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The authors present empirical evidence that borrowers, consciously or not, leave traces of their intentions, circumstances, and personality traits in the text they write when applying for a loan. This textual information has a substantial and significant ability to predict whether borrowers will pay back the loan above and beyond the financial and demographic variables commonly used in models predicting default. The authors use text-mining and machine learning tools to automatically process and analyze the raw text in over 120,000 loan requests from Prosper, an online crowdfunding platform. Including in the predictive model the textual information in the loan significantly helps predict loan default and can have substantial financial implications. The authors find that loan requests written by defaulting borrowers are more likely to include words related to their family, mentions of God, the borrower’s financial and general hardship, pleading lenders for help, and short-term-focused words. The authors further observe that defaulting loan requests are written in a manner consistent with the writing styles of extroverts and liars.

The federal government makes credit for higher education widely available at subsidized prices through its student loan programs. A loan provision that at times has significantly increased the size and volatility of the subsidies is the consolidation option, which allows borrowers to convert floating rate loans to fixed rate loans, often on very favorable terms. The option provides a novel setting in which to study how unsophisticated borrowers respond to financial incentives. We develop a model to evaluate the option's cost to the government, and find that the ex-ante cost of the option ranged from 0.8% to 6.4% of loan principal between 1998 and 2005. Using a sample of 700,000 student loan records, we find that borrowers responded to the time-varying incentives to consolidate although some left sizeable amounts of money on the table; that more indebted borrowers were more likely to optimize; and that there is some evidence of learning over time.

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relationship between abnormal loan growth and risk in Swedish financial institutions by type and borrower using three indicators as proxies for risks related to loan losses, the ratio of interest income to total loans and solvency perspectives. Design/methodology/approach Using a large sample of different types of Swedish financial institutions, this paper uses a panel framework to examine the relationships between abnormal loan growth rates and loan losses, interest income as a percentage of total loans, changes in the equity to assets ratio and changes in z-score. Findings The findings show two important points of evidence. First, abnormal lending to retail customers increases loan losses and interest income in relation to total loans. Second, abnormal lending to other credit institutions decreases loan losses and significantly changes the capital structure by increasing the reliance on debt funding and significantly improves the z-score measure. Research limitations/implications The findings provide useful implications for the management of loan portfolios for a wide range of Swedish financial institutions, identifying two components: abnormal lending to households may increase loan losses and increase interest income in relation to total loans, and excessive lending to other credit institutions may reduce solvency risk and allow more debt financing for the financial institution. Originality/value This is the first study to use a panel framework in analyzing the behavior of different types of Swedish financial institutions in relation to loans granted to retail customers and other credit institutions.

Unlike a traditional bank loan with only a single creditor, a syndicated loan involves a group of lenders: a lead arranger and a number of participant lenders. The syndication process, therefore, generates an additional dimension of agency problem between the lead arranger and the participant lenders, in addition to the traditional agency cost of debt between the borrower and the lender (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). We investigate the association between CEO entrenchment of the borrowing firm and the loan syndication concentration and composition. Several results are obtained. First, in syndicated loans made to firms with entrenched CEOs, the number of participant lenders and their share in the loan are smaller; the lead arranger retains a larger loan share. Second, these loans are held more closely (in a more concentrated manner). Third, foreign lenders are less involved in these loans; the number of foreign lenders and their shares in the loan are both smaller. Fourth, we find that the results are mainly driven by loans syndicated by non-dominant lead arrangers. Our findings shed light on the two types of agency problems associated with syndicated loans; between lenders and the borrowers and between lead arranger and participant lenders, and have important implications for shareholders, creditors and regulators.

Which characteristics of microfinance institutions affect the choice of a decentralized loan approval process? That is the main question this article attempts to answer. A second concern is whether the choice of allocating the loan approval decision to the loan officer enables a microfinance institution to expand its number of loans and improve its loan portfolio quality after controlling for the endogeneity of the choice of decentralizing the loan approval. To achieve this goal, we study an independently pooled cross-section sample of 362 assessment reports for 267 MFIs from 2001 to 2012 across 67 countries. Results suggest that size, cooperative status, and solidarity lending are MFI-level variables that affect the likelihood of choosing a decentralized loan approval process. Allocating the decision-making authority to the loan officer improves MFIs’ breadth of outreach (the number of active borrowers) but does not affect the size of the loan portfolio and does not deteriorate their loan portfolio quality.

