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This chapter reviews philosophical perspectives on creativity. It includes summaries of key philosophers, some ancient (Plato, Aristotle), some dated but still relevant (Kant, Nietzsche), and some contemporary, or close to it (e.g., Wittgenstein), each having something to say about creative behavior. It might be most accurate to say that this chapter reviews philosophies rather than the views of philosophers. It is of course never a good thing to categorize people in terms of career (or to categorize them in any way!), and as a matter of fact the views summarized in this chapter have often been proposed by people who are not typically viewed as philosophers. Some of the philosophies outlined herein were proposed by artists or scientists, not philosophers.

This article has three aims, all of them related to the theory and practice of intertextuality. Firstly, the article makes an attempt to reconstruct the Augustinian-Lutheran type of discourse. A number of modern theologians and historians of philosophy have observed that the main currents within Christian theology have their basis in a specific discourse organiza-tion of textual utterances. With reference to these observations, the article maps out some dominant features of Augustine’s and Luther’s discoursive practices. The type of discourse thus reconstructed contains grammatical, logical-argumentative, narrative and rhetoric-figurative characteristics, and – as a matter of fact – it manifests a high degree of applicability in the field of literary studies. Secondly, the article applies the reconstructed type of discourse to analyze a masterpiece of Swedish twentieth-century literature, the novel Dykungens dotter (The Marsh King’s Daughter, 1985) by Birgitta Trotzig (1929–2013). In several interviews, Trotzig makes evidently contradictory remarks on Augustine and Luther. She dissociates herself from their anthropology at the same time as she hints that their view of human conditions has made a deep impression on her. The article’s application intends to throw light on this precarious hermeneutic situation. The intense presence of the Augustinian-Lutheran type of discourse in the novel made apparent through the application indicates that an interpretation of Trotzig’s writings by means of Augustinian-Lutheran intertexts is hermeneutically motivated in spite of her own negative declarations. Thirdly, the article makes use of the reconstructed type of discourse in order to examin Gérard Genette’s notion of architextuality. There is a theoretical incongruence in his notion. On an explicit definitory level, architextuality includes all types of discourse and modes of enunciation. On a conteptual level, however, the notion of architextuality is constructed on the pattern of literary genres. The article’s application demonstrates that Genette’s notion requires some corrections to live up to its definitory commitments. The Augustinian-Lutheran architext comes into conflict with some of Genette’s linguisticly construed structuralistic categories and demands a more discoursive and hermeneutic way of thinking. Titel på engelska:Towards a Broader Notion of Architextuality. The Augustinian- Lutheran Type of Discourse in Birgitta Trotzig’s Dykungens dotter (The Marsh King’s Daughter)

The time-lag argument seems to put some pressure on naive realism to agree that seeing must happen simultaneously with what is seen; meanwhile, a wide-accepted empirical fact suggests that light takes time to transmit from objects at a distance to perceivers—which implies what is seen happened before seeing, and, accordingly, naive realism must be false. In this paper, I will, first of all, show that the time-lag argument has in fact involves a misunderstanding concept of simultaneity: according to Special Relativity, simultaneity is a matter of convention rather than a matter of fact, so, in principle, we can stipulate a perceptual conception of simultaneity, according to which what is seen is simultaneous with seeing. Secondly, the generalized time-lag argument has a mistaken view on the perceived events and perceiving; it has a doubtful assumption that these events are momentary in the mathematical sense. Such idealization is the main reason why we have the intuition that the time-lag effect of perceiving is in conflict with our ordinary perceptual experiences. Finally, I argue that the naive realist account of the perceptual relation is a nontemporal constitutive relation; and hence naive realism is compatible with the claim that we can perceive things as they were, and it should not be weakened by the time-lag argument.

The Lettres Portugaises (1669) have always been at the heart of many debates, especially concerning the first line of the text: “Considere, mon amour”. Many critics state that the vocative “mon amour” refers to the male receiver of the letters, whereas others believe that the female writer is addressing her personified feeling. Currently, the problem remains unsolved, because there are valid arguments in support of both positions, even if none of them is entirely convincing. The article claims that the text could actually be incorrect and that the term “mon amour” could be replaced by “mon cœur”. If we make this replacement, all the contradictions that characterize the other interpretations seem resolved. Moreover, the presence of “cœur” in the first line would be more coherent with how the word is used in the rest of the text. The article seeks therefore to explain how the current version of the first line has come about: probably an error occurred, due to a printer’s distraction or it could be the free translation of a Portuguese text beginning with “Meu coracao”. As a matter of fact, the Lettres Portugaises were published as if they had been translated from authentic correspondence, even if their origin was quickly called into question: the debate over the first line is therefore linked to the intricate discussion about the genesis of the text and the article suggests a possible solution.

Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.

In this article, the science of the maqāsid which is one of the most important issues of fiqh method is discussed. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s (d. 751/1350) views about the maqāsid are taken into the center. For this reason, the main purpose of this study is to identify and analyze his views. He made evaluations about the science of maqāsid in many of his works, especially in I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn ‘an Rabb al-‘Ālamīn. However, he did not touch the classical theory of maqāsid, which was shaped within the framework of the necessity. Instead, he adopted an applied understanding of maqāsid. By emphasizing the benefits often, he mentioned that the shari’ah is based on wisdom and the servants’ benefits in the world and the hereafter. He clarified various fiqh sciences by means of the maqāsid. The qiyas, justification of provisions (ta‘līl), ijtihad, means (wasa’il) and change of judgment were among these sciences. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya stated that there is a very close relationship between the maqāsid and qiyas. He emphasized the appropriate qualification that expresses the relationship among ‘illah (reason-cause). He said that the word of qiyas includes both valid and invalid qiyas. He used many phrases to express the qiyas that he deemed valid. He described the valid qiyas as a tool of measurement. Instead of invalid qiyas, he mentioned many words, especially invalid qiyas. He mentioned three different groups against the qiyas. According to his statements, the views of these three groups are inconsistent and criticized these views from various perspectives. The fourth view, which he mentioned and described as balanced, should be taken as the basis. Because the leading scholars are united in this view. He stated that the ‘illah in religious texts are clearly stated. The ‘illah in the verses are determined by Allah; the ‘illah in the hadiths are determined by Prophet. In this context, he has made feel the importance of the inductive method (istiqrā) to achieve the goals of religion. He attached great importance to the justification of the provisions. The provisions are handled in three groups: comprehensible with the reason, incomprehensible with the reason and those between the two. In fact, he stated that some defected provisions were considered as ritual. According to him, some issues such as iddah (period of waiting) are not rituals, because it is possible to understand the wisdom of iddah. It is seen that he pioneered scholars in the contemporary period on this issue. He has established a close connection between the maqāsid and ijtihad. According to his statement, the claims that the door of ijtihad was closed do not reflect the truth. Because to accept that these claims are true would mean the disappearance of science. Therefore, it is not possible to take these claims into account. He stated that the problems of fiqh should be solved with a vivid and effective understanding of ijtihad within the framework of maqāsid. In the context of the maqāsid, he also attached great importance to the issue of means. Because the means depend on the maqāsid, it follows its footsteps. According to him, both the aim and the means have become the purpose. For this reason, paths leading to haram are prohibited. If the paths leading to the haram are not prohibited, a situation such as encouragement to haram occurs. He stated that the words and actions that cause harm are combined under four groups. He said that changing the provisions is necessary for the benefit of people. In terms of changing the provisions, he has determined five elements as time, place, situation, intention and custom. According to him, the idea of changing the provisions has great benefits. Those who do not understand this benefit properly caused the people to have problems. Hence, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya attached great importance to meaning and purpose besides the literal meanings of religious texts. As a result of this, he adopted the idea of changing the fatwa practically. On the other hand, he was generally opposed to cheating. In conclusion, it can be easily said that he made valuable contributions to the science of maqāsid. As a matter of fact, frequent reference to his views in today’s works confirms this claim.

As a matter of fact, few, if any, theists have been expressivists about morality. This is probably because expressivism is thought to have unacceptable theological implications. That is, it is thought to imply (1) that God’s goodness depends on our desire-like states, (2) that God’s goodness is not a real property, (3) that it is not true that God is good, and (4) that God’s moral thoughts have no explanation. I argue that expressivism has no such implications and conclude that expressivism is theologically acceptable.

Submitted by Leticia Alvarenga (leticiaalvarenga@fdv.br) on 2021-02-18T14:17:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 COURA - Problemas da teoria das fontes do direito.pdf: 398107 bytes, checksum: e323ece570405abf554d1c59c6e80771 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Galdino (repositorio@fdv.br) on 2021-06-28T17:05:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 COURA - Problemas da teoria das fontes do direito.pdf: 398107 bytes, checksum: e323ece570405abf554d1c59c6e80771 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-28T17:05:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 COURA - Problemas da teoria das fontes do direito.pdf: 398107 bytes, checksum: e323ece570405abf554d1c59c6e80771 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-12-10 O presente texto pretende evidenciar os problemas da tradicional teoria das fontes do Direito em face da noção de que Direito é um empreendimento coletivo e uma prática social interpretativa, como apresenta Ronald Dworkin em sua teoria do Direito como Integridade. Assim, pretendemos mostrar que a teoria das fontes do Direito parte do pressuposto positivista no sentido de que o Direito seria uma mera questão de fato, a partir da existência de uma regra de reconhecimento, padecendo, nesse ponto, daquilo que Dworkin de-nomina de aguilhão semântico. Retirando-se o aguilhão semântico, passa-se a perceber o Direito como um conceito interpretativo, incompatível com uma teoria das fontes que pretenda relevar, de antemão e de forma unívoca, o que seja o direito válido. This paper highlights the problems of the theory of the sources of law considering that law is a collective enterprise and an interpretative social practice, as presented by Ronald Dworkin. Thus, the paper shows that the theory of the sources of law starts from the positivist assumption that law would be a mere matter of fact, from the existence of a rule of recognition, suffering, at this point, from what Dworkin calls semantic sting. Removing the semantic sting, it is possibly understanding law as an interpretative concept, incompatible with a sources of law theory that intends to discovery, beforehand and in a univocal way, what is the valid law.

In this article, the “qissa of the first murder" (al-Maidah/27-31) is discussed methodologically in the point of classical tafsir sources and modern studies. The qissa consists of two elements which are the phrases “two sons of Adam” and the “crow’s guidance to the murderer”. In general, the commentators consider that the “Adam” indicates the Prophet Adam. The crow was sent to show how the body would be buried because the murder committed is the first murder on earth that does not know what to do with a dead body. In this general opinion, as well as the proofs of verses words and in-text contex elements, authentic ḥadiths, which are the main references of the tafsir, and narrations of companion and followers were taken into consideration. Along with other ḥadiths; especially it is seen that it is not possible to discredite the following ḥadīth narration of Masruq Ibn al-Ajda reported from Abdullah Ibn Mas'ud that is included in almost all authentic ḥadith sources as “no person is killed wrongfully, but a share of responsibility for his blood will be upon the first son of Adam, because he was the first one to kill". By adding the views of the companions, followers and the alliance of the ummah, it has become clear who the killer and victim are. In addition, the crow sent to show how to bury the dead body that confirms this view. Until the 20th century, it is seen that all of the commentators are in alliance on this view. The view referred to personalities such as Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and al-Ḍaḥḥāk is that the two people mentioned in the qissa are from children of Israel. However it is evident from other narrations of this view is not related to the idea that Adam and his wife were not the first human couple. Therefore, there is not an unique understanding of Adam that is accepted by everyone. In the explanations made by the commentators taken into consideration the different verses related to the subject. On the other hand, the literal meaning of the verses was taken as a basis and there was no need for taʾwīl because of any ambigious expression. These are also constitute the basic elements of the method followed in classical tafsirs. As for the evolutionist point of view; there is no such phenomenon as the first children of the first two people. Because in evolution, it is impossible to mention such a thing as the first two people. One of the dominant elements that shapes the modern exegesis understanding is this style of approach. According to the claim that the qissa's are symbolic, the verse statements are not important already. In this aspect, it is emphasized that both there is no reality of the story and is mentioned in reference to the Torah. But the similar story mentioned in the Torah, which is originally as divine, does not contradict its inclusion in the Qur’an as a truth. As a matter of fact, the Qur’an has been modifier and corrective as well as supplemantary and confirmative on the texts of Torah and Bible. In addition, the story of Abel and Cain in Torah is not mentioned the crow. According to the symbolist understanding, the Qur'an conveys a story that is claimed to be an imaginary product, and adds unfounded element to it during the transfer. This is a delusion that is not based on any evidence. It is certain that Allah, who knowledge encompasses everything and describes what is told in the Quran as truth, does not need to tell an imaginary story to show the guidance. Moreover, if the qissa of the first murder is symbolic, it means that the entire ummah, including the Prophet (pbuh) and the companions, has not understood this since 14th century which means that even mentioning this is absurd. The same inconsistent situation applies to evolutionist interpretations. As a result, after one of the two brothers killed the other; the killer did not know what to do the dead body, and finally learned from a crow that he should be buried. The literal expression of the verse refers to these two people as "two sons of Adam", and ta'wîl on this issue is far from convincing unless there is a valid evidence. It is seen that both approaches, which are the product of modern times in terms of methodology of Qur’anic Exegesis, are not based on solid scientific basis and lead the way to different contradictions rather than solving problems.

“Ma‘dum” is a concept used to mean “non-existent”. Schools of Kalām have studied the nature of non-existent around the ma‘dum concept. In this context, it was discus-sed what happened before the things exist. The movement that first started this de-bate in the Kalām was Mu‘tazila. According to Mu‘tazila, ma‘dum is not absolute non-existent; in contrast, it is a “thing”. This view of Mu‘tazila was rejected by the Ashʿariyyah and Māturīdiyyah. Not only did the Ashʿariyyah and Māturīdiyyah scho-lars rejected the view of Mu‘tazila in this regard, but also formed their own view on the issue. According to this view, ma‘dum is not a “thing”, in the contrast, it is absolu-te non-existent, in other words, it is nothing. Almost all of the Ahl-al-Sunna accepted this view. These two different approaches on ma‘dum were the distinguishing quali-ties of both Mu‘tazila and Ahl-al-Sunna. It is possible to argue that both views, which contrasted each other, developed with certain concerns. The main concern of Ahl-al-Sunna, which advocates the view of “ma‘dum is absolute non-existent”, is not to harm the idea that Allah is a single eter-nal entity. As a matter of fact, if ma‘dum is accepted as a “thing” instead of absolute non-existent, it will be said that there is another entity that has existed with Allah since the eternity, which will damage the idea that Allah is the only eternal being. The main concern of Mu‘tazila, who advocated the view that “non-existent” is a “thing”, was to purify Allah’s knowledge from all kinds of flaws and deficiencies. As a matter of fact, if ma‘dum is accepted as an absolute non-existent, not a “thing”, Allah will only know what he will create after he has created them, which will damage the idea that Allah has known everything perfectly since the eternity, and will undermine Allah’s omniscience attribute. The one that belongs to Ahl-al-Sunna from these two approaches about whether ma‘dum is absolute non-existent or a “thing”, was discussed by many Sunni thinkers in detail. However, it is seen that the one that belongs to Mu‘tazila does not have adequate clarity. As a matter of fact, considering the works of their own scholars, it is understood that the ma‘dum, which Mu‘tazila described as a “thing”, carries an epis-temological nature, not an ontological nature. The position of this epistemological truth is considered as Allah’s eternal knowledge. In this case, both of the ideas of Al-lah knows everything with His knowledge, and that Allah is the only eternal being are not harmed. One of the thinkers who can be referred to on Mu‘tazila’s ma‘dum understanding in the framework of their own resources is Abū Rashīd āl-Nīsābūrī, who conveyed the different approaches of Mu‘tazila about ma‘dum, and then explained his opinion on this issue in detail in his book al-Masāʾil fi l-kḫilāf bayn al-baṣriyin wal-baghdādiyin (Ques-tions concerning the differences between the Baṣrah and Baghdad). There are two important points that come to the forefront in the non-existent view of Āl-Nīsābūrī. The first one is that ma‘dum is considered as a “thing”, not an absolute non-existent; and the second is the claim that ma‘dum has no physical entity, but that it has a presence in the mind. Over these two emphases, it can be speculated that two issues related to ma‘dum are resolved. In this respect, it is stated that there is nothing that Allah does not know about in the eternity by saying that ma‘dum is not absolute non-existent. With this acceptance, the knowledge of Allah is cleared of all kinds of deficiencies. When the idea that ma‘dum is a mental entity, not a physical one is accepted, the idea that Allah does not have equal is not damaged. As a matter of fact, an entity in the form of knowledge is nothing other than Allah, but it is a being that is the require-ment of Allah. Because Allah is the one who is All-Knowing. Āl-Nīsābūrī evaluated the ma‘dum as a “thing” in terms of its being the substan-ce/essence, being known and being eternal. According to him, the substance should exist even in case of the non-existent of it. Since substance is substance in case of its non-existent, then it is ma‘dum, i.e. an substance. Since there is nothing beyond the knowledge of Allah, ma‘dum consists of the “known”. Being known requires being se-parated from other things with a clear attribute. Therefore, ma‘dum is a “thing” with a distinct attribute. Since ma‘dum is a “thing”, and since it is in the knowledge of Allah since the eternity, then it is also eternal.

