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The objective of this paper is twofold. First, I present a framework called historical coherentism (Chang, 2004; Tal, 2016; Van fraassen 2008) and argue that it is the best epistemological framework available to tackle the problem of coordination, an epistemic conundrum that arises with every attempt to provide empirical content to scientific theories, models or statements. Second, I argue that the problem of coordination, which has so far been theorized only in the context of measurement practices (Reichenbach, 1927; Chang, 2001; Tal, 2012; Van fraassen 2008), can be generalized beyond the philosophy of measurement. Specifically, it will be shown that the problem is embodied in classificatory practices and that, consequently, historical coherentism is well suited to analyze these practices as well as metrological ones. As a case study, I look at a contemporary debate in phylogenetics, regarding the evolutionary origin of a newly identified archaeal phylum called Methanonatronarchaeia. Exploring this debate through the lens of historical coherentism provides a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the field and a foothold for critical analyses of the standard rationale used by practitioners., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Hermann Weyl's philosophical reflections remain a topic of considerable interest in the history and philosophy of science. In particular, Weyl's commitment to a form of idealism, as it pertains to his reading of Husserl and Fichte, has garnered much discussion. However, much less attention has been given to Weyl's later, and at that only partial, turn towards a form of empiricism (i.e. from the late 1920s onward). This lack of focus on Weyl's later philosophy has tended to obscure some of the most significant lessons that Weyl sought to draw from his decades of research in the foundations of mathematics and physics. In this paper, I develop some aspects of what I will term as Weyl's 'modest' empiricism. I will argue that Weyl's turn toward empiricism can be read in the context of a development of Helmholtz's epistemological program and his unique form of 'Kantianism'. The hope is that this reading will not only provide a better understanding of Weyl's later thought, especially his (1954) criticism of Cassirer, but that it may also provide the basis for a novel 'Weylian' account of the mathematization of nature underwriting the group-theoretic methodology of parts of modern physics., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

The paper focuses on the relevance of Kant's anthropologically oriented idea of the pragmatic use of reason for specific theoretical approaches in sociology. As I show in the first part, Kant's explicit presence in 20th-century sociology does not refer much to his anthropology and specifically to its cornerstone - the pragmatic use of reason which establishes a subtle connection between the theoretical and practical functions of reason. As an instrument for gaining systematic knowledge about the social world and ourselves as beings both passively and actively involved in this process, Kant's pragmatic use of reason serves a specific form of the theoretical use of reason. At the same time, it embodies a kind of practical reasoning concerning the "general welfare" in the social sphere. Building on the key arguments in the first part, I then address the question of whether we can view Kant's pragmatic approach as a possible third way for sociology today, beyond the simplifying opposition of 'theoretical' normativity and 'realistic' empiricism, and whether this third way can help us in clearing specific sociological issues. Here, I focus on two examples, namely the use of Kant's notion of "unsocial sociability" in Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory and on the criticism of Kant's cosmopolitanism in Ulrich Beck's reformed sociology of cosmopolitanism., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The current interlinked environmental and socioeconomic global crises constitute the gravest threat to humanity's well-being, indeed survival, today. Studies of the historical roots and contemporary manifestations of the various elements of these crises-including accelerating environmental degradation, unfettered capitalist technoscientific/industrial expansion, overpopulation, and overconsumption-are plentiful. Also well-known is the influence of Francis Bacon's writings, particularly The Advancement of Learning (1605), Novum Organon (1620), and the utopian New Atlantis (1627), on the development of empiricism and the modern scientific method as well as the reform and organization of scientific research. Bacon's significance for the founding of the Royal Society of London (1660) and for the plan and structure of the Encyclopedie (1751-1772), coupled with his oft-cited aphoristic injunctions to study nature to control/dominate it, are staples in the lore and justification of technoscience. I argue that the enduring appeal of so-called Baconianism derives, in part, from a fundamental misappropriation of certain of Bacon's original ideas. Specifically, the complex ethical and religious framework within which Bacon situated his vision of scientific and technological development was discarded (or ignored) so that, by the early decades of the 18th century, Baconianism had come to be understood almost exclusively for its utilitarian role in society. This deracinated version became the familiar trope of technoscience's unlimited potential to transform nature (including human nature and behavior) in the service of an ideology of industrial/consumerist expansion since then. Linkage between the history of science/technology and addictive consumerism, apparent by the close of the 19th century, has been insufficiently examined. Such addictive consumerist behavior and continued virtually unregulated industrialization and production, were effectively removed from ethical scrutiny and a high degree of material acquisition and personal/societal rapaciousness became the norm rather than the exception in most countries. I suggest that further historical deconstruction of this denuded Baconianism will yield important insights in the search for viable solutions to the present global socioenvironmental crises., (© 2021 Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

