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The bremsstrahlung x-ray spectrum used in high-energy, high-intensity x-ray cargo inspection systems is attenuated and modified by the materials in the cargo in a Z-dependent way. Therefore, spectroscopy of the detected x rays yields information about the Z of the x-rayed cargo material. It has previously been shown that such ZSpectroscopy (Z-SPEC) is possible under certain circumstances. A statistical approach, Z-SCAN (Z-determination by Statistical Count-rate ANalysis), has also been shown to be effective, and it can be used either by itself or in conjunction with Z-SPEC when the x-ray count rate is too high for individual x-ray spectroscopy. Both techniques require fast x-ray detectors and fast digitization electronics. It is desirable (and possible) to combine all techniques, including x-ray imaging of the cargo, in a single detector array, to reduce costs, weight, and overall complexity. In this paper, we take a whole-system approach to x-ray spectroscopy in x-ray cargo inspection systems, and show how the various parts interact with one another. Faster detectors and read-out electronics are beneficial for both techniques. A higher duty-factor x-ray source allows lower instantaneous count rates at the same overall x-ray intensity, improving the range of applicability of Z-SPEC in particular. Using an intensity-modulated advanced x-ray source (IMAXS) allows reducing the x-ray count rate for cargoes with higher transmission, and a stacked-detector approach may help material discrimination for the lowest attenuations. Image processing and segmentation allow derivation of results for entire objects, and subtraction of backgrounds. We discuss R&D performed under a number of different programs, showing progress made in each of the interacting subsystems. We discuss results of studies into faster scintillation detectors, including ZnO, BaF2 and PbWO4, as well as suitable photo-detectors, read-out and digitization electronics. We discuss high-duty-factor linear-accelerator x-ray sources and their associated requirements, and how such sources improve spectroscopic techniques. We further discuss how image processing techniques help in correcting for backgrounds and overlapping materials. In sum, we present an integrated picture of how to optimize a cargo inspection system for x-ray spectroscopy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

X-ray cargo inspection systems typically use a several-MV pulsed linear accelerator (linac) to produce a bremsstrahlung spectrum of x rays by bombarding a target with electrons. The x rays traverse the cargo and are detected by a detector array. Spectroscopy of the detected x rays is very desirable: if one can determine the spectrum of the transmitted x rays, one can determine the Z of the material they traversed. Even in relatively low-dose modes of operation, thousands of x rays arrive at each detector element during each pulse, unless the x rays are heavily absorbed or scattered by the cargo. For portal or fixed-site systems, dose rates, and therefore x-ray count rates, are even higher. Because of the high x-ray count rate, spectroscopy is impractical in conventional cargo inspection systems, except in certain special cases. For a mobile system, typical pulse durations are a few microseconds, and the number of pulses is on the order of 100 per second, leading to a duty factor of about 0.04%. Clearly, a linear accelerator x-ray source with much higher duty factor would be useful, since then the same number of x rays could be spread out over time, reducing the x-ray count rate. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a linear accelerator system, using more or less Conventional Off the Shelf (COTS) components, capable of duty cycles of 1% or greater. A survey was conducted of available linac RF source options and, given the possibilities, calculations were performed for suitable beam centerline designs. Keeping in mind that the size and cost of the accelerator system should be practical for use in a mobile cargo inspection system, only a few options are shown to be reasonably feasible, both requiring the use of klystrons instead of the magnetrons used in conventional systems. An S-Band design appears clearly possible, and there is also a promising X-Band design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective cargo inspection systems for nuclear material detection require good penetration by the interrogating radiation, generation of a sufficient number of fissions, and strong and penetrating detection signatures. Inspection systems need also to be sensitive over a wide range of cargo types and densities encountered in daily commerce. Thus they need to be effective with highly hydrogenous cargo, where neutron attenuation is a major limitation, as well as with dense metallic cargo, where x-ray penetration is low. A system that interrogates cargo with both neutrons and x-rays can, in principle, achieve high performance over the widest range of cargos. Moreover, utilizing strong prompt-neutron (∼3 per fission) and delayed-gamma ray (∼7 per fission) signatures further strengthens the detection sensitivity across all cargo types. The complementary nature of x-rays and neutrons, used as both probing radiation and detection signatures, alleviates the need to employ exceedingly strong sources, which would otherwise be required to achieve adequate performance across all cargo types, if only one type of radiation probe were employed. A system based on the above principles, employing a commercially-available 9 MV linac was developed and designed. Neutrons are produced simultaneously with x-rays by the photonuclear interaction of the x-ray beam with a suitable converter. A total neutron yield on the order of 1011 n/s is achieved with an average electron beam current of 100 μA. If fissionable material is present, fissions are produced both by the high-energy x-ray beam and by the photoneutrons. Photofission and neutron fission dominate in hydrogenous and metallic cargos, respectively. Neutron-capture gamma rays provide information on the cargo composition. The prompt neutrons resulting from fission are detected by two independent detector systems: by very efficient Differential Die Away Analysis (DDAA) detectors, and by direct detection