Search

U ovom radu analiziraju se normativni akti regulacije zaštite životinja na razini nacionalnih država (posebno Republike Srbije) i na razini nadnacionalnih organizacija i saveza država (Europsko vijeće i Europska unija). Autor posebni naglasak stavlja na pojmovnu artikulaciju izraza upotrijebljenih u dokumentima koji opserviraju zaštitu životinja. U članku se, iz praktičko-filozofijske perspektive, razmatraju pojmovi: (I) »životinja« (»svaki kralježnjak koji je u stanju osjećati bol, patnju, strah i stres«); (II) »dobrobit« (»osiguravanje uvjeta u kojima životinja može ostvariti svoje fiziološke i druge potrebe svojstvene vrsti«); (III) »zlostavljanje« (»svako postupanje ili nepostupanje sa životinjama kojim se namjerno ili iz nehaja izaziva bol, patnja, strah, stres, povreda, narušava genetska cjelovitost životinje i izaziva smrt«), kao i druge riječi koje su relevantne za razumijevanje dominantno antropocentričkog pristupa životinjama. Također, istražuju se teškoće s implementacijom postojećih zakona o zaštiti i dobrobiti životinja, koje su uvjetovane nedovoljno interioriziranim senzibilitetom kako službenih institucija, tako i građana – prema tzv. ne-ljudskim živim bićima. Autor pritom ističe da je veoma važno da institucije, kao i ljudi koji ih čine, postojećim spoznajama i uvidima ne zalaze ispod dostignutih civilizacijskih standarda etičko-moralne kulture te da različite teme u vezi odnosa prema životinjama promišljaju uz dužan oprez i svjesnost dilema s kojima se mogu susresti u profesionalnom radu i životu. Odgovarajući pluriperspektivni pristup, kao i svijest o odgovornosti, trebali bi rezultirati delikatnijim odnosom navedenih subjekata prema ne-ljudskom dijelu živih stvorenja., The author analyses normative acts regulating the protection of animals, both at the national level (especially in the Republic of Serbia) and at the level of supranational organisations and state unions (the Council of Europe and the European Union), but also attempts to conceptualise the terms used in the documents observing the protection of animals. From the practical and philosophical perspective, this paper considers the terms (I) “animal” (“any vertebrate animal capable of experiencing pain, suffering, fear and stress”), (II) “welfare” (“the provision of conditions in which animals can exercise their physiological and other species-specific needs”), (III) “abuse” (“any treatment or disregard of animals, that causes pain, suffering, fear, stress, injury, damages the genetic integrity of the animal and causes death intentionally or through negligence”), and other terms relevant to understanding the prevailing anthropocentric approach to animals. The paper also examines the difficulties in implementing the adopted legislation on the protection and welfare of animals caused by an insufficiently internalised sensitivity of official institutions as well as citizens towards so-called non-human living beings. In the author’s view, it is important that they do not fall below the achieved civilisational standards of ethical and moral culture in their cognitions and insights, and that they consider various topics related to animals with due caution and awareness of the dilemmas they may encounter in their professional work and lives. An appropriate pluriperspective approach and a consciousness of responsibility should eventually lead to a more sensitive attitude of said subjects towards the non-human part of the animal creation.

Since the early 90s, Greece has witnessed an unprecedented population movement: Members of indigenous linguistic minorities have moved from the periphery to urban centres and large numbers of people have moved to Greece, primarily from the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. This “flow of bodies” (Appadurai 1990) has disrupted the country’s monolingual and monocultural image (even if, in historical terms, this was in itself a construction) and in its place an awareness and sensibility of a multilingual and multicultural society has emerged.

