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Aristotle analyzed the problem of education in the seventh and eighth books of Politics. Most researchers interpret his thoughts on education as “the education of the youth”. Some authors try to convince us of the significance of contemplation and the problem of the best possible way of life in analyzing Aristotle’s education theory. We would like to regard the problem of education in another frame. The role of education is exceptionally significant, judging from the central theme of Politics – the political practice of human beings. Therefore, the critical question we want to ask here is – what is the reason for creating a polis? Only when we understand Aristotle’s answer to this question will we know why education plays such an essential role in a polis. Aristotle avoids definitively prescribing and ordering what music children and citizens should listen to. He leaves open the critical question about “how children and citizens should be educated”. Disagreeing on the proper way of education is the very essence of education. No ready-made best way to be educated has to be applied in every case. The best way is only the one that is the outcome of the particular dispute. Just as citizens, while in power, have to think about those who are subordinate because they replace each other, when thinking about the aim of education, they have to think about each other. Outside of that process, there is no ideal form of education, the application of which would improve the political community. Aristotel problem obrazovanja analizira u sedmoj i osmoj knjizi Politike. Većina istraživača njegova razmišljanja o obrazovanju tumači kao „obrazovanje mladih“. Neki autori, analizirajući Aristotelovu teoriju obrazovanja, pokušavaju da nas uvere u značaj kontemplacije i problema najboljeg načina života. Ovde želimo da problem obrazovanja sagledamo u drugom okviru. Uloga obrazovanja izuzetno je značajna, sudeći po središnjoj temi Politike – političkoj praksi čoveka. Stoga je ključno pitanje koje ovde želimo da postavimo – koji je razlog stvaranja polisa? Tek kada shvatimo Aristotelov odgovor na ovo pitanje, moći ćemo razumeti zašto obrazovanje igra tako bitnu ulogu u polisu. Aristotel svakako izbegava da propisuje i naređuje koju muziku deca i građani treba da slušaju. On ostavlja otvorenim ključno pitanje „kako obrazovati decu i građane“. Neslaganje oko ispravnog načina obrazovanja je zapravo njegova suština. Ne postoji gotov, najbolji način obrazovanja koji se može primeniti u svakoj situaciji. Najbolji način je samo onaj koji je rezultat sporenja na ovu temu. Kao što građani, dok su na vlasti, moraju misliti na one koji su podređeni jer jedni druge smenjuju, isto tako kada razmišljaju o cilju obrazovanja jednako moraju misliti jedni na druge. Izvan tog procesa ne postoji idealan oblik obrazovanja čijom bi se primenom mogla unaprediti politička zajednica.

Virtue accounts of innovation ethics have recognized the virtue of creativity as an admirable trait in innovators. However, such accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the way creativity functions as a collective phenomenon. We propose a collective virtue account to supplement existing virtue accounts. We base our account on Kieran’s definition of creativity as a virtue and distinguish three components in it: creative output, mastery and intrinsic motivation. We argue that all of these components can meaningfully be attributed to innovation groups. This means that we can also attribute the virtue of creativity to group agents involved in innovation. Recognizing creativity as a collective virtue in innovation is important because it allows for a more accurate evaluation of how successful innovation generally happens. The innovator who takes a collective virtue account of creativity seriously will give attention to the facilitation of an environment where the group can flourish collectively, rather than only nurturing the individual genius.

