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One hundred years after the birth of Leopoldo Zea, one of the most prominent philosophers of Latin America, in this paper we reflect on the role of the human being in history and the philosophy proposed by the author. We gather his vision about the Western philosophical heritage, anthropocentric and Eurocentric, facing the possibility of generating from our region a philosophy centered on the idea that all humans are human. Thus, we will unveil his criticism to the pretension of a universal Man and we will make visible his anthropological and humanist proposal, from which he manifests the need of recognition, from the cultural diversity, of all human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines two influential essays: The Study of Nature and the Vision of God, by the early twentieth century Canadian idealist, George John Blewett, and The Politics of Recognition by the contemporary Canadian social and political philosopher, Charles Taylor. In considering these very different essays, an effort is made to illuminate shared concerns, methods, and perspectives in an attempt to articulate and to support the idea of a distinctive Canadian tradition in philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A discussion of the account of recognition latent in the relational interpretation of moral requirements. I show how an appealing conception of recognition falls out of this interpretation, which treats moral norms as directed requirements that specify what we owe to others, and that correspond to claims on the part of those at whom they are directed. It is argued that relations of accountability, in which we demand of each other compliance with moral requirements, can be understood to involve demands for interpersonal recognition within the relational interpretation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the value of interpersonal recognition, understood in relational terms, considering the perspectives both of claimholders and of the agents who owe them moral consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second‐personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second‐personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the constant and ongoing search of a scientific reliability, Hermeneutics validates a real modification of the human questioning, and makes the relay between the faculty of reasoning and the action. It inaugurates new perspectives by creating the link between the passivity of theory and the activity of practice. The most important perspective is Clinical Philosophy, considering Hermeneutics as a process of therapeutic work and a practical form of philosophizing. Hermeneutics is qualified as a critical and dialectical medium in order to elucidate the questioning of being, proving that everyone is a continuous project in life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Reflexe is the property of OIKOYMENH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How is it possible for a picture to depict a picture? Proponents of perceptual theories of depiction, who argue that the content of a picture is determined, in part, by the visual state it elicits in suitable viewers, that is, by a state of seeing-in, have given a plausible answer to this question. They say that a picture depicts a picture, in part, because, under appropriate conditions of observation, a suitable viewer will be able to see a picture in the picture. In this article, I first argue that this answer is in conflict with the way in which some of the most influential perceptual theories of depiction - Robert Hopkins's version of the experienced resemblance theory and Dominic Lopes's version of the recognition theory - construe seeing-in. I then formulate a version of the recognition theory that avoids this conflict and show how it can explain the depiction of pictures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the meaning and function of saññā in perception. "Recognition" seems to be the best translation for sahha, since this term conveys the sense of both cognizing and naming, which are the two main activities carried out by saññā. Saññā collects the not yet well-defined information provided by the senses and, also through its comparative function, organizes this information into a datum that is so made available to the consciousness (viññāṇa). Saññā processes both simple data like color, and complex phenomena like death or danger. Saññā can, however, fail in its task to recognize things. Key terms: Buddhist theory of mind, Buddhist theory of perception, Pali Canon, phassa, recognition, saññā, vedanā, viññāṇa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work, which is mainly based on a Western view and which takes into account the reality in Spain, is a reflection about the role Philosophy nowadays has. Taking both Philosophy for Children and Philosophy for Peace as its references, this study understands the Philosophical thinking as necessary to produce the indignation that will make the organization of social movements possible, provoking at the same time the opportunity to imagine peaceful alternatives for human suffering and the natural one. The analysis of indignation is done through Peter Frederick Strawson's theory in connection with Honneth's research about recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two ways in which sense has been approached in contemporary philosophy. The dividing line is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition and those who determine sense as arising with paradox. In The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze puts forth a paradoxical constitution of sense in order to render that which is new in being something untimely, the always new in being. In placing paradox at the center of the constitution of sense, Deleuze effectively works to displace the two aspects of doxa, good sense and common sense. Such a conception of sense comes into direct tension with Husserl's theory of sense. By outlining the fundamentals of Husserl's position, I intend to show on what points the two part ways. This distinction will create the context in which we can posit the relationship of transcendental and formal logic in Deleuze's philosophy via Sartre's essay "The Transcendence of the Ego." My aim is to show that the doubling of sense does not reinforce the act of recognition, which Husserl realizes in the two-leveled predicative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Jena writings. According to the author Hegel's writings established the basics of Naturphilosophie of recognition, the evolution cognitive relation to oneself. It is stated that Hegel described vital movement of organism as a group of three processes that include internal growth, preservation through consumption of internal inorganic and oraganic nature.