The work defines three aspects of Souriau’s animal aesthetics by stressing their relevance in the context of early and contemporary ethology: in (1), the concept «biological nature» which is interpreted by Souriau as a realm of appearances and as intrinsically aesthetic; in (2), the concept of animal sensibility, which makes it possible to reframe animals’ artistic behaviours and the sense by which such phenomena establish a meaningful relationship with the environment; in (3), the concept of form, in the description of natural appearances, is presented as it enters into the process of institution that, accordingly to Souriau’s interpretation of biological nature, encompasses non-human animals and humans. All three definitions will allow us a), to present Souriau’s critique of anthropomorphism and his proposal of an «healthy» zoomorphism; b) to reformulate animals’ sensibility in a non-reductionistic fashion; and finally, c) to address the issue with the supposedly sole communicative function of animal artistic behaviors.

This paper deals with different methods and approaches in translating Les Fleurs du mal by Charles Baudelaire and shows relevant elements of poetry translation through a detailed comparative analysis of the versions of three Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian translators. The author presents difficulties in transferring certain poetic figures due to syntactic and phonetic differences in languages. In each chapter, the author analyzes different elements (extralinguistic, semantic, and of conveying the right tone). The work shows advantages and disadvantages of each of the analyzed elements, especially if a translator chooses to neglect all the others for the sake of keeping only one. The author suggests that for translating Baudelaire, one needs to have a specific sensibility and imagination, but should also be theoretically acquainted with Baudelaire’s poetics.

El presente estudio parte del análisis del nuevo Directorio para la Catequesis, fijando la atención en el concepto de la experiencia cristiana. El objeto de interés particular es la visión «estética» de dicha experiencia. El Directorio varias veces habla de la belleza del Evangelio, la belleza de Dios o la belleza de Cristo. Todas estas menciones parecen más que unas meras metáforas. Se trata, más bien, de una nueva manera de presentar a la fe cristiana, que sea más adecuada a la sensibilidad del hombre contemporáneo. Después de analizar el texto del documento, se exponen las raíces teológicas del lenguaje estético presente en él y se propone un intento de evaluación de ventajas y peligros del acercamiento estético al tema de la fe.

Resumen En nuestro trabajo analizamos la propuesta de una norma del gusto por parte de David Hume en el marco de su filosofía escéptica. Nuestra investigación parte de la premisa de que el filósofo no logra consolidar los principios básicos de una Ciencia del Hombre tal como él mismo propone en la Introducción del Tratado de la naturaleza humana y que, por lo tanto, en varios ámbitos del saber no es posible distinguir cuáles son los principios últimos que rigen el entendimiento y la conducta de los seres humanos. La experiencia estética no escapa a esta dificultad. En este sentido, en nuestro estudio indagamos cuál es el objetivo y la finalidad de Hume en los Ensayos morales, políticos y literarios al proponer el dictamen de jueces idóneos como guía de las valoraciones estéticas. Nuestra atención está puesta en determinar por qué un pensador escéptico estaría interesado en regular los juicios de gusto. Al mismo tiempo, y a fin de desentrañar en toda su complejidad la propuesta humeana, nos detendremos a examinar los rasgos característicos de la esfera de la sensibilidad teniendo en cuenta sus semejanzas y diferencias con el pensamiento de Hutcheson. Abstract In our paper, David Hume’s proposal for a standard of taste within the framework of his sceptical philosophy is analysed. Our research starts from the assumption that the philosopher is not able to consolidate the basic principles of a Science of Man as he himself proposes in the Introduction of Treatise of Human Nature and that, therefore, it is not possible to distinguish which are the latest principles that rule human beings’ understanding and behaviour in several spheres of knowledge. The aesthetic experience does not escape this difficulty. In this sense, in our research, we have enquired about what Hume’s objective and purpose in the Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary are when he proposes the verdict reached by skilful judges as a guide to aesthetic evaluations. Our focus is placed on establishing why a sceptical thinker would be interested in regulating judgments of taste. Similarly, and aiming for unravelling Hume’s proposal all over its complexity, we will examine the distinctive features of the sensibility sphere, and we will consider their similarities with and differences from Hutcheson’s thought.