After retirement, older people often find themselves far from their children and grandchildren, and many spend their last years isolated and alone. As traditional concepts of family and social institutions fragment, social networks weaken, leading to an epidemic of loneliness, and substance abuse and suicide in developed countries. In fact, life expectancy in the US has dropped for the past few years, in large part due to a dramatic increase in suicide and drug overdose (ref). None of these social problems is likely to be solved by metformin. They point to a crisis of identity and meaning, an existential crisis. In this context, one might wonder if we are already seeing the effects of tinkering with our lifespan. There are many more conclusions one could draw about the implications of longevity, many of which have been elegantly described in Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness, published by the President’s Council on Bioethics, which I used as a reference for this talk. I hope I have been successful in providing a 10,000-foot view of the questions of efforts to extend human longevity and its implications that will provoke thought and discussion. I would like to end these reflections by turning back to my favorite transhumans. The reason we love superheroes is not for their superior strength or intelligence, but their characters. They use their powers to protect and serve humanity rather than dominate or annihilate it. It is not their gadgetry that makes them great, but how they use it to save the vulnerable. Even as a small child I knew that if everyone acted the way they did, the world would be a better place. The moral of every story was that the “enhancement” humanity needed would not come as the fruit of technology, but of virtue. Después de la jubilación, las personas mayores a menudo se encuentran lejos de sus hijos y nietos, y muchos pasan sus últimos años aislados y solos. A medida que los conceptos tradicionales de familia e instituciones sociales se fragmentan, las redes sociales se debilitan, lo que lleva a una epidemia de soledad, abuso de sustancias y suicidio en los países desarrollados. De hecho, la esperanza de vida en los EE. UU. Ha disminuido durante los últimos años, en gran parte debido a un aumento dramático en el suicidio y la sobredosis de drogas. Es probable que la metformina no resuelva ninguno de estos problemas sociales. Señalan una crisis de identidad y significado, una crisis existencial. En este contexto, uno podría preguntarse si ya estamos viendo los efectos de modificar nuestra vida útil. Hay muchas más conclusiones que se podrían sacar sobre las implicaciones de la longevidad, muchas de las cuales se han descrito elegantemente en Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness, publicado por el President’s Council on Bioethics, que utilicé como referencia para esta charla. Espero haber tenido éxito al proporcionar una visión de “10,000 pasos” de las cuestiones relativas a los esfuerzos para extender la longevidad humana y sus implicaciones que provocarán pensamiento y discusión. Me gustaría terminar con estas reflexiones volviendo a mis transhumanos favoritos. La razón por la que amamos a los superhéroes no es por su fuerza o inteligencia superior, sino por sus personajes. Usan sus poderes para proteger y servir a la humanidad en lugar de dominarla o aniquilarla. No son sus artilugios lo que los hace geniales, sino cómo los usan para salvar a los vulnerables. Incluso cuando era pequeño sabía que si todos actuaban como lo hacían, el mundo sería un lugar mejor. La moraleja de cada historia era que la “mejora” que necesitaba la humanidad no vendría como fruto de la tecnología, sino de la virtud.

This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as a virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. This view is sometimes assumed to require a commitment to an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On that view, practical wisdom would require philosophical insight and an implausibly well worked out set of weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim to show that particularists can and should take on much of what was thought to belong to the Grand End view. I argue for a conception of practical wisdom as a virtue of extended action that accounts for overarching ends without the need to appeal to an unrealistic, intellectualized blueprint for life. Further, on the view advocated here, as in Aristotle, practical wisdom is a virtue of substantial rationality and a different capacity from instrumental rationality in that it requires reflection on what constitutes a good human life. This is not high-minded philosophical reflection and is, in fact, something rather mundane that draws on the same rational capacities we deploy to assess the goodness of actions.

Σκοπός της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η ανάδειξη πτυχών της αριστοτελικής φιλοσοφίας, με έμφαση στις έννοιες της αρετής και του σπουδαίου πολίτη, βάσει της πραγματείας των Ηθικών Ευδημείων. The thesis focuses on the aspects of Aristotelian philosophy, with an emphasis on the concepts of virtue and the spoudaios citizen, based on the treatise Eudemian Ethics. 140 σ.