The human mind is unable to acquire the knowledge of metaphysical and unseen worlds which fall in the category of faith such as angels , concept of life and death , hereafter, and the belief in heaven and hell, except through the divine guidance given to the messengers and Prophets by Almighty Allah .The faith in angels is one of those believes mentioned in all the divine religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. All these three divine religions agree on the existence of angels in general. As this is one of the six articles of faith of our true Islamic religion, and this is one of the most important article of faith in Judaism and Christianity too. Belief in angels is the most widely discussed doctrinal elements in the sacred books of all these religions. It is a matter of fact that all these three divine religions have a firm belief in the existence of angles but they differ only regarding their details such as their names, classes, descriptions, characteristics and actions. This article analyses and addresses the main question about angels in sematic and divine religions which is; how do the divine religions present angels and which are the similarities and differences between them.

Recently, a number of Kantians have argued that despite Kant’s own disparaging comments about same-sex intercourse and marriage, his ethical and legal philosophy lacks the resources to show that they are impermissible. I go further by arguing that his framework is in fact more open to same-sex than to different-sex marriage. Central is Kant’s claim that marriage requires equality between spouses. Kant himself thought that men and women are not equal, and some of his more insightful remarks on the issue reveal that he was also aware that, as a matter of fact, women were disenfranchised by society, and suffer legal and other forms of discrimination. Kant, according to his own account, cannot approve of heterosexual marriage. Same-sex couples, by contrast, can satisfy the crucial equality condition. I conclude with a suggestion for refocus with respect to the issues at hand, calling for attention to more complex and insidious forms of inequality than deprivation of rights and full civil participation.

Rapid advancement of technologies continues to revolutionize healthcare foundations and outlook. Technological progress in medicine are not only continuing to improve quality of individual life but also generally improving quality of healthcare services. As a matter of fact, the most significant change in healthcare systems was the shift from standardized, patronizing and rigid physician–patient relationship to more patient-focused, personalized and participatory practice. With this shift came increased attention to the assurance of patient’s right to autonomy. Therefore, this article aims to discuss principal problematic aspects of patient’s right to autonomy hereby the patient’s role in the context of technologies and innovation. It is argued, that one of the effective ways to ensure patient’s right to autonomy is implementation of legal instruments, such as informed consent, advance directives and Ulysses contracts. However, this article also proposes, that with a potential of new technologies and artificial intelligence, these legal instruments need to be reconsidered and transformed in more efficient and eligible model, presenting information in more individualized, appealing and convenient manner.

İslam dininin ikinci temel kaynağı olan hadislerin, Hz. Peygamber dönemine yakınlığı bakımından kıymetini ifade eden âlî isnâd çeşidi, hadis ehli için büyük önem arzetmekte¬dir. Bu sebeple eserini âlî isnâdlar ile inşa etmiş olan müelliflerin çalışmalarının hadis ilmin¬deki değeri ayrıdır. Bu meyanda örnek olarak gösterebileceğimiz hicri üçüncü asrın telifleri arasında yer alan ve dönemin çalışmalarına kıyasla âlî isnâdlar ihtiva eden Ebü’l-Cehm el-Bâhîlî (öl. 228/842)’nin Cüz adlı çalışması, kimi âlimler tarafından takdir edilse de döne¬minde ve sonrasında ehl-i hadis nezdinde yeterli ilgiyi görmemiştir. Ebü’l-CehmCüz ese¬rinde ehl-i hadis’in, öğrencilerinin ilmini ve hadislerini ihmal ettiğini iddia ettiği meşhur muhaddis Leys b. Sa‘d (öl. 175/791)’dan dinlediği rivayetlere yer vermektedir. Leys b. Sa‘d, yazılı nüshalardan rivayette bulunmakla da tanınan bir hadisçiydi. Cüz’deki Leys b. Sa‘d rivayetlerinin, diğer kaynaklarda da yer alan Leys rivayetleriyle benzerliği, ilk dönemlerde yazılı metinlere istinaden gerçekleştirilmiş rivayet usulünün varlığı iddialarını güçlendir¬mektedir. Bu çalışmada Ebü’l-Cehm’in diğer eserlere yansıyan bu nakilleri incelenecek; ayrıca hocası Leys b. Sa‘d’ın rivayetleri inşa edilmeye çalışılacaktır.Özet: Hicri üçüncü asırda kaleme alınan hadis eserleri, en seçkin kaynaklardır. Hadis alanına münhasır en temel eserler bu dönemde yazılmış, ilerleyen süreçte kıymetlerine binaen üzerlerine sayısız çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Hicri üçüncü asır içerisinde yazılan eserlerden birisi, bu makalenin konusu olan Ebü’l-Cehm el-Bâhilî (öl. 228/842)’ye ait olan Cüz adlı eseridir. Müellif, döneminde pek dikkate alınan bir isim olmamıştır. Bunu, hakkında serd edilen cerh lafızlarına bağlamak mümkündür. Bununla birlikte Cüz eseri, âlî isnadlar ihtiva etmesi hasebiyle dikkat çekmektedir. Müelliften Peygambere en az ravi sayısı ile erişim anlamına gelen âlî isnadlar, hadislerin sıhhatini ve sübutunu belirlemede öncelikli ve seçkin bir yere sahiptirler. Ebü’l-Cehm el-Bâhilî’nin âlî isnadlar barındıran Cüz eserinin ise döne¬minde yeterince ilgi çekmediği görülmektedir. Bununla birlikte eserin bir diğer kıymeti meşhur muhaddis el-Leys b. Sa‘d (öl. 175/791)’ın rivayetlerine yer veriyor olmasıdır. El-Leys b. Sa‘d, hicri ikinci asrın müçtehid imamlarından birisidir. Döneminde etkin ve önemli bir rol oynamış olan Leys’in rivayetlerinden günümüze ulaşanlar oldukça azdır. Bu sebeple Ebü’l-Cehm’nin Cüz’ü, hocası el-Leys b. Sa‘d’ın birçok rivayetine yer veriyor olması hase¬biyle bir başka kıymete daha erişmektedir.Döneminde pek ilgi görmeyen Cüz eseri, ilerleyen süreçte hadisçilerin dikkatini çekmiş olmalıdır ki birçok müellifin, Cüz’ün rivayet hakkını elde ettiği görülmektedir. Aslında dö¬nemi içerisinde bazı isimlerin onun rivayetlerini kullandığı da bilinmektedir. Örneğin Buhârî’nin muallak bir isnad ile Ebü’l-Cehm’e ait olan bir rivayete Sahih eserinde yer verdiği İbn Hacer tarafından beyan edilmiştir. Sonraki dönemlerde Cüz’ün rivayet hakkını alan isimler arasında Ahmed b. Hanbel (öl. 241/855), Taberânî (öl. 360/971), Ebû Bekir el-Mer¬vezî (öl. 292/905), Dârekutnî (öl. 385/995), Beyhakî (öl. 458/1066) gibi meşhur muhaddis¬lere rastlamaktayız. Her ne kadar Ebü’l-Cehm’in rivayetleri, döneminin kayda değer çalış¬malarında yer alsa da, muhaddisler muteber tahammül metodlarıyla Cüz eserinin rivayet hakkına sahip olsalar da, eserin yazılı bir metin halinde mâlik olunmasının ötesinde bir kıymete haiz görülmediği anlaşılmaktadır.Mecrûh bir kimse olan, bu sebeple kimi muhaddislerin itibar etmek istemediği anlaşılan Ebü’l-Cehm’in, tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla, temel hadis kaynaklarında 11 hadisi yer al¬maktadır. Bununla birlikte bazı eserlerde Cüz’de yer alan rivayetlerin bir kısmının, aynı sıra ve düzen ile yer alıyor olması, Cüz’ün bu kişiler tarafından nüsha halinde malik olunduğunu göstermektedir. Bu durum Muasır araştırmacı Fuad Sezgin (öl. 1924/2018)’in ortaya koyduğu ilk dönem eserleşmelerinin yalnızca şifahi aktarımla değil, yazılı nüshalar üzerinden de gerçekleştirildiği teorisini güçlendirmektedir. Ebü’l-Cehm, şifahi rivayet dönemi, rıhleler ve hadislerin eserleşmesi hususunda oldukça hareketli bir süreçte yaşamış olmasına rağmen, eserini yalnızca altı hocadan semâ ettiği hadislerden oluşturduğu görülmektedir. Döneminin usulüne uygun olarak ale’r-rical bir tasnife sahip olan eser mu‘cem özelliği göstermektedir. Müellif esere el-Leys b. Sa‘d rivayet¬leri ile başlamış; Süfyân b. Uyeyne rivayetiyle neticelendirmiştir. Eserde 112 rivayet bulun¬maktadır. Muttasıl isnâdların hâkim olduğu eserde iki isnâdın muallak olduğu görülmekte¬dir. Eserin büyük bir çoğunlukta merfû‘ rivayet ve bu sayıya yakın ölçüde de mevkûf rivayet barındırdığı görülmektedir. Eser günümüzde matbu halde bulunmaktadır.Eser birkaç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm başlıksız olup Ebü’l-Cehm’in, hocası el-Leys b. Sa‘d’dan aldığı rivayetleri ihtiva etmektedir. Bu rivayetler Leys > Ebu’z-Zübeyr > Câbir b. Abdullah ve Leys > Ebu’z-Zübeyr > Yahyâ b. Ca‘de > Ebû Hüreyre tarikleriyle gel¬mektedir. İkinci bölüm “Nâfi‘nin Abdullah b. Ömer’den rivayetleri” başlığını taşımaktadır. Merfû’, mevkûf ve maktû’ rivayetlerden biri muallaktır ve mübhem bir ravi ihtiva etmekte olup eserdeki diğer isnâdlara göre nâzil bir isnâda sahiptir. Üçüncü bölüm “Sevvâr b. Mus‘ab > Ebû Abdullah el-Hemedânî rivayetleri” başlığını taşımaktadır. Merfû’, mevkûf ve maktû’ rivayetlerden oluşan bölümün tamamı Sevvâr b. Mus‘ab’ın rivayetleri değildir. Kitabın ilk bölümlerinde görülen rivayetlerin intizamî sıralanması bu kısımlarda oldukça sekteye uğ¬ramış gibidir. Nitekim daha ikinci isnâdda Sevvâr’ın bulunmadığı bir rivayet yer almaktadır. Cüz, müellifin Heysem b. Adî, Abdülkuddûs, Abdülazîz el-Mâcişûn ve Süfyân b. Uyeyne riva¬yetleri ile son bulmaktadır. Ebü’l-Cehm’in Cüz eserinde yer alan rivayetlerin bazılarının temel fıkhi hükümlere muarız rivayetler oldukları görülmektedir. Örneğin Allah Resulü’nün ‘Bir ya da iki yudumluk emme haram kılmaz’ sözü, Sübey’a el-Eslemiyye doğum yapınca iddet beklemeden evlenmesine izin vermesi, Osman b. Affân’ın Rubeyyi bint. Muavviz’in boşanmasının ardından iddet bek-lememesine hükmetmesi, İbn Ömer’in burnu kanadığında namazdan ayrılıp yıkayarak geri dönüp kaldığı yerden devam etmesi ve “kimse kimsenin yerine oruç tutamaz, hac edemez” sözü, müşrik kadınlarla evliliği haram olarak nitelendirmesi bunlara örnek verilebilir. Bu rivayetler elbette fıkıh çerçevesinde tetkik edilmelidir fakat Ebü’l-Cehm’in kimi rivayetlerde teferrüd ettiği yönündeki ifadeler de düşünüldüğünde, tüm bunların onun ehl-i hadis nez¬dinde mecruh bir kimse olarak tanınmasının sebepleri olarak görülebilir.Ebü’l-Cehm’in Cüz’ünün el-Leys b. Sa‘d’ın 66 rivayetine yer vermesi hasebiyle, İbn Sa‘d rivayetlerini derlemek için inşa edilmiş eserlerin tamamını geride bıraktığı görülmektedir. Bu sebeple Leys’in Cüz’ünün günümüze ulaşmış bir şekli olduğu yönünde bizde bir kanaat hâsıl olmaktadır. Nitekim İbn Kutluboğa dâhil Leys’in rivayetlerine yer veren hadisçiler, Ebü’l-Cehm’in Cüz’ünü görmezden gelememiş; bilakis onu referans almışlardır. Bu durumda İmam Şâfiî’ye atfedilen ve Leys’in öğrencilerini vefasızlık ile niteleyen söz düşünüldüğünde, Ebü’l-Cehm’in onun vefalı bir öğrencisi olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Damân kavramı etrafında teşekkül eden ve fakihlerin fürû-ı fıkıh sistematiği içerisinde zamanla geliştirdiği sorumluluk (tazminat) hukuku, fıkhın yani İslam hukukunun önemli bölümlerinden birini oluşturmaktadır. Tazminat hukuku (damân), ilk dönem fıkıh eserlerinde müstakil bir konu olarak ele alınmamış olsa da ilerleyen dönemlerde bu alana dair literatürün oluşmaya başladığı görülmektedir. Sorumluluk hukukuyla ilgili klasik fürû-ı fıkıh kitaplarında dağınık biçimde yer alan bu konuları ilk defa bir araya getiren kişiler Hanefi hukukçularıdır. Mezhebin kurucu imamlarının görüşleri etrafında şekillenen ve ilk dönemlere ait metinlerde klasik formunu kazanan tazminat konusu, hukukun yeni şartlara uyum sağlaması ihtiyacının bir ürünü olan vâkıât türü eserlerde meşâyihin fetvâ ve yorumlarıyla genişletilmiştir. Hanefî mezhebinde tazminat hukukuyla ilgili olan bu konular, öncelikle Üsrûşenî’nin el-Fusûl fi’l-muâmelât, İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî’nin Fusûlu’l-ihkâm ve Şeyh Bedreddin’in Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn’i gibi vâkıât türü eserlerde özel bir bölüm (fasıl) olarak ele alınmış, daha sonra burada ele alınan konular geliştirilerek devam ettirilmiş ve nihayetinde bu alana dair müstakil eserler telif edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, zikredilen eserler incelenerek literatürde ve ilgili konularda nasıl bir gelişme ve genişlemenin olduğu mevzubahis edilecektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, öncelikle Hanefî fukahâsının tazminatla ilgili telif ettiği ilk örnek eserler mukayeseli bir şekilde analiz edilecek sonrasında da Zenbillizâdelerden Fudayl Çelebi’nin (öl. 991/1583) ed-Damânât fi’l-furûi’l-Hanefîyye adlı eserinin bunlar arasındaki yerine temas edilecektir.Özet: İslam hukukunun önemli bölümlerinden birini oluşturan sorumluluk (tazminat) hukukunun ana fikri, Kur’an-ı Kerîm ile Hadîs-i Şeriflerde belirtilmiş sonra fakihler mensubu olduğu mezhebin fürû-ı fıkıh sistematiği içerisinde zamanla bunu geliştirerek ciddi bir birikim ortaya koymuşlardır. Hukukun önemli bölümlerinden birini oluşturan bu konular, klasik fıkıh kitaplarının -ibadet bahisleri de dâhil- neredeyse her bölümünde meseleler arasına serpiştirilerek işlenmiştir. Yani, ilk dönem fıkıh eserlerinde damân konusu müstakil bir konu olarak ele alınmamıştır. Bu şekilde olmakla birlikte, ilerleyen dönemlerde tazminat hukukuna dair literatürün oluşmaya başladığı, sayıca az da olsa ilk önce bu konuda müstakil bölümlerin sonrasında da bu alana özel müstakil eserlerin yazıldığı görülmektedir.Sorumluluk hukukuyla ilgili klasik fürû-ı fıkıh kitaplarında dağınık biçimde yer alan bu konuları ilk defa bir araya getiren kişiler Hanefi hukukçularıdır. Mezhebin kurucu imamlarının görüşleri etrafında şekillenen ve ilk dönemlere ait metinlerde klasik formunu kazanan tazminat konusu, hukukun yeni şartlara uyum sağlaması ihtiyacının bir ürünü olan vâkıât türü eserlerde meşâyihin fetvâ ve yorumlarıyla genişletilmiştir. İlk önce Hanefîlerden Mecdüddîn el-Üsrûşenî (öl. 637/1240) el-Fuṣûl fi’l-muʿâmelât adlı eserinin “Ödenmesi Zorunlu Olan Tazminat Türleri ve Bunların Keyfiyeti” başlığını taşıyan 29. bölümünde sözleşmeden ve sözleşme dışındaki haksız fiillerden doğan sorumlulukları ele almıştır. Daha sonraki dönemde yazılan fusûl edebiyatının tazminat bölümleri ile bu alanda müstakil olarak telif edilen ilk çalışmaların konu sistematiği ve muhtevası incelediğinde büyük ölçüde bunların Üsrûşenî’ye dayandığı ve onun bu alanda özel bir üslup/tür geliştirmeye çalıştığı rahatlıkla görülmektedir. Üsrûşenî’nin fusûl ismini taşıyan bu eseri, türünün ilk örneği olduğu için de İslâm hukuk literatüründe özgün bir yere sahiptir. Üsrûşenî’nin burada başlattığı usul ve yöntemi Hanefîlerden İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî (öl. 670/1271) Fuṣûlü’l-iḥkâm fî uṣûli’l-aḥkâm ve Simavna Kadısı oğlu Şeyh Bedreddin (öl. 823/1420) Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn adlı eserlerinin tazminat bölümlerinde geliştirerek devam ettirmiş, sonrasında da Zenbillizâdelerden Fudayl Çelebi (öl. 991/1583) eḍ-Ḍamânât fi’l-furûi’l-Hanefîyye adlı eserinde bu konuları daha da zenginleştirerek müstakil bir eser haline getirmiştir. İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî, Üsrûşenî’nin tazminat bölümünde ele aldığı konuları başlıklandırmış ve ilgili konulardaki rivâyetleri bir üst başlık altında toplayarak daha da sistematik bir hale getirmiştir. Her iki eserin tazminat bölümleri mukayese edildiğinde ele alınan konuların birebir aynı olduğu, ancak Üsrûşenî’den farklı olarak İmâdüddîn’in bölüm sonuna anne karnındaki cenine verilen zararların tazmini (damânü’l-cenîn) ile kaçan köleyi geri getiren kişinin sorumluluğunu (damân-ü râddi’l-âbık) ilâve ettiği dikkatleri çekmektedir. Şeyh Bedreddin ise Üsrûşenî ile İmâdüddîn’in ele aldığı konulara ilâve olarak sadece kaybolan eşyayı (lukata) bulan kişinin sorumluluğunu (damânü’l-mültekıt) eklemiştir. Şeyh Bedreddin’in tazminat bölümündeki konu başlıklarının neredeyse tamamının İmâdüddîn’in tazminat bölümünde aynen mevcut olduğunu ve bunların çoğunun da ilk olarak Üsrûşenî’nin el-Fusûl’ünde yer aldığını göz önüne alırsak, ana omurgası itibariyle bütün bunların Üsrûşenî’ye dayandığını ve onun eserinin İslâm hukuk literatüründe özgün bir yere sahip olduğunu söylememiz icap eder.Fudayl Çelebi’nin eḍ-Ḍamânât’ı, tazminat hukuku alanında müstakil olarak ortaya konulan ilk eser olma özelliğini taşımaktadır. Yapılan bazı modern çalışmalarda, Gānim el-Bağdâdî’nin (öl. 1030/1620) Mecmaʿu’ḍ-ḍamânât fî mezhebi’l-İmâmi’l-Azâm Ebî Hanîfete’n-Nu’mân isimli eserinin bu alanda telif edilen ilk eser olduğu söylense de Çelebi’nin eḍ-Ḍamânât adlı eserinin Bağdâdî’nin Mecmaʿu’ḍ-ḍamânât’ından daha önce kaleme alındığı bilinmektedir. Nitekim Çelebi’nin eḍ-Ḍamânât’ı eseri hicri 984’te, Bağdâdî’nin Mecmaʿu’ḍ-ḍamânât’ı ise 1027’de tamamlanmıştır. Çelebi’den kırk bir yıl sonra vefat eden Bağdâdî’nin müstakil olarak telif ettiği bu eserdeki konu dizimi farklı olmakla birlikte bu çalışma da aynı geleneğin devamı niteliğindedir.Eserin konu sistematiği ve muhtevası incelediğinde Çelebi’nin ed-Damânât’ının, Üsrûşenî’nin başlatıp İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî ve Şeyh Bedreddin’in geliştirerek devam ettirdiği yazım türünün devamı niteliğinde olduğu rahatlıkla görülmektedir. Kendisinden önceki eserlerin tazminat bölümleri ile mukayese edildiğinde diğerlerinin ele aldığı konulara ilâveten Fudayl Çelebi’nin ed-Damânât’ında şirket, mudârabe kefâlet, havâle, sulh, hacr, me’zun (kendilerine ticaret serbestliği tanınan kişiler) ve vasiyet gibi bu üç eserde ele alınmayan yeni tazminat konularının eklendiği görülmektedir. Yukarıda zikredilen bu eserlerden Şeyh Bedreddin’in Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn’i ile Bağdâdi’nin Mecmaʿu’ḍ-ḍamânât’ı dışındaki eserler, kütüphanelerde yazma halinde olduğu için tazminat hukukuyla ilgili yapılan modern çalışmalarda bu eserlere çok fazla başvurulmamıştır. Hatta bunlardan Çelebi’nin eḍ-Ḍamânât’ı neredeyse hiç bilinmemektedir. Bu eserle ilgili bazı bibliyografik çalışmalarda az bir bilgi mevcut olsa da tazminat hukukuyla ilgili Arapça yazılan muasır çalışmalarda bu eserin kaynak olarak kullanılmadığı dikkatleri çekmektedir. Söz konusu eserin yazma halinde olması ve özellikle İstanbul kütüphanelerinde bulunmasının bu duruma neden olduğu rahatlıkla söylenebilir. Türkçe yazılan çalışmalarda da bu eserin yeterince bilindiğini ve kaynak olarak kullanıldığını söylemek oldukça zordur. Üsrûşenî’nin el-Fuṣûl fi’l-muʿâmelât adlı eseri ile İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî’ye ait olan Fuṣûlü’l-iḥkâm fî uṣûli’l-aḥkâm isimli çalışması, henüz yazma halinde olduğu için gerek eserin bütününe gerekse tazminat bölümüne dair kapsamlı herhangi bir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Şeyh Bedreddin’in matbu haldeki Câmi‘u’l-fusûleyn adlı eseri, H. Yunus Apaydın’ın başkanlığında Türkçe’ye çevrildiği için eserde ele alınan tazminat konularını buralarda görmek mümkündür. Bunun yanı sıra, söz konusu çevirideki tazminat bölümünü tercüme eden Kemal Yıldız, Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn’deki bu bölümü “Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn’in Kaynakları ve Hanefî Mezhebi Uygulamasında Tazmînât” ismiyle müstakil bir kitap olarak yayınlamıştır. Yıldız, bu çalışmasının birinci bölümünde öncelikle Câmiʿu’l-fuṣûleyn’in kaynaklarını kısaca tanıttıktan sonra, esas olarak ikinci bölümde kendi açıklama ve değerlendirmelerini ekleyerek tazminat bölümünü baştan sona tercüme etmiştir. Yıldız’ın bu çalışmasında, Üsrûşenî ile İmâdüddîn el-Mergînânî’nin Fuṣûl ismini taşıyan mezkûr eserleri hakkında tanıtıcı bilgiler verilmiş olsa da özellikle bu eserlerin tazminat bölümlerinin içeriğine dair herhangi bir bilginin olmayışı, ilgili konuda araştırmacılara değerlendirme yapma imkânı vermemektedir.

