Search

The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility. The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement.

In the first book of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes two types of preliminary knowledge that can be involved in scientific understanding: knowing that something is and knowing what something is, which he treats as equivalent to knowing what something signifies. What do these two types of preliminary knowledge amount to? How are they reciprocally related? On what grounds may they be regarded as trustworthy? It turns out that knowing that something is probably covers three types of knowledge: knowing that something is the case, knowing that something exists, and knowing that something is so-and-so. Given this wide spectrum covered by knowing that something is, the problem arises of understanding what logical space is left for knowing what something is. Unless knowing what something is a particular case of knowing that something is, the most plausible guess is that knowledge of what something is, is knowledge whose linguistic formulation involves the ‘definitional’ reading of sentences, namely the reading of a sentence whereby its predicate-expression is taken to offer a complete description of the nature of the kind signified by its subject-expression. The trustworthiness of our grasp of definitions is due to a special faculty postulated by Aristotle, namely the intellect, which has the power to ‘look into’ the nature of the kinds it is concerned with.

The Philebus presents some arguments for the paradoxical claim that the many are one and the one many. The most serious of these arguments concerns the multiple spatial locations of an attribute. For instance, since the attribute man belongs to many men, it is in them, and it is therefore both one and many (for it is in them either by having different parts of itself contained in them or by being wholly contained in each of them). Plato maintains that this argument goes astray. He appeals to division and collection, the procedures linked with definition and classification. He probably has in mind a mereological model of particulars, whereby perceptible particulars are mixtures whose ingredients are the attributes which they partake of. Among the ingredients of a perceptible particular there are properties that specify its spatial location, so the problem of the multiple spatial location of an attribute evaporates.

It has often been claimed that (i) Aristotle’s expression ‘protasis’ means ‘premiss’ in syllogistic contexts and (ii) cannot refer to the conclusion of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. In this essay we produce and defend a counter-example to these two claims. We argue that (i) the basic meaning of the expression is ‘proposition’ and (ii) while it is often used to refer to the premisses of a syllogism, in Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 it is used to refer to the conclusion of a syllogism. In our view, the best explanation of Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘protasis’ is that it means proposition throughout but is frequently used without change of meaning (in certain specific contexts) to refer to the premisses from which a conclusion follows. In Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 he uses ‘protasis’ to refer to the conclusion when he needs a single expression to refer to both the conclusion and one of the premisses of the syllogism that constitutes the core of a syllogism through the impossible. If we are correct, we have shown that the view that the expression ‘the final protasis’ in EN 7.3, 1147b9ff must mean ‘the final premiss’ and so cannot refer to the conclusion of the relevant syllogism is mistaken.

Two chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, E 4 and Θ 10, discuss truth and a use of the verb ‘to be’ associated with it. The relationship between these two chapters is problematic because despite an apparent cross-reference connecting them, they seem to put forward incompatible views. This chapter argues that (contrary to appearances and to what some commentators believe) E 4 fully agrees with Θ 10. One of the assumptions on which the reconciliation relies is that when ‘to be’ is employed in accordance with the use associated with truth, it applies to external things (mainly, but not exclusively, states of affairs) but neither to thoughts nor to sentences (to both of which however ‘true’ applies). This sheds a novel light on E 4, which turns out to make claims rather different from those which commentators have taken it to defend. In particular, E 4 commits Aristotle to the view that states of affairs (unlike Fregean thoughts) are mind-dependent entities.

The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions: Is it really about the paradox of the liar? If it is, is it addressing a strong version of the paradox or some weak strain of it? If it is addressing a strong version of the paradox, what solution does it propose? The conciseness of the passage does not enable one to answer these questions beyond doubt, and commentators have offered very different replies. However, a reasonable case can be made for claiming, first, that the passage in question is about the paradox of the liar, second, that it addresses a strong version of the paradox, and, third, that it attempts to solve it by assuming that someone uttering 'I am speaking falsely' (or whatever sentence-type the paradox turns on) is neither speaking truly nor speaking falsely absolutely.