Celem tego artykułu jest krótka analiza republikańskiej koncepcji wolności przedstawianej w polskiej i pozapolskiej teorii republikańskiej XVI wieku. Punktem wyjścia rozważań jest teza głosząca, że kategoria wolności w teorii republikańskiej jest ściśle związana z namysłem i ustaleniami dotyczącymi istoty i celu wspólnoty politycznej, określanej w tradycji rzymskiej mianem civitas libera. Wolność jest pochodną dobrze urządzonego, wolnego ładu politycznego, w którym kluczową rolę odgrywa prawo i cnota. Analizując ideę wolności republikańskiej przez pryzmat dwóch kontekstów: klasycznej tradycji republikańskiej i jej ustaleń oraz ładu społeczno-ustrojowego Rzeczypospolitej, wskazuję, że łączy się ona ściśle z innymi kluczowymi dla teorii republikańskiej kategoriami, takimi jak res publica, sprawiedliwość i prawo, cnota, ustrój mieszany oraz obywatelskość, wyrażana w ideale vita activa, i dopiero w połączeniu z nimi możliwe jest ukazanie pełnego rozumienia wolności i jej uwarunkowań. This article discusses the republican concept of freedom presented in the Polish and not only Polish republican theory of the sixteenth century. The starting point for the discussion is the thesis that the category of freedom in republican theory is closely related to reflection and findings regarding the essence and purpose of the political community referred to in the Roman tradition as civitas libera. Freedom is a derivative of a well-ordered, free political order in which law and virtue play a key role. Analysing the idea of republican liberty through the prism of two contexts: the classical republican tradition and its findings and the socio-political order of PolandLithuania it is argued that liberty is closely connected with other key categories of the republican theory, such as res publica, justice, law, virtue, mixed government and citizenship expressed in the ideal vita activa, and only in connection with them is it possible to understand freedom and its conditions. The republican theory of the sixteenth century brings also a unique insight about freedom as non-domination which has been widely discussed by Quentin Skinner and others in recent decades.

In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (and presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community (as both a „kingdom of ends” and social reality) provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue.

The article analyzes the types of "meek" and "proud" female images in the works of F.M. Dostoevsky in connection with the typologies of the images of the writer among the literary critics N.A. Dobrolyubov, V.F. Pereverzev and A.A. Gizetti. The article refers to the classical authors of the early critical understanding of Dostoevsky's works, who divided female images into two opposite types of the "meek" and "proud". At the same time, the article emphasizes the idea that in Dostoevsky's polyphonic world every literary hero has a multidimensional consciousness, which is why the direct dichotomous division into the "proud" and "meek" can only be a rough generalization. The first part of the article examines the typologies of N.A. Dobrolyubov, as well as one of V.F. Pereverzev, who creates the most ambitious and significant typology, considering female images. He sensitively notices the ambiguity and tragedy of Dostoevsky's heroines and introduces the term "the doppelgngerwoman" into the typology of female images, on the basis of which each heroine somehow contains a certain internal conflict, the solution of which in the course of a novel allows her character to develop towards one of the indicated subtypes. The second part of the article analyzes the typology of A.A. Gizetti, who in his research focuses on such type of Dostoevsky's female images as the "proud", highlighting a new, "mysterious" subtype of the Dostoevsky's proud heroine. In the performed comparison of "meek" and "proud" types of female images it is considered to distinguish positive and negative ethical meanings of them. The article formulates conclusions about the various subtypes of "meek" and "proud" characters in the writer's artistic world, and outlines the grounds for further system of understanding of meekness and pride on a scale of correlation with vice and virtue.

In the world of Islamic intellectuals, Al-Ghazali is one of the Sufistic figures who understands Islam very well. Arguments and ways of thinking about philosophy, monotheism and others were able to become a bridge for Muslims in that era. But apart from the intellectual prowess of al-Ghazali can not be separated from the criticism of his thinking. Some scholars at that time tried to criticize al-Ghazali's thoughts, especially about the hadith arguments that he used in Islamic law. Some scholars' considered that al-Ghazali used the hadith maudlu'. This is as seen in one of his monumental works, Ihya 'Ulum ad-Din, both for the purpose of at-targhib (providing motivation) and at-tarhib (scaring), and/or fadhail al-a'mal (the virtue of attitude/ behavior). It is interesting to briefly examine the epistemological framework of hadith in al-Ghazali's thought, which according to some scholars' has a tasahhul (loose) attitude in terms of hadith transmission, thus drawing criticism from some scholars and even orientalists, and the basis held by al-Ghazali in narrating and using hadiths that are af and even willing' quality, especially those related to haram and halal. However, this monumental book by al-Ghazali is considered a very great book in its era until now because it includes various types of knowledge.