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia-beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, as well as any other metaphysical views about the ultimate nature of qualia. The reworking of the displaced perception model I am proposing is supposed to be compatible with any available metaphysical view on qualia. The second step consists of rejecting the epistemological misgivings of the original model, namely the view that knowing qualia requires “connecting beliefs” along with “meta-representations.” Yet, Dretske’s crucial mistake has been to force knowledge of qualia into the “belief-box.” As a matter of fact, there is only one belief involved in introspecting qualia, namely the qualia-belief itself. The third final step is this. Assuming the key Wittgensteinian insight, I argue that introspection of qualia is a process that is both epistemically reliable and automatic. It is reliable because it dispenses with justification of any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, it is automatic because it also dispenses with reflexive connecting beliefs. For example, it takes nonconceptual awareness of the color blue as an input and automatically yields the belief that phenomenal blue is the conscious character of my experience of the sky as an output just by employing the concept BLUE.

As a matter of fact this interesting issue of the quarterly journal, Paradoxa does not contain anything explicitly concerning Italian politics. Nevertheless, much of what the authors write can be u...

The connection of the Islamic world with Logic as a branch of science started with the first translation activities and an original Logic system was established with al-Fârâbi (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sinâ (d. 428/1037). In the end, Logic is seen as a science that teaches the rules of right thinking. Initially, thoughts against Logic were expressed by Ghazzâli (d. 505/1111), and Logic, for all the sciences, began to be considered as an “introduction”. The science of Logic was summarized by Ghazzâli in the introduction to the work of Principles of Jurisprudence, previously the influence of Logic on the science of the Kalam began to be seen at different levels in time as well as in other religious sciences. In this context, it is possible to see references to the terms and rules referred to in the science of Logic in the works of Hadith Methodology. In this research, as an example of this subject, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d. 852/1449), who is dominant in both branches of science, was selected as Nuzhetu’n-na ẓ ar and the interaction of Hadith and Logic was examined under some headings. Ibn Hajar wrote this book on the basis of Ibn al- Ṣ ala ḥ 's book "Ulumu'l-hadith". He put forward the subjects of the Method of Hadith in a new order, separate from Ibn al- Ṣ ala ḥ 's. It is clear that during this arrangement, Logic is utilized. As the philosophers who set up the system, the most general concept is important for establishing a new system. Among the concepts used in the Hadith Method, Ibn Hajar has chosen the concept of 'habar' as the most meaningful. In his work, he placed the concept of "habar" at the top of the list. As a matter of fact, in Logic, five predicables are listed as genus, species, discrimination, holistic separation and correlation. He has taken over the concept of the widest covering in his new assembly and has made its classification according to him. He took advantage of logic not only in terms of order, but also when referring to relations between concepts. In Logic, there are four types of relationships between the two concepts: equality, separation, full entrepreneurship and incomplete entrepreneurship in terms of accuracy and totality. For example, where it refers to the relationship between the concept of "habar" and the concept of "hadith", it says that this relationship is not a relationship of equality, but a relationship of full enterprise. In this respect, it is clear that Ibn Hajar refers to the types of the relationship used in Logic among the terms in his work. Thus, by drawing attention to the different aspects and distinctive characteristics of these terms, they are instrumental in easier understanding of the related terms. He also benefited from the science of Logic in terms of definition. Since the subject of "definition" is one of the most important issues in Logic, the interaction on this subject is more. Making the definition according to five predicables has been accepted as fundamental in Logic. It was also desired that the definition be complete. Ibn Hajar made clear his attention to these issues in some of his definitions. For example, it is possible to see this when explaining the concept of "Musnad". He states that the word "marfu", which he uses in the definition, is a genus, while the word "sahabi" is a species. As seen in these examples, Ibn Hajar tries to define the terms used in the hadith science in the manner mentioned in Logic. He tried to make a definition in accordance with the principle of complete definition. Indeed, Ibn Hajar clearly refers to some of these, and in some definitions, he points out which word is genus, and which is species. Ibn Hajar benefited from the knowledge of Logic, which the Islamic world had met through translations, as well as from the religious sciences of his own time. This aspect of his works should not be kept away from attention. In the dynamism of Hadith Science in the ninth century of Hijri, the effect of this issue should not be ignored. It is seen that the science of Logic is effective in the hadith method in other subjects, especially the issues mentioned above. Detailed analysis of this effect is the subject of wider research. The science of Logic also had an effect on the expressions used especially in exposing the subjects in the method. It is possible to see this effect in Ibn Hajar's systematization of the hadith method. It should also be noted that this effect has not changed the essential definitions of the terms. Rather, it was effective in terms of how and on what basis the definitions should be made and resulted in the definitions being made in a certain order.