This study utilizes Farm Service Agency lending data to verify if previous racial and gender bias allegations still persist in more recent lending decisions. Beyond loan approval decisions, this study focuses on trends in direct loan packaging terms for approved single proprietorship farm borrowers. Results indicate that although no significant disparities were noted in loan amounts and maturities prescribed for various racial and gender minority groups, nonwhite male and female borrowers were usually charged higher interest rates than the others. Loan pricing differentials could have been the lenders' strategy for price management of borrowers' credit risks.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to test whether diversification of credit portfolios across economic sectors leads to improved profitability and reduced credit risks for Ghanaian banks that have been characterized by high non-performing loans in recent times (IMF, 2011).Design/methodology/approachStatic and dynamic estimations, namely Prais-Winsten, fixed and random effect estimators, feasible generalized least squares as well as the system generalized methods of moments are employed on the annual data of 30 Ghanaian banks that operated between 2007 and 2014 to determine the effect of loan portfolio diversification on bank performance.FindingsThe study shows that loan portfolio diversification does not improve banks’ profitability nor does it reduce banks’ credit risks.Research limitations/implicationsThe study focuses on a single banking system in Africa largely as a result of data limitation.Practical implicationsThe study emphasizes the need for banks to perform a careful assessment of the effects of their lending policies geared toward increased sectoral diversification on their monitoring efficiency and effectiveness. A further investment in loan screening and monitoring is necessary to minimize credit risks.Originality/valueThis study is the first to present empirical evidence on the effects of loan portfolio diversification on bank performance in an emerging banking market in Africa.

This paper asks whether the credit market impede innovation. Using a province- and industry-level innovation dataset combined with regional loan structure in Chinese credit market during 1999-2007, we identify two measures to proxy Chinese banking structure, the long-term vs. short-term bank loans and the Big-Four vs. non-Big-Four banks, which affect technological innovation. We show that industries that are more dependent on external finance exhibit disproportionally higher level of innovation in provinces with a larger share of the long-term bank loan market. However, a larger share of the short-term bank loan market appears to discourage innovation in industries with more dependence on external finance. Moreover, the positive effect of the long-term bank loans on innovation is strengthened in provinces with a higher level of market share of the non-Big-Four banks, whereas the negative effect of the short-term bank loans on innovation is mitigated in those provinces. This study provides evidence on the positive effect of the credit market on innovation.

This study shows that initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading for an entity's debt increases the share of loans retained by loan syndicate lead arrangers and increases loan spread. These findings are consistent with CDS initiation reducing the effectiveness of a lead arranger's stake in the loan to serve as a mechanism to address the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the loan syndicate. Additional findings corroborate this interpretation by revealing a moderating effect for firms with greater transparency, for loans originated by a lead arranger with a strong reputation in this market, and for firms with relatively illiquid CDS markets.

Banks face a dilemma in choosing between maximising profits and facilitating the sustainable use of resources within a carbon-constrained future. This study provides empirical evidence on this dilemma, investigating whether a bank loan announcement for a firm with high carbon risk conveys information to investors about the firm’s carbon risk exposure collected through a bank’s pre-loan screening and ongoing monitoring. We use a sample of 120 bank loan announcements for ASX-listed firms over the period 2009–2015. We measure high (low) carbon risk exposure based on whether firms meet (do not meet) the reporting threshold of the NGER scheme. We document positive and significant excess loan announcement returns for loan renewals for high carbon risk firms, but not for loan initiations. Further, we document a more significant loan announcement return for renewals with favourable term revisions. Finally, we find no evidence that the market differentiates between domestic and foreign lenders. Taken together, our results suggest that investors perceive that banks incorporate carbon risk considerations into their lending decisions. Our results highlight the value of banks as financial intermediaries given the information asymmetry surrounding firms’ carbon risk exposure, and more generally the need to extend modern banking theory to consider issues such as the impact of banks’ CSR reputation on lending decisions.

