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This paper will primarily focus on the philosophical depictions of Medea’s character and actions. The following identities will be examined: gender (which roles defined a woman in antiquity and are these definitions still relevant today), political (what does it mean to be a foreigner and not belong to a particular political community), and psychological (do passions inevitably lead to a split in the psyche or, on the contrary, constitute it). These will serve as frames that outline Medea’s exceptional (in)humanness in the Greco-Roman society.

The idea that learning liberates or that education emancipates is hardly a novelty, and it can be traced to ancient times and Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. Thus, in this paper, we aim to express that some of the ideas (like the idea that women and men are equally subject to moral virtue because of their rationality) and educational practices (such as those that encourage students to use their voices and reason independently from any authorities) embraced by well-known Roman Stoics did have emancipatory potential. Particularly important was a requirement that philosophy should be lived outside the classrooms. Ideja da učenje oslobađa ili, preciznije da obrazovanje emancipuje teško da predstavlja neku novinu, budući da se ta ideja može pratiti sve do antičkog perioda, odnosno grčke i rimske filozofske misli. U ovom radu nastojimo da pokažemo da su neke od ideja (poput ideje da su i žene i muškarci zbog svoje racionalne prirode podjednako podložni vrlini) i obrazovnih praksi (poput prakse kojom se podsticalo iznošenje sopstvenih stavova i korišćenja vlastitog razuma, bez oslanjanja na spoljne autoritete) koje su zastupali neki od dobro poznatih rimskih stoika imale emancipatorski potencijal. Posebnu važnost je nosio zahtev u skladu sa kojim filozofija treba da se živi i van učionica.

Is the Stoic sage a possible or desirable ideal for contemporary men and women, as we enter into difficult times? Is he, as Seneca presents him, the very best person for a crisis? In order to examine these questions, Part 1 begins from what Irene Liu calls the “standard” modern conceptions of the sage as either a kind of epistemically perfect, omniscient agent, or else someone in possession of a specific arsenal of theoretical knowledge, especially concerning the physical world. We contest this contentious conception of the sage for being inconsistent with the Stoic conceptions of wisdom, the technai and knowledge which can be gleaned from the doxographic sources. In Part 2, we suggest that the wisdom of the Stoic sage reflects the Stoics’ “dispositional” conception of knowledge, their substantive conception of reason (Logos), and their sense of philosophy as above all an “exercise” or askêsis of a craft or technê for living. It is embodied in an ongoing exercise of examining one’s impressions for consistency with what one already knows, looking back to the natural prolêpseis with which all people are equipped. In Part 3, we show how only this account of the wisdom of the sage, at the epistemic level, enables us to understand how, in the non-doxographic texts led by Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientiae, the sage is celebrated above all for his ethical characteristics, and his ability to bear up in a crisis. Concluding reflections return to our framing concern, as to whether philosophy as a way of life, and the ancient ideal of the sage, can speak to us today not only as scholars, but as individuals called upon to live in difficult times. We suggest that they can and should remain sources of orientation, contestation, and inspiration.

���Death, which is the most horrifying of evils, is nothing to us; whenever we, on the one hand, exist, death is not present. On the other hand, whenever death is present, we, then, do not exist��� (Ep. Men. 125). According to Epicurus, in section one hundred twenty-five of his ���Letter to Menoeceus���, if death is the deprivation of all sense-perception and the annihilation of the subject, it cannot be bad, for there must be an existing person to perceive that harm. The Epicureans, as James Warren suggests, therefore, advocated a sharp distinction between life and death. This paper argues that the clear threshold between existence and nonexistence that the Epicureans were so keen to establish is not as unambiguous as they maintained, since the point at which a person can be said to have died is indeterminate. While there is a distinct difference between life and death, I contend that the boundary the Epicureans upheld is fuzzy; the process of dying���the move from life to death���could be an uncertain and potentially painful process that ought to be feared. I aim to demonstrate, moreover, that the Stoic therapy for the fear of dying, primarily that of Epictetus and Seneca, mitigates our fears of this uncertain, nebulous stage and serves as a more effective palliative than the Epicurean by encouraging us to embrace uncertainty instead of resisting it. There is, according to the Stoics, a kind of certainty in uncertainty, namely that we know that we cannot know; acknowledging the insuperable epistemic gap with which we must all contend acts as a kind of consolation, for it, to the Stoics, may compel us to adopt attitudes to overcome the fear of future uncertainty, namely the fear of dying and possible pain. I seek to show (a) how the Epicurean therapy for the fear of dying is flawed, primarily by exposing a kind of logical vagueness that can be profitably analyzed as a sorites paradox; (b) how the Epicureans could have challenged the proposed sorites paradox; (c) why this vagueness ushers in a sort of uncertainty that harms the Epicurean hedonic project; (d) how Epictetus��� and Seneca���s treatment for the fear of dying is more efficacious than the Epicurean; and (e) how Epictetus��� and Seneca���s respective treatments could be challenged. I conclude that the Stoic therapy is more effective than the Epicurean, for the former fills the lacuna that the latter leaves open; dying, to the Stoics, ought not to be feared, but it is ultimately up to us whether we choose to adjust our mindset so as not to dread it.