1924yılında Tevhid-i Tedrisât kanunu ile medreselerin kapatılması ve İstanbulDârülfünunu İlahiyat Fakültesi’nin kurulmasıyla birlikte özellikle İslamiilimler alanında bir dönüşümün amaçlandığı söylenebilir. Üniversite’ye geçişsürecinde genelde İslami ilimler özelde hadis alanında yapılan değişikliklerözellikle ders isimlerinin hadis-i şerif ve usûl-i hadîs’ten hadis ve hadistarihine çevrilmesi hadis eğitiminde de yeni bir döneme girildiğinigöstermektedir. Nitekim derslerin bu şekilde isimlendirilmesiyle birlikte hadistarihi literatürünün de oluşmaya başladığı görülmektedir. Özellikle hadis vehadis tarihi derslerinde hazırlanmış olan metinlere ulaşılması ve bu metinlerinarasında durduğu yerin değerlendirilmesi Cumhuriyet’in ilk yıllarında hadis eğitimindenasıl bir dönüşüm yaşandığının cevabını verecektir. Nitekim bu dönemde mezkûrderslerin hocaları tarafından yazılan ve derslerde takrir edilen İzmirli İsmailHakkı’nın Hadis Tarihi ve Hüseyin Avni Arapkirli’nin el-Bugyetu’l-hasîsfi Târîhi’l-hadîs isimli eserleri hem Türkçe hadis tarihi literatürüneöncülük etmekte hem de 1924-1933 yıllarını kapsayan Dârülfünun İlahiyatFakültesi dönemi hadis anlayışının tespit edilmesinde temel kaynak olmaözelliği taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada mezkûr eserlerin metin analizleri yapılaraktümevarım metodu uygulanmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu yapılırken ise müderrislerinfikri alt yapılarını yansıttığı düşünülen hususlara temas edilecektir. Böylecedönemin hadis tarihi derslerinin gelenek ve modern arasında nerede durduğu belirlenmeyeçalışılacak ve hadis eğitiminin pratikte nasıl bir eğitim verdiğinideğerlendirilecektir.Özet: 1923 yılında Cumhuriyet’in kurulmasının ardından 1924 yılında ilan edilenTevhîd-i Tedrisât kanunu ile medreselerin ilga edilmesi sonucunda İstanbul Dârülfünunuİlahiyat Fakültesi açılmıştır. Bu fakültenin açılması ile İslami İlimleralanındaki eğitim modern diye isimlendirilebilecek yeni bir zeminde varlığını1933 yılına kadar sürdürmüştür. Bu çalışmada, 1924-1933 yılları arasındakiDârülfünun İlahiyat Fakültesi’nde verilen Hadis ve Hadis Tarihi derslerindenHadis Tarihi derslerinin izleri sürülmeye çalışılmıştır. Dönemin hadis tarihiderslerinin kısa bir tarihçesi verilecek ve derslerde okutulan eserlerin metinanalizinin yapılması sağlanacaktır. Bu yapılırken ise derslerin hocalarıtarafından ders notu olarak kaleme alınan İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’nın HadisTarihi ve daha önce gün yüzüne çıkartılmamış olan ancak ilk defa bumakalede ele alınan Hüseyin Avni Arapkirli’nin el-Bugyetu’l-Hasîs fîTarîhi’l-Hadis isimli çalışmaları esas alınmıştır. Zikredilen bu eserler, Hadis Tarihiliteratürünü başlatması açısından oldukça önemlidir. Bununla birlikte bueserler Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde hadis alanında verilen ilk eserler olmaözelliği taşımakta ve dönemin fikri alt yapısını ortaya çıkarmada önemlikaynaklar olma özelliği taşımaktadırlar. ÖncelikleDârülfünun bünyesindeki hadis derslerinin kısa bir tarihçesini vermek gerekirseders isimlerindeki ve sürelerindeki değişikliğine dikkat çekilmesigerekmektedir. İlahiyat Fakültesi’nin açılmasından önce kurulanDârülfünun’larda ders isimleri Hadis-i Şerîf ve Usûl-i Hadis diyeisimlendirilmiştir. Ayrıca bu dersler eğitim süresi olan dört sene boyuncamüfredatta yer almıştır. Cumhuriyet’in ilanından sonra 1924 yılında kurulanDârülfünun’da ise bu isim, Hadis ve Hadis Tarihi olarak değiştirilmiştir. Böyleceklasik hadis usulü ilminden tarih yönü daha ağır bir hadis eğitiminebaşlanmıştır. İlahiyat Fakültesi’ninaçılışından 1931 yılına kadar Hadis ve Hadis Tarihi derslerinin iki sene vehaftada üç saat olarak işlendiği görülmektedir. 1931’den fakültenin kapatılmış olduğu 1933 yılına kadar ise derslerhaftada iki saat olarak işlenmeye devam etmiştir. Eserleriniçeriğine bakıldığında ise İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’nın Hadis Tarihi isimlieserinde tarihsel bir tasnifi takip ettiği görülür. İlimler tasnifiyle konuyabaşlayan İzmirli, hadislerin yazılması ve tedvini gibi konulara temasetmektedir. Ardından hadis ilminin usul konularını da ayrıntılı bir şekildetemas etmektedir. Şia’nın hadis tarihine değinmekte ve hicri üçüncü asırdanitibaren hadis tarihinin genel bir haritasını çıkarmaktadır. Bu eser Şia’nınhadis tarihine ve özellikle ehl-i rey’in hadis anlayışına yer vermesi açısındanda kendisinden önceki hadis eğitimi geleneğinden ayrılmaktadır. Ayrıca eserdehadis usulü kısmının geniş bir şekilde işlenmiş olması da sadece dersinmuhtevasının sadece hadis tarihini kapsamadığını göstermesi açısındanönemlidir.Bununlabirlikte İzmirli’nin eserinde hadislerin yazılması, Buhârî eleştirisi, hadistarih ilişkisi gibi tartışmalı konulara yer verdiği görülmektedir. Ancak bukonularda İzmirli, kendi yaklaşımını çok net bir şekilde ifade etmemektedir.Bunu yaparken görüşleri bir otoriteye dayandırma çabasında olduğu gibi konuylailgili muğlak ifadeler kullanarak kendi görüşlerini de satır aralarınagizlemektedir. Örneğin, hadis tarihininen önemli konularından biri olan hadislerin yazılması meselesinde ilkdönemlerde hadislerin sahabenin özel sayfalarında yazıldığını ifade etmektedir.Bu durum, hadislerin sahabe döneminde yazıldığı izlenimi veriyor olsa da dahasonra yapılan açıklamalarda ilk dönemlerde hadislerin bir yerde toplanıpyazılmadığını belirtmektedir. Özel sayfalar kısmını da açıklayan İzmirli bununsahabenin kalplerinde saklı olan hadislere işaret ettiğini söylemektedir. Birbaşka örnekte ise Buhârî’nin eserindeki rivayetlerin sahih olduğu hususundaherhangi bir şüphenin bulunmadığını belirtmektedir. Ancak ilerleyen sayfalardaBuhârî’nin eserinde hakkında olumsuz görüş beyan edilen raviler bulunduğunubelirtmekte ve Buhârî ile ilgili Dârekutnî’nin eleştirilerini sıralamaktadır.Zikredilen iki örneğe bakıldığında İzmirli’nin özellikle tartışmalı konulardabiraz daha temkinli hareket ettiği söylenebilir. Eserineİzmirli gibi ilimler tasnifiyle başlayan Hüseyin Avni Arapkirli’ye gelindiğindeise onun hadis usulü kısmını çok daha muhtasar bir şekilde aktardığıgörülmektedir. Bunun yansıra özellikle hadis tarihinin Hz. Peygamber ve sahabedönemini ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Ayrıca hicri üçüncü asır vesonrasındaki hadis literatürünün oluşumu ile ilgili de eserde ayrıntılıbilgiler sunmaktadır. Hüseyin Avni’nin eserinde ele aldığı konular bağlamındameseleye bakıldığında ise eserin hadis tarihi konuları daha ağırlıklı birşekilde oluşturulduğu söylenmelidir. Kendisieserinde İzmirli’nin aksine tartışmalı konulara çok fazla girmemektedir. Ancakhadis-tarih ilişkisi, hadislerin yazılması gibi bazı tartışmalı konulara yeryer değindiği de söylenmelidir. Konuyla ilgili görüşlerini daha net bir şekildeortaya koyan Hüseyin Avni, hadis tarihini tarih ilminin bir alt başlığı olarakgörmektedir. Hadislerin yazılması meselesinde ise öncelikle sahabeden konuylailgili aktarılan birbirine muhalif rivayetlere yer vermektedir. Ardından iseilk dönemlerde Kur’an ile karışma endişesi bulunduğundan hadislerin genellikle yazılmadığınıve bu durumun Ömer b. Abdülaziz’in hilafetine kadar devam ettiğini açık birşekilde belirtmektedir. Dolayısıylaeserlerinde farklı metotlar benimseyen her iki müellifin yeni bir metotarayışında oldukları söylenebilir. Zira İslami İlimler için yeni bir şey olanHadis Tarihi derslerinin ve konuyla ilgili literatürün ilk örneklerinde böylebir arayışın varlığı doğal karşılanmalıdır. Ancak bu isimlerin Osmanlı eğitimsisteminden geçtikleri ve oradaki birikim ile yeni bir sistemin içerisine dahilolmuş oldukları unutulmamalıdır. Dolayısıyla eski ve yeni arasında bir biryerde durmaları, yukarıda belirtilen çekincelerin bir parçası olarakdeğerlendirilebilir., Dār al-FunūnTheology founded in 1924 was a modern educational institution which adoptedboth traditional and modern approach to Islamic Sciences. The changes in thefield of hadīth during the process oftransition to the university caused a change in the definitions and the titlesof the courses such as from hadīth al-sharīf and usul al-hadīth to hadīth and the history of hadīth and the time allocated to each course was graduallyreduced. The preparation of the texts by the teachers in the hadith historycourses and their content will answer the question of whether there is atransformation in the field of hadīth in the early years of the Republic of Turkey. As amatter of fact, Izmirli İsmāʿīl Ḥaqqī’s History of Ḥadīth and Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ Arapkīrli’s al-Buġyaal-Hasîs fī Tārīh al-Hadīth which were written in this period, pioneered thestudies based on the field of the history of hadīth in Turkish hadīth literature. In addition, these works are the mainsource in understanding the period. In this study, the mentioned works will betextually analysed through the induction method. Therefore, the subjects thatwould reflect the ideas of the teachers will be discussed. Thus, it will betried to determine whether the courses of the history of hadīth are closer to tradition or modern ideas and, how theeducation of hadīth is practised.Summary: After thefoundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Faculty of Theology was openedat Istanbul University as a result of the abolition of madrasas issuing a law regarding to the Unification of Educationannounced in 1924. With the opening of this faculty, the education in the fieldof Religious Sciences continued its presence on a new foundation, which can beconsidered modern, until 1933. In this study, it was attempted to trace thecourses of Ḥadīth and the History of Ḥadīth given in the Faculty ofTheology at Istanbul University between 1924 and 1933. Firstly, a brief historyof the courses will be given, and then it is among the purposes of this studyto perform a textual analysis of the works written by the teachers of thesecourses. While doing this, Izmirli Ismail Hakkı's History of Ḥadīth, which was written ascourse notes and Huseyin Avni Arapkirli's al-Buġya al-Hasîs fī Tārīh al-Hadīth, which has not been knownuntil discussed it this article for the first time, were focused on. These works are very important in terms ofinitiating the History of Ḥadīthliterature. Furthermore, these are the first works in the field of hadīth in the Turkish Republic, and theyare very important sources for revealing the ideological infrastructure of theperiod. To beginwith, it is necessary to attract attention to the change in the course namesand duration if there is a need to briefly mention the history of hadīth courses in University. In theuniversities founded before the opening of the Faculty of Theology, the courseswere named as Ḥadīth al-sharīf and usul al-hadīth. Besides, these courses were includedin the curriculum for four years, which constituted the duration of theeducation. In the university founded in 1924 after the proclamation of theRepublic, the name was changed as Ḥadīth and the History of Ḥadīth. It isseen that the courses of Hadīth andthe History of Hadīth were taughtthree hours a week for two years from the opening of the Faculty of Theologyuntil 1931. From 1931 until 1933, when the faculty was closed, the coursescontinued to be given two hours a week. When thecontent of the works is viewed, it can be seen that Izmirli İsmāʿīl Ḥaqqīfollowed a historical system in his work History of Ḥadīth. Beginning the subject withthe classification of sciences, Izmirli touches upon the topics such as thewriting and codification of hadīths.Afterwards, he also deals with the methodology of in detail. He then mentionsabout the history of hadīth by Shiʿāand draws a general map of the history of hadīthas of the third century of the Islamic calendar. This work differs from theprevious tradition of the education of hadīth in termsof including the Shiʿā’s the history of hadīth and especially of ahl al-raʾy’s understanding of the hadīth. Inaddition, the detailed discussion of hadīth practicein the work is significant in terms of showing that the content of the coursedid not only cover the history of hadīth.Moreover,it is observed that Izmirli touched upon controversial topics in his work suchas the writing of hadīth,Bukhari's criticism and hadīth-historyrelation. However, Izmirli does not express his approach to these topics soclearly. In doing so, he hides his views between lines, using ambiguousstatements related to the topics while trying to base the views on authority. For instance, he says that the hadīths were written on the specialpages of the companions in the early periods when it comes to writing hadīths, whichwas one of the most important topics of the history of hadīth. Eventhough this gives an impression that the hadīths werewritten in the companion period, it is stated in the following explanationsthat the hadīths had notbeen gathered and written down in one place. Izmirli also says that they referto the hadīths in thehearts of the companion. In another example, he mentions that there is no doubtabout the accuracy of the narrations in Bukhārī's work. However, in thefollowing pages, he states that there are narrators, who are not trustworthy,in Bukhārī's work and says Dāraqutnī's criticisms related to Bukhārī. When theaforementioned two examples are examined, it can be stated that Izmirli acted abit more cautiously especially in controversial topics. When itcomes to Ḥuseyin ʿAvnīʿ Arapkīrli, who starts his work with the classificationof sciences as Izmirli does, it is seen that he discusses the part of practicemuch more briefly. Additionally, he gives more attention to Prophet Muhammadand companion period of the hadīth history.In his work, he also provides detailed information about the formation of the hadīthliterature in the third century of the Islamic calendar and afterwards. Whenthe issue is reviewed within the scope of the topics discussed by ḤuseyinʿAvnīʿ in his work, it is necessary to mention that the topics related to thehistory of hadīth were moredominant in the work. UnlikeIzmir, he does not allocate much space to controversial topics in his work.However, it should also be noted that he partly touched upon some controversialtopics such as hadīth -historyrelation and writing of hadīths. ḤuseyinʿAvnīʿ considers the history of hadīth as asub-heading of history. Regarding the writing of hadīths, hestates openly that the hadīths generallywere not written down because of the possibility for them to be mixed up withthe Qur’ān in the early periods, and this continued until the time of caliphateʿÖmer bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Thus, itcan be said that both writers, who applied different methods in their works,looked for a new method. However, it should be remembered that these names werea part of the Ottoman educational system and included in a new system togetherwith their background. Consequently, the fact that they were somewhere betweenold and new.

Belief polarization occurs when subjects who disagree about some matter of fact are exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on that dispute. While we might expect mutual exposure to common evidence to mitigate disagreement, since the evidence available to subjects comes to consist increasingly of items they have in common, this is not what happens. The subjects’ initial disagreement becomes more pronounced because each person increases confidence in her antecedent belief. Kelly (2008a) aims to identify the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon and assess whether these processes undermine the justification of polarized beliefs. He concludes that given evidentialism, justification is not undermined by the polarizing mechanisms. I take on board Kelly’s description of the polarizing mechanisms, but challenge his conclusion. I argue that on plausible versions of evidentialism, the beliefs that result from these routes to polarization are not justified.

At Pol. 7.12, 1331a19–20, Aristotle states it as a matter of fact that the citizenry of the best city should be divided into ‘public messes’ (syssitia). His primary concern in the rest of the chapter is to uncover the optimal way in which syssitia should be organized, and the way in which they should be situated in relation to other facilities, public buildings, agorai and temples in the city. The proposed plan is roughly as follows. Syssitia would be divided into three main sections. First, the syssitia of soldiers would be held at the guardhouses located at strategic points along the walls surrounding the city (1331a20–3). Next come ‘the most supreme syssitia of the magistrates’ (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια: 1331a24–5) and the syssitia ‘of the priests’ (τῶν ἱερέων: 1331b5). These would be held at a place appropriately having ‘an appearance directed at establishing virtue and [being] more strongly positioned than the neighbouring parts of the city’ (1331a28–30), that is, the highest place in the city. This envisioned acropolis would also house temples (1331a24–5). Situated below it would be the ‘free agora’, which would include gymnasia (1331a35–7) and would be generally directed at leisurely activity (1331b12). Finally, below the free agora, a ‘necessary agora’ and buildings of officials entrusted with legal, commercial and municipal duties would be established, at a location conducive to importing and exporting goods (1331b6–12).

AntikYunan’da ortaya çıkan felsefe, MÖ 4. yüzyıldan MÖ 1. yüzyıla kadarki süreçtepek çok değişime uğrayarak gelişimini devam ettirmiştir. Felsefe, doğadaninsana geçerek ilk değişimini, Platon ve Aristoteles tarafından felsefeningenel çerçevesinin çizildiği sistematik dönemle de ikinci değişimini gerçekleştirmiştir.Bu süreçte çizilen genel çerçevenin felsefenin yanında tıp alanını daetkilediği ve bu etkinin MÖ 1. yüzyılda açıkça ortaya çıktığı görülür. Buçalışma, söz konusu dönemde filozof olduğu kadar hekim unvanıyla da tanınanAthenaeus’un ruh/beden düalizminde hangi düşünce okullarını benimsediğini ve netür kaynaklardan beslenerek mesleğini icra ettiğini ortaya koymayıamaçlamaktadır. Buna göre Athenaeus’un felsefesini Platon ve Stoacı görüşlerdenhareketle açıklamanın o dönemin önemli bir tartışma zeminini oluşturanruh/beden ilişkisini daha anlaşılır kılacağı ifade edilebilir. Nitekim Romaİmparatorluğu’nun kuruluş döneminde hekimler, fizyolojik ve zihinsel olduğufarz edilen pek çok hastalığı psikolojik tedavilerle gidermeye çalışmışlardır.Ayrıca bu anlayış, bedensel hastalıkların ruhsal durumlarla ilişkili olduğunugöstermesi açısından önemlidir. Hekimlerin psikolojik rahatsızlığı bulunanhastaları dikkat dağıtıcı egzersizlerle iyileştirme çabaları, böyle birdüşüncenin sonucu olarak okunabilir., The philosophy that emerged in Ancient Greece hasundergone many changes and continued its development. The first change inphilosophy was realized by shifting focus from nature to man, and the secondchange was realized by Plato and Aristotle during the systematic period inwhich the general framework of philosophy was drawn. It can be said that thegeneral framework drawn during this process influenced the field of medicine aswell as philosophy. This influence appeared clearly in the 1st century BC. Thisstudy aims to reveal which schools of thought were adopted by Athenaeus, whowas also a physician as well as a philosopher, in soul/body dualism and whatkind of sources he utilized for practicing his profession. Accordingly, one canstate that explaining the philosophy of Athenaeus based on Platonic and Stoic thoughtmakes the relationship between soul and body that constitutes an importantbasis of discussion of that period more understandable. As a matter of fact,during the foundation period of the Roman Empire, physicians tried to cure bothmental and physiological diseases by psychological treatments. Furthermore,this understanding is important in terms of showing that physical diseases arealso related to mental states. The efforts of physicians to cure patients withpsychological disorders through distracting exercises can be read as a resultof such a thought.

The presence of a theory of the transmigration of the soul or, according to Empedocles’ words, of the δαίμων is a controversial issue among scholars. A major difficulty arises when one tries to read the fragments of thePurifications– where this theme is particularly recurrent – in conjunction with those usually attributed to the poemOn nature. The aim of this paper is to suggest a ‘method’ to analyse the extant fragments, and to offer a possible interpretation of the nature of the so–called cycle of the δαίμων. On the one hand, I shall try to show that the two poems, if read together, can provide a ‘salvific’ message. As a matter of fact, the description of the cosmic order that emerges from the poemOn naturemight convey the same prescription as stated in thePurificationsfor following the universal laws, which would ultimately allow human beings to be happy even in an age of universal evil. On the other hand, I shall propose to identify the δαίμων with the roots, which can escape from the cycle – i.e. become happy – when they are shaped as human minds, thanks to the way in which the processes of knowledge work.

In the Qur'an, in exchange for ghayb, shahada is used. According to the Qur'an, ghayb is always included in the sphere of the concept of Allah within the big ontic sphere divided into two as Allah and human. The basis of this dichotomy is the ontological difference between Allah as a creator and His creation. Despite this ontological difference between two realms of existence, Allah is the only being that humans, who are limited to the realm of shahada, have the most and constant contact. When it comes to revelation, this ontological difference becomes more of a matter of language than a matter of existence, and it is reflected in the language of the Qur'an. There are strong statements in this language about how the ghayb can only be known by Allah, which makes the ghayb belong entirely to Allah. To express it in the language of the Quran, ghayb can only be known by Allah , on land and in sea, in the darkness of the ground, in the movement of a leaf Allah's knowledge prevails, and the keys of the ghayb already belong to Him. Indeed, the fact that the Prophet's emphasis on “I do not know the unseen” as an answer to a number of demands of miraculous things from him indicates that this area is dominated by Allah alone. In this sense, it can be said that whether the ghayb is known or not is not the problem of the Qur'an because this area is already fully dedicated to Allah in the Qur'an. For this reason, it is not possible for human beings, whose permanent place in the realm of existence is among the created, to violate the area which belongs to Allah, who is the absolute creator. And because of this, the Qur'an carries the discussion to the owner of the ghayb, not the knowledge of the ghayb itself. As a matter of fact, on the meaning base of every ayah emphasizing ghayb, there are revelation period addressees who were thinking of a number of human violations against ghayb and the language of Qur'an generates answers to these thoughts with its discourse. Because soothsayers, augurs, and poets in the mindset of jahiliyah's understanding of ghayb could obtain information about the past and the future, and it is believed that the source of this information was jinns.Speaking on such a bases, the Qur'an emphasized that Allah does not impart the realm of ghayb with ethereal creatures, that no one has the ability to obtain information about the ghayb, and it states that the keys of the ghayb belongs Allah. Despite these statements, some ulama, by looking at some ayahs with adverbs of exception and the differentiation of absolute ghayb and relative ghayb, brought up the questions of to what extent can slaves have a grasp of the ghayb in the historical process, what does relative ghayb means, what did Allah conveyed to His messengers as information from the ghayb, to the agenda. There is no doubt that what led the ulama to these interpretations were literal structure of the most effective operative ayahs; the paratext context, the idiosyncratic language and theocentric wording of the Qur'an were ignored and the expressions in the ayahs were interpreted as pointing out information and signs about the future. These Qur'anic uses that the ulama most often accepted as the evidence of the Qur'an's miraculousness and the Prophet's risalat were the subjects of Ijaz ul Qur'an works and method books under the same title. Moreover, these wordings were taken as the basis of scientific tafsir; the fact that the Qur'an does not contradict scientific discoveries and findings was considered to be an indication of its accuracy and universality in the reports of the ghayb concerning the future. In addition to the future tense used in the ayahs, expressions with emphasis modes have also been effective in the formation of this perception. As a matter of fact, the ulama, thinking this news expressing such certainty can only emanate from someone who knows what he is saying and can prove his words, considered them as evidence of the divinity of the Qur'an. Our work is written away from the discussion of whether the ghayb can be known or not, with the thesis that Allah is the only owner of the ghayb and does not impart His quality to anyone including His messengers. In our opinion, taking into consideration the issue of with whom does Allah share the knowledge of the ghayb and in which ways in a scientific manner means paving the way to jahiliyah's understanding of knowledge meshed with soothsayers, augurs, and poets after centuries. In accordance with this opinion, our topic is whether Allah, the sole owner of the ghayb, made some warnings concerning the ghayb in the Qur'an, which is His only open speech to his to His addressees.Two main expression styles are seen in the Qur’an’s sentence structure: informative and constructive. In terms of their purposes, constructive sentences include informative sentences. Within the process, constructive sentence form was ignored as a higher form of informative sentence structure. As a result of this, ghayb (the invisible/unknown world) which has no epistemological value in the Qur’an has become a Qur’anic problem. The classifications of the ghayb put forward to solve this problem could not generate a common opinion, furthermore, it could not provide a sturdy concept of revelation and God. Most of the time, the tone of the verses was ignored. Future tense in the words and the expressions with takid (affirmation) was taken as a proof of the divinity of the Qur’an and the prophecy of the Rasul, and they became the argument of the titles of İcâzu’l-Qur’an. Our topic is not God’s might or wisdom, in other words, it is not whether God can see the future or not. Our topic is whether God who rules the past and the future in every way uses this as an information tool when He is talking to His slaves. In our opinion the place the Qur’an sets for the ghayb is not on a fundamental base, it is on the basis of generating answers for the misunderstandings about the ghayb and resources on it. Our study aims to justify that the constructive expressions, composed of its subform of informative expressions, about the ghayb are a work of the Qur’anic style which most of the time contains consolation, incentive and encouragement., Kur’ân’ın cümle yapısında ihbârî ve inşâî olmak üzere iki temel ifade biçimi görülmektedir. Dil otoritelerine göre bu ifade biçimleri nihâî ayrımları ifade etmemekte, zaman zaman birinin bir diğerinin kapsamına dahil olabileceği geçişkenlikleri içinde barındırmaktadır. Süreç içerisinde bu geçişkenlikler göz ardı edilmiş, bunun neticesinde gayb, Kur’ânî bir problem haline getirilmiştir. Bu problemin çözümü için üretilen gayb tasnifleri müşterek bir kanaat oluşturamamış, üstelik vahiy ve Allah tasavvurunda sorunlara yol açmıştır. Çoğu zaman ayetlerdeki üslûp dikkate alınmamış, lafızlardaki gelecek kipleri ve tekidli ifadeler Kur’ân’ın ilahîliğinin ve Rasul’ün risaletinin delili sayılmış, bu durum ilerleyen süreçte İ‘câzu’l-Kur'ân başlıklarının argümanı haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada Allah’ın geleceğe dair bilgisi konusuna girilmeden geleceğe yönelik bilgi taşıdığı düşünülen üç ayetin cümle türü üzerinden gaybla ilişkisi ele alınmıştır. Kur’ân’ın gayba ayırdığı yer, birçok yerde aslî bir zeminde değil, muhataplarının gayba ve gaybî bilgi kaynaklarına dair yanlış anlayışlarına cevap üretme zeminindedir. Bu anlamda çalışmamız, gayba dair ihbârî ifadelerin üst formu inşâî bir yapıdan müteşekkil çoğu zaman teselli, teşvik, cesaretlendirme içerikli Kur’ânî bir üslûbun eseri olduğunu temellendirmektedir. Haber formunda fakat inşa nitelikli bu ayetlerin vukuu ise, mucizevî sonuçlar değil, kişilerin kevnî yasalara uygun doğru eylem ve tutumlarının doğurduğu sonuçlardır. Bu anlamda ayetler, nihai olarak bir başarının gerçekleşeceğine işaret etmemekte, “dirayetli olan, sebat gösteren aydınlığa çıkar” minvalinde bir mesajla Allah’ın yaratılış üzerindeki sünnetine vurgu yapmaktadır.