In this paper I explore how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectual humility are successful at tracking some manifestations of this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections.

Eğitimin temel hedefi, insanı doğasına uygun biçimde geliştirmektir. İslâm filozoflarının eğitim felsefeleri bu açıdan ilgiye değerdir. Fârâbî’ye göre insanın düalist yapısı ve birbirinden farklı iki özden oluşması, eğitimi de ikili bir yapı üzerine temellendirme zorunluluğunu doğurur. Dolayısıyla insanın hem bedenen hem ruhen ve birbirlerinden farklı yöntemlerle eğitilmesi gerekir. İbn Sînâ eğitimde yöntem tartışmalarına ilgi göstermez, onu temel olarak ruh eğitimi ve yalnızca metafizik eğitim kısmı ilgilendirir. Gazâlî değişken bir eğitimci tipi tasarlar ve bu değişkenliği öğretmenin eğitim anlayışına göre değil öğrencinin hazırbulunuşluğuna göre şekillendirir. Huy ve davranışlarından dolayı artık eğitilemeyecek ve kendisinden vazgeçilebilir kimseler olabileceği düşüncesi Gazâlî’ye özgü kabul edilebilir. İbn Bâcce için erdemli toplumda erdemsiz kimse bulunamaz ancak erdemsiz toplumda erdemli kimse bulunabilir fakat sahip olduğu yetkinliklerin hiçbiri erdemsiz toplumda bir yankı uyandırmaz. Erdemli kimse toplum karşısında yalnız ve gariptir. İbn Tûfeyl, düşüncesini din ile felsefeden yalnızca biri üzerine bina etmek yerine, iki disiplini bir araya getirerek en uygun düşünceye ulaşmaya çalışır. İbn Rüşd’e göre yalnızca fizik âlem hakkında bilgi sahibi olmak, bilginin künhüne sahip olmak anlamı taşımaz. Dolayısıyla bilginin tam ve eksiksiz olabilmesi için metafizik âlemi de kapsayacak bir genişliğe ulaşması gerekir. İbn Haldun içinse eğitim sanatlardan biridir, geliştirilip güçlendirilmesi bir meleke olarak işlenmesine bağlıdır ve çokça tekrar etmekle mükemmelleşir. Toplumun fert üzerindeki etkileri konusunda Gazâlî, Kindî ve İbn Haldûn’un düşünceleri ortaktır. Eğitimde bireysel farklılıkları en fazla önemseyen İslâm düşünürü ise İbn Haldûn’dur., The main goal of education is to develop people in accordance with their nature. The educational philosophies of Islamic philosophers are of interest in this respect. According to Al-Farabi, the dualist structure of man and his being composed of two different essences necessitate to base education on a dual structure. Therefore, people need to be trained both physically and spiritually and in different ways. Avicenna is not interested in the discussion of method in education, he is mainly concerned with spiritual education and only the metaphysical education part. The thought that there may be people who can no longer be educated and who can be dispensed with due to their habits and behaviors is unique to Al-Ghazali. According to Ibn Bâcce, there can be no ignorant people in a virtuous society, there can be a virtuous person in an ignorant society, but none of the competencies he possesses resonate with an ignorant society. Ibn Tufayl tries to reach the most appropriate idea by bringing the two disciplines together, instead of building his thought on only one of religion and philosophy. According to Averroes, only having knowledge about the physical world does not mean having all of it. For Ibn Khaldun, education is one of the arts, its development and strengthening depends on its cultivation as a faculty and it becomes perfect with a lot of repetition. The thoughts of Ghazali, Al-Kindi and Ibn Khaldun are common on the effects of society on the individual. The only Islamic thinker who cares most about individual differences in education is Ibn Khaldun.