Benjamin’s philosophy has often been discussed without considering the sensible nature of thinking and the peculiar role the individual obtains in this conception from his early writings on. This article wants to point out the key role of the individual between sensibility and perception through language.

Through continuous inquiry and reflection on the roots of religion, Marx was able to understand the limits of political emancipation when the relationship between political emancipation and religion was correctly revealed. People were not only restricted by the metaphysics of ideas but in reality, they were also restricted by capital. Hegel used concepts while Feuerbach used sensibility as ways to rescue them, yet they were all still trapped in metaphysics. Marx proposed a way on the basis of sublating the two, not only in terms of metaphysics but also the capital by thoroughly criticizing reality. It is through the path of dialectics that Marx was able to introduce a higher-level communist society in the internal criticism and denial of capitalist society by profoundly revealing the theoretical dilemma and internal contradictions of the fusion of metaphysics and capital in the pursuit and realization of human freedom and liberation.

In the article “Levinas: sensibility or reason’s life”, Paulo Lorelle proposes to enlighten Levinas’ ambition of an enlargement of reason. Indeed, through the prism of this declaration, appears in Levinas’ work the constant equivocity of the concepts of “reason” and “rationality” thus divided into a “suspect reason” — that negates alterity — and a “new reason” that arises from alterity. One will here consider this enlargement of reason from Levinas’ later work, in terms of a “sensibilization”. If Totalite et infini already contains a significant number of references to this other rationality, this latter still unfolds beyond sensibility. This new rationality appears on the contrary in Autrement qu’etre, as a sensible reason. And, in texts from the 70s published in De Dieu qui vient a l’idee and Entre nous, Levinas conceives reason’s sensibilization in terms of a wakefulness (eveil). So that the equivocity of the concept of “reason” now points to two different moments of one and the same process — a process of lethargy and wakefulness, of insensibilization and sensibilization of reason.

Dependency functions as a keyword in care theory. However, care theorists have spelled out the ontological and moral ramifications of dependency in different and often conflicting ways. In this article, I argue that conceptual disputes about dependency betray a fundamental discordance among authors, rooted in the empirical premises of their arguments. Hence, although authors appear to share a vocabulary of dependency, they are not writing about quite the same phenomenon. I seek to elucidate these differences by teasing out and comparing different conceptions of dependency found in the literature. Borrowing a phrase from Eva Kittay, I trace four “paradigm cases” of dependency: the infant, the physically disabled person, the profoundly intellectually disabled person, and the refugee. These paradigm cases serve as the empirical touchstone from which theorists extract their conceptions of dependency. Each paradigm case, moreover, permits (or even implores) a particular ethical sensibility toward care. How we understand and value dependency thus seems to determine how we understand and value care, and vice versa. In this way, I contend, our normative orientation toward care might influence what sorts of dependency we see—and, by extension, which forms of dependency we fail to notice.

In this paper, I set an aspect of what it is to live a flourishing life against the backdrop of neo liberal trends that continue to influence educational policy across the globe. The view I set out is in sharp contrast to any narrow assumption that education’s main task is the measurement of high performing individuals who will thus contribute to an economically viable society. Instead, I explore and argue for a conception of what constitutes a flourishing life that is embedded in a more pragmatist analysis of what education may be. The argument begins with developing the centrality of embodiment to aesthetic sensibility and goes on to suggest how collective understanding of this within a community could constitute a sense of performance and thus contribute to the educational aim of developing a full and flourishing life. The argument is that this way of seeing life could have implications for educational practice, the role of the teacher and could help to reconfigure how education is experienced by the young.