Honneths theory of recognition has been broadly discussed as a central approach of critical social theory. Taking this seriously, the article traces first the main assumptions of Honneths approach and his examination of the main structures of society and therefor of the recognition-theoretical turn. Secondly, some major objections formulated by Nancy Fraser und Christoph F. Zurn and Jean-Philippe Derantys defence of Honneths approach wiIl be discussed. Third, the article will argue that Honneths attempt to reformulate a normative critical social theory fails to grasp its object - society - adequately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on animal welfare which can be grounded within the ethical life and concept of recognition of philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. It states that inflicting of pain in animals lowers ethical status of human beings and so recognition of their protection from harm should be defended on those grounds. According to Hegel, abusing animals is not just wrong for animals but is also degrades human beings in terms of ethics.

This article engages Axel Honneth's recent work on Georg Lukács' concept of reification in order to formulate a politically relevant and historically specific critique of capitalism that is applicable to theorizing contemporary democratic practice. I argue that Honneth's attempt to reorient the critique of reification within the terms of a theory of recognition has done so at the cost of sacrificing the core of the concept, which forged a connection between the socio-political analysis of capitalist domination and an analysis of the unengaged, spectatorial stance of human beings toward the world, showing how they together impede emancipatory social transformation. In order to accomplish the unfinished task of rendering the critique of reification applicable to contemporary critical theory, I seek to synthesize the advantages of Honneth's approach, which focuses on the normative aspects of the critique of reification, with Lukács' emphasis on the practical, political-economic dimensions of reification and the historically specific pathologies of the capitalist social form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often thought that Hegel's social philosophy is straightforwardly hostile toward liberal ideals. In this article, I contend that many such suspicions can be dispelled through a more nuanced engagement with his rhetorical and argumentative strategies. To tackle such a broad topic in this space, I focus on the shortcomings of a rights-based individualism within the Philosophy of Right - where Hegel describes civil society as a 'semblance' [Schein] of a rational polity. Although such passages might suggest the collectivism that has long haunted his legacy, I propose that he is offering something rather more normatively attractive. More specifically, I argue that his grammar of recognition disinters the suppressed social conditions for those rights (and the individuality they protect) that are often misrecognized as foundational by liberal theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the aesthetic aspects of creation. The author mentions that he will not touch aesthetics as practiced by philosophers in tackling the aesthetic aspect of creation, but will rather focus on the philosophical tradition of creation. He pleads for a less negative view of history and artistic creation, one that is not underpinned by Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. The author emphasizes that aesthetic creation should be based on cognition and recognition rather than on dialectic subversion of tradition.

Recognition of phenomenological tendencies in several dozen disciplines beyond philosophy raises the question of how phenomenology in general might be defined prior to specification in terms of the agendas of the particular disciplines. After an attempt at an answer to this question, some observations concerning the possible benefits of interdisciplinary encounters, especially for philosophical phenomenology, are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Politique et Sociétés is the property of Politique et Societes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses Axel Honneth's critique of Hegel's analysis of recognition and proposes an alternative approach to the problem that is based on a more hermeneutical view of Hegelian philosophy. The author demonstrates that the change in Hegel's conception of the political realm during his later years in Jena contributed to his "Phenomenology of Spirit's" interesting and relevant analysis of the concept of recognition.

Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as colour universals. Shade a is different from shade b iff it is possible to distinguish a from b visually. In this paper I will argue that the standard argument is based on a mistaken view of inference. We can correctly draw inferences from a demonstrative judgement about something x, even if we are not able to recognise or re-identify the previously demonstrated x during our reasoning. We are prima facie entitled to rely on our preservative memory as retaining our initial demonstrative apprehension of x. The fact that preservative memory entitles us to assume sameness of referent over time is linguistically manifest in the use of anaphoric pronouns: if we can no longer recognise and demonstrate our original demonstratum, we can use anaphoric expressions to pick it up, thereby ensuring sameness of reference. (‘That is a nice bird. Now it has vanished. So there is a nice bird that has just vanished.’) Since preservation of the initial episode of apprehending x grounds our reasoning from demonstrative judgements, there is no longer a reason to require demonstrative concepts to be recognitional capacities. The standard argument does not get off the ground. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article consists in the reconstruction of the social-philosophical model of struggle for recognition that discloses the normative grammar of social life. For this purpose the author carries out the analysis of the basic normative principles of recognition and the main strategies of their justifications in the works of A. Honneth, N. Fraser, Ch. Taylor. On the basis of the obtained research results the following inferences are drawn: firstly, under the conditions of postmodern societies moral foundations of social interactions cannot be reduced to the universal principle of equality and in this case turn out to be the conflict-laden integration of different normative obligations. Secondly, the justification of moral principles should be carried out by the constellation of the methodological approaches of the philosophical anthropology, social and discursive theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proceeding from the question, «What compels a moral (sittliches) life and by means of what structures?» the author subjects to the critical consideration A. Honneth's statement about normative monism of recognition in the sphere of morals. The article analyzes how (on what methodical bases) the universalization of the relation of recognition, that presupposes bringing various forms of social interrelation (namely: love, legal recognition and solidarity) to the uniform sample, the uniform logic of bilateral recognition, is reached. In this connection it is shown, that such bringing is possible at the cost of ignoring of own ethical potential of such forms of intersubjective experience as the relation between the sexes and the adult-child relation. In respect of the ideas history there comes to light the irrelevance of Honneth's interpretation of Hegel to the key thesis of the philosophy of spirit (resp. the philosophy of Sittlichkeit) of the German classic. The author specifies the possibility of alternative actualizing Hegel's reading, which could overcome reductionism and conceptual dead-ends of the position of the methodical individualism represented by Honneth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the interpretation of philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel on mutual recognition. It discusses the proper understanding of the account of recognition in "Foundations of Natural Right," by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which grasps the full meaning of Hegel's account on the recognition in the "System of Ethical Life." It delineates the argument of Fichte which states that the sciences of right and morality are distinct autonomous disciplines. It cites Fichte's hypothesis of egoism, his idea on the relationship between right and morality, and his insights on free efficacy. He also claims that recognition can occur only if it is mutual or reciprocal. Neohouser's arguments on "Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality" are also presented.

The article discusses the importance of group identity or social characteristics and their relation to individualism and liberalism. Social contract theorists consider the notion of social recognition as zero-sum game, that is a condition in which no participant can gain unless someone loses, as an obstacle to the development of a political theory. The possibility of social recognition beyond hierarchy is explored by citing Charles Taylor's "Politics of Recognition," which tackles canon formation and cultural separatism. The Hegelian notion of recognition as a condition for the emergence of self-consciousness is discussed.

The article addresses the concepts of reconciliation and recognition, especially in relation to the domains of philosophy and rhetoric. The divorce of philosophy from rhetoric was said by Theodor Adorno to be akin to barbarism, and the title of the journal under review would seem to express a conciliatory interest--"Philosophy AND Rhetoric." Looking to the violence of some political situations, it would seem that recognition must precede reconciliation. The example is adduced of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

There is a growing feeling that analytic philosophy is in crisis. At the same time there is a widespread and primafacie attractive conception of analytic philosophy which implies that it equates to good philosophy. In recognition of these conflicting tendencies, my paper raises the question of whether anything could be wrong with analytic philosophy. In section 11 indicate why analytic philosophy cannot be defined by reference to geography, topics, doctrines or even methods. This leaves open the possibility that analytic philosophy is a style of philosophizing (section 2). According to what I call a rationalist conception, the distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy is that it is guided by the ideal of rational argument. This conception implies that 'analytic philosophy' is an honorific title. In section 3 I point out that the rationalist definition yields a different extension for `analytic philosophy' than commonly recognized. Section 4 defends the appeal to ordinary use in debates about the nature of analytic philosophy. Section 5 grants that there is an honorific use of the label, while also pointing out that the rationalist-cum-honorific conception is at odds with a more wide-spread and entrenched taxonomic practice. Section 6 alleges that the rationalist conception boils down to a `persuasive definition' of analytic philosophy, and argues in favour of a more neutral philosophical taxonomy. Section 7 argues that analytic philosophy is an intellectual tradition held together both by lines of influence and by family-resemblances. The consequences for my topic are two-fold. First, there could obviously be something wrong with this intellectual tradition; secondly, the question whether there is something wrong needs to be raised separately with respect to individual phases or sections of that tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis. Gymnica is the property of Palacky University in Olomouc and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, I make a contribution to a naturalistically-minded theory of truthmakers by proposing a solution to the nasty problem of truthmakers for negative truths. After formulating the difficulty, I consider and reject a number of solutions to the problem, including Armstrong's states of affairs of totality, incompatibility accounts, and JC Beall's polarity view. I then defend the position that absences of truthmakers are real and are responsible for making negative truths true (and positive falsehoods false). According to the positive account of absences I offer, absences of contingent states of affairs are causally relevant mind-independent features of the physical world, located within space and time, and capable of being discovered by scientific inquiry. Recognition of the reality of absences strengthens truthmaker theory as a naturalistic metaphysics, as truth and falsity of each and every contingent proposition finds an ontological grounding in some region of the physical universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The frequent use in clinical practice of the concept of borderline state or the difficulty in taking responsibility for this type of patient led us to a study and exploration of their essence. An ethical reflection must be made by taking the risk of approaching philosophical concepts such as immediacy, receptivity and recognition. Starting from a detailed case, we combine a clinical reading with the experimental and phenomenological implications. Our Study is based on four authors (L. Binswanger, B. Kimura, H. Maldiney, P. Ricœur [1–4]). We feel that Borderland or Border line patients need to be reintroduced into the flow of the world, many of them are vegetating and follow whatever path or action comes to hand. Borderland patients suffer from an axiological disorder comparable to the “As if” structures theorised by H. Deutch. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article examines the argument that moral, human and legal rights require social recognition. It describes what moral rights from the perspective of recognition theorists. It states the independence thesis and considers some examples that clarify this thesis. It discusses how independence theorists view moral rights and social recognition. It considers the legal rights enforcement thesis from the perspective of both recognition and independence theorists. Finally, it presents rationales for recognition thesis.

