF and REDD) issues. However, despite controversies in some areas, AOSIS has remained a tightly coordinated and cohesive alliance that continues to be a key player in global climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While small island developing states (SIDS) are micro-contributors to anthropogenic climate change, they are among the most vulnerable to its impacts, with some islands even facing the possibility of extinction. Recognising their vital stake in an effective climate regime, small island states formed a negotiating group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), to represent their interests in the international climate negotiations. Given their limited power, however, to what extent, and by what means, did AOSIS impact the climate regime? Assuming that both the process and outcome of negotiations depend largely on power, this article argues that low-power parties can nonetheless exert influence in international negotiations by ‘borrowing’ power, that is, by drawing on external power sources. A framework for analysis is thus developed and used to assess AOSIS's negotiating strategies and respective successes in the climate change regime from 1990 to 1997. As the analysis reveals, AOSIS made use of external sources of power over this period, and shaped the negotiations to a remarkable degree, much more so than the a priori power distribution would predict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]