The purpose of this study is to assess how information sharing offices affect loan price and quantity in the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks in 42 countries for the period 2001–2011. From the Generalised Method of Moments, public credit registries decrease loan price. With instrumental Quantile Regressions, two main findings are established. Public credit registries consistently decrease the price of loans whereas private credit bureaus consistently have the opposite effect. Public credit registries increase loan quantity in bottom quintiles (or banks associated with lower loan quantities) while private credit bureaus increase loan quantity in top quintiles (or banks associated with higher loan quantities).

During the 1990s and early 2000s, developing nations in all parts of the world experienced financial crisis. Studies have documented, both theoretically and empirically, that authorities’ guarantee that insolvent financial institutions would be “bailed out” increased the incentives of banks, especially large institutions, to take on excessive loan risk. However, little research has been conducted on how the possibility of being “bailed out” impacts banks’ decisions regarding the understatement of loan loss reserves (i.e. the tendency to conceal loan risk). We argue that the Mexican financial crisis of the 1990s represents a rich setting to investigate the link between “bailout assistance” and banks’ accounting for loan loss reserves. The analysis of loan trends for the entire financial system shows that Mexican banks fully reserved non-performing loans not in 1997, when new accounting standards took effect, but rather in 1999–2001, after the largest institutions had been sold to foreign banks and international bailout assistance had been exhausted. Also, the results show that in the period preceding their sale to foreign institutions, “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) banks used bailout assistance to directly manage their reserves. By contrast smaller banks used non-bailout sources of capital to reserve non-performing consumer loans, and directly swapped non-performing commercial loans for bailout assistance. Thus, while both TBTF and smaller banks utilized bailout assistance, the bailout funds only affected loan loss reserve levels in the case of TBTF banks.

We investigate the ability of small business borrowers to signal to investors their credit worthiness through the use of text descriptions in the peer‐to‐peer lending market. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the loan description written by a borrower and whether or not the project is funded by investors. Using textual analysis, we find that small business loan descriptions can be used to predict the likelihood that the loan will be funded. We also find that an index, created from a textual analysis of the words used in the loan description, can forecast the performance of the loan, specifically whether or not the loan defaults. This index has the strongest impact when we focus on borrowers with low FICO scores, suggesting that for these individuals the description can signal information that standard measures used for lending purposes cannot. Overall, it appears as though investors are making investment decisions based on proper and relevant signals given by the borrowers through the loan description. (JEL D47, D53, D82, D83, G14, G21)

I comprehensively study the effect of bank competition on the cost of bank loans using U.S. bank loan data from 1995 to 2010. The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads and covenant intensity. I show that loan spreads and covenant intensity are negatively related to bank competition. I also find that non-investment grade and financially constrained firms benefit more from bank competition than investment grade and financially unconstrained firms do. Lenders with low market power are more willing to reduce loan price than lenders with high market power in competitive lending markets. The results suggest that lenders give favorable loan terms to borrowers in competitive loan markets.

This paper tries to check whether capital requirement policy has significant influence on bank loan growth by using a sample of regional banks in China from 2005–2008. The paper develops a simultaneous equation models to analyze the endogenous relationship between capital changes, loan growth and non-performing loans. The paper finds that during the sample years, capital condition indeed became a strict constraint for the loan growth of these banks This constraint also became more and more strict and significant across the sample years as the implementation of the policy carried on.

We develop a theoretical model of a network of intermediaries whose optimal behavior is jointly determined, leading to heterogeneous financial norms and systemic vulnerabilities. We apply the model to the network of U.S. mortgage intermediaries from 2005 to 2007, using a data set containing all private-label, fixed-rate mortgages, with loan flows defining links. Default risk was closely related to network position, evolving predictably among linked nodes, and loan quality estimated from the model was related to independent quality measures, altogether pointing to the vital importance of network effects in this market. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision July 11, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

The capacity of Ghanaian banks to absorb large but plausible losses resulting from concentration of individual bank loan portfolios in sectors of the Ghanaian economy is investigated. Stress scenarios consist of worsening of banks’ impaired loan charges by one, two and three standard deviations of the industry’s recent distribution of non-performing loans. Findings reveal that the capital adequacy ratios of many banks would have been negatively impacted, some to the point of becoming insolvent. It is argued that, though these would be micro-prudential breaches, they are of such magnitude as to have economy-wide repercussions. Thus, bank loan portfolios are too concentrated.