This paper addresses the debated issue of abstract language in the framework of embodiment. First, we discuss the notion of abstractness in the light of the Western philosophical thought, with a focus on the English empiricist tradition. Second, we review the most relevant psychological models and neuroscientific empirical findings on abstract language. It turns out that abstract words are not such, because their meaning is "far from experience", but, because of the high complexity of the attached experiential clusters. Finally, we spell out the consequences of this understanding of abstractness in relation to the neural mechanisms subserving abstract language processing. If abstract words, as compared to concrete ones, imply an increasing complexity of the associated experiential clusters, then the processing of abstract language relies on the recruitment of several neural substrates coding for those experiences. We forward that, at the neural level, this complexity is coded by means of three main mechanisms: (1) the recruitment of the motor representations of different biological effectors (abstract meaning as effector-unspecific); (2) the recruitment of different systems, including sensory, motor, and emotional ones (abstract meaning as multi-systemic); (3) the recruitment of neural substrates coding for social contexts and levels of self-relatedness (abstract meaning as dynamic). As compared to the current approaches in the literature on abstract language that combine embodiment with some a-modal aspects, our proposal is fully embodied and rules out additional aspects. Our proposal may spur future empirical research on abstract language in the embodied approach.

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse.

This article is about the ethics of the will that is caused by modern ideology of our century. The will, becomes desire, turns on itself to increase its own power. The ethics of the will is based on the decision of an individual, which prioritizes its will over reason and find many obstacles to act freely. Kant to avoid the moral limits of an arbitrary will, distinguishes the empirical subject, determined by their appetites, from the moral or rational subject, with a free will of conditioning. The ethics of the will is a reflection of Kant's empirical subject and current ideologies. Against ideologies the classical tradition is proposed, an ethic that reflects on human life and the realization of man in the world.

Deductive and inductive reasoning both played an essential part in Freud's construction of psychoanalysis. In this paper, the author explores the happy marriage of empiricism and rationalism in Freud's use of deductive reasoning in the construction of psychoanalytic theory. To do this, the author considers three major amendments Freud made to his theory: (i) infant and childhood sexuality, (ii) the structural theory, and (iii) the theory of signal anxiety. Ultimately, the author argues for, and presents Freud as a proponent of, the epistemological position that he calls critical realism., (© 2014 The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc.)

Scientists have rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification that are enforced with significant punishments, such as loss of funding, termination of employment, or imprisonment. These rules pertain to data that describe observable and unobservable entities. In this commentary I argue that scientists would not adopt rules that impose harsh penalties on researchers for data fabrication or falsification unless they believed that an aim of scientific research is to develop true theories and hypotheses about entities that exist, including unobservable ones. This argument presents a challenge for constructive empiricists, such as van Fraassen. Constructive empiricists need to be able to explain why rules pertaining to data fabrication and falsification do not threaten their philosophy of science.

One of the overriding goals of Healthy People 2010 is to reduce the health disparities observed among Americans. Because workers in small businesses tend to have little or no access to health screening or preventive health education programs, they may be unaware of their unique risk factors and are thus more at risk of cardiovascular disease (CVD). Furthermore, occupational health nurses are more likely to be available in health programs to employees in large rather than small businesses. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how nursing values and philosophy might influence public health nurses' thinking about nursing science and ethical issues relating to the risk of CVD among low-wage workers. The following questions will guide the exploration of health disparities among low-wage workers: (a) What are the health disparities observed among low-wage workers with CVD risk? (b) What are the philosophical and ethical perspectives on the issues presented? (c) Based on these findings, how should limited resources be allocated? and (d) How does this affect nursing? These approaches will provide the foundation for developing a culturally sensitive ethical and philosophical perspective to prevent CVD and promote cardiovascular health among low-wage workers., (© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)