Bu makale, Bilgi Felsefesi’nde (epistemoloji) çığır açan Immanuel Kant üzerinedir. Kant kendi döneminde birçok taraftarı olan ampirizm ve rasyonalizm çatışması arasında bir sentez girişiminde bulunmuştur. Evrensel ve zorunlu olan bilginin imkânı için hem deneye hem de akla ihtiyaç duyan Alman filozof bilginin tek bir kaynaktan doğan iki kökü olduğunu dile getirir. Bunlar duyarlık ve anlama yetisi (anlak)’dir. Duyular bilginin malzemesini oluşturur, anlama yetisi ise bu malzemeyi düzenleyecek, birleştirecek olan şeyi sağlar. Bu minvalde Kant, fenomen ve numen arasında bir ayrıma giderek yalnızca fenomen alanın bilgisine sahip olunabileceğini ifade eder. Numen alanın bilgisi ise bizim için kör bir noktadır, yani bu alanın bilgisine sahip olmak mümkün değildir. Halis bir bilgi duyulur dünyada (mundus sensibilis) mümkündür., This article, Immanuel Kant who pioneering in knowledge philosophy is on. Kant attemped a synthesis between the conflict empiricism and rationalism, which had many adherents in period. The German philosopher who needs both experience and reason for the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge states that knowledge has two roots arising from a single source. These is sensibility and understanding. The senses form the material of knowledge and the understanding provides what will organize and unify this material. In this way Kant, distinguishes between phenomenon and numenon and states that only the knowledge of the phenomenon field can be obtained. The knowledge of the numen field is a blind spot for us, that is, it is not possible to have the knowledge of this field. A genuine knowledge is possible in the sensible world.

While Lyotard’s interest in the sublime is well known, his later investigations of the beautiful are much less so. In part this seems to have to do with his own evolving views toward the beautiful as an aesthetic category, which in much of his best-known writings appears mostly to be aligned with representation and thus with Classicism and the Enlightenment. Nonetheless, there is another and more subtle understanding of the beautiful to be found in Lyotard, where it is even found alongside the sublime and what he calls, following Freud, “unconscious affect.” In these works, the beautiful appears to take on another relevance, and may even help us to begin to take the full measure of the “philosophy of the affect” that Lyotard seems to be largely engaged in during many of his last writings. This essay is an attempt to begin this process by giving a detailed reading of one of the major of these texts, in order, on the one hand, to show how the beautiful comes to be counted alongside the sublime and unconscious affect, and on the other, to make some suggestions about how it differs from them and might thus offer a broader understanding of Lyotard’s late account of affectivity. This reading of the beautiful appears most clearly in an essay devoted to the Kantian judgment of taste entitled “Sensus Communis.” I try to elucidate the main contours of this argument in terms of the split in Kant’s sensus communis that Lyotard introduces there: a communis that is formed not by any shared sensibility but by the “voices” of the faculties themselves; and the sentiment of beauty as a sensus that exceeds not only the faculties of knowledge and action but even the conscious subject itself. As with the later conception of the sublime and unconscious affect, the beautiful here appears as a very specific “temporal crisis” that undoes the temporalization of the subject. In this sense, it is consistent with other readings of the affect in this stage of Lyotard’s writings. Nonetheless, it also differs in that it is time in statu nascendi, in the state of birth, and as a result I argue that it seems to figure a certain promise that is absent in both the sublime and unconscious affect, even if that promise is always and only ever to come.

This article examines how Edward Young’s Night Thoughts IX reshapes the key concepts of Baruch Spinoza and John Locke while deploying the speaker’s perceptions of the Almighty in human domains. At the age of sensibility, it was Young among his contemporary writers, who seriously utilizes, in his contemplative ode, divine experiences of external circumstances. His reworking of the two philosophers enables the speaker to effectively deliver his spiritual awareness of divinity to Lorenzo, who is a contemporary iconic figure ignoring immaterial revelations in the surrounding world. The essay scrutinizes how Young’s allusion to Spinoza and Locke contributes to enhancing the capability of one’s mind to realize the diverse manifestations of deity in permanent natural landscapes.