According to a well-established tradition in the philosophy of language, we can understand what makes an arbitrary sound, gesture, or marking into a meaningful linguistic expression only by appealing to mental states, such as beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I explore the contrasting possibility of understanding the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions just in terms of observable linguistic behavior. Specifically, I explore the view that a type of sound (or other item) becomes a meaningful linguistic expression within a group in virtue of the production of that type of item becoming that group’s widespread, copied way of getting others to involve an object or relation in their activity. After discussing a preliminary version of the view, I develop it in response to some key concerns about whether it really does, as a matter of fact, eschew mental states, and about its adequacy as an account of linguistic meaning.

O homem do puro estado de natureza começa sua existência “por funções puramente animais”. De fato, o esforço de Rousseau na primeira parte do Discurso sobre a desigualdade consiste em quase “animalizar” o ser humano, tornando-o incapaz de realizar certos tipos de operações que o homem social ou socializado (dotado de um aparelho mental já desenvolvido) pode efetuar. No entanto, apesar de animalizado, o homem conserva sua dignidade própria e sua natureza exclusiva. O autor jamais reduz o comportamento humano ao animal. O objetivo do presente artigo é investigar o caráter desta natureza exclusiva e mostrar que, ao contrário do que sustentam alguns intérpretes, a perfectibilidade (signo de distinção humano) já atua no puro estado de natureza. Nesse sentido, não podemos encará-la como uma simples virtualidade nem como uma faculdade em potência.

The sacred and the revolution Leszek Kołakowski and othersThe author examines the relationship between the sphere of the sacred and the phenomenon of the revolution. He points to the distinctiveness of Leszek Kołakowski’s position as compared to the views articulated by other representatives of the so-called Warsaw school of the history of ideas. He claims that Kołakowski’s philosophical programme, which takes into account the sacred and mythical dimension of the socio-political diagnoses, can help us to understand the Russian Revolution of 1917 as well as other revolutionary movements and processes of the 20th century. He demonstrates that the sacred is an inherent aspect of the revolutionary mentality. Also, he argues that the ideologies which turned against religion in the name of the struggle with religious superstitions, in the end became quasi-religious. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary utopia may be perceived as a kind of crypto-religion involving such elements of the mythical thinking as a belief in the cognition of history, an assumption that the latter may be started anew, a belief in the possibility of the secular eschatology, etc.

The aim of this study is to examine the divine contract of almighty Allah with His servants in the perspective of Qur'anic verses. First, misak and ahd concepts used for the divine contract in the Qur'an were analyzed. Then, the divine agreements of Allah with his creatures are explained in the light of the Qur'anic verses. The research was concluded by noting the rewards of those who remain faithful to and the penalties to those who violate the divine agreements. God created human and placed ability to know and to believe their creators and His discipline. This is called the divine contract. Indeed, in verse of A’raf 172 God has asked all souls the question “Am I not your Lord?” and after this question, all the souls replied that "Yes you are our Lord, we promise". This is called elest bezmi or bezm-i elest. Some scholars have said that this convention took place in the realms of the souls before people were created and sent to the world. The others say that this divine contract consists of the expression of the faith placed in human nature (fitrat) in a representative language. The vious of God’s deed is unknown as the form of His existence. Man can never comprehend the vious of His deeds just as man cannot comprehend the form of His existence. Only Allah knows the truth since this is a metaphysical matter. We do not know entirely and exactly how Allah took the promise from man. It is compulsory to human being to believe that God has taken the promise from man about believing in his existence and oneness. Almighty Allah has placed the ability to every human nature to know Allah and to believe in His discretion. When some people are created and sent to the world, they act according to the necessity of this divine agreement and know Allah and worship him. Some people forget or ignore this divine agreement they deny Allah and turn away from worshiping Allah. Thus, they break down their promises. Almighty Allah reminds people of the divine contract by sending prophets at various times throughout human history and advice to human beings to act according to the divine contract. In short, the prophets invite people to believe in Allah existence and to live in a frame of His commandments by obeying the commands of Allah. Allah has taken the covenant from the prophets, Jews, Christians, idolaters and believers throughout human history. Almighty Allah has taken words from each prophet that they will do the work given to them properly. The prophets must do the divine notification. For this cause, it is necessary to endure difficulties, to make all kinds of material and spiritual sacrifices and even to fight if it is necessary. It is the exam of the prophets to bear these difficulties and to fulfill the task. As a matter of fact, the prophets will be questioned as to whether they had promised to Allah on the Day of Judgment, whether they had announced the commandments revealed to them, and whether people followed these commandments. The prophets will also testify in favor of and against their followers on Day of Judgment. Almighty Allah, had received covenant from the Jews to explain Torah to the people, from the Christians to explain Bible to the people. However, both the Jews and the Christians have altered and altered the divine books that were given to them in exchange for a very little world interest. Almighty Allah, had received covenant from the Jews to explain Torah to the people, from the Christians to explain Bible to the people. However, both the Jews and the Christians have altered and altered the divine books that were given to them in exchange for a very little world interest. Those who break Allah's covenant deserve the curse of God. Almighty Allah says: “And those who break the covenant of Allah, after its ratification, and sever that which Allah has commanded to be joined (i.e. they sever the bond of kinship and are not good to their relatives), and work mischief in the land. On them is the curse (i.e. they will be far away from Allah’s Mercy), and for them is the unhappy (evir) home (i.e. Hell).” (Ar-Ra’d, 13/25) Indeed, the Sons of Israel were subjected to various misfortunes because they breaked their covenant with Allah. And they are cursed by Allah and their hearts are solidified. Thus, those who fail to fulfill His promise to Allah / those who disobey the Scripture receive damages and mischiefs in the world, with their hearts being hardened. Almighty Allah has prepared a great punishment in the Hereafter for those who break Allah's covenant.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I would like to bring into the light the almost unexplored Sellars’s theory of particulars. Second, I would like to show its surprising degree of compatibility with the thesis supported by some contemporary tropists (Lowe, Gozzano and Orilia (eds), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Ontos Verlag, 2008; Moltmann, Mind 113:1–41, 2004 and Moltmann, Noûs 47:346–370, 2013). It is difficult to establish whether Sellars possessed an own theory of tropes, developed independently by the classical form it took in Williams 1953, but as a matter of fact the peculiar features of his “complex particulars” model it is very much like Williams’s theory. So much so that to all intents and purposes it represents a tropes variation. One of its strengths is that it is not part of a constituent ontology, since it is essentially developed from a linguistic and phenomenological point of view. It is for these reasons that this theory manages to avoid some of the classic objections to tropes and it shows to be compatible with the argument of Jonathan Lowe’s “proper visibility” as well as with Friederike Moltmann’s exquisitely linguistic interpretation of tropes.

This paper aims to present the contemporary accelerationism of Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek focusing on their take on the emancipating production of political subjects. Even though their views have been understood as a Marxist heresy, it turns out they behold the legacy of Post-Workerism (also known as the Italian theory or Autonomism) which they actually sketch out as a declension of the hegemonic logic of the Post-Marxism of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. As a matter of fact, Post-Workerism and Post-Marxism both diverge from conventional Marxism and its understanding of the rise of the political subject - yet follow two different logics of emancipation. In this article, Srnicek and Williams ’ s accelerationism is situated in the frame of a dispute between two confronted theoretical currents: the autonomous experience of the multitude, and, the equivalential articulation of «the people». The discussion of this hybridization leads me to the reconceptualization of their accelerationism as a tecnopopulism .

Paul Greengard's name is and will remain profoundly associated with Neuroscience, with brain signaling and chemical transmission, with Parkinson's and Alzheimer's diseases, with fundamental discoveries and solving paradoxes, but much less perhaps with drug discovery. This should not be mistaken as disdain. Paul in fact did contemplate developing therapeutic avenues to actually treat brain diseases much more than it is known, perhaps during his entire career, and certainly over the last two decades. As a matter of fact, he did more than contemplate it, he directly and indirectly contributed in the development of treatments for neurological diseases and disorders. Paul's impact on fundamental aspects of the brain has been so gargantuan that any other aspect of Paul's life will have difficulty to shine. It is precisely this less known aspect of Paul's career that will be covered in this review. We will discover how Paul very early on moved away from biophysics to avoid working on nuclear weapons and instead started his career in the pharmacological spheres of a large pharmaceutical company.

Assuming a distinction between civilization and morality this chapter explores how Kant approaches the factual plurality of cultures. While the concept of civilization shares in some features of the pragmatic origin of culture, it also has, for Kant, a normative connotation; this is implicit in not only the distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples, but also in the duty to work for the advancement of a cosmopolitan order in charge of advancing perpetual peace. In this context, it is reasonable to ask which role Kant envisions for the factual plurality of cultures. In this chapter, I intend to clarify the extent to which he takes such plurality simply as a matter of fact, or considers it in an evaluative light.

It is the aim of the editors of this collection of essays to provide more than just a companion to the critical edition of The Papers of the Metaphysical Society 1869–1880, which they had previously published through Oxford University Press in 2015. As a matter of fact, since its release, this critical edition has already brought impetus to the study of the Metaphysical Society, which—so far and since A. W. Brown’s post-war biographical sketch—had been surprisingly scarce given the notoriety ...

Resumen La historia parece tener una importancia especial en el campo de la filosofía, en pocas disciplinas encontramos tantas referencias a los autores y problemas del pasado. Sin embargo, esto puede ser una simple cuestión de hecho: hasta ahora hemos creído que enseñar la historia de la filosofía era formativo para los futuros filósofos, pero tal creencia puede cambiar. También podría ser una cuestión de puro interés profesional: algunos estudiamos la historia de la disciplina, y tratamos de justificar esa dedicación alegando que ésta puede ser útil, en cierta medida, para los pensadores contemporáneos. En este artículo, sin embargo, abogaré por una comprensión de nuestra historia como algo central a la hora de hacer filosofía, es decir, que nuestro interés por el pasado disciplinar no es sólo contingente, ni una mera cuestión de supervivencia laboral. Dicho objetivo me llevará a contrastar dos posiciones, la de quienes defienden una reconstrucción racional de las tesis de los autores del pasado y la de los que sostienen un estudio detallado de su contexto. Establecido esto, relacionaré estas perspectivas con la concepción del pasado que comparten y propondré, alternativamente, una interpretación que no deja a la filosofía desconectada de su historia, sino que entiende que dicha historia ya es filosofía. Abstract History seems to have a special importance in Philosophy. Only in few disciplines do we find so many references to the authors and problems of the past. However, this may be a simple matter of fact: until now we have believed that teaching the history of philosophy was formative for future philosophers, but such a belief may change. It may also be a matter of pure professional interest: some of us study the History of Philosophy and try to justify this dedication by claiming that it may be useful, to some extent, to contemporary thinkers. In this article, however, I will argue for an understanding of our history as central to Philosophy, that is, that our interest in the disciplinary past is not merely contingent, nor merely a matter of working survival. This objective will lead me to contrast two positions, that of those who defend a rational reconstruction of the theses of the authors of the past and that of those who sustain a detailed study of their context. Having established this, I will relate these perspectives to the conception of the past that they share, and I will propose, alternatively, an interpretation that does not leave philosophy disconnected from its history but understands that this history is already philosophy.