Purpose: In the recent past Agricultural Finance Corporation has experienced huge non-performing loan portfolio. This has been to the tune of 5 billion comprising of 2500 clients. The purpose of this study was therefore to establish the contributors of non-performing loan to agricultural finance institution. The study sought to determine the effect of initial loan appraisal, the extent to which loanees’ level of financial management skill affect NPL, and effect of credit policies and loan recovery strategies on nonperformance of loans at AFC. Methodology: The study adopted a case study research design. Data was collected by using questionnaires administered by the researcher. The research targeted a single unit AFC. A total of 4 heads of department from credit, debt collection and recovery, Finance and Audit were targeted to respond to the questionnaire. The selection of the 4 heads was based on purposive sampling method. In addition 36 credit officers and 16 branch managers were selected using stratified and random sampling method as respondent to the study. This gave a total of 54 respondents. The data was analyzed using descriptive statistics utilizing SPSS. Results: The research findings showed that there was a significant positive relationship between loan appraisal and ratio of non-performing loan to total advances. This implies that as the process of loan appraisal is improved and done properly, the loan performance also improves similarly. Therefore, if initial loan appraisal is not done properly it will lead to more non-performing loan Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The study recommends that AFC top management should create a working relationship with other lending institutions to ensure that farmers do not abuse the well-kept farming financial records to acquire more loans from the other financial institutions whose recovery could create huge NPL on the part of AFC loans advanced to them.

The non-performing loans (NPL) of financial institutions are considered as a significant issue in the context of Nepal for last few decades. The paper aims to identify the impact of macroeconomic variables (GDP, Inflation, and Real Effective Exchange Rate) and bank specific variables (size, change in loan, real lending rate of interest, and share of loan to total assets) on the non-performing loan of the commercial banks in Nepal. The study was conducted mainly with secondary sources. The data were collected for 26 commercial banks covering the period of 2002-2012 with 227 observations. The study found that macroeconomic variables such as the real effective exchange rate have significantly negative impact on non-performing loan. The impact of GDP growth rate was found to be insignificant in this study. One year lagged inflation rate has significant positive impact on non-performing loan. The banks which charge relatively higher real interest rate have higher non-performing loan, which is consistent with the findings of previous studies. The ownership dummy has positive coefficient and significant at one percent level showing that if the bank is government owned the non-performing loan would be higher than that of the private owned banks. As well, more lending in the previous years and current year reduces the non-performing loan since the coefficient of change in loan in current and previous years have negative coefficient and significant at one percent level.Economic Journal of Development Issues Vol. 19 & 20 No. 1-2 (2015) Combined Issue, Page: 22-38

A substantial part of households and micro enterprises, particularly in developing countries including Indonesia, did not have access to formal financial institutions which then lead them to borrow money from illegal loan providers. Using an experimental study, we tested whether predatory loan, an illegal short-term loan with high-interest rate, was preferable or not by comparing with pawnshop loan, bank loan and household’s limited saving when households confront with financial distress. We divided the participants into three groups: lower low, low, and upper low income. We found that predatory loan was preferable especially for the lower low and low-income group. Result also confirmed that even if the predatory loan charge was increased, the lower low- and low-income groups still prefer to ease their financial distress through predatory loans. Moreover, the longer the duration of the predatory loan, the higher its probability to be chosen as a funding source in times of household financial distress. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26905/jkdp.v21i3.1261

Using a sample of syndicated loan facilities granted to US corporate borrowers from 1987 to 2013, we directly gauge the lead banks’ market power, and test its effects on both price and non-price terms in loan contracts. We find that bank market power is positively correlated with loan spreads, and the positive relation holds for both non-relationship loans and relationship loans. In particular, we report that, for relationship loans, lending banks charge lower loan price for borrowing firms with lower switching cost. We further employ a framework accommodating the joint determination of loan contractual terms, and document that the lead banks’ market power is positively correlated with collateral and negatively correlated with loan maturity. In addition, we report a significant and negative relationship between banking power and the number of covenants in loan contracts, and the negative relationship is stronger for relationship loans.