En este trabajo se examinan las estrategias discursivas de la literatura de Cervantes y Gracián en torno a la formación del sí mismo y el estatuto del mundo en su sentido metafísico. Conceptos tales como «valor» y «corazón” debieran ser leídos desde una perspectiva ética que delimita esencialmente la constitución del ser humano y de su mundo. Estas estrategias muestran cómo se suelen abordar teóricamente los inicios de la Modernidad desde sus últimas consideraciones (propias del idealismo alemán) y cómo tal vínculo debe ser reconsiderado., This paper aims to examine the discursive strategies in Cervantes’ and Gracián’s literature, mostly concerned to the configuration of the self and the status of the world in a metaphysical sense. Concepts such as «courage» or «heart» should be read in an ethical way as the essential approach to the human being and its world. These strategies show how we usually address the beginnings of the Modern Age (from its last development in the German Idealism) and how this historical connection should be reconsidered., Proyecto de Investigación «Herencia y actualización del Barroco como ethos inclusivo» (PID2019-108248GB-I00 / MICIN/ AEI / 10.13039/501100011033), financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Agencia Estatal de Investigación, del Gobierno de España

Resumen El tratado metodológico de Spinoza, llamado Tratado de la reforma del entendimiento, introduce al lector con la declaración de un objetivo puramente ético, la obtención de la felicidad. Ésta, identificada con la virtud, es también el objetivo último de la filosofía. Es evidente, por lo tanto, que existe una relación entre el método y la ética, pero su naturaleza no es del todo clara. Así pues, cabe preguntarse: ¿se trata de una relación que puede presentar algún tipo de interés en la comprensión de la teoría ética de Spinoza o es meramente una relación accidental? Dicho de otro modo, ¿los procedimientos metodológicos tienen una función constitutiva en la búsqueda de la virtud o se trata solo de una relación mediata y carente de interés filosófico? En el presente trabajo nos proponemos indagar cuál es la naturaleza de esta relación, partiendo de la hipótesis de que reviste un interés filosófico que es necesario clarificar. Con este fin abordaremos otras cuestiones en torno a la relación entre la virtud y el conocimiento, en especial en torno al modo en que dicha relación aparece planteada en la Ética de Spinoza. Abstract Spinoza’s methodological treatise, called Tractatus intellectus emendatione, introduces the reader with a declaration of a purely ethical objective, the obtaining of happiness. This happiness, identified with virtue, is also the ultimate goal of philosophy. It is evident, then, that there is a relationship between method and ethics. But its nature is not clear enough. Thus, it is worth asking: is this a relationship that may present some kind of philosophical interest in understanding of Spinoza’s ethical theory or is it merely an accidental relationship? In other words, do methodological procedure have a constitutive function in the search of virtue or is it only a mediate relationship lacking in philosophical interest? In the present paper we propose to inquire which is the nature of this relationship starting from the hypothesis that it have a philosophical interest which needs clarification. To this end, we will address other questions about the relationship between virtue and knowledge, specially about the way in which such relationship appears raised in Spinoza’s Ethics.