This article is considering origins of Stoic representation of Cosmos as The Universe State and there is briefly tracing its totemistic preconditions, which were proceeding from the primitive mythopoetic thinking’s specifics. Furthermore, there is proving a thesis about that the metaphor of Cosmos-Polis has emerged from searchings of an adequate philosophical language by early Greek thinkers, and that sociomorphical code was one of the most important metaphorical models of Cosmos in ancient philosophical poetics, not only for Stoics. A great number of political doctrines by Plato and faraway in the postplatonic tradition, including Stoa, were arising on the fundament of the this code. There is considering character of some Stoic ethical contradictions and is offering an attempt of resolving them through allocation of horizontically-civil and vertically-divine links in the Stoic teaching, which were containing peculiar dual system of communication of stoic sage with Cosmos.

Orientador: Paulo Sergio de Vasconcellos Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem Resumo: Os conceitos de sapientia e uirtus em Sêneca (4 a.C. ¿ 65 d.C.) permeiam grande parte de sua obra, sendo que, por vezes, encontram-se fortemente ligados: pode-nos parecer difícil pensar em uma pretensa relação de subordinação entre os conceitos de sabedoria e virtude em si mesmos; no entanto, o modo como ambos se conjugam na obra desse autor incita-nos a questionar se a meta final do homem é a virtude através da sabedoria, ou a sabedoria através da virtude. A filosofia estóica é bastante conhecida pelo fato de subjugar a lógica, e mesmo a física, à moral: como o próprio Sêneca apregoa, nada teria valor se não pudesse ser utilizado na vida prática. E, justamente no âmbito dessa, tais categorias são desenvolvidas nos escritos do estóico. Dessa forma, à primeira vista, tende-se a considerar que, para o filósofo, a sabedoria estaria subordinada à virtude. A pesquisa que realizamos dividiu-se em três etapas: a seleção e tradução de epístolas senequianas que expusessem sua concepção daqueles dois conceitos; a elaboração de notas explicativas; um estudo introdutório acerca da relação entre o ser sábio e a virtude, no contexto em que o filósofo se insere Abstract: The concepts of sapientia and uirtus in Seneca (4 b.C. ¿ 65 a. C.) permeates a great part of his works, seeing that, sometimes, they are strongly linked: it seems to be difficult to think about an assumed relation of subordination between the subjects of wisdom and virtue in themselves; nevertheless, the form both get conjugated in this author¿s works incites us to question if the man¿s final goal is virtue through wisdom or wisdom through virtue. The stoic philosophy is well known by the fact of subjudging the logic and even physics to ethics: as Seneca himself proclaims, it would be useless if it could not be used in daily life. And, precisely on its ambit, these categories are developed on the author¿s writings. Therefore, at first sight, it tends to consider that, for the philosopher, wisdom would be subordinated to virtue. Our research was divided into three steps: selection and translation of Seneca¿s epistles that expose his conceivings about the two concepts; elaboration of explicative notes and an introductory study about the relation between being a wise man and the virtue, in a context where the philosopher inserts himself Mestrado Mestre em Linguística