Loan modification is widely discussed as an alternative to foreclosure, but little research has focused on quantifying its effect on loan performance. I quantify this effect early in the housing crisis by exploiting exogenous variation in the incentives to modify securitized nonagency loans. An additional modification reduces loan losses by 35.8% relative to the average loss; this reduction suggests that the marginal benefit of modification likely exceeded the marginal cost. Consistent with the idea that high-income borrowers may be better equipped to withstand bad economic times, I find that modifications are especially beneficial when borrowers have larger loans. Received April 25, 2016; editorial decision March 24, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity. Findings The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity. Research limitations/implications The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured by G-index and institutional ownership. Practical implications The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies. Originality/value First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

We analyze the impact of sovereign rating changes on European corporate loan spreads. We demonstrate that sovereign downgrades lead to significant increases in the spread of loans to domestic firms. We find evidence that the negative effects of a sovereign downgrade are widespread across all firms, also unrated, which are the majority of firms in the European syndicated loan market. A relevant part of this impact depends on the reliance of financial regulation on credit ratings (certification effect), which reduces also loan size and leads to additional burdens for investment grade firms. Instead, we do not find evidence of a significant impact generated by an upgrade. Our results hold also controlling for the sovereign risk, crisis periods, lender characteristics, and endogeneity of loan contract terms.

The federal government holds colleges accountable if too many of their students default on loan repayment, but the default measure traditionally used captures only a fraction of students who are struggling to repay their loans. The 2015 College Scorecard dataset introduced a new loan repayment metric, showing that the percentage of students who have not reduced the principal balance of their loans by at least $1 over a given period of time far outstrips the traditional loan default measure. Using a sample of 3,595 colleges, we test the extent to which student demographics, institutional characteristics, and state-level economic factors are associated with repayment rates and default rates. We also examine whether factors associated with loan repayment rates change between one and seven years after students begin repayment. We find that characteristics traditionally associated with economic disadvantage, including being a first-generation college student or a member of an underrepresented minority group, tend to be associated with lower loan repayment rates, as does attendance at for-profit colleges. These factors are just as or more strongly associated with longer-term repayment rates compared to shorter-term repayment rates.

Many students are averse to taking out loans to pay for education—a phenomenon that is commonly discussed but rarely systematically analyzed. This study explores the relationship between student loan aversion and individual financial characteristics. In this analysis, we rely on a unique dataset of survey responses from more than 5,000 high school seniors, community college students who did and did not borrow for higher education, and adults without a college degree. Regression analyses, using a robust set of controls and institutional fixed effects, show that higher financial literacy and higher knowledge of federal student loans are related to lower loan aversion for education. The magnitude of these effects is large, as much as a 30 to 50 percent reduction in loan aversion in some samples. There is also evidence that prior experience with payday lending is related to increased loan aversion for community college students who did not borrow for college.

This study analyzes the benefits of rapid student loan repayment, defined here as borrowers who repaid their cumulative undergraduate loan debt in half the time of the expected repayment cycle (10 years). Drawing from data on borrowers in two nationally representative samples, I first explain the analytic framework employed to identify rapid loan repayers, then examine whether rapid loan repayment is associated with financial benefits in terms of salary, homeownership, and non–poverty level, identifying how rapid loan repayers differ from their non–rapid loan repayer and nonborrower counterparts. Results show salary benefits associated with rapid loan repayment and indicate that among rapid loan repayers, cumulative loan debt generally did not surpass $15,000. These findings suggest that policy-makers may consider the adoption of shorter repayment plans with clear eligibility cutoff amounts as an alternative to the more common 10-year fixed plan.

This paper examines whether and how the adoption of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) reduces information asymmetry in loan contracting. We hypothesize that the adoption of XBRL can enhance information dissemination and mitigate the information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders. Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts, we find that borrowers who adopt XBRL enjoy more favourable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Additional analyses indicate that the relations among XBRL adoption and bank loan price vary with loan structure. Overall, this research provides evidence that technology advancements such as XBRL reduce cost of bank loans by decreasing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.