In The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance (2012), Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi unfolds a political and clinical diagnosis of contemporary society, stating that the crisis we experience today is a permanent state of absent social autonomy and political agency. This crisis is not solely economic but is caused by semio-capitalism impacting all spheres of human life, affecting sensibility in particular—the linguistic and physical-sensuous link between the individual and the world. Taking up the term sensibility as a bodily basis of experience and as an aesthetic notion, in this article I will explore the relation between individual and collective bodies, the crisis as a suspension of change, and literature, focusing on the Danish poet Ursula Andkjær Olsen’s 2017 lunatic and fragmented novel of love and economy The Crisis Notebooks, but also with reference to some of her other work(s). I argue that the bodily experience of crisis, as expressed in this novel, leads to an inhibited social sensibility but also, paradoxically, to a radical openness towards the world. With reference to the Danish literary scholar Anne Fastrup’s interpretation of French vitalism’s idea of sensibility in The Movement of Sensibility (2007), I suggest that a more ambiguous, material notion of both a constructive and a destructive sensibility is crucial for its understanding, and hence—for an understanding of the relationship between body and crisis as expressed in The Crisis Notebooks. Finally, I suggest that an aesthetic notion of sensibility can provide a prism through which relations between today’s financial mechanisms and a sociocultural experience of crisis are rendered visible—if not sensuous—and it is from here that alternatives to the crisis can be found, felt, formulated or fabulated.

The contemporary debate that discusses whether the content of perceptual experience is or not conceptual claims I. Kant as its precursor. Surprisingly, both contenders in this debate do so. The Kantian non conceptualists, R. Hanna and L. Allais, among others, have support their arguments on Kant´s insistence on clearly separating intuitions and concepts and the faculties that make them possible, sensibility and understanding in order to emphasize that, once divided according to their functions, it makes sense to think that experience emerges from the collaboration between those two faculties. In this paper I want to make an argument in favor of the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows: If, as the Kantian conceptualists say, concepts already operate in sensibility, why would it be necessary to postulate an independent device that helps close the bridge between sensibility and understanding? Why is there a need for schematism? I will defend the legitimacy of that tertium as a mediator element that resolves the problem of the subsumption of particulars under concepts, and with that I will make an argument for the separability between intuitions and concepts.

This article examines the Kantian ideas on motion in his work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In that essay, Kant holds that motion as a concept—from its connotation as elemental and fundamental predicament of the material reality—mobilises in matter all the characteristics of its essence as a property. Nevertheless conceiving motion as a concept does not enable us to confirm the existence of motion itself in the natural world because ‘the possibility of specific natural things can’t be discovered from their mere concepts.’ (Kant in Principios metafisicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza. Tecnos, Madrid, 7. 1991). Therefore, the concept of movement does not evidence the existence of the movement or its characteristics and properties. Such claim would imply that motion as a concept is not evidence of the existence of motion as such and, therefore, the properties of matter cannot be mobilised based on that concept because they are characteristics of the essence of motion. Then, how does Kant intend to denote motion? Why pretend to explain matter form the concept of motion if a pure concept is, by definition, independent of the data obtained from the sensibility? (Colomer in El pensamiento aleman. De Kant a Heidegger. Herder, Tomo I. Barcelona, 114. 1986). Therefore, we will demonstrate that such weakness is the breaking point of the Kantian concept of motion in his “dynamic-metaphysical” model.