Despite the widespread idea that the Roman Stoics would have left aside physics and logic and devoted themselves almost exclusively to the third element of the Stoic triad, ethics, we know several Seneca’s titles related to the study of nature, physics. These studies cover topics related to severalareas of study, such as biology, geology and cosmology. They also permeate the philosopher's entire life, from his youth to his old age. Finally, the Naturales Quaestiones are Seneca's longest treatise and his longest work if we exclude the collection of letters to Lucilius. In the preface here translated, Seneca sets out his view on the importance of the study of nature and, far from considering it secondary, argues that it is the ultimate good of human life, without which even a perfectly ethical life is worthless. A despeito da ideia amplamente difundida de que os estoicos romanos teriam deixado de lado física e lógica e se dedicado em caráter praticamente exclusivo ao terceiro elemento da tríade estoica, a ética, conhecemos diversos títulos de Sêneca relacionados ao estudo da natureza, a física. Esses estudos abarcam temas ligados a diversas áreas de estudos, como biologia, geologia e cosmologia. Também permeiam toda a vida do filósofo, desde a sua juventude até sua velhice. Por fim, as Naturales Quaestiones são o tratado mais longo de Sêneca e sua obra mais longa, se excetuarmos a coletânea de cartas a Lucílio. No prefácio que ora traduzimos, Sêneca expõe sua visão acerca da importância do estudo da natureza e, longe de considerá-lo secundário, argumenta que se trata do sumo bem da vida humana, sem o qual mesmo uma vida perfeitamente ética deixa de ter valor.

The paper discusses Seneca’s phrase ‘human rights’ (ius humanum) in On Benefits 3 and relates the passage to recent debates about human rights in Stoicism and ancient philosophy. I argue that the Latin phrase refers either to rights or to a law conferring rights. The difference between the passage and a common expectation for human rights lies in the kind of relation between right and duty. In Seneca’s passage the right does not in itself have a correlative duty on the part of other people, and yet it does, if exercised through benefactions, create a duty in others. By contrast, the relation between right and duty is usually expected to be unconditional.

En s’appuyant sur la présence, dans le corpus de Sénèque, d’une œuvre à forte connotation satirique, nous étudierons plus précisément la place de la satire du corps dans son œuvre. En effet, les exemples de corps tourmentés et difformes sont nombreux dans le développement de la doctrine philosophique de Sénèque : on assiste à une mise à l’épreuve du corps, par la satire, de manière généralisée. Néanmoins, cette satire a un objectif philosophique bien précis : faire en sorte que le lecteur, qu’il soit amusé ou dégoûté de voir ces corps tordus par les passions, refuse un tel comportement et cherche à réformer son âme. The role of body satire in Seneca’s work will be subject to a more precise study based on the various excerpts with strong satirical connotations. As a matter of fact, examples of tormented and deformed bodies are legion in the development of Seneca’s philosophical doctrine: bodies being put to a tough test through satire are indeed widespread. Nonetheless, this satire aims at a specific task: ensuring that the readers, be they amused or disgusted at seeing those bodies twisted by passions, refuse such behaviours and try to reform their souls.

In the article, Seneca’s figure is rehabilitated as relevant to understanding the emergence of sovereignty and modern representation. The idea put forth by the author of De Clementia would become one of the bases for Bodin’s writings and is also present in Hobbes’ work. During the Renaissance, De Clementia promoted monarchical forms. In De Clementia, this Stoic philosopher presents Nero in a depersonalised form. He is not only the sovereign capable of shaping a multitude, representing it in its whole and giving it the character of “people”, but also one who secures peace and rules with justice. Thus, in Seneca, one can discern a prototheory of sovereignty and representation, with decisionism as its result. If these readings of Seneca are plausible, genealogies of modern concepts that interpret their emergence as a revolutionary Trennung (e.g. Schmitt and early Conceptual History) (Lehmann and Van Horn Melton, 1994; Lehmann and Richter, 1996) could be facing a problem of omission. The conceptual support for the process through which the medieval social and political world was destroyed and substituted by modernity does not come from Cicero’s republican tradition, but from a monarchical notion of unity among the governor and the governed; an idea defended by Seneca, according to which absolute sovereignty would guarantee private property, contracts, and a sui iuris apolitical soul.

In this paper, through the example of Antonii Radyvylovskyi’s work, I examine the impact of Seneca’s texts on the philosophical component of Ukrainian church sermons from the Baroque period. The objective of this study is to investigate Radyvylovskyi’s use of Seneca’s texts in his own writing. The result should help better understand the ideological influence of ancient philosophy on the formation of the national philosophical tradition of the Baroque epoch. The contents of ideological borrowings from Seneca’s texts and the mechanisms of their use are traced. A list of Seneca’s texts from which Radyvylovskyi quotes is provided. It is also shown that Radyvylovskyi uses Seneca’s authority in his moral teachings and philosophical thinking about the characteristics of human nature. We conclude by commenting on Radyvylovskyi’s creative use of Seneca’s ideas and the significant philosophical component of his written legacy.