We present the first empirical study of loan searching strategies and loan granting decisions in a context where banks observe whether applicants have unsuccessfully applied for credit to other lenders in the past. Our identification strategy benefits from the use of granular data on loan applications and exploits the fact that evaluating lenders observe only the rejections received by a borrower up to six months before the current application. We document that past rejections diminish the probability of approval and increase the probability that a loan search is interrupted.

This paper examines the long-run relationship between bank profits, loan growth, and monetary policy at different types of profitable banks. U.S. commercial bank data are analyzed from the FDIC's Historical Statistics on Banking from 1966 to 2013. The banks are divided into two groups based on their relative profitability (above or below the average profit rate) to examine their real estate and commercial loan activities. The bank's loan portfolio allocation (i.e., the ratio between real estate and commercial loans) is also examined to see if it has a relationship with monetary policy. The study finds evidence that monetary policy has a slightly larger negative relationship with real estate loans in banks with above average profits than with their less profitable peers. The analysis also finds evidence suggesting that commercial loan growth in low-profit banks may be more sensitive to their loan loss provisions than to monetary policy. The loan portfolio ratio shows a significant negative relationship with monetary policy and a positive relationship with provisions. The analysis reveals a positive coefficient or ‘perverse result’ between some of the commercial loan growth measures and monetary policy that may be explained by portfolio shifting at banks.

We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on loan spreads of syndicated bank loans, with a particular interest in how CSR and credit ratings are interrelated as a joint determinant of loan spreads. Focusing on private debt contracts, we show that both CSR strengths and concerns are related to their loan spreads. CSR strengths work to lower firm risk, hence reducing the loan spread, whereas CSR concerns increase firm risk, thus increasing the loan spread. Once we include detailed credit rating information in the models, however, CSR concerns lose significance, but CSR strengths remain significantly related to the loan spread. We also find that both CSR strengths and CSR concerns are related to loan spread for non-rated firms, but the CSR concern effect is stronger than the CSR strength effect for these firms. A further test shows that firm risk measured by stock return volatility plays as a direct channel through which a firm’s CSR activities affect loan spreads, whose result lends further support to our main results. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that CSR matters to the pricing of loan contracts beyond credit rating information and the results remain robust to the possible firm size effect and the endogeneity issues.

We document the impact of banks’ liquidity management on secondary loan sales. We track the dynamics of bank loan share ownership in the secondary market using data from the Shared National Credit Program, a U.S. supervisory credit register of syndicated bank loans. Controlling for loan quality using a loan-year xed eects approach, we nd that banks with greater reliance on wholesale funding at the onset of the 2007{ 2009 nancial crisis were more likely to exit loan syndicates via loan sales during the crisis. We therefore establish that during periods of marketwide stress|characterized by disruptions in short-term wholesale funding markets|banks use secondary loan sales as a liquidity management technique. Our ndings provide empirical support to and have implications for the design of the Basel III liquidity regulations.

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether firms retaining industry-specialist auditors receive better price and non-price terms for bank loans. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of companies retaining big N auditors during the 2000-2010 period, this paper constructed six proxies for auditor industry expertise and tested three major loan terms: loan spreads, number of general and financial covenants and requirements for collateral. Findings It was found that companies retaining industry-specialist auditors receive lower interest rates and fewer covenants. Banks are also less likely to demand secured collateral. These findings are supported by several sensitivity tests. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that auditor industry expertise provides incremental value to creditors and that bank loan cost is one economic benefit for companies hiring specialist auditors. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the impact of auditor industry expertise on the cost of private debts.

In this study, we seek to understand whether soft information conveyed by contracting language found in private loan agreements is informative regarding borrower risk. We proxy for credit-risk-relevant soft information using Loughran and McDonald’s uncertainty measure. We first examine initial contract terms and find that, incremental to traditional summary measures of credit risk, increased contractual uncertainty is associated with higher initial loan spreads and a greater likelihood of using dynamic and performance-pricing covenants. We then turn to examine realized credit risk over the life of the loan and find that increased uncertainty is associated with a higher likelihood of future loan downgrades and loan amendments. We corroborate our results on the risk relevance of soft information by showing that the bid-ask spreads of loans trading on the secondary loan market are increasing in uncertainty. Overall, the evidence we provide is consistent with embedded linguistic cues in loan agreements publicly revealing the credit risk assessments of privately informed lenders.