In the present paper we reflect on some critically important issues in theory construction from the point of view of a practicing scientist. The starting point is to suggest the need for a minimal base of common agreement on the role of successfully working theories. It is proposed that scientific knowledge is not composed of singular facts but rather of relational structures connecting facts. Useful theories are both receptive and productive. Theories provide models, i.e., idealised representations of reality, expressed, in their most developed phases, in a mathematically formalised language. We further focus on the notions of rationality and universality, and show that these are mutually related and actually inseparable. Universality means description of observable phenomena in terms of universally valid laws that are essentially of a rational character, i.e., stated in terms of relational invariants preserved in variant, contingent conditions. Law-like components of a theory are universal by definition, not given by circumstances, and rational by their form, not by their content. Facts, on the other hand, are irrational elements unless they can be derived from law-like relations of another theory. Relational definition of rationality is self-consistent and independent from vaguely defined notions like 'reason'. Pertinent to studies of human nature, including psychophysiology, is the problem of individuality. To reconcile the claim of universality with an adequate account of unique individuality, we advocate a 'distributed nomothesis', distinguishing first-order laws ruling in an individual 'idioversum', from the higher-order, universal laws. Idioversal laws play the role of 'facts' in construction of universal theories.

A summary of the influence of positivistic philosophy and empiricism on the field of psychology is followed by a critique of the empirical method. The dialectic process is advocated as an alternative method of inquiry. The main advantage of the dialectic method is that it is open to any logical argument, including empirical hypotheses, but unlike empiricism, it does not automatically reject arguments that are not based on observable data. Evolutionary and moral psychology are discussed as examples of important fields of study that could benefit from types of arguments that frequently do not conform to the empirical standards of systematic observation and falsifiability of hypotheses. A dialectic method is shown to be a suitable perspective for those fields of research, because it allows for logical arguments that are not empirical and because it fosters a functionalist perspective, which is indispensable for both evolutionary and moral theories. It is suggested that all psychologists may gain from adopting a dialectic approach, rather than restricting themselves to empirical arguments alone.

Let me recapitulate. I am not happy with developments in the behavioral sciences. I wonder whether science does actually stand divorced from the intention, motive, and character of the scientist. I suspect that some of our current philosophies in science, whether so conceived or not, encourage and abet a science of the trivial. I believe we should recognize that, as epistemology, the empirical rule cannot stand alone. The great advances in science are associated with its grand conceptions even more than with its discoveries. We often mistakenly assume that the rule of objectivity has traditionally divided the character of science from that of the scientist. This is far from true. The objectivity of 18th- and 19th- century science was believed to be a function not so much of methodology and procedure as of the honesty and integrity of the scientist. Michael Faraday had this to say about the matter (3, p. 233): It puzzles me greatly to know what makes the successful philosopher [scientist]. Is it industry and perseverance, with a moderate proportion of good sense and intelligence? Is not a modest assurance or earnestness a requisite? Do not many fail because they look rather to the renown to be acquired than to the pure acquisition of knowledge, and the delight which the contented mind has in acquiring it for its own sake? I am sure I have seen many who would have been good and successful pursuers of science, and have gained themselves a high name, but that it was the name and the reward they were always looking forward to-the reward of the world's praise. In such there is always a shade of envy or regret over their minds, and I cannot imagine a man making discoveries in science under these feelings. As to Genius and its Power, there may be cases; I suppose there are. I have looked long and often for a genius for our own laboratory, but I have never found one. But I have seen many who would, I think, if they submitted themselves to a sound self-applied discipline of mind, have become successful experimental philosophers. Are these issues native only to behavioral science? Earlier, I laid at Skinner's door much of the blame for an unreasonable complacency regarding the disposition of modern behavioral science. In all fairness to Skinner, however, it is only correct to acknowledge that the same problem is evident in other areas of science. Skinner appears to be a spokesman, in the behavioral sciences, for one of those famous "Zeitgeists." Let me quote a series of observations by Paul Weiss, a biologist at the Rockefeller Institute, New York City, from a paper entitled "Experience and experiment in biology" (5): Without imagination one can contrive infinite variations of experimental set-ups, all of them novel, yet utterly uninteresting, inconsequential, insignificant. The mere fact that something has not been done or tried before is not sufficient reason for doing or trying it. . . . But is not scientific history full of instances of accidental discovery of the unexpected? True again, but he who does expect something will be on the alert even for the unexpected, while he who just ambles, looking for nothing in particular, is prone to miss even the obvious. . . . We see instruments turning from servants into tyrants, forcing the captive scientist to mass-produce and market senseless data beyond the point of conceivable usefulness-a modern version of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. . . . Finally, I recommend study of N. W. Storer's article "The coming changes in American science" (6). Storer, a sociologist at Harvard University, feels that prior to 1940 the basic currency in science was professional recognition. This in turn reinforced certain fundamental values-a high emphasis on communication; dedication of the individual and a tendency to work in small, select groups; a spurning of worldly gain and a proclivity for basic research. Today, professional recognition is being replaced by more common currencies-money, power, and worldly prestige. The result is a shift of values in science: numbers are no longer small or groups select; communication and professional recognition are viewed as means to gain money, power, and prestige rather than as ends in themselves; basic research is giving way to a kind of imposter with a thinly disguised commercial goal. I do not know how to resolve the issues in modern science. It seems to me we may be troubled by the embarrassments of too much success. Will we continue to succeed if we do not change our ways? Maybe, but not as magnificently I am sure as we could if we did change them. We cannot do anything about our numbers-nor would I want us to forswear all worldly possessions. We can examine critically and revise certain of our guiding philosophies. We can follow a suggestion of P. H. Abelson (7) and alter granting procedures so that institutions, as well as individuals, are given support. In the end, however, the major force for change resides in the minds and hearts of scientists who share a concern about science.

