Search

In the paper we build up the ontology of Leśniewski's type for formalizing synthetic propositions. We claim that for these propositions an unconventional square of opposition holds, where a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation. Further, we construct a non-Archimedean extension of Boolean algebra and show that in this algebra just two squares of opposition are formalized: conventional and the square that we invented. As a result, we can claim that there are only two basic squares of opposition. All basic constructions of the paper (the new square of opposition, the formalization of synthetic propositions within ontology of Leśniewski's type, the non-Archimedean explanation of square of opposition) are introduced for the first time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an attempt to find some new ways of tackling old problems about meaning, I explore some possible models in which meaning may be conceptually situated. I take a close look at a traditional realist conception of meaning and give some reasons as to why we may have more room to move within this than is immediately apparent. Alternative frameworks are explored along the way. The approach of thus situating meaning is an ontological one, but it is also an epistemological, as well as a hermeneutical one; in that the models put forward illuminate central issues and offer potential solutions to outstanding puzzles ranging across (at least) all of these broad realms of enquiry. Such solutions give a set of initial conceptualizations of the potential role meaning can play across broader frameworks of enquiry. As such they offer fresh inroads into otherwise deadlocked debates over the nature and place of meaning across philosophical enquiry in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper considers the last philosophical investigations and achievements in Bulgaria in the field of applied ontologies. It begins with a general review of the essence of ontology as a philosophical discipline and its close relationship with human knowledge as well as with the function of ontology as technology for the systematization of knowledge. Next the new arguments are considered in favour of the usefulness of process ontology as a general ontological framework, especially the basic statements of the theory of general processes, and the relationship of process ontology with the hierarchical levels of reality. It is paid a special attention on the substantiation and description of the differences between process and event in philosophical literature in the framework of contemporary process ontology. Finally, possible application is considered of process ontologies for the investigation and achievement of new knowledge with the help, first, of a formal-ontological model of the theory of general processes using an example of mereological formalization of dynamic (process) ontology, and second, of a process ontological approach to the investigation of the so-called anticipatory systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a binary predicate “... causes ...” and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately captured within a corresponding formalism, proponents of slingshots usually take the adequacy of their formalizations for granted without justifying it. The first part of this paper argues that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot, viz. the one e.g. presented by Davidson (Essays on actions and events. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), can indeed be refuted for relying on an inadequate formal apparatus. In contrast, the formal means of Gödel’s (The philosophy of Betrand Russell. New York, Tudor, 1944) often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper. Nonetheless, I contend that Gödel’s slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation would like it to do. It provides good reasons for (i) but not for (ii). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basis of science is the hypothetico-deductive method and the recording of experiments in sufficient detail to enable reproducibility. We report the development of Robot Scientist "Adam," which advances the automation of both. Adam has autonomously generated functional genomics hypotheses about the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae and experimentally tested these hypotheses by using laboratory automation. We have confirmed Adam's conclusions through manual experiments. To describe Adam's research, we have developed an ontology and logical language. The resulting formalization involves over 10,000 different research units in a nested treelike structure, 10 levels deep, that relates the 6.6 million biomass measurements to their logical description. This formalization describes how a machine contributed to scientific knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing relevant literature regarding approaches to context formalisation is analysed in search of a characterisation that explains the links - suggested by knowledge theory of the firm - between knowledge integration capability and common knowledge types. The ontological and the syntactic-semantic-pragmatic continuum approaches reveal an extensive description of context, which contributes to the understanding of the knowledge integration process, and to an eventual operationalisation of common knowledge types. This theoretical development opens possibilities for the elaboration of prescriptive models that support the integration of knowledge during routine operations of the organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been several obstacles to an embrace of critical theoretical work in GIScience; chief among them is the barrier between conceptualization and formalization. Early critics of the technology were not cognizant that technological change must be implemented within the language of code. While critics expressed their concerns in a theoretical and esoteric language, increasingly GIScientists are at pains to address the same issues so that solutions can be incorporated into software technologies. Indeed an implicit recognition of the important divide between informal and formal environments has aided GIScience researchers in developing strategies to represent multiple epistemologies in GIS. The article begins with a review of early critical GIScience, examines the degree of its acceptance in the light of a content analysis of GIS journals, and then illustrates that the issue of multiple representation of the same reality is being addressed under the rubric of ontologies. New research in this area has had significant impact on GIScience because it has been articulated and addressed at both the conceptual and formal stages—a criterion for real changes to both GISystems and GIScience. The article concludes with an examination of why critical GIS remains relevant to the discipline, in spite of efforts to address issues of representation within GIScience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with a study which analyzed how geographic objects have been produced through data models and legitimized through academic research and discussion. Historical overview of unconsciousness; Metaphysical discussions in geographic information systems (GIS); Relationship between ontology and GIS; Discussion on formalization in GIS.

The article discusses the analysis of the web-based pro-anorexic (ana) movement group which has challenged the biomedical ideas that surround the treatment for anorexia in terms of normalization of the body shape and weight. The group has considered the anorexic condition as a state of stability and control in which they provide a non judgmental support and guidance to manage anorexia. The researcher has illustrated the way that the pro-ana movement has enabled the existence of an embodied anorexic ontology and epistemology. The emergence of the group has been maintained by the establishment of an ana-language and formalization, legalization and creation of an ana rituals as well as behavior patterns.

In this paper the question is addressed to what extent the collective processes in a multi-agent society can be interpreted as single agent processes. This question is answered by formal analysis and simulation. It is shown for an example process how it can be conceptualised, formalised and simulated in two different manners: from a single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social) perspective. Moreover, it is shown how an ontological mapping can be formally defined between the two formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic properties. Thus it is shown how collective behaviour can be interpreted in a formal manner as single agent behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]