The present paper proposes to analyze the relation between Deleuze and Kant through Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic. Even though Deleuze describes Kant as an enemy, we have in his work an appropriation of various elements of Kant’s philosophy. Deleuze critiques criticizes Kant for having presupposed a common sense as the condition of the agreement of the faculties alongside all of his three critiques and also for the scission of the aesthetics in two domains: sensibility and creation. What we shall argue in this paper is that, through his reading of the Critique of Judgment, Deleuze finds the elements of internal reversion of kantism which he will radicalize in his own philosophy in order to reunite the two different aesthetics domains in a discordant harmony., O presente trabalho se debruça sobre a relação entre Deleuze e Kant a partir da interpretação que o primeiro realiza da estética do segundo. Apesar de Deleuze descrever Kant como seu inimigo, temos na sua obra uma reapropriação de diversos elementos da filosofia crítica kantiana. Deleuze critica Kant por ter pressuposto um senso comum como condição do acordo das faculdades em todas as três críticas e de ter cindido a estética em dois domínios: sensibilidade e criação. O que pretenderemos demonstrar neste artigo é que a partir da sua leitura da Crítica da Faculdade de Julgar, Deleuze encontra os elementos de uma reversão interna do kantismo que ele própria radicaliza em sua filosofia de forma a reunir os dois sentidos de estética em um acordo discordante entre as faculdades.

This paper argues that children as members of a perennial psychoclass represent one potential vanguard of an emergent shift in Western subjectivity, and that adult–child dialogue, especially in the context of schooling, is a key locus for the epistemological change that implies. I argue from Herbert Marcuse’s prophetic invocation of a “new sensibility,” which is characterized by an increase in instinctual revulsion towards violence, domination and exploitation (whether personal or structural) and, correspondingly, a greater sensitivity to all forms of life. As the embodiment of a form of philosophical “post-animism” or hylozoism, it represents the evolutionary shift that, it could be argued, our species requires for survival at this historical moment. I suggest that the evolutionary phenomenon of neoteny—the long formative period of human childhood and the pedomorphic character of humans across the life cycle—makes of the adult-collective of school a primary site for the reconstruction of belief. After exploring child–adult dialogue more broadly as a form of dialectical interaction between what John Dewey called “impulse” and “habit,” I argue for a form, or archetype of schooling first articulated in ancient Greece called skhole, a space that functions, according to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, as a “meeting place,” a “form of gathering and action” dedicated to inquiry, and not to the production of calculated, preordained outcomes—a space removed from the world of production, and characterized by a form of temporality associated with childhood: aion, or “timeless time,” as opposed to kronos, or linear time. Skhole is dedicated to emergence and cultural reconstruction, which follows from an educative relationship between adults and children based on understanding the latter as bearers of the “novel,” and on a faith in the “reorganizing potentialities” of childhood impulse, or interest—that is, on natality as a fundamental principle of cultural evolution.

Genevieve Lloyd’s assessment of Spinoza’s rationalism shows how imagination and sensibility are integrated with reason in his metaphysics and equally makes clear how his philosophy illuminates a nu...

Este artículo propone una reconsideración del libro Reflejos del nazismo (1982), primera publicación académica sobre las imágenes “fascinantes” del nazismo en la cultura masiva. A tal fin, en primer lugar se realiza una relectura de la noción “nuevo discurso sobre el nazismo” y su característica central: la correlación tensa entre sensibilidad kitsch y motivos asociados a la muerte y el apocalipsis. Posteriormente, se desarrolla una crítica a esta concepción señalando que la correlación kitsch-muerte y sus derivaciones no definen una particularidad del objeto sino aspectos extensivos a buena parte de la cultura contemporánea. Por último, se concluye que la concepción de Friedländer encubre la historicidad de estos discursos así como uno de sus aspectos más cruciales, al que Michel Foucault y Susan Sontag habían dado tempranamente el nombre de “erotización”.