of neutrons with energies higher than 3 MeV using a recently developed fluorine-based threshold activation detector (TAD). The delayed gamma-ray signals are measured with high efficiency with the same TAD and with additional lower-cost plastic scintillators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intense neutron sources are essential for cargo inspection for a broad range of threats from explosives, to contraband, to nuclear materials and especially SNM (Special Nuclear Materials). To be effective over a wide range of cargo materials, in particular for hydrogenous cargo such as food, and to offer practical inspection times, the neutron source must be very strong, typically >1010 neutrons per second. Unfortunately there are currently no reasonably compact and economical neutron generators with the required intensities. The insufficiency and inadequacy of intense neutron sources are especially conspicuous in the ≤2.5 MeV range (low voltage (d,D) generator). This energy range is needed if the strong signature of prompt fission neutrons (≈3 per fission) is to be detected and discerned from the numerous source neutrons. The photonuclear reactions of x-rays from commercial linacs in appropriate converters can provide ample intensities of neutrons. These converters have a very low (γ,n) energy threshold: 1.67 MeV for beryllium and 2.23 MeV for deuterium. The intense x-ray beams provided by commercial x-ray systems, more than compensate for the relatively low (γ,n) cross-sections which are in the milli-barn range. The choice of converter material, the geometrical shape, dimensions and location relative to the x-ray source, determine the efficiency of the neutron conversion. For electron accelerators with less than 10 MeV, the preferred converters, Be and D2O, are also very good neutron moderators. Thus, while increasing the converters' thickness leads to an increase in the overall neutron yield, this causes the softening of the neutron spectrum, which reduces the neutron penetration especially in hydrogenous cargos. Photoneutron sources can be optimized to meet specific needs such as maximum fission signals in various cargo materials of interest. Efficient photoneutron sources with different energy spectra were investigated. Conversion efficiency of more than 10-4 neutron per 9 MeV electron yielding neutron intensities of more than 1011 n/s for commercial 100 μAmp electron accelerators has been modeled and designed. The simulation was validated in laboratory experiments using small Be and D2O converters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The detection and interdiction of concealed special nuclear material (SNM) in all modes of transport is one of the most critical security issues facing the United States and the rest of the world. In principle, detection of nuclear materials is relatively easy because of their unique properties: all of them are radioactive and all emit some characteristic gamma rays. A few emit neutrons as well. These signatures are the basis for passive non-intrusive detection of nuclear materials. The low energy of the radiations necessitates additional means of detection and validation. These are provided by high-energy x-ray radiography and by active inspection based on inducing nuclear reactions in the nuclear materials. Positive confirmation that a nuclear material is present or absent can be provided by interrogation of the inspected object with penetrating probing radiation, such as neutrons and photons. The radiation induces specific reactions in the nuclear material yielding, in turn, penetrating signatures which can be detected outside the inspected object. The “conventional” signatures are first and foremost fission signatures: prompt and delayed neutrons and gamma rays. Their intensity (number per fission) and the fact that they have broad energy (non-discrete, though unique) distributions and certain temporal behaviors are key to their use. The “non- conventional” signatures are not related to the fission process but to the unique nuclear structure of each element or isotope in nature. This can be accessed through the excitation of isotopic nuclear levels (discrete and continuum) by neutron inelastic scattering or gamma resonance fluorescence. Finally there is an atomic signature, namely the high atomic number (Z>74), which obviously includes all the nuclear materials and their possible shielding. The presence of such high-Z elements can be inferred by techniques using high-energy x rays. The conventional signatures have been addressed in another article. Non-conventional signatures and some of their current or potential uses will be discussed here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Detection and interdiction of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in transportation is one of the most critical security issues facing the United States. Active inspection by inducing fission in fissile nuclear materials, such as 235U and 239Pu, provides several strong and unique signatures that make the detection of concealed nuclear materials technically very feasible. Differential Die-Away Analysis (DDAA) is a very efficient, active neutron-based technique that uses the abundant prompt fission neutrons signature. It benefits from high penetrability of the probing and signature neutrons, high fission cross section, high detection sensitivity, ease of deployment and relatively low cost. DDAA can use any neutron source or energy as long as it can be suitably pulsed. The neutron generator produces pulses of neutrons that are directed into a cargo. As each pulse passes through the cargo, the neutrons are thermalized and absorbed. If SNM is present, the thermalized neutrons create a new source of (fission) neutrons with a distinctive time profile. An efficient laboratory system was designed, fabricated and tested under a US Government DHS DNDO contract. It was shown that a small uranium sample can be detected in a large variety of cargo types and configurations within practical measurement times using commercial compact (d,T) sources. Using stronger sources and wider detector distribution will further cut inspection time. The system can validate or clear alarms from a primary inspection system such as an automated x-ray system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]