al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) is one of the important philosophers who contributed to the science stuides and tried to create a philosophy of science in medieval Islamic thought. He based his understanding of science on the principles of logic abd tried to evaluate the subject of science within epistemological and metaphysical integrity. He considered religious and rational sciences within their limitations. As a matter of fact, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm (Classification of Sciences) is one of the examples that best reflects his conception of science and philosophy.In this study, the scientific research understanding of al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) was evaluated in the context of the treatise “Maqāla Abi Nasr al-Fārābī fīmā yasiḥḥu wa-mā lā yasiḥḥu min aḥkām al-nujūm”, which briefly abbreviated as Aḥkām al-nujūm. This assess-ment is to explain his understanding of method through the philosophical and logical arguments used by al-Fārābī on the distinction between the science of astronomy and astrology. It can said that the basic structure of the study is shaped around the con-cepts of syllogism, induction, sampling, experience and causality that stand out as criteria in the comparison of the scientific qualities of these two disciplines and in the explanation of the subject.al-Fārābī considers the science of stars (Ilm al-nujūm) under the title of mathema-tics/ta‘līmī sciences, a sub-discipline of nazarī (theorical) philosophy. He states that the concept of the science of stars is used jointly for two sciences. One of them; a) knowledge of the provisions extracted from the stars (Ilm aḥkām al-nujūm). This science is called Astrology. It is an art that studies how stars point to future events and current human situations. b) the knowledge of the stars (Ilm al-nujūm al-ta'līmī). This science is called as astronomy. This science covers the shapes of celestial bodies, types of motion, cosmic positions, mass and weight calculations, the Earth sphere, climates and, in relation to them, the shapes of the Earth. Therefore, al-Fārābī states that the science that is valuable in terms of its subject, which is encouraged to learn and teach, is the science of the stars (Ilm al-nujūm al-ta’līmī). He also recommends avoiding the invalid propositions and inferences of the art of astrology, which are incompatible with scientific understanding and are in contrast.What makes the treatise important is that it offers a method to be followed in re-search in other sciences, especially in astrology. Because, as in the art of astrology, he sees the root cause of some philosophical and logical errors arising out of being away from a functional methodology. According to al-Fārābī, people who do research should have a philosophical formation and a competent nature first. He says that it is necessary to base the research method in this field on the principles of philosophical knowledge and logic. Because, according to al-Fārābī, it is not possible to reach a valid and correct judgment without knowing these principles. Therefore, he emphasizes the importance of knowing Qiyas and Burhan (demonstration) which is one of the areas where comparison is applied. Because one of the disadvantages that leads a researcher to a mistake in the field of science is that a person tends to accept what is not mandatory conclusive evidence as a Burhan. al-Fārābī points out the logical violations made by those who are engaged in the art of astrology in the principle that those who are similar share common judgment. If any quality of one thing is similar to the quality of another thing, it indicates that all these things do not require it to be similar to the other thing in essence and nature. al-Fārābī also emphasizes the ontological principle of equality, stating that one of the two possible equals cannot be superior to the other. In this context, he calls attention to that some principles should be considered in the application of the method of induction and sampling, one of the reasoning forms in terms of methodology. By discussing the epistemic value of experience knowledge in terms of methodology, he tries to reveal the results it will provide us in terms of as-trology. al-Fārābī draws attention to the error made in this matter by stating that the universal judgment obtained from induction does not have the quality of a mandatory precise knowledge. He draws attention to the moral, religious and social problems that will be created by determining life through the data of astrology about the future. Therefore, it considers the judgment given by the science of astrology regarding the results of possible propositions for the future invalid. As a metaphysical basis, in the perspective of the principle of causality, Astrology prefers to interpret the inconsist-encies and misinterpretations of the art with the understanding of physical determin-ism and evaluate them together with the concepts of “coincidence” and “possible unknown”., Orta çağ İslâm düşüncesinde bilim çalışmalarına katkı sunan ve bir bilim felsefesi oluşturmaya çalışan önemli filozoflardan biri de Fârâbî’dir (öl. 339/950). Bilim anlayışını, mantığın ilkelerine dayandırmıştır. Bilim konusunu epistemolojik ve metafiziksel bütünlük içerisinde değerlendirmeye çalışmıştır. O, dinî ilimler ile aklî ilimleri kendi sınırlılıkları içerisinde bir bütün olarak ele almıştır. Nitekim İhsâü’l-ulûm (İlimlerin Sayımı) adlı eserinde ilimlere ilişkin yapmış olduğu sınıflandırma onun bilim ve felsefe tasavvurunu en iyi yansıtan örneklerdendir.Bu çalışmada kısaca Ahkâmü’n-nücûm şeklinde ifade ettiğimiz “Makale Ebi Nasr el-Fârâbî fi ma yasihhu ve mâ lâ yaṣiḥḥu min aḥkâmi’n-nücûm” risalesi bağlamında Fârâbî’nin bilimsel araştırma anlayışı değerlendirilmiştir. Bahse konu olan bu değerlendirme astronomi bilimi ile astroloji sanatının ayrımı konusunda Fârâbî’nin kullandığı felsefî ve mantıkî argümanlar üzerinden onun yöntem anlayışını izah etmektir. Çalışmanın temel örgü-sünün ise bu iki disiplinin bilimsel niteliklerinin mukayesesinde ve konunun izahında kriter olarak öne çıkan kıyas, tümevarım, örneklem, tecrübe ve nedensellik kavramları etrafında şekillendiğini söyleyebiliriz.Fârâbî, yıldızlar bilimini (İlmu’n-nücûm) nazarî felsefenin bir alt disiplini olan matematik/teâ‘lîmi bilimler başlığı altında ele alır. Yıldızlar bilimi kavramının iki ilim için ortak kullanıldığını belirtir. Bunlardan biri; a) Yıldızlardan çıkarılan hükümler ilmi (İlmu ahkâmi’n-nücûm). Bu ilim astroloji olarak isimlendirilir. Yıldızların gelecekte olacak olaylar ile şu andaki insanî birtakım durumlara işaret etmesini inceleyen bir sanattır. b) Talîmî yıldızlar ilmi (İlmu’n-nücûmi’t-teâ‘lîmî). Bu ilim ise astronomi olarak isimlendirilir. Bu ilim gök cisimlerinin şekillerini, hareket türlerini, kozmik konumlarını, kütle ve ağırlık hesaplamalarını, yer küreyi, iklimler ve bunlarla ilişkili olarak yer-yüzü şekillerini kendine konu edinir. Dolayısıyla Fârâbî konusu bakımından değerli olan, öğrenilmesi ve öğretilmesi teşvik edilen bilimin Talîmî yıldızlar ilmi (İlmu’n-nücûmi’t-teâ‘lîmî) olduğunu belirtir. Bilimsel anlayışla uyumlu olmayan ve tezat teşkil eden Astroloji sanatının geçersiz kabul edilen önerme ve çıkarımlarından da uzak durulmasını önerir.Risaleyi önemli kılan husus, özelde astroloji genelde ise diğer bilimlerdeki araştırmalarda takip edilecek bir yöntem teklif etmesidir. Zira o, astroloji sanatında olduğu üzere ortaya çıkan birtakım felsefî ve mantıksal hataların temel sebebini işlevsel bir yöntembilimden uzak olmakta görür. Fârâbî’ye göre araştırma yapacak kişilerin öncelikle felsefî formasyona ve yetkin bir tabiata sahip olmaları gerekir. O, bu alandaki araştırma yönteminin felsefî bilgi ve mantık ilkeleri üzerinden temellendirilmesinin gerekli olduğunu söyler. Çünkü ona göre bu ilkeler bilinmeden geçerli ve doğru bir yargıya ulaşmak mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla kıyas ve kıyasın uygulandığı sanatlar-dan burhanın bilinmesinin önemine vurguda bulunur. Zira bir bilim alanında araştırmacıyı hataya sevk eden olumsuzluklardan biri de kişinin zorunlu kesin kanıt olmayanı burhanmış gibi kabule yönelmesidir.Fârâbî, astroloji sanatıyla uğraşanların, “benzerler ortak yargıyı paylaşırlar” ilkesinde yaptıkları mantıksal ihlallere de dikkat çeker. Bir şeyin herhangi bir niteliğinin bir başka şeyin niteliğiyle benzerlik göstermesi, tüm o şeylerin özü ve mahiyeti itibariyle de diğer şeye benzemesini gerektirmeyeceğine işaret eder. Fârâbî ontolojik müsâvât ilkesine de vurguda bulunarak mümkün iki eşitten birinin diğerinden daha üstün olamayacağını belirtir.Bu bağlamda yöntembilim açısından akıl yürütme formlarından örneklem ve tümevarım metodunun uygulanmasında birtakım ilkelere dikkat edilmesi gerektiğini söyler. Fârâbî tümevarımdan elde edilen tümel yargının zorunlu kesin bir bilgi niteliği taşımadığını belirterek bu konuda düşülen hataya dikkat çeker. Tecrübî bilginin yöntembilim açısından epistemik değerini tartışarak astroloji açısından bize sağlayacağı sonuçları ortaya koymaya çalışır. O, geleceğe dair astroloji ilminin verileri üzerinden hayatı determine etmenin yaratacağı ahlakî, dinî ve toplumsal sorunlara dikkat çeker. Dolayısıyla Astroloji ilminin geleceğe dair mümkün önermelerin sonuçlarına ilişkin vermiş olduğu yargıyı geçersiz kabul eder. Metafizik bir esas olarak nedensellik ilkesi perspektifinde astroloji sanatıyla uğraşanların tutarsızlığını ve yanlış çıkarımlarını fizikî determinizm anlayışıyla yorumlayarak “rastlantı/ittifakî” ve “mümkün meçhul” kavramlarıyla beraber değerlendirmeyi tercih eder.

The basis of Plato's war with the poet is not only that the poet is concerned with images having a weak positioning on the ontological plane. The poets, especially epic poets such as Homer, are the founding actors of social nomos (laws) and ethos (home, character, custom). Nevertheless, Plato has a radical demand about establishing social nomos and ethos through his own methods. For this reason, Plato enters into a strong war with the poet. His fight is in fact between rationality and imagination, as well as between logos and epos or mythos. In this context, Nazim Hikmet, as an epic poet, is a rival of Plato even though he is not Plato’s contemporary. As a matter of fact, his influence cannot be denied that the image of Shaykh Badr al-Din and some kind of social consciousness in this regard. For all that, we can argue that philosophy also pursues remaking of the social mindset shaped by the epic poet in its Platonic representation, with inspiration from ancient rivalry. In this study, the image of Shaykh Badr al-Din will be re-evaluated from a philosophical perspective by adopting rational criteria although it has come to the forefront with two dimensions (socialist and materialist) in Nazim Hikmet’s imagination. Is Shaykh Badr al-Din truly a socialist and materialist as he is alleged to be? Or did the “poet” manipulate the truth by crippling the mind as usual?

Ḥadīths have been preserved and recorded in various ways since the Companions. These activities continued dur-ing the Tābiīn (the successors of the Companions) Period. So much so that these methods have formed the infra-structure of other methods that will emerge later. In this context, before the 70's (A.H.), works named al-Aṭrāf appeared. However, these first works consisted of the notes that they wrote some of the ḥadīths before coming to the science assemblies to help students remember in ḥadīth learning. Ḥadīth scholars have adopted and applied this method in a very short time. Thus, this method also provided the opportunity for the formation of the first written ḥadīth documents. In addition, with the writing of ḥadīth works, it has turned into a system of al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj in order to make maximum use of these books and to reach the source of a narration that is tried to be found. As a result, al-Aṭrāf literature, which can be evaluated as index, has emerged. As a matter of fact, the first examples of this literature, arranged alphabetically according to the names of the Companions or ḥadīth texts, started to be given since the 4th (A.H.) century. In this way, the way to quickly benefit from the accumulation of the ḥadīth area has been opened. This article focuses on the historical adventure of al-Aṭrāf and their contributions to the ḥadīth field, as well as literature knowledge of the works of al-Aṭrāf which are of great importance for both al-Kitābah, al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj.Summary: In order to understand and practice the religion of Islām, great efforts have been made both in the past and later periods in order to convey the words, verbs, interpretations and qualifications of the Prophet to the next genera-tions as they are protected from all kinds of falsification and changes. This process, which started with memoriza-tion and partly writing at the beginning, has gained momentum with the use of other methods since the period of Tābiīn. In this context, the method of aṭrāf was started to be used to facilitate memorization, to be a reminder, and to transmit the ḥadīth through the hearing of the ḥadīth sheikh. The first examples of this method were seen by Muḥammad b. Sīrīn during his participation of his teacher Abīde/Ubayda Salmān in the scholarly assembly. At this stage, the relevant method was manifested as writing a passage from the beginning of the ḥadīth. Thus, the aforementioned method, which had great contributions in recording and memorizing ḥadīths in accordance with the original, has gained widespreadness and application among the ḥadīth scholars like Ubeydullaḥ b. Omar, Shu’bah b. al-Ḥajjāj, Sufyān as-Sawrī, Mālik b. Anas, Ismāīl b. Ayyāş and Vakī b. Jarrāḥ in a very short time. In this context, Yazīd b. Zuray’ stated that he went to his teacher without his aṭrāf work of ḥadīths which he transmitted from Shu’bah and listened to ḥadīth in this way. Therefore, this mentioned event is important in terms of putting forth that Shu’bah allowed the aṭrāf method in his assemblies. The method was used by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who traveled to Madīnah to convey the reports recorded with the mentioned method of his teacher Abū Alḳama al-Farawī and at the same time listen to the related transfers from him, but who could not reach his goal. Therefore, the related narrations show that aṭrāf method was used effectively by ḥadīth scholars to remember the ḥadīths in the 1st and 2nd centuries, so sections from the narrations were written during the preparatory stage before coming to the scholarly assembly. Ultimately, the importance of these works, which manifest in different ways and offer great contributions to writing, is an undeniable reality for the history of ḥadīth.Aṭrāf, the plural form of taraf that literally means the side and edge of something, mean a section, phrase or first part that indicates the whole of the ḥadīth. This method, along with the formation of ḥadīth literature, has been started to be given as a name to the works organized alphabetically according to the name of the Companions or ḥadīth texts by mentioning some of the ḥadīths with the 4th century. In this sense, aṭrāf has started to become a unique literature in a sort of taṣnīf and takhrīj method in order to make use of the ḥadīth writing easier.Aṭrāf studies may aim to bring together the isnāḍs (chains of transmitters) in all books, or they can be limited to the chains in certain books. Aṭrāf books contain the ḥadīths in the Ṣaḥīḥān or Kutub al-Sittah and are written in alphabetical form based on the name of the companions or according to the texts of ḥadīth. The first of these, which has the attribute of the musnad in a sense, is arranged in alphabetical order according to the name of the Companion, and if there are many people who narrate from him, according to the names of the tābiīn and taba-i tābiīn (successors of the tābiīn). Accordingly, the narrations of each companion were determined and listed in al-phabetical order in aṭrāfs in musnad-type, and a passage was written from the ḥadīths and marked as books/chapters in the places of relevant narration. On the other hand, the second type of aṭrāf books were ar-ranged by giving a few words from a section that allows remembering the head or all of the ḥadīths without in-cluding chains, and then placing these texts in alphabetical order.The type of aṭrāf offers the opportunity to see different chains of narrations together and provides many facilities for the ḥadīth researchers. Therefore, ḥadīth researchers show great interest in this genre. Aṭrāfs provide many benefits for both ḥadīth chain and text. In this respect, it is possible to talk about many advantages of the ḥadīth to its transmister such as the determination of mutawātīr, garīb, azīz, mashhūr, mutābī or the testimony of ḥadīth; to provide facility to make a reputation research of a riwāyah (narration), to provide an opportunity to determine the location of the narrations in the primary sources; to detect the link or any blackout in the chain, to reach the nu-merical knowledge of ḥadīth narrated by a companion or other narrators, to obtain information about narrators whose identity is not explicitly stated, to know the first narrator, to provide the protection of the ḥadīths from taḥrīf or alteration, to give the opportunity to identify the subject they contain, to be able to obtain text integrity by getting various chains, the detection of the sabab al-wurūd (the context of ḥadīth).Due to the contributions we have mentioned above, many books on aṭrāf literature that started with Abu’l-Ḥasen Ali b. Omar ad-Dārakutnī have been published. Among them Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn/el-Jem`u bayna’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Mas`ūd Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Ubayd ad-Dimashkī, Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Muḥammad Ḥalaf b. Muḥammad b. Ali al-Vasiṭī, Zaḫāiru’l-mavārīs fi’d-dalālati alā mavāzi`i’l-hadīs by Abdülganī b. İsmāīl en-Nāblūsī and Tuḥfatu’l-ashrāf bi ma`rifati’l-aṭrāf by Abu’l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Abdurrahman el-Mizzī can be mentioned. Some of the related works are arranged in musnad style while others are arranged according to the first word of ḥadīth texts. As a result, the method of aṭrāf has become a kind of indexer in order to facilitate reaching the source of the re-ports and make the highest level of use required by the classification and bookings of the ḥadīths in the 3rd centu-ry. These works, arranged alphabetically in the name of the Companions or according to the texts of the ḥadīth, have taken their place in the history of the ḥadīth with their many examples, both in the form of taṣnīf and the method of takhrīj by mentioning a part of the ḥadīth by the head., Hadisler, sahâbe döneminden itibaren çeşitli yollarla muhafaza ve kayıt altına alınmaya başlanmış; bu faaliyet tâbiîn devrinde de daha sonra ortaya çıkacak farklı tasnif sistemlerinin nüvesini teşkil edecek nitelikteki yöntem-lerle devam etmiştir. Bu bağlamda henüz hicri yetmiş yıllarına varmadan hadis öğreniminde hatırlamaya yardımcı olması için öğrenciler tarafından ilim meclisine gelmezden önce rivayetlerden bir pasaj/yazma şeklinde not tut-ma tarzında ortaya çıkan etrâf usulü, çok kısa bir sürede muhaddisler tarafından benimsenip uygulanmıştır. Böyle-ce ilk yazılı hadis vesikalarının oluşmasına da imkân sağlayan bu metot, rivayet türü eserlerin tasnifi ile birlikte onlardan âzami ölçüde faydalanmayı temin etmek ve aranılan haberin kaynağına kısa yoldan ve tez elden ulaşılma-sını sağlamak amacıyla bir tasnif ve tahrîc sitemine evrilmiş, neticede fihrist niteliğindeki etrâf edebiyatının orta-ya çıkmasına olanak sunmuştur. Nitekim sahâbe isimlerine veya hadis metinlerine göre alfabetik düzenlenmiş söz konusu literatürün ilk örnekleri, hicri 4. asırdan itibaren zuhur etmiş böylece alana dair birikimden hızlı bir şekil-de yararlanmanın da önü açılmıştır. İşte bu makale, hem kitâbet, hem tasnif hem de tahrîc açısından büyük bir önem arz eden etrâfların tarihî seyrini, hadis alanına katkılarını ve literatürünü konu edinmektedir.Özet: İslâm dininin doğru bir şekilde anlaşılması ve uygulanabilmesi için Resûl-i Ekrem’e ait söz, fiil, takrir ve vasıfların her türlü tahrîf ve tebdilden korunarak oldukları şekliyle sonraki nesillere ulaştırılması için gerek sahâbe gerekse sonraki dönemlerde büyük gayretler sarfedilmiştir. Ezber ve kısmen de kitâbet ile doğan bu süreç, tâbiîn döne-minden itibaren başkaca usullerin kullanılmasıyla hız kazanmıştır. Bu bağlamda ezbere kolaylık sağlaması, hatır-latıcı nitelik taşıması ve hadis şeyhinden sema yoluyla hadis tahammülünde kullanılmak üzere etrâf yöntemi uy-gulanmaya başlanmıştır. İlk örnekleri Muhammed b. Sîrîn tarafından hocası Abîde/Ubeyde es-Selmânî’nin ilim meclisine katılması esnasında görünen bu yöntem bu aşamada hadisin evvelinden bir pasaj yazmak şeklinde teza-hür etmiştir. Böylece hadislerin aslına uygun bir şekilde kayıt altına alınmasında ve ezberlenmesinde çok büyük katkıları olan mezkûr metot, çok kısa bir sürede Ubeydullah b. Ömer, Şu`be b. el-Haccâc, Süfyân es-Sevrî, Mâlik b. Enes, İsmâil b. Ayyâş ve Vekî` b. Cerrâh gibi muhaddisler arasında yaygınlık kazanmış ve uygulama alanı bulmuş-tur. Bu bağlamda Yezîd b. Zürey`, Şu’be’den tahammül ettiği hadislerden müteşekkil etrâf çalışması olmaksızın hocasının yanına gittiğini ve bu şekilde hadis dinlediğini belirtmiştir. Dolayısıyla zikredilen bu olay, Şu`be’nin meclislerinde etrâf usulüne izin verdiğini göstermesi açısından önemlidir. İlgili yöntem, hocası Ebû Alkame el-Ferevî’ye ait ve mezkûr yöntem ile kaydedilmiş haberleri arz etmek, aynı zamanda da ilgili nakilleri ondan dinle-mek üzere Medîne’ye rihle gerçekleştiren ancak amacına ulaşamayan Ahmed b. Hanbel tarafından da kullanılmış-tır. Dolayısıyla ilgili rivayetler, etrâf tarzının hicrî 1. ve 2. yüzyıllarda hadislerin hatırlanması amacıyla muhaddis-ler tarafından etkin bir şekilde işletildiğini, bu nedenle ilim meclisine gelmeden önce hazırlık aşamasında rivayet-lerden bölümler yazıldığını göstermektedir. Nihayetinde farklı şekillerde tezahür eden tedvin için çok büyük katkı-lar sunan etrâf çalışmalarının hadis tarihi açısından önemi de yadsınamaz bir gerçekliktir. Bir şeyin yanı, tarafı ve ucu anlamına gelen ve taraf kelimesinin çoğulu olan etrâf, hadisin tamamına işaret eden bir cüzü, ibaresi veya ilk kısmı anlamına gelmektedir. Bu usul, hadis edebiyatının teşekkülü ile birlikte hicri IV. yüzyıldan itibaren hadislerin evvelinden bir kısmının zikredilerek sahâbe adına veya hadis metinlerine göre alfabe-tik olarak düzenlenen eserlere isim olarak verilmiştir. Bu anlamda etrâflar, hadis müdevvenatından daha kolay yararlanma amacıyla bir tür tasnif ve tahrîc yöntemi tarzında müstakil bir literatür haline gelmiştir.Etrâf çalışmaları, bütün kitaplardaki isnadları bir araya getirmeyi hedefleyeceği gibi belli kitaplarda bulunan se-nedlerle de kayıtlanabilir. Etrâf kitapları, başta Sahîhân veya Kütüb-i Sitte’deki hadisleri ihtiva etmekte olup sahâbe adını esas alarak müsned türünde veya hadis metinlerine göre alfabetik olarak kaleme alınmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, bir açıdan müsned özelliği taşıyıp rivayetlerin ilk râvisi olan sahâbî adına, ondan rivayette bulunanların çok olması durumunda ise tâbiîn ve tebe-i tâbiîn isimlerine göre alfabetik olarak düzenlenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda müs-ned türü etrâflarda her sahâbînin rivayetleri tespit edilip alfabetik olarak sıralanmış ve hadislerden birer pasaj yazılarak ilgili naklin yerlerine kitap/bölüm olarak işaret edilmiştir. İkinci nevi etrâf kitapları ise senedlere yer vermeksizin hadislerin baş tarafından veya tamamını hatırlamaya imkân veren bir bölümünden birkaç kelimeyi vermek sonra da bu metinleri alfabetik sıraya koymak suretiyle tertip edilmiştir.Daha ziyade rivayetlerin başka tariklerini bir arada görme imkânı sunan ve hadis araştırmacılarına sağladığı pek çok kolaylık sebebiyle muhaddislerin yoğun mesâi harcadıkları etrâf türünün hem sened hem de metne ilişkin sağladığı pek çok faydalardan bahsetmek mümkündür. Bu doğrultuda hadisin; mütevatir, garîb, azîz, meşhur, mütâbi` veya şâhidliğinin tespitine imkân vermesi, bir rivayetin fert olup olmadığına yönelik itibar araştırmasına olanak sağlaması, nakillerin aslî kaynaklardaki yerlerinin tespitine imkân sunması, senedde ittisal veya inkıta` olup olmadığının saptanması, sahâbî veya diğer râvilerin naklettikleri hadislerin sayısal bilgisine ulaşılması, kimliği açık bir şekilde belirtilmeyen râviler hakkında bilgi edinilmesi, ilk râvisinin bilinmesi gibi senede ilişkin yararları yanı sıra; haberlerin tashîf, tahrîf ve tebdilden korunması, içerdikleri konunun tespit edilebilmesine fırsat vermesi, farklı tariklerin bilinmesi ile metin bütünlüğünün elde edilebilmesi ve makâsıdü’ş-şerîayı ortaya koyabilecek şe-kilde sebeb-i vürûdun tespit edilebilmesi gibi mervîye dönük avantajlarını da saymak mümkündür. Yukarıda belirttiğimiz katkıları nedeniyle Ebü’l-Hasen Ali b. Ömer ed-Dârekutnî ile başlayan etrâf edebiyatına ilişkin pek çok kitap te’lif edilmiştir. Bunlar arasında Ebû Mes`ûd İbrâhîm b. Muhammed b. Ubeyd ed-Dımaşkî’ye ait Etrâfü’s-sahîhayn/el-Cem`u beyne’s-sahîhayn, Ebû Muhammed Halef b. Muhammed b. Ali el-Vasıtî’nin Etrâfü’s-sahîhayn’ı, Abdülganî b. İsmâîl en-Nâblûsî’nin Zehâirü’l-mevârîs fi’d-delâleti alâ mevâzi`i’l-hadîs’i ve Ebü’l-Haccâc Yûsuf b. Abdurrahman el-Mizzî’ye ait Tuhfetü’l-eşrâf bi ma`rifeti’l-etrâf vd. adlı çalışmaları saymak mümkündür. İlgili eserlerden bazıları müsned tarzında diğerleri ise hadis metinlerinin ilk kelimesine göre tertip edilmiştir.Neticede etrâf metodu, hicrî 3. asırda hadislerin büyük bir kısmının tasnif edilip kitaplaşmasıyla birlikte haberle-rin kaynağına ulaşmayı ve onlardan istenilen en üst seviyede istifadeyi kolaylaştırmak amacıyla bir çeşit fihrist niteliğine bürünmüştür. Hem tasnif hem de tahrîc yöntemi şeklinde hadislerin baş tarafından bir kısmı zikredil-mek suretiyle sahâbe adına veya hadis metinlerine göre alfabetik olarak düzenlenen bu eserler, pek çok örnekleriy-le hadis tarihindeki yerlerini almıştır.