There is a growing discourse on “new sincerity,” and related terms like “quirky” and “metamodernism,” as a movement or sensibility in contemporary cinema developing from the late 1990s onward, exemplified by the work of filmmakers such as Wes Anderson and Charlie Kaufman. However, what this new concept means in the context of cinema has so far remained under-defined and requires further philosophical analysis. This article provides such an analysis by offering a reconceptualization of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist-phenomenological notions of good faith and sincerity, which will be connected to developments in film and elaborated in relation to Frances Ha (Noah Baumbach, 2012). I propose, against Sartre's own preference for the problematic term “authenticity,” to understand sincerity as the reflective resumption of good faith's pre-reflective acceptance of human-reality. This conception of sincerity as reflective allows us to accurately understand the combination of self-awareness and affirmation that characterizes new sincerity cinema: its self-awareness does not serve the postmodernist strategy of endless self-ironization; instead, its portrayals affirm the meaningfulness of its filmic reality, while also being aware of film as a medium. An analysis of Frances Ha illustrates how this concept of sincerity might be seen to function both on the level of story world, characters and themes, and on that of narrative structure and audio-visual style, thereby showing how we can meaningfully speak of sincerity in and of film.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the project of recovering aspects of Christian thought which are significant for a contemporary eco-theological sensibility. The work of William Temple, in particular his concept of the sacramental universe, is discussed in relation to three eco-theological principles. Temple’s affirmation that matter has significance coheres with the principle that the Earth has value; his notion that the Incarnation is the pre-eminent expression of divine meaning connects with the principle that creation is expressive of divine mind and purpose; and the inter-disciplinary scope of Temple’s thought coheres with the principle of inter-connectedness. Temple’s concept of the sacramental universe might assist the engagement between theology and the present ecological context.

According to What Is Philosophy?, all disciplines combat opinion, but art fights most effectively because art and opinion both pertain to sensibility. Yet, this common provenance also makes the line dividing art and opinion porous. The stakes of this porosity are perhaps most visible in the relation of art to life. Although art must avoid two forms of death, ‘chaos’ and ‘opinion’, Deleuze and Guattari don't treat chaos and opinion equally. The fundamental distinction between good death (what I call ‘euthanasia’) and bad death, between death by chaos and death by opinion, has a number of problematic consequences. Perhaps the most consequential: opinion is deadlier than death itself.

Krishnachandra's re-articulation of Kant's transcendental system challenges Kant's conceptualization of 'apperceptive self' conceived as a logical function which is as well the precondition of all our knowledge claims. In Kant's framework, though this "unity of consciousness" is projected as a principle, which undertakes a foundational role as 'apperceptive I', it is capacitated with merely a logical function. Krishnachandra disagrees with Kant's reduction of function of the "self" to a logical process. This reduction would render knowledge of the "self" to be an inferential knowledge, thus making this derivation analogous to the proofs of the transcendental conditions of understanding and sensibility through the logical process of deductions. Krishnachandra's question is: whether this equation established between logical function of 'apperception' and the "self" will suffice to establish the "certitude" of knowledge claims. This is the first task Krishnachandra addresses in his work, Studies in Kant which is elucidated in the following section of this paper. Further, we will see how Krishnachandra’s exploration into the dynamics of this problem leads him to alternatively foreground the "unity", which is much sought by Kantian scholars, between the theoretical and the practical domains of Reason.

This article is mainly about two things: first, exploring the gatherings of studying in the university. And second, it is about describing new relations to understand studying practices beyond the normative interventions carried out inside learning environments (e.g. learning centers, libraries) and the clearly demarcated functions imposed to their practice. In a certain sense, common assumptions about study recognize its importance for achieving learning goals and its capacity to be designed according to pre-conceived intentions. However, in an attempt to reconsider our understanding about studying, the basic arguments here is that studying practices are constituted by open-ended activities that are guided by present interests to things that matter. Based on Theodore Schatzki’s practice theory, activities of studying were observed through scenes, where students and study-materiality join together in the event of studying at the Agora Learning Centre of KU Leuven in Belgium. Adopting a particular sensibility and narrative to describe and attend to actions and material entities entangled on studying activities, the article attempts to take a look at these activities beyond their functionality. Therefore, the main purpose of this research is to take a look at ‘what is going on’ in studying practices.