espanolEn el drama Las troyanas de Seneca el Joven, segun proponemos, existen argumentos e ideas de la filosofia estoica en torno a las emociones y las pasiones. Tales ideas, derivadas de la teoria etica-epistemologica estoica, estan insertas en los discursos de personajes como Hecuba, Andromaca, Agamenon o Helena. Seneca exhibe la historia-mito de la Guerra de Troya como una fuente de emociones erroneas, es decir, de pasiones que alejan a los personajes de la virtud-felicidad. Consecuentemente, el autor nos presenta discursos, en boca de sus personajes, que instan a evitar estoicamente esas pasiones, como lo son el miedo, el dolor o el orgullo excesivos. EnglishWe propose that in the dramatic play The Troades of Seneca the Young are arguments and ideas belonging to the stoic philosophy that analyze emotions and passions. Such ideas, derived from the ethical-epistemological stoic theory, are inserted on the speeches of characters like Hecuba, Andromache, Agamemnon or Helen. Seneca exhibits the history-myth of the Trojan War as a source of erroneous emotions, that is, of passions that remove happiness-virtue from the characters. Consequently the author presents us speeches, spoken by his characters, which urge to stoically avoid such passions like excessive fear, pain or pride.

Seneca, together with Alcinous, Apuleius, Albinus, Taurus and an anonymous Neoplatonic author – as I try to show in this paper –, encourages us to think that studying is essential not so much in order to acquire an education, but in order to learn how to live. According to these testimonies, to achieve this aim we must take into consideration several aspects and problems related to teaching, which are still discussed today and for which the ancient philosophers have their own solutions. Ancient philosophers’ debates and reflections on schools and teaching, on reading programs and on the nature of students can be useful to reconsider certain limits of current Italian schools and of the country’s educational system, which in “modernizing” education seems to have lost sight of the very purpose of teaching.

Introducción al n. 5 (2020)

The morally aporetic end of Seneca’s Latin Medea puzzles the reader of the play. After having killed her two sons in an act of vengeance against Jason, the mythic female figure is raised to the heavens on a winged chariot toward a triumphal exit. How come that the repudiated and enraged woman turns out to be a kind of heroine for the Stoic playwright? It happens that for him virtus is not measured by good actions in the battlefield, but as a mental disposition to face ill fortune. In a range of occasions Seneca writes about the virtuous human being and his/her consistency of character. We deal in this article with Seneca’s Letter 120 on epistemology, the philosophical piece De providentia and the plays Medea and Hercules Furens in an attempt to elucidate the process through which the barbarous princess regains her identity, far from men, closer to the gods., O fim moralmente aporético da tragédia latina Medeia, de Sêneca, estarrece o leitor. Depois de ter matado os dois filhos em um ato de vingança contra Jasão, a figura feminina mítica é alçada ao céu em uma carruagem alada para uma saída triunfal. Como é que essa mulher repudiada e irada acaba por ser uma espécie de heroína para o dramaturgo estóico? Acontece que, para Sêneca, a virtus não é medida por boas ações no campo de batalha, mas como uma disposição mental para enfrentar adversidades. Em uma série de ocasiões, Sêneca escreve sobre o ser humano virtuoso e sua consistência de caráter. Tratamos neste artigo da Epistula 120 sobre epistemologia, da obra filosófica De providentia e das peças Medea e Hercules Furens na tentativa de elucidar o processo através do qual a princesa bárbara recupera sua identidade, longe dos homens, mais perto dos deuses.