al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273) was a scholar of tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh. He experienced both Western and Eastern civilizations in the geography of Andalusia and Egypt, respectively. In his famous Tafsīr called al-Jâmi li-Aḥkâm al-Qur’ān, al-Qurṭubī comparatively explained and interpreted all legal verses. Also, in addition to exploring the spesific legal rulings denoted in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, al-Qurṭubī has largely interpreted the legal norms regarding the issues of jurisprudence. By doing this, al-Qurṭubī contributed to the formation and development of a civil codification activity under a kazuistic format. The casuistic structure of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is anlaysed in terms of the form and content in the sample of al-Jâmi . Therefore, neither the similarity or similarity of the schools of the legal exegesis of Qur’ān and of the legal schools nor the disciplines of positive law, but their kazuistic structures, which systems they built and which interpretation methods and techniques they operated on this basis, were evaluated in terms of their original structure. In this direction, the article emphasizes that the casuistic structure of the legal exegesis of Qur’ān is established on and by the Prophet’s sayings and practices. Although, it has been observed that it is a unique tradition, both as form and content, and that the interpretation means are identified with its own unique structure, it has been concluded that the casuistic method is not one of the fundamental elements of both this tradition and Islamic legal thought. This means that the casuistic method is always a tool that can be changed and transformed according to the conditions of time and space.Summary: As it is stated in al-Isrāʾ 17/106: “And (it is) a Qur’ān which we have separated (by intervals) that you might recite it to the people over a prolonged period. And we have sent it down progressive.”, the Qur’ān is revelaed in about twenty-three years by taking into consideration the sociocultural positions of its interlocutors. The Prophet Muḥammad explained the Qur’ān by the virtue of the ayah: “(We sent them) with clear proofs and written ordinances. And We revealed to you the message (i.e. that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them and that they might give thought.” (an-Naḥl 16/44). Of course, there is no subject integrity in this Qurānic chronology-which also reflects life. As a matter of fact, the issues related to individual and society have been independently analyzed by a casuistic/case-based method and ruled in accordance with the intention of Allāh. It can be seen that the ayahs “They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, ‘In them is great sin and (yet, some) benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit.’ And they ask you what they should spend. Say, ‘The excess (beyond needs).’ Thus Allāh makes clear to you the verses (of revelation) that you might give thought.” (al-Baqara 2/219) and other ayahs such as (al-Baqara 2/186; al-Nisāʾ 4/176; al-Anfāl 8/1) reflect the casuistic method in terms of form and content. This can also be exemplified by the Sunna. For example, when the question “Is it permissible to perform ablutions with sea water?” was posed to Messenger of Allāh. He said that “It’s water is clean and his dead (fish) are lawful “(Abū Dāwūd, “Ṭaḥāra”, 41). By this answer, the Prophet Muḥammad indeed ruled and established a general rule.It can be said that this early example table formed the basis of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān in terms of origin, source and application, and that its shape and content are often immanent in the examples it contains. In this article, based on the prophetic period, the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān and casuistic structure has been studied with an analytical and critical approach. Again, because the casuistic method is one of the universal concepts of east-west science and cultural life, an interdisciplinary approach was exhibited in this study. The roots of the casuistic method date back to 5000 BC and the legal systems of the society and states of antiquity are examined from this method. This method is chosen and used in the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān. However, this study does not analyse the sameness or the similarity of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān and the legal schools nor the positive law disciplines, but the casuistic structures used by these, the systems they have built on this basis and the interpretation methods and techniques they have been used and analyzed in terms of their originality.In effect, the article embodies the Qur’ānic exegesis called al-Jâmi li-Aḥkâm al-Qur’ān by al-Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273), a scholar of tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh. In addition to the works of the aḥkām al-Qur’āns, which deal with the interpretation of the ayahs related to the subjects of ʿibādāt, muʿāmalāt ve ʿuḳūbāt, many other works have been used in parallel with the development of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān. al-Qurṭubī, who comparingly explained the legal verses in his tafsīr, investigated the aspects of the Qur’ān and Sunna that indicate the aḥkām, generally interpreted the existing legal norms within the framework of evidence and introduced his own opinions and etasblished his ijtihād. Thus, he benefited from the tafsīr accumulation and contributed to the formation and development of a civil legalization activity with casuistic format. As a matter of fact, the casuistic/case-based method has been used as a codification/tadwīn technique by Western and Eastern legal disciplines and systems. The casuistic method covers both concrete event and abstract ruling methods. In the casuistic method, which is fact-based event, the laws are organized according to all possible events that can be experienced. On the other hand, the abstract method, which is defined as the abstract ruling method, aims to organize the laws in a general and abstract framework. In the article, it is stated that the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān contains both concrete and abstract dimensions in its own way. It has been emphasized that the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is based on divine revelation (waḥy) and that it is separated from human law as its origin and source, and that this feature is its most faithful characteristic. On this basis, the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān is a separate scholarly tradition and has its own definition, subject and purpose. Its original structure and function have been noted. As a matter of fact, the subject and purpose of the legal exegesis of the Qur’ān always require the tafsīr and taʾwīl of the legal verses having regard to the Qur’ān and Sunna. It is also necessary for the purpose of investigating the ways in which nuṣūṣ (an explicit statement upon which a ruling is based) can refer to the provisions and to resolve the issues related to individuals and society. As a matter of fact, the legal verses function as a guide for humanity until the day of judgment as the inspiration for religious-legal matters; they contain the content and provisions that offer happiness in the two worlds., Kurtubî (öl. 671/1273), tefsir, hadis ve fıkıh âlimidir. Hem Batı hem de Doğu medeniyetini sırasıyla Endülüs ve Mısır coğrafyasında tecrübe etmiştir. Kurtubî, el-Câmiʿ li-aḥkâmi’l-Ḳurʾân adlı meşhur tefsirinde tüm ahkâm âyetlerini mukayeseli olarak tefsir ve te’vil etmiştir. Yine Kur’an ve Sünnet’in ahkâma delâlet yönlerini araştırmanın yanında umumiyetle fıkhî meselelere dair hukuk normlarını yorumlamıştır. Bu suretle Kurtubî, kazuistik bir format altında sivil bir kanunlaştırma faaliyetinin teşekkülüne ve geliştirilmesine katkı sağlamıştır. Makalede ahkâm tefsirinin kazuistik yapısı, el-Câmi‘ örnekleminde şekil ve muhteva cihetinden incelenmiştir. Bu yüzden makalede ne ahkâm tefsiri ve fıkıh ekollerinin ne de pozitif hukuk disiplinlerinin aynîliği ya da benzerliği değil, bunların kazuistik yapıları, bu temelde hangi sistemleri inşa ettikleri ve hangi yorum yöntem ve tekniklerini işlettikleri, özgün bünyeleri açısından değerlendirilmiştir.Bu istikamette ahkâm tefsirinin kazuistik yapısının, Hz. Peygamber’in söz ve uygulamalarıyla şekillenip bu temel üzerine tesis edildiği vurgulanmıştır. Bu kapsamda ahkâm tefsirinin hem şekil hem de içerik cihetinden müstakil bir gelenek olduğu ve istimal ettiği yorum enstrümanlarının özgün bünyesiyle özdeşleştiği ortaya konmakla birlikte, kazuistik yöntemin gerek ahkâm tefsirinin gerekse İslâm hukuk düşüncesinin temel bir unsuru olmadığı neticesine varılmıştır. Bu sonuç kazuistik yöntemin zaman ve mekân şartlarına göre değişim ve dönüşüme tâbi tutulabilecek bir araç vasfı taşıdığını göstermektedir.Özet: Kur’an, “Biz Kur’an’ı, insanlara dura dura okuyasın diye âyet âyet ayırdık ve onu peyderpey indirdik”(el-İsrâ 17/106) âyetinin mazmununca, muhatapların sosyokültürel konumları gözetilerek yaklaşık yirmi üç yılda indirilmiştir. Hz. Peygamber de “İnsanlara, kendilerine indirileni açıklaman ve onların da (üzerinde) düşünmeleri için sana bu Kur’an’ı indirdik” (en-Nahl 16/44) âyetinin mûcibince, Kur’an’ı insanlara açıklamıştır. Hayatı yansıtan bu Kur’an kronolojisinde tabii olarak bir konu bütünlüğü mevcut değildir. Nitekim fert ve topluma dair meseleler kazuistik/meseleci bir yöntemle müstakil olarak tahlil edilip murâd-ı ilâhi muvacehesinde hükme bağlanmıştır. Bu süreç makale açısından okunduğunda “Sana içkiyi ve kumarı sorarlar. De ki: ‘Onlarda hem büyük günah, hem de insanlar için (bazı zahiri) yararlar vardır. Ama günahları yararlarından büyüktür.’ Yine sana Allah yolunda ne harcayacaklarını soruyorlar. De ki: ‘İhtiyaçtan arta kalanı.’ Allah size âyetleri böyle açıklıyor ki düşünesiniz” (el-Bakara 2/219) gibi âyetlerin (el-Bakara 2/186; en-Nisâ 4/176; el-Enfâl 8/1) şekil ve muhteva cihetinden kazuistik yöntemi yansıttığı görülebilir. Bu durum Sünnet’le de örneklendirilebilir. Meselâ Resûlüllah, “Deniz suyuyla abdest almak câiz midir?” sorusunu “Suyu temizdir, ölüsü de (balıkları) helâldir” (Ebû Dâvûd, “Ṭahâret”, 41) şeklinde cevaplayarak genel bir kural ihdas edip hüküm vermiştir. Erken dönemdeki bu örnek tablonun, köken, kaynak ve uygulama açısından ahkâm tefsirinin temelini zımnen oluşturduğu ve içerdiği örneklerde şekil ve muhtevasının ekseriyetle mündemiç olduğu söylenebilir. Zaten makalede bu dönem temel alınarak ahkâm tefsiri ve kazuistik yapısı analitik ve eleştirel bir yaklaşımla işlenmiştir. Yine kazuistik yöntem, Doğu-Batı ilim ve kültür hayatının evrensel kavramlarından biri olduğundan çalışmada interdisipliner bir yaklaşım sergilenmiştir. Kazuistik yöntemin kökleri MÖ 5000’li yıllara uzanmakta olup antik çağın toplum ve devletlerinin hukuk sistemleri bu yöntem cihetinden incelenmektedir. Ahkâm tefsirinde de bu yöntem tercih edilip kullanılmıştır. Bununla birlikte ne ahkâm tefsiri ve fıkıh ekolleri ne de pozitif hukuk disiplinlerinin aynîliği ya da benzerliği değil, bunların kazuistik yapıları, bu temelde inşa ettikleri sistemleri ve kullandıkları yorum yöntem ve tekniklerinin özgünlükleri cihetinden analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Esasen makale tefsir, hadis ve fıkıh âlimi Kurtubî’nin (öl. 671/1273) el-Câmiʿ li-aḥkâmi’l-Ḳurʾân adlı Kur’an tefsirinin örnekleminde işlenmekle beraber, ibâdât, muâmelât ve ukūbâtla ilgili âyetlerin tefsir ve te’vilini konu edinen ahkâmü’l-Kurʾân dalına ait eserlerin yanında ahkâm tefsirinin gelişimine muvâzî olarak birçok eserden de istifade edilmiştir. Tefsirinde ahkâm âyetlerini mukayeseli olarak açıklayan Kurtubî, Kur’an ve Sünnet’in ahkâma delâlet yönlerini araştırmış, umumiyetle mevcut hukuk normlarını deliller muvacehesinde yorumlamış ve kendine has görüş ve ictihadlarda bulunmuştur. Böylece hem tefsir birikiminden istifade etmiş hem de kazuistik formatla sivil bir kanunlaştırma faaliyetinin teşekkül ve gelişimine katkıda bulunmuştur. Nitekim kazuistik/meseleci yöntem, Batı ve Doğu hukuk disiplin ve sistemlerince bir kodifikasyon/tedvîn tekniği olarak kullanılagelmiştir. Kazuistik yöntem, hem somut olay hem de soyut kural metotlarını kapsamaktadır. Somut olay diye tabir edilen kazuistik/casuiste metotta, kanunlar meydana gelmesi muhtemel tüm hâdiselere göre teferruatıyla düzenlenirken, soyut kural metodu olarak nitelenen mücerret/abstract metotta kanunların genel ve soyut bir çerçevede tanzim edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Makalede ahkâm tefsirinin gerek somut gerekse soyut boyutları kendine has bir şekilde içerdiği ifade edilmiştir. Konunun temellendirilmesi istikametinde ahkâm tefsirinin vahye dayandığından hareket edilip köken ve kaynak olarak beşerî hukuk düşüncelerinden ayrıldığı ve bunun en mümeyyiz vasfı olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Binaenaleyh ahkâm tefsirinin müstakil bir ilmî gelenek olup kendine has bir tanımı, konusu ve gayesi bulunduğu işlenmiş ve özgün yapı ve işlevine dikkat çekilmiştir. Nitekim ahkâm tefsirinin konu ve amacı ahkâm âyetlerinin dâima Kur’an-Sünnet merkezinde tefsir ve te’vilini icap ettirmektedir. Nasların ahkâma delâlet yönlerinin araştırılıp fert ve toplumun meselelerini çözme hedefi de bunu lüzumlu kılmaktadır. Nitekim ahkâm âyetleri dinî-hukukî meselelerin ilham kaynağı olarak kıyamete kadar insanlığın hidayet rehberidir; iki cihan saadetini kazandıran muhteva ve hükümleri ihtiva etmektedir.Makalede inşa edilen bu temel üzerinden genelde İslâm hukuk düşüncesinin özelde ahkâm tefsirinin doğuşundan günümüze zaman ve mekân şartları bağlamında değişim, gelişim ve etkileşim süreçleri geçirdiği ve tüm bu gelişmelerin şekil ve muhtevasına yansıdığı ortaya konularak belli başlı sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır: Bunların başında ahkâm tefsirinin hem şekil hem de içerik cihetinden müstakil bir gelenek olduğu ve istimal ettiği yorum enstrümanlarının özgün bünyesiyle özdeşleştiği müşahede edilmekle birlikte, kazuistik yöntemin gerek ahkâm tefsirinin gerekse İslâm hukuk düşüncesinin temel bir unsuru olmadığı neticesi gelmektedir. Bu bakımdan kazuistik yöntem, zaman ve mekân şartları bağlamında her zaman değişim ve dönüşüme tâbi tutulması mümkün bir enstrüman konumundadır. Bu çerçevede diğer yorum araçları gibi kazuistik yöntemin de ahkâm tefsirinin orijinal bünyesinde kendine has bir tarzda geliştiği ve herhangi bir ekol veya sistemin enstrümanları, diğerleriyle sûreten aynı veya benzer görünseler dahi özgün bünyelerine göre şekillendiği belirtilmiştir. Bu husus gözetilmediğinde ise hatalı yorum ve çıkarımların ortaya çıkabileceği vurgulanmıştır. Makalede ahkâm tefsirinin problemleri açısından kazuistik yönteme analitik ve eleştirel bir tarzda yaklaşılıp müsbet ve menfi neticeler el-Câmiʿ üzerinden örneklendirilmiştir. Meselâ Kurtubî, al-Ṭalāq sûresinin 4. âyetindeki “hayız/âdet görmeyenler (ve’llāī lem yaḥiḍne)” ifadesini ahkâm tefsiri ve fıkıhla ilgili eserlerin çoğunluğundaki gibi, “bulûğa ermemiş küçük kız çocuğu (es-sagīre)” olarak yorumlamakla kalmamış, velisi tarafından evlendirilmesi ve kocasının kendisiyle cinsel ilişkiye girmesinin câiz ve meşrû olduğunu ileri sürerek adı geçen evliliği Allah’ın bir emri olarak nitelemiştir. Bu bakımdan makāsıdü’ş-şerîa prensibi teori ve pratikte gözetilmediğinde kazuistik yöntemin Kur’an’ın parçacı okunmasına yol açabileceği hatta mezhep taassubu ve ideolojik-siyasî okumalar gibi garazlı yaklaşımları doğurabileceği vurgulanmıştır. Bu yüzden ictihad faaliyetinin makāsıdü’ş-şerîa temelinde gerçekleştirilmesi ve ulaşılan kanaatin sonuca gidilmeden itikadî, ahlâkî ve amelî hükümler başta olmak üzere tüm şer‘î hükümlere dair ilkelere arz edilip hukuk normunun Kur’an’ın mesajlarına uygun olup olmadığının her bir hüküm özelinde tahlil edilmesi gerektiği kanaatine varılmıştır. Kur’an’ın ana konularına taban tabana ters düşen bu tür örnekler haricinde, Kurtubî, ifrat ve tefritten salim amaçsal bir perspektif sergilemiş, makāsıdü’ş-şerîa ilkesini geniş anlamıyla işletmiş ve mezhep taassubu gütmemiştir. Bunlar ahkâm tefsirinin karakteristik şekil ve muhtevasını yansıtmasının ötesinde özgün yapı ve işleviyle örtüştüğünü de göstermektedir. Bu açıdan belirtmek gerekir ki her ilmî çalışma gibi bir takım zaaflarına rağmen el-Câmiʿ li-aḥkâmi’l-Ḳurʾân’ın, gerek İslâm gerekse modern hukuk felsefesine katkı sağlayacak imkân ve kapasiteye sahip bir hukuk şaheseri konumunda olduğu müşahede edilmiştir.

