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The relationship between personality traits and biased assimilation, evaluating arguments, and persuasive messages more favorably if supporting pre‐existing attitudes, lacks adequate research. Research suggests that higher narcissistic traits are associated with biased reactions. Additionally, research suggests that people with greater scientific reasoning abilities have more biased reactions to information that challenges their attitude, as they more easily locate flaws on topics that oppose their beliefs. Participants (N = 260) completed measures to identify their views on trans bathroom use, as well as other personality and attitude measures. They were randomly assigned to read one of the two articles using fake scientific data that either supported trans people using a bathroom reflecting their gender identity or that they should use a bathroom matching their sex‐assigned at birth. Participants rated the quality of the article significantly higher when their opinion on bathroom use was congruent with the article than when it was incongruent. We used regression analyses with participants' perceptions of the quality of the article as the outcome variable and scientific reasoning scores, narcissism personality index scores, open‐mindedness scores as predictor variables. In the mismatch group, the higher the scores on scientific reasoning, the lower the ratings of the quality of the opinion incongruent article. In the match group, the higher the scores on open‐mindedness, the lower the ratings of the quality of the opinion congruent article. This research suggests that bias reduction is necessary to function in a world where scientific facts are called into question on a consistent basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If preference-inconsistent information initiates more effortful cognitive analysis than does preference-consistent information, then people should be more sensitive processors of information they do not want to believe than of information they do want to believe. Three studies supported this prediction. Study 1 found that inferences drawn from favorable interpersonal feedback revealed a correspondence bias, whereas inferences drawn from unfavorable feedback were sensitive to situational constraint. Study 2 showed this sensitivity to the quality of unfavorable feedback to disappear under cognitive load. Study 3 showed that evaluations of the accuracy of favorable medical diagnoses were insensitive to the probability of alternative explanation, whereas evaluations of unfavorable diagnoses were sensitive to probability information. The importance of adaptive considerations in theories of motivated reasoning is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]