Quantitative research plays an instrumental role in facilitating health and wellness. Effective interventions are developed, assessed, and refined through the application of logic and empirical evidence in a scientific milieu characterized by diverse views. However, the increasing colonization of academic discourse by postmodern/critical theory (PCT) may undermine foundational concepts upon which quantitative research rests. The postpositivist tradition in which quantitative methods are embedded emphasizes probabilistic truth, logic, empirical evidence, and the interplay of diverse, frequently conflicting perspectives. Conversely, some currents of thought within PCT emphasize multiple realities, intuition, personal stories of lived experience, and the exclusion of views that challenge PCT tenets. The increasing adoption of these concepts in academia may limit or even delegitimize quantitative research as currently practiced in social work. We conclude by arguing that social work clients are best served by a scientific discourse that values multiple theoretical frameworks, research methodologies, and scientists operating from different social locations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a critical analysis of the concept of «universal concreteness» in Voltaire’s philosophy. The content of the ontological and epistemological foundations of Voltaire’s worldview in his historical-philosophical searches is revealed. The abstract nature of the principles of deism and «universal unity» in the philosophy of the French enlightener is the result of the influence of the one-sidedness of representatives of empiricism and rationalism. Voltaire and his associates in their philosophical constructions, argued G. Hegel, proceeded from the principle of universality and the embodiment of the concept of «wit», while the Germans relied on the possibilities of criticism of pure reason. The potential possibilities of the concept of «universal concreteness» in Voltaire’s worldview form the basis of his theoretical and practical philosophy, in particular of human existence, morality and free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to complicate the opposition between "thick description" and "thin" thought experiments by constructing a thought experiment of its own. It compares the use of examples—thick and thin—in the work of Malinowski and Wittgenstein, who came to extremely similar conclusions about the importance of context to meaning, the former around a decade before the latter. By imagining the—by no means implausible—possibility that Wittgenstein read Malinowski, the article asks how it might change anthropological views about thickness and thinness if it turned out that one of the major philosophical sources of our disciplinary preference for "thick description" as a generalized prescription for ethnography took some inspiration for such ideas from Malinowksi's more modest and restricted empiricism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experientialism in aesthetics is the view that the artistic merit or the aesthetic value of something is determined by the final value of certain experiences of it. These are usually specified as experiences of it with understanding and appreciation. Until recently, experientialism was the dominant view. Not anymore. Experientialists are now subject to a barrage of objections, many of which they have not answered. Here I argue that all of these objections fail. I develop a new form of experientialism that is immune to them. It also has an independent rationale. It incorporates an account of the value of art appreciation that is plausible in its own right. And it endorses many of the core insights of anti‐experientialists, especially concerning the final value of good art. Those of us unconvinced by experientialism need to take this form of it seriously. I conclude by identifying some genuine problems it faces. Even these aren't clearly insoluble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Correia and Rosenkranz have recently argued in Analysis (2020, 2022) that tense realism (understood as the view that there is a real difference between past, present and future) entails realism about temporal passage (and thus the idea that there is some change in which time is the present time). I argue that their argument is either unsound or question-begging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, we will revisit the relation between the respective conceptions of pure experience of Nishida Kitaro and William James. As various authors have previously shown, comparing Nishida and James can not only help us better understand both of their specific understandings of pure experience, and consequently its position within their respective enterprises, but also give a platform with which to see how these two authors could contribute to contemporary discussions on philosophical methodology. However, despite the long history of comparative research on these two thinkers, there is still no consensus about the extent to which Nishida's philosophy actually resembles James' work