To study the presence of a risk-taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk-taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply-side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk-taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk-taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.

Past empirical studies appear to support the idea that banks and finance companies do not differ in their ability to resolve adverse selection problems associated with issuing new debt. In this article, we find there is a difference. More specifically, using an event study we find larger abnormal returns for secured loan disclosures to lower quality borrowers when the lender is a finance company versus a bank. This suggests the market views finance companies as more effective than banks in evaluating/monitoring lower quality borrowers obtaining secured loans. We posit this is due to finance companies’ greater expertise in this type of lending, resulting from specialization. Our findings extend the literature on how lender identity can influence signals about firm value from loan disclosures. Our results also support recent findings that positive abnormal returns to borrowing firms may not be a general feature across the loan population, but may be restricted to smaller, lower quality borrowers. Fi...

This study had two central objectives, compliance of capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios prudential requirement and analysis on the influence posed by Capital Adequacy, Profitability, and Loan Growth on Non-Performing Loans. Banking sector ratios as reported by the supervisory authority (Bank of Tanzania) were used for the purpose of this study. The banking sector ratios show that commercial banks in Tanzania had strong Capital adequacy ratio greater the 10% required by the Bank of Tanzania. However, the banking sector failed to meet non-performing loans 5% threshold. On the hand, when regression analysis was used to study the influence, it was found that, capital adequacy, profitability posed insignificant influence on non-performing loans whereas loan to asset ratio and interest margin had a significant influence.

We examine the pricing of characteristics and betas in the cross-section of expected corporate loan returns. Expected loan returns decrease with default beta. Default beta contains information not captured by rating or spread-to-maturity. A three-month formation momentum strategy earns a monthly premium of 122 bps. The effect is robust to various formation and holding periods, cannot be explained by other loan characteristics, and is prominent in loans issued by lowest-rated borrowers. We discover that portfolios including loser loans are riskier, but have lower returns. We find a cross-market correlation between loan and stock momentums. However, each contains additional independent information.

We estimate interest rate pass-through in the loan market using an individual bank-based panel dataset from Japan. Previous studies using data from European countries have presented a number of common findings, including that banks with a high proportion of relationship lending tend to set lower pass-through. In this respect, we have obtained similar results using a dataset for Japan going back to the early 2000s. We further examine the influence of borrowing firms’ balance sheet characteristics on loan interest rate pass-through, and find that these additional factors are also important determinants for pass-through dispersion. However, after the recent global financial crisis, even banks with a high proportion of relationship lending have largely lowered loan interest rates by raising pass-through, and pass-through has not necessarily been determined in accordance with borrowing firms’ balance sheet characteristics. These results differ from those of recent studies on European countries. Possible background factors explaining this change are that (i) pressure to lower loan interest rates has risen due to extensive monetary easing and greater lending competition among banks, while Japan’s banking system as a whole has maintained its resilience in the post-crisis period; (ii) demand for bank loans has increased substantially due to disruptions in the market for alternative funding sources, such as commercial paper and corporate bonds; and (iii) public measures to increase bank loans have been broadly introduced in Japan.

In recent years, credit unions have increasingly purchased loan-participation agreements in order to diversify their loan portfolios and manage loan growth. Responding to high charge-off rates for these loans and concern for systemic risk, the National Credit Union Administration imposed in 2013 new rules on federally insured credit unions that limited the purchase of loan participations from a single originator to the greater of $5 million or 100% of net worth. This study uses a difference-in-difference framework to examine the effect the policy had on returns. As a result of the policy change, credit unions with a high share of net worth in loan participations earned, on average, a return on assets 47 basis points less than their counterparts. Further, we find evidence that suggests these lower returns were driven by a decline in participation loans with recourse provisions, liquidity issues, and relatively higher interest expenses.