The article presents German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel's concept of mutual recognition. For Hegel, the ideal relation that two self-conscious beings might have to each other is one of reciprocal mutual recognition. Self-consciousness is defined by its being recognized as self-conscious by another self-consciousness. The fully educated Hegelian moral subject is self-determining, and is capable of making and pursuing its own ends. The article author is of the view that the very possibility of self-determination is undermined by the doctrine of mutual recognition, not by consciousness becoming subject to the recognition bestowed by others, but rather because of the very nature of its own act of recognition itself.

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Argues that the proposed requirement for a cognitive state to be intentional does not rely on controversial internalist assumptions. Buddhist defense; Manifestation of the acquisition of recognitional capacities; Appeal made to save the Yogacara-Sautrantika view from the charge of incoherence.

Over the past 20 years post-structuralist scholars have produced critiques of the field of development. In some circles it is now quite broadly accepted that this approach is futile and that we ought to move into a 'post-discourse' era. By way of counterpoint, this paper argues that such exchanges are based on misrecognitions whose acceptance forecloses possibilities that both critics and their detractors would welcome. The paper is broken into two sections. The first engages problems ascribed to post-structuralist critiques that seem to have been particularly successful in discouraging further engagement. The second explores three aspects of a single moment of post-structuralist thought that have been obscured by current debate. Engaging these aspects, while bringing difficulties of its own, may secure conditions necessary for the emergence of the sorts of partnerships often claimed as necessary both by developers and by their post-structuralist critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proposes that Georg Hegel's 'theory of recognition' is intended as an answer to a specific question in his sytematic philosophy. Theory of ethical life of the ethical community; Need for an adequate account of Hegel's speculative notion of freedom; Identification of the 'state' in a 'state' theory of freedom.

Discusses the elements of moral psychology that posed problems for Immanuel Kant's moral philosophical concept of practical reason as will. Rationality as interest; Relation between reason and recognition; Question of choice in Kant's concept.

Discusses the unmediated recognition for anti-realists. Ability of human beings to perform various tasks of direct recognition; Apprehension of the alien language by the blind; Limitations of a person's direct recognitional capacity.

Discusses a study which showed that aspect recognition is a central concept in the discussion of the paradox of rule following and that it lies at the core of Wittgenstein's thought. Centrality of aspect recognition; Concept of aspect recognition; Analysis of the book `The Wind in the Willows.'

The present study investigated the effects of arousal on facial recognition. It was hypothesized that recognition accuracy would decrease as self-reported arousal increased. Arousal was manipulated through the presence/absence of electrical shock. Because self-reports of arousal differed significantly across the two conditions for female subjects but not for males, only the data from females were used. As predicted, recognition accuracy was lower in the high arousal condition than in the moderate arousal condition. Some evidence of an own-sex bias was found but no own-race bias was observed. About onethird of all subjects showed a significant positive relationship between recognition accuracy and degree of confidence in their judgments. Averaged across subjects, the relationship between confidence and accuracy was small but statistically significant. Implications of these findings for highly-arousing crime situations are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the link between the metonymic chain and the implication that the norms of the normal and the criteria that determines the canonical. Every system of classification works on the rules of inclusion and exclusion whether it is pragmatic in nature. With this regard, a new imaginary is being created that mediates the affective relation between the subjective and the social, and so correlating the relationship with the process of recognition. On the other hand, the relation of ontology to ethics is explored.