The assertion of strict determinism was considered as to be a crucial part of the Stoic doctrine. Most other philosophical schools of the ancient world ridiculed or attacked it, whereas the Stoics consistently defended it. Nonetheless Seneca, the most eminent Roman Stoic, never presented a systematic description of what he thought fatum to be. The article offers a selection of the philosopher’s most important remarks about fate in a number of single works (Naturales Quaestiones, De providentia, De vita beata, Consolatio ad Helviam, Epistulae morales, Epigrams, Tragedies) placing them in the respective line of argument and considering their scope. It can be shown that behind these selective remarks there exists a highly consistent doctrine of fatum in perfect accordance with the Stoic mainstream. However, Seneca does not deal anywhere with the weak points of the concept, but introduces it almost everywhere as a self-evident basis for his reasoning. His primary interest lies in the psychological problems with acceptance of fatum and in the practical handling of its apparent lack of transparency and predictability. Die Annahme eines strengen Determinismus gilt als ein unverwechselbares Kernstück der stoischen Lehre, das von anderen philosophischen Schulen der Antike gerne ironisiert und attackiert, von den Stoikern konsequent verteidigt wurde. Der bedeutendste römische Stoiker, Seneca, hat seine Auffassung vom fatum indes nirgends systematisch darge-legt. Der Beitrag stellt eine Auswahl der markantesten Äußerungen über das fatum aus den verschiedenen Werkgruppen zusammen (Naturales Quaestiones, De providentia, De vita beata, Consolatio ad Helviam, Epistuale morales, Epigramme, Tragödien) und ordnet sie interpretierend in den jeweiligen Kontext ein. Es zeigt sich, daß hinter den punktuellen Äußerungen eine in sich widerspruchsfreie und mit dem mainstream der Stoa übereinstimmende Lehre vom Schicksal zu rekonstruieren ist. Seneca problematisiert diese allerdings nirgends, sondern präsentiert sie seinen Lesern fast überall als selbstverständlich gültige Argumentationsbasis. Sein Interesse gilt den psychologischen Problemen der praktischen Akzeptanz des fatum, dem konkreten Umgang mit dessen scheinbarer Undurchschaubarkeit und Willkür.

On examinera la théorie stoïcienne des lekta en suivant les critiques formulées contre elle provenant de trois perspectives différentes : celle des Péripatéticiens, de Sextus Empiricus et celle formulée au sein même de l’école par Sénèque. Ces critiques se concentrent sur des questions relatives à une théorie du langage, mais une lecture minutieuse révèle que le cœur du problème réside dans un rejet profond de l’ontologie stoïcienne, constituée en partie, par les lekta. Les réactions des critiques tendent toutes à confirmer leurs propres positions, soit en rejetant la possibilité de présence réelle des lekta, soit en considérant cette présence comme négligeable. Ces confirmations de la validité de ses propres convictions se font par le biais de déformations ou de raccourcis faits à la théorie stoïcienne. En dévoilant ces mécanismes d’escamotage, c’est pourtant bien l’importance de la théorie des lekta qui est percée à jour, et les sérieux défis qu’elle pose aux théories rivales, en remettant en question le contrôle supposé de l’homme sur ses pratiques linguistiques, et en complexifiant la relation de la logique à l’éthique. In this paper, the Stoic theory of lekta is presented from the point of view of three main critical responses: the Peripatetics, Sextus Empiricus and an internal challenge posed by Seneca. The critiques focus on questions about language, but the detailed examination of the attacks reveals that the heart of the problem is the rejection of Stoic ontology, constituted by lekta. The aim of the paper is to show how, from the different responses, which go from dismissing to belittling the relevance of the Stoic theory of lekta, the critics reaffirm the validity of their own views through misrepresenting that of the Stoics. They also thus reveal despite themselves the seriousness of the Stoic theory and the threat it in fact poses to their views: threats to the control humans are considered to have over the grammar and practices of their languages, and threats to a straightforward separation between logic and ethics.

International audience; It is quite surprising to fi nd Greek medical knowledge in Seneca's philosophical works. Indeed, Stoicism recommends not to give an excessive importance to the body, and Roman intellectuals are wary most of the time of Greek knowledge. Yet, the medical knowledge of the philosopher is undeniable, both through the use of precise technical terminology and rigorous pathological or therapeutic theories. The source of this Greek knowledge is diffi cult to identify precisely. The most obvious thing is that the school of Sextii occupies a primordial place in this transmission network. More than a source, it is actually a fi lter between Greek medical knowledge and the work of the Roman philosopher. Indeed, Sextii deploy a morally-infl ected medicine, by integrating into the very core of the medical theories, mostly thos e of Hippoc r ate s, elements of Hellenistic philosophical knowledge, an inflection which corresponds perfectly to the ethical requirements of Roman Stoicism.; La présence du savoir médical grec dans l'oeuvre philosophique de Sénèque est étonnante dans la mesure où le stoïcisme préconise de ne pas donner une importance excessive au corps, et où le savoir grec est généralement sujet à une défiance de la part des intellectuels romains. Pourtant, les connais-ances médicales du philosophe sont indéniables, tant à travers l'emploi d'une terminologie technique précise que celui de théories pathologiques ou thérapeutiques rigoureuses. La source de ce savoir grec est diffi cile à établir avec précision. Ce qui semble apparaître de manière certaine, c'est la place primordiale de l'école des Sextii dans ce réseau de transmission. Plus qu'une source, il s'agit en réalité d'un fi ltre entre le savoir médical grec et l'oeuvre du philosophe romain. En eff et, les Sextii ont procédé à une infl exion morale de la médecine, en intégrant au sein même des théories médicales, telles qu'on peut les trouver chez Hippocrate, des éléments du savoir philosophique hellénis-tique, infl exion qui correspond parfaitement aux exigences éthiques du stoïcisme romain.