This paper examines the loan size and its productive application after involvement in micro-finance programme in western development region of Nepal. The paper is based on primary sources of data collected through structured questionnaires. The survey includes 500 clients from four districts of western development region both from government and Private microfinance institutions. The study shows that there is positive association between size of savings and loans, size of savings and loan application, current loan size and ethnicity, loan size and duration of membership, and finally loan size and its application. It has been found that clients who have taken small size of loans, they have mostly spent their loans on domestic purposes and found poor application of loans in micro-business whereas big loan size clients have greater application of loans in productive sectors. Micro-finance institutions should increase loan size (as per the provision of monitory policy) with necessary entrepreneurship skills that will help to enhance productive application of loans however, strict monitoring and supervision is essential. Thus, MFIs should give equal priority for non-financial services such as financial literacy and provision of entrepreneurship skills through government and non-government organizations that ultimately helps to utilize micro-credit into productive sectors.Repositioning Vol.1(1) 2016: 63-72

The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 dramatically but temporarily increased the mortgage loan amount eligible for insurance through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). We use the implementation and expiration of these loan limits as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of FHA insurance to measure the impact on the overall mortgage market and conventional lending. We find that the introduction of higher loan limits increased the number of loan originations, but that the expiration of those loan limits roughly 6 years later did not significantly decrease affected loan originations. The substitution between loan products and small net impact on the overall mortgage market when the ESA loan limits expired may be explained by the return of a stronger conventional lending industry than existed during the housing crisis.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify determinants of feasible outcome events (expired with no loss, settled for loss, still performing) and time to event of Farm Service Agency (FSA) operating and farm ownership (FO) loan guarantees. Design/methodology/approach Data on 19,126 FSA guaranteed loans, which were made by various lenders to farmers who have limited ability to obtain loans from normal sources without the Federal guarantee, were collected. Cox proportional hazards models for operating loans (OLs) and FO loans are estimated to identify borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, lender types, and farm and macroeconomic environment factors that influence guarantee outcomes. Findings Loans with different characteristics (loan amount, loan term, lender type, region originated) and assistance programs (Beginning Farmer, Interest Assistance) have differing guarantee outcomes. Contemporaneous variables, in particular delinquency status, have a significant impact on guarantee outcomes. Research limitations/implications All loans were originated in calendar years 2004 and 2005. Since FO loans may have as long as 40 year terms, results are not as robust for FO loans as for OLs. Practical implications Different loan characteristics and macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the occurrence of possible guarantee outcomes and time to the outcomes. Originality/value Guaranteed loans are the primary method of government credit assistance to US farm operators. Data on individual borrowers have been difficult to obtain for much of the life of the guaranteed program because loan applications are held privately. This study provides insight on how various factors drive guarantee performance which is useful to policy makers trying to increase guaranteed loan program efficiency.

Front-line loan officers of microfinance institutions are important in acquiring information on potential borrowers and selecting them in accordance with the microfinance institution's mission. This study uses a unique data set on loan officers and their loan portfolios from China's largest nongovernmental organization microfinance institution to test whether officers' personal characteristics affect the size and quality of their loans. The analysis uses a period in which the institution shifted from reliance on government donations and subsidies to commercial sources of funding. Imposing more commercial incentives on loan officers could affect how they balance potentially competing objectives to serve the poor and pursue profitability. The paper finds that loan officers who were formerly farmers or worked in local government were better able to maintain lending to poorer borrowers, without incurring substantially lower repayment rates on their loans. In short, it appears that the career backgrounds of loan officers did play a role in preventing mission drift.

As a rule, long-term bank loans entail solid security - a mortgage, regardless of their purpose. The mortgaged property has its specific market value during the loan approval period but during the repayment period, the value of the real estate varies. This is the reason why the initially specified indicator of the coverage of loans with the value of the mortgage - the LTV ratio changes, which in turn increases the risk of loan repayment. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the necessity of establishing adequate initial LTV ratios (together with other important ratios). This would help nullify the risk of any variations in real estate prices, the loan currency risk, the interest rate risk, as well as the risk of an increase in bank's claims because of a long foreclosure process. The paper analyses effects of changes in LTV ratios caused by varying circumstances using the case study method. The comparative method analyses the changing trends of data on the LTV ratios for the already approved loans over a seven-year period by comparing the flow of the loan capital sum with the real value of the mortgage for three types of loans. The conclusion reached is that commercial banks should establish the initial LTV ratio for various long-term loan products and thus prevent its rise. Banks should do this by taking into account all the factors that cause the ratio’s increase, and thus give preference to the reduction of the credit risk and not the attractiveness and accessibility of loan products.