A part of the Theaetetus (1 87c3-200d4) is concerned with the A question whether false belief is possible. Plato first expounds a puzzle which purports to prove that nobody could ever hold false beliefs, and then makes four attempts to explain what false belief is or how false beliefs are formed. All attempts fail. In this paper I address the initial puzzle, the 'Argument from Knowing and Not Knowing' (1 87e5-1 88c8). In the first of the four parts of the paper I describe a counter-example which seems to show that some conclusions drawn in the Argument from Knowing and Not Knowing are false. In the second part of the paper I argue that Plato knew of a possible defence against counter-examples like the one I describe. In the third part I attribute to Plato the view that a step of this defence is an invalid inference which people might accept because they are careless when they make denials. In the fourth part I argue that this carelessness in making denials is linked to a misunderstanding of negations discussed in the Sophist, namely the view that negative particles signify the contrary.

Aristotle created logic and developed it to a level of great sophistication. There was nothing there before; and it took more than two millennia for something better to come around. The astonishment experienced by readers of the Prior Analytics, the most important of Aristotle's works that present the discipline, is comparable to that of an explorer discovering a cathedral in a desert. This article explains and evaluates some of Aristotle's views about propositions and syllogisms. The most important omission is the difficult subject of syllogisms involving modalities. Aristotle distinguishes two relations of opposition that can obtain between propositions with the same subject- and predicate-expressions: contrariety and contradiction. In every canonical syllogism, one term is common to the two premises: it is called “middle term,” or simply “middle.” The remaining two terms of the premises are the only ones occurring in the conclusion: they are called “extreme terms,” or simply “extremes.”

Aristotle's Poetics is one of the deepest and most influential philosophical works on art, or rather, on a specific art. The treatise pursues several aims, one of which, and the most general, is to classify the works that can be labeled “poetical composition” and their parts. Another, more specific, aim is to vindicate poetry in the face of the criticism leveled at it by Plato. Another specific aim is to explain some concepts that are fundamental for the understanding of poetry (for example, that of imitation). Furthermore, the discussion of some forms of poetry was probably a useful way to express ideas about education and political life in the city, and to convey thoughts about the relation between people's actions and their characters. The range of issues covered by the Poetics makes it reasonable to bring the topics under two headings: Aristotle's views on poetry in general; and his account of tragedy (the genre that has the lion's share of the treatise).

Adversus Mathematicos (M.) x is the second book dedicated by Sextus to the discussion of the physical doctrines put forward by dogmatic philosophers. An extensive section (M. x 85–120) deals with Diodorus Cronus' arguments concerning movement.

L'A. etudie les propositions anaphoriques et les propositions indefinies dans la logique stoicienne, en tant qu'elles sont subordonnees aux conditionnelles indefinies et aux conjonctions indefinies qui constituent respectivement des propositions universelles et particulieres, engageant le statut propositionnel et quantitatif des conditions de verite ou de faussete dans le domaine technique du verbe grec υπποταττeιν(uppotattein)

Ideas in and problems of the philosophy of language surface frequently in Plato's dialogues. This forms the basis of the present article. Some passages briefly formulate, or presuppose, views about names, signification, truth, or falsehood; others are extended discussions of important themes of the philosophy of language. Basic predicative expressions are an integral part of Plato's philosophy of language. The article further emphasizes on the importance of forms as missing standards. Plato does say that perceptible particulars derive their names from the forms they partake of.

Aristotle’s discussion of sameness in the Topics. In the Topics Aristotle discusses sameness to an extent and with a care that strike us as rather unusual: elsewhere he tends to concentrate on unity rather than sameness, and his remarks about sameness are introduced almost as asides in his reflections on unity. As several commentators have noticed, there is probably a twofold reason why in the Topics Aristotle is so interested in sameness: on the one hand, he thinks that sameness is intimately linked to definition; on the other hand, definition is one of his major concerns in the Topics.1