at all. Was Nishida's interest in James' work found only in superficial similarities between two authors interested in overcoming the subject–object distinction? Or did Nishida attempt to somehow develop or radicalize James' work, taking his notion of pure experience into the realm of religion and metaphysics? In this contribution, we will agree with previous authors who have argued that Nishida is best understood as trying to go beyond or develop James' work. However, we will make this claim with the caveat that James had good reason not to take the avenues Nishida pursued, and that Nishida's attempt to radicalize some ideas in James may have led to some difficult points within his early philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is sexual orientation? The contemporary consensus among philosophers is that it is a disposition. Unsurprisingly, recent debates about the metaphysics of sexual orientation are almost entirely intramural. Behavioral dispositionalists argue that sexual orientation is a disposition to behave sexually. Desire dispositionalists argue that it is a disposition to desire sexually. We argue that sexual orientation is not best understood in terms of dispositions to behave or dispositions to desire before arguing that dispositions tout court fail to illuminate sexual orientation. We then introduce and defend the idea that sexual orientation is best understood in terms of categorical phenomenal properties of sexual arousal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of new philosophies like rationalism, empiricism, and mechanistic philosophies of Descartes, Locke, Berkly, and Hume have influenced the development of science and the questioning of divine involvement in human events. As a result, the foundational principles upon which conventional theism had been built are almost entirely destroyed by this incident. In this sense, this article seeks to critically analyze how rationalism, empiricism, and moral subjectivism oppose or support Christian theism, which offers uniformity and assistance in understanding the nature and purpose of existence. Using the analytic approach, the study reveals that, given the heterogeneous and diverse character of the contemporary world, postmodern science and philosophical perspectives have now evolved to combat the pervasive effects of Christian theism. It further shows that the concepts, practices, and traditions founded on a philosophical understanding of Christianity make up the conceptual foundation of Christian theism. It concludes that Christian theism is preferable because it offers the foundation for social development and advancement and may create a world of peace via the application of its ethical and constitutional principles to promote enduring tranquility, prosperity, and equality in human society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or "truths of reason," or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila's view is contrasted to Plato's, in the Theaetetus, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (psychē). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we will try to identify the concrete ways in which John Locke describes the limits of toleration between different types of faith and its metaphysical foundations. From the beginning of his text A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke specifies that toleration is, first and foremost, a practical ideal and, secondly, a moral one. As such, toleration must be the essential feature of the true Church because in the field of religious faith any claimed superiority is in fact only the expression of the struggle for power and domination. A theoretical perspective on the idea of religious toleration is also recalled from Lockeˈs radical empiricism, which correlates man's identity with his appearance at birth, for the first time in the world, as a different form from others. Such a view is contrary to metempsychosis which could lead to innate ideas in the human soul about moral principles and especially about God, as Plato or Descartes believed. Starting from the principles of toleration, John Locke's idea was to find those elements through which a fundamental separation between the Church and the State could be achieved. But toleration ceases when the Church and the State merge discreetly until they can no longer distinguish the boundaries between them. We consider that the fundamental principle of religious toleration is based on the idea of reciprocity, i.e. tolerationto- toleration and intolerance-to-intolerance, as Locke stated. This principle is also an essential landmark for a moral law on religious toleration in the contemporary, global world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the interplay between literature and the visual arts, specifically highlighting the paradoxically literary nature of the panorama, linking it to certain forms of literature. It examines the convergence between the panorama as a spectacle and a literary medium, discussing its relation to descriptive literature and the perceptions of realism it engendered.