The reference to human sensibility, to the dimension of the “sensible” as the object of education itself, finds its most distant formulation in Plato's Republic. However, this task has remained a problem lacking a reasonable equation until now. In Brazil, especially after the publication of the National Curriculum Parameters in 1997, the discussions and propositions for an education of the sensibility have intensified. Our purpose, considering the limits of this paper consists in the exposition and reflection of two different theoretical perspectives. They are situated in different historical moments of the twentieth century and they are important reference for the national debate regarding a supposedly education of sensibility nowadays. This is the case of Soviet psychologist and theorist Lev S. Vygotsky (1896) and of the French philosopher Jacques Ranciere (1940).

This paper proposes a possible path to overcoming the knowledge/experience dualism that TS Eliot famously labelled the ‘dissociation of sensibility’ and my related desire to write what I define as ...

Study is recently re-invoked as an alternative educational formation to disrupt the learning trap and trope. This paper calibrates study and learning as two hermeneutic principles and correlates them with seeing, hearing, and observing as three onto-epistemic modes that respectively underpin Greco-Christian, Rabbinic, and ancient Chinese exegetical traditions. Linking study and learning with the hermeneutic issues of language, text, meaning, and reality, my calibration unfolds in four steps. First, I introduce an epistemic aporia encountered in interpreting some Chinese educational “wind” texts, exposing our naturalized reasoning of learning along a representational enclosure. Second, turning to Susan Handelman’s writing, I trace this learning-as-representation enclosure as being conditioned upon the Greco-Christian exegetical mode of seeing, meanwhile correlating study back with the Rabbinic hearing hermeneutic. Third, I move on to explicate an onto-cosmological Yijing observing, proffering a study hermeneutic as a movement of observing, following, and attuning to wendao, literally put, “a crisscrossing pattern that (re-)turns with dao.” Finally, I re-observe and study the crisscrossing Chinese educational “wind” texts, evoking a Chinese “wind-teaching” sensibility so far rarely discerned through representational thinking and learning.

Michael Bonnett has long attempted to rehabilitate the concept of nature, thereby challenging us to reconsider its profound implications for diverse educational issues. Castigating both ‘postmodern’ and ‘scientistic’ accounts of nature for failing to appreciate that nature is at once transcendent and normative, Bonnett proposes his phenomenology-inspired view of nature as the ‘self-arising’, which is bound up with the notion of ‘our experience of nature’. Despite its enormous strengths, however, Bonnett’s argument might obscure the ways in which the real issue involved in nature is addressed: the issue of our nature, which enables our experience of nature in the first place. In this paper, after reviewing Bonnett’s view of nature and considering his criticism of Richard Rorty’s assault on the reality of nature, I will try to show how the Aristotelian notion of second nature that John McDowell has reanimated can supplement Bonnett’s project and render plausible the idea that the naturalness of our sensibility is unique to human beings; through this approach, the issue of human nature can be (re)located in discussions of nature at large and, connectedly, brought again within the scope of the philosophical study of education in the present-day intellectual climate that increasingly marginalises non-scientific, intellectual endeavours. I will also briefly reflect on the relevance of the notion of second nature to Stephen Boulter’s recently proposed idea of ‘education from a biological point of view’.

In his Philippics Cicero more than once refers to Fadia, whom he depicts as Antony's wife, and to the children she bore him. He also discusses Fadia in his correspondence with Atticus. Plutarch was aware of the Philippics and much of Cicero's correspondence, and therefore of Fadia, and yet, in his Life of Antony, he says nothing about her. This paper examines three possible explanations for the biographer's silence: (i) an informed sensibility regarding the historical value of invective; (ii) the narrative design of this Life and its contribution to Plutarch's characterisation of Antony; (iii) Plutarch's (disturbing by contemporary standards) disapproval of an aristocrat's siring children on women of the lower orders – even by way of legitimate marriage or concubinage. It is, it appears, the ensemble of these factors which excludes Fadia from Plutarch's biography, and the pertinence of each adds to our appreciation of Plutarch's biographical principles.