Human and non-human animals are social beings, both have social interactions. The ability to anticipate behavior of others is a fundamental requirement of social interactions. However, there are several ways of how agents can succeed in this. Two modes of anticipation, namely mindreading and behavior-reading, shape the animal mindreading debate. As a matter of fact, no position has yet convincingly ruled out the other. This paper suggests a strategy of how to argue for a mentalistic interpretation as opposed to a behavioral interpretation. The first step suggests considering a pluralistic approach in order to allow for shortcomings such as not having a natural language. Second, a critical examination of the principle called Morgan’s Canon will show that this principle cannot be used as a final argument to rule out mentalistic approaches. Finally, the author argues that the setting of current experiments is responsible for the indistinguishability of mindreading versus behavior-reading and she suggests alternative experimental designs.

To a certain extent, some of the Germanic verbs are still etymologically unclear, a matter of fact which is not necessarily due to a substrate influence, as some scholars believe. However, we will not pursue any substrate theories for the Germanic vocabulary here. Instead, the new approach of univerbation etymologies is being adopted, which makes it possible to operate with known Indo-European word material and yet create new etymologies for old “problem verbs”. The analysis of the Germanic (etymologically obscure) verbal root as a “neo-root”, being a univerbation of preverb and verbal root, has already been successfully utilized in the etymologization of Germanic *falla-nan ‘to fall’, *fanha-nan/*fanga-nan ‘to catch’ and Gothic fraisan ‘to try’, which paved the way for further univerbation etymologies. In the present study, the focus is on etymologically obscure or problematic Germanic verbs, which possibly reflect a univerbation of a verbal root and the Indo-European preverb *pe- /*po-. These are the newly discussed verbs of the present study (besides the already mentioned Gmc. *falla-nan ‘to fall’ and Gmc. *fanha-nan/*fanga-nan ‘to catch’): Gmc. *fara-nan ‘to walk, ride’, *feha-nan ‘to rejoice’, *felha-nan ‘to hide’, *feta-nan 'to find', *feta-nan ‘to give birth’, *falþa-nan/*falda-nan ‘to fold’. The present paper not only offers a thorough etymological discussion of these verbs, but also addresses important questions of historical syntax and prosody, the answers to which lend additional weight to the proposed etymological interpretations.

El presente artículo defiende que, en el Político, Platón investiga sistemáticamente la índole metafórica del logos: quienes hablamos y nos entendemos hablando no podemos dejar de hacer comparaciones, poner ejemplos o servirnos de modelos o paradigmas, cada vez que estamos entendiendo algo, tanto si nos damos cuenta de ello como si no. En particular, el llamado “método de las divisiones” necesita de los ejemplos para que le sirvan de guía en el descubrimiento de las diferencias y las semejanzas. De hecho, este carácter metafórico del logos se descubre en el intento de dar caza al político, que estructura el diálogo de comienzo a fin. La principal dificultad a la que es preciso hacer frente en dicha búsqueda se debe a que, ya desde el inicio, la caza del político se está dejando guiar subrepticiamente por un ejemplo que desorienta a sus perseguidores: el paradigma del pastor. Por ello hace falta dar tantas vueltas y recomenzar de nuevo varias veces la persecución, pues el ejemplo que oriente la búsqueda ha de hacerse explícito y ha de ser además un buen ejemplo, un ejemplo que permita entender. Pero, así reconducida, como la búsqueda de un buen paradigma para entender qué es la política, la caza del político plantea algunos problemas, relacionados con el vínculo entre logos y semejanza. Este artículo se centra en uno de ellos: la dificultad de explicar qué es un ejemplo y la consiguiente necesidad de proponer algo tan paradójico como un ejemplo de ejemplo. The aim of this paper is to show that, in the Statesman, Plato systematically investigates the metaphorical nature of logos: we, who speak, and speaking understand each other, can’t do it without making comparisons, giving examples or making use of models or paradigms, whether we realize it or not, whenever we want to understand something. Particularly, the so-called “method of divisions” needs the examples, in order to be driven by them in the discovery of differences and similarities. As a matter of fact, this metaphorical feature of logos is uncovered in the attempt to hunt the statesman, which structures the dialogue from beginning to end. The major difficulty in this chase is due to the misleading example that surreptitiously guides it from the start: the paradigm of herdsman. That is why, in order to hunt the statesman, it is required turning round and round, as well as starting again some times, since the example that leads the pursuit must be explicit and must be a good example, one that enables to understand. But, reformulated as the quest of a good paradigm to understand what politics is, the chase of the statesman raises some problems in relation to the link between logos and similitude. The present article focuses on one of them: the difficulty to explain what an example is and the consequent need to propose something so paradoxical as an example of example.

For most Christians the doctrine of the Trinity is accepted as a matter of fact. Especially in systematic theology the Trinity is frequently used as the starting point for theological deliberations. Yet when we ask a Christian lay person what this doctrine means we usually do not get an answer. Does this mean that theologians have not really communicated the meaning of this doctrine to the Christian community or have they delved into something that is totally incomprehensible? Keywords: Trinity, Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Christianism, Person, Substance, Bible, Jewish monotheism

Kant holds that it is possible to quarrel about judgements of beauty and cultivate taste, but these possibilities have not been adequately accounted for in the dominant interpretations of his aesthetics. They can be better explained if we combine a more subjectivist interpretation of the free harmony of the faculties and aesthetic form with a type of social constructivism. On this ‘subjectivist-constructivist’ reading, quarrelling over and cultivating taste are not attempts to conform to some matter of fact, but rather to reconcile subjective perceptions through mutual interchange governed by the regulative goal of constructing a universal community of agreement.

In this paper, I examine Strauss’s critique of Collingwood’s interpretive approach and argue that Strauss’s accusation of historicism partly misses its target. While Collingwood can be said to be a “historicist” thinker insofar as he pursues the project of the German historicist tradition and attempts to establish the autonomy and specificity of philosophy of history as a discipline, he does not endorse the premises of radical historicism according to which all thought is historically relative. Although many of Strauss’s arguments against interpretive historicism are valid, they do not apply to Collingwood’s enterprise. In creating a dialogue between the two thinkers, I demonstrate that their respective theories of interpretation are as a matter of fact closer than they appear at first sight. Both philosophers defend the possibility of understanding past authors as they understood themselves, they maintain the importance of the quest for philosophical truth in interpreting the past texts and make the case for the necessity of history for philosophy.

The marginality of pleasure in alcohol and other drug (AOD) policy, related health interventions and public discourse is an ongoing concern for AOD researchers. While this neglect of pleasure is now well documented (e.g. Coveney & Bunton, 2003; Holt & Treoloar, 2008; Hunt & Evans, 2008; O’Malley & Valverde, 2004; Moore, 2008), what pleasure is and how it emerges has not been a primary analytic focus. Rather, AOD research on pleasure has tended to center on the social, economic and political processes ‘driving’ or denying pleasure. In this way, the materiality of pleasure itself has often been positioned as a commonsense stable force (e.g. located at the site of the body), or what Bruno Latour (2004) might refer to as a matter of fact. In this collection, however, the contributors delve into the inner social and material workings of pleasure as a matter of concern, that is, a precarious ‘event’ or ‘enactment’ involving various human and nonhuman actors and forces, which make it vulnerable, contingent and multiple. This begs the question, when recent commentators argue we need to talk about pleasure (Davey, 2015), and ask ‘where’s the pleasure?’ (Ritter, 2014): what pleasure are we talking about? In gathering these articles together in this themed collection we, along with the authors of each contribution, ask what the ‘new materialist’ turn can tell us about drugged pleasures and what new forms of pleasure can emerge in its presence.

Instead of wondering about the nature of robots, as if our thinking about humans was stable and straightforward, we should dig deeper in thinking about how we think about humans. Indeed, the emotions embedded in the ethical approaches to robots and artificial intelligence, are rooted in a long tradition of thinking about humans, either in an instrumental or in a pseudo-divine way. Both perspectives miss humanness, and are misleading when it comes to thinking about robots and their relationships with humans. With the instrumental way to grasp humanness, humans are seen as machines and, by the same token, robots can easily be seen as human, as a matter of fact. With the quasi-divine way to grasp humanness, humans are seen as aspiring omniscient-omnipotent creatures and, by the same token, robots are projected to be, what men will always fail to become. Hence, our way to think about robots is mirroring our way to think about humans…as long as we hold rationality as a distinctive criteria for humanness. The text below flows from a TEDxULB talk that took place in Brussels on May 4, 2016 ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcGywYSJlf0 ). It calls for leaving behind the rational subject as proxy for humanness, and embracing instead the figure of the relational self. The relational self is rooted in the Arendtian concept of plurality. Embracing the relational self, instead of the rational subject, has several advantages: it allows to distinguish humans from artefacts; it allows to grasp the dynamics between control, orientation, and recognition and to understand how human freedom flows from this dynamics; it opens to the foregrounding of vulnerability, as a shared characteristic of humanness, instead of as a defect touching only some; last, and surely not least, it points to a new form of vulnerability: that of our attentional spheres, whose protection may deserve a new fundamental right, in order to ensure our integrity, besides and beyond body and home.

This paper examines our pre-theoretic conception of non-supernaturalism; the thesis that all that exists is natural. It is argued that we intuitively take this thesis to be a substantive, non-dogmatic, empirically justified, not merely contingent truth. However, devicing an interpretation of non-supernaturalism that captures all aspects of this intuition is difficult. Indeed, it is found that this intuition conflates the strong inferential scope of a metaphysical claim with the modest justificatory requirements of an empirical matter of fact. As such, non-supernaturalism, in its pre-theoretic form, contains an internal tension that must be navigated whenever the thesis features in systematic thinking. (C) The Author(s) 2020. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0

It is not easy to say what relations are. They are probably too fundamental to be defined. At any rate, we are as yet unable to define them. However, we are directly presented with such situations as involve “left and right,” “before and after,” etc. Relations are all pervasive. The idea of unrelated entities, though in itself logically free perhaps from contradiction, is as a matter of fact untenable. We do sometimes say with regard to certain things that they are totally unrelated, but what is implied in such a statement is merely a negation of certain specific relation or relations which happens to be the subject of our attention. To be unrelated in any specific way is itself a relation, and from this point of view, nothing is unrelated.

In this article, I examine whether the possibility exists that in the foreseeable future, robot technology will permit the development of emotional robots. As the title suggests, the content is of a technological as well as of a philosophical nature. As a matter of fact, my aim in writing this paper was that of bridging two distinctive fields in a world where humanity has become accustomed to technological innovations while overlooking any consequential complications arising from such inventions. To this end, I review and commentate on what Anders Sandberg, Paul Thagard, Nikhil Churamani and other thinkers have contributed on the subject matter. The literature review indicates that in the short to the medium term, scientists will only design and engineers will only build robots that will be able to only learn, be trained, or under the most optimistic conditions only simulate human emotions. However, in the long term the possibility exists for technology to advance to such a state so as to permit an entire human brain to be emulated in a robot via a concept named ‘mind uploading’. If one day that becomes a reality, that will be the point where humanity will possibly come closest to creating robots with emotions.