Bu çalışma Seneca'nın özgürlük kavramına dair fikirlerini, Antik Yunan ve Roma felsefesi temelinde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu inceleme yapılırken, öncelikle Antik Yunan Uygarlığının özgür yurttaş ve köle ayrımındaki toplum yapısı, beraberinde ise Roma'nın politik ve kültürel yapısı ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda araştırmanın ilk kısmının odağında, Antik Yunan'ın söz konusu politik ve kültürel yapısı Platon ve Aristoteles'in özgürlük anlayışlarından yola çıkarak açıklanırken akabinde, Roma toplumunun özgürlük anlayışı Stoa felsefesinin önderliğinde incelenmiştir. Böylelikle Seneca'nın, Stoa öğretisinde hakim olan determinizm çizgisinde özgürlüğe nasıl alan açtığı araştırılmış ve belirlenen bu özgürlüğün günümüz dünyasındaki yerinin imkânı değerlendirilirmiştir. This study aims to examine Seneca's ideas on the concept of freedom on the basis of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In this study, first of all, the social structure of Ancient Greek Civilization in the distinction of free citizen and slaves and the political and cultural structure of Rome are examined. In this context, in the focus of the first part of the research, while the political and cultural structure of Ancient Greece is explained from the understanding of freedom of Plato and Aristotle, the understanding of freedom of Roman society was examined under the leadership of Stoa philosophy. Thus, how Seneca opened the space for freedom along the line of determinism prevailing in the doctrine of Stoa was investigated and the possibility of the place of this freedom in today's world was evaluated. 117

Bu çalışma,Stoa felsefesinin ölüm anlayışını ve bu ölüm anlayışının felsefe tarihindeki yerini ve önemini belirlemek için hazırlanmıştır.Araştırmanın asıl amacı yaşamın bir diğer yüzü olan ölüm düşüncesini kavramak,Stoa felsefesi içerisindeki önemini ele almak böylece ölümün kötü bir olgu olmadığını, ölüm korkusunun anlamsızlığını ortaya koymaktır. Bunun yanı sıra Stoacı ölüm fikrinin oluşmasında etkili olan filozofların düşünceleri ortaya konulup, Stoacı ölüm anlayışının düşünce tarihinde bıraktığı izler açıklığa kavuşturulmaya çalışılacaktır.Tezimizin birinci bölümünde,Stoa felsefesinde ölüm anlayışınaetki eden düşünceleri, ikinci bölümde son dönem Stoa filozofları; Cicero(İÖ. 106-43)Annaeus Seneca (İÖ. 3-65), Epiktetos (İS. 50-130)ölüm felsefeleri üçüncü bölümde ise genel olarak son dönem Stoa felsefesinde ölüme bakış üzerinde çalışılacaktır.Anahtar Kelimeler:Stoa, Ölüm, Cicero, Seneca, Epiktetos, Thisstudy has beenpreparedtoindicatetheunderstanding of deathanditsplaceandimportance in thehistory of philosophy. The main aim of theresearch is tocomprehendthethought of deathwhich is anotherside of life andtotakeitsimportancewithinthephilosophy of stoa, thustorevealthatdeath is not a badphenomenonandthatthefear of death is meaningless. Inaddition, thethoughts of thephilosopherswhoareinfluential in thecreation of theStoicdeath idea will be presentedandthetraces of theStoicdeathconceptwill be triedto be clarified. Inthefirstpart of thisthesis, thethoughtswhichinfluencestheunderstanding of death in Stoa philosophy, İn thesecondpart, thedeathphilosophy of thelastperiodStoicphilosophersCicero (BC 106-43) Annaeus Seneca (BC 3-65), Epiktetos(OS. 50-130), and in thethirdchapter, theunderstanfing of death in thelastperiod of stoa philosophywill be studied.KeyWords: Stoa, Death, Cicero, Seneca,Epictetus. 87