Tools and tests for measuring the presence and complexity of consciousness are becoming available, but there is no established theoretical approach for what these tools are measuring. This article examines several categories of tests for making reasonable inferences about the presence and complexity of consciousness (defined as the capacity for phenomenal/subjective experience) and also suggests ways in which different theories of consciousness may be empirically distinguished. We label the various ways to measure consciousness the measurable correlates of consciousness (MCC) and include three subcategories in our taxonomy: (a) neural correlates of consciousness, (b) behavioral correlates of consciousness, and (c) creative correlates of consciousness. Finally, we reflect on how broader philosophical views about the nature of consciousness, such as materialism and panpsychism, may also be informed by the scientific process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge development is one of the foundations for nursing to grow as a profession. Knowledge development in nursing has been greatly influenced by the philosophical perspective in different eras. This study aims at exploring the philosophical standpoints and methodological perspective of nursing knowledge development. Performing research guided by philosophy and using suitable methodology underpinning the philosophical approach is the need for strengthening nursing knowledge at present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a new reductive theory of modality, called the moodless theory of modality. This theory, and not modal realism, is the closest modal analogue of the tenseless theory of time. So, if the tenseless theory is true, and the temporality–modality analogy is good, it is the moodless theory that follows. I also argue that the moodless theory, considered on its own, is better than modal realism: arguments often thought to be decisive against modal realism are weak against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article focuses on the distinction between psychosocial types and conceptual personae advanced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in What is Philosophy? The conceptual persona is the tool that a philosopher invents in order to create new concepts with which to bring forth new events. Although they present it as one of the three elements of philosophy, its nature and function and, above all, its conjunctions with psychosocial types have been overlooked by scholars. What is Philosophy? contains a list of character traits of which each conceptual persona is composed. The central argument of this article is that this list can well be regarded as a table of categories that enable the exercise and experience of philosophy's creative thinking. Since the character traits of a conceptual persona match the characteristics of the given psychosocial types, it is necessary to keep inventing new conceptual personae always starting from the historical presuppositions. The philosopher requires the conceptual persona to transfer his or her movements of thought to philosophy's plane of immanence and thereby transform them in such a manner that philosophy can unfold as a creative power. It emerges as the subject of creative thinking at the same time as the concepts that subject creates, with which it coincides in the moment of creation. With the conceptual persona in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari determine the one element of philosophy that makes the transcendental empiricism a method of creation that appears as a precise operation with all its convincing and transparent results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of cognition arose with the beginnings of European folklore scholarship. Debate concerned whether the creation of folklore in modern life is an embodied cultural response or an intentional mindful action. The folkloristic move away from cognition can be attributed to a philosophical empiricism in which only knowledge of externalized evidence gained through observation and collection is valid. The essay surveys alternative folkloristic philosophies and approaches oriented toward cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aesthetic value empiricism claims that the aesthetic value of an object is grounded in the value of a certain kind of experience of it. The most popular version of value empiricism, and a dominant view in contemporary philosophical aesthetics more generally, is aesthetic hedonism. Hedonism restricts the grounds of aesthetic value to the pleasure enjoyed in the right kind of experience. But hedonism does not enjoy any clear advantage over a more permissive alternative version of value empiricism. This alternative is aesthetic liberalism. On this view, an object's aesthetic value is fully grounded in any value—not just the hedonic value—of a correct and complete experience of its sensory features. To demonstrate the advantages of liberalism over hedonism, I apply both views to analyze the aesthetic value of the Spring Temple Buddha and Anselm Kiefer's Seraphim. I detail four advantages of liberalism over hedonism, and I conclude by defending liberalism from two kinds of objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this final chapter of Interpreting Kant in Education, I revisit and expand on some of the main differences in interpretation between the reading of Kant being presented and the familiar Kant found in education theory. It has been maintained that some deep‐seated presuppositions from empiricist epistemology have influenced interpretations of Kant's terms, which have led to widespread 'mind‐imposes‐meaning' characterisations of his view. This 'Kantian' picture receives extensive criticism for intellectualism and a conception of mind as detached from real life. I have attempted to free Kant from this picture and to show that his Copernican view can be read in an altogether different light. Alternative understandings of Kant's central terms and insights have been introduced and developed in each chapter, with a spiralling effect. In this last chapter I consider some interpretations by Anglophone theorists and comments by contemporary Kantians to further elucidate these understandings, which illustrate some of the richness to be found in a renewed engagement with Kant's philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I outline the metaphysical nature of reality of persons as the confluence of four modes of relating-to that I propose exist as the scaffolding of personal being. In effect, I am outlining the conceptual sketch of a philosophical anthropology that situates all forms of philosophical and scientific inquiry given that there is no perspective outside of being a person. While only a conceptual sketch, this article begins the speculative process to work toward such an account.1 I would venture the bold assertion that all forms of personalism must assume the existence of all four modes of relationality that I am speculating about herein. My account attempts to capture the process-oriented view of the activity of being a person ('personing'). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]