Modern philosophy tends to consider human reality in more and more interdisciplinary contexts. Thanks to that, at first traditional, and now new media as well as IT, attract philosophers’ attention and provide material for thinking over a lot of so-called “eternal philosophical questions”. Among them, there are some of the broadest questions: a) catching the margins of the real; b) understanding, which phenomena and objects to constitute human might be called real. The key goal of this article is to research one of the crucial concepts, which brings us to understanding reality, – the notion of virtuality. The author of this paper outlines background of this notion, describes its characteristics and usage in modern philosophical discourse. First of all, virtual is described in its connotations to all three dimensions of time being: past, present, and future. It is argued that the notion of virtuality at first used to be “rediscovered” by Gilles Deleuze, but then it has experienced crucial changes in philosophy of the XXth and XXIst centuries. By means of that, virtual is discussed as a counterpart of the concept of reality. In particular, this article touches upon a variety of connotations between the notions of virtuality, reality and actuality. It also shows the context of juxtaposition of the aforementioned notions. What is more, this paper reveals moral aspects of virtuality both in transcendental and as immanent senses. This article shows the background of indistinguishability for “real” and “virtual”. Finally, it is stated that in the situation of so-called “substituted reality” the multiplicity of connotations of the notion of virtuality ought to be used to rediscover the notion of reality itself., Сучасна філософія тяжіє до осмислення людської дійсності у дедалі ширших міждисциплінарних контекстах. Спочатку традиційні, а віднедавна й інтернет-медіа та інформаційні технології опинилися у полі зору філософів та стали джерелом для переосмислення чималої кількості так званих вічних філософських запитань. Серед них зокрема і найширші, як-от усвідомлення меж реального та розуміння, які саме явища й речі з тих, що конституюють людське, можна вважати реальними. Цю статтю присвячено дослідженню одного з понять, що є ключовим для осмислення реальності, – поняттю віртуальності. Авторка висвітлює його витоки, особливості і специфіку вжитку в сучасному філософському дискурсі. Зокрема, показано конотації віртуального з усіма трьома часовими вимірами: минулим, теперішнім та майбутнім. Наголошено, що поняття віртуального спочатку було «перевідкрите» Жилем Дельозом, а потім пережило ще низку сутнісних змін у філософії ХХ–ХХІ століть. Тож віртуальне розглянуто як контрагент реального. Зокрема, у статті приділено увагу різноманітним конотаціям між поняттями віртуальності, реальності та фактичності. Крім того, розкрито моральні аспекти віртуальності – як у трансцендентному, так і в іманентному сенсі. Висвітлено підґрунтя для нерозрізнюваності «реального» та «віртуального». Зроблено висновок про те, що в ситуації так званої підміни реальності різноманіття конотацій поняття віртуальності може бути використане для перевідкриття вже самого поняття реальності.

The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent...

Vaiśesikas are realist philosophers of classical India. They admit time (kāla) as a ubiquitous real substance. In this paper, our aim is to discuss such a determination of time following sixth century Vaiśesika scholar Praśastapāda and a few of his interpreters, Vyomaśivācārya and Udayanācārya. This paper is an effort to state realist philosophers’ understanding of time and also to highlight how in classical Indian tradition, interpretations paved the way for proving the reality of time. The application of logical methods by the Vaiśesika interpreters is also worth studying. These methods show the internal development occurring in the system of Vaiśesika. Praśastapāda stated different notions like priority etc. (paratvādi) as the linga or hetu of kāla. Vyomaśiva and Udayana have established this statement of Praśastapāda as the laksaņa of kāla by virtue of different forms of inference.

Imagine advanced computers that could, by virtue merely of being programmed in the right ways, act, react, communicate, and otherwise behave like humans. Might such computers be capable of understanding, thinking, believing, and the like? The framework developed in this paper for tackling challenging questions of concept application (in any realm of discourse) answers in the affirmative, contrary to Searle’s famous ‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, which purports to prove that ascribing such mental processes to computers like these would be necessarily incorrect. The paper begins by arguing that the core issue concerns language, specifically the discourse-community-guided mapping of phenomena onto linguistic categories. It then offers a model of how people adapt language to deal with novel states of affairs and thereby lend generality to their words, employing processes of assimilation, lexemic creation, and accommodation (in intersense and intrasense varieties). Attributions of understanding to some computers lie in the middle range on a spectrum of acceptability and are thus reasonable. Possible objections deriving from Searle’s writings require supplementing the model with distinctions between present and future acceptability, and between contemplated and uncontemplated word uses, as well as a literal-figurative distinction that is more sensitive than Searle’s to actual linguistic practice and the multiplicity of subsenses possible within a single literal sense. The paper then critiques two misleading rhetorical features of Searle’s Chinese Room presentation, and addresses a contemporary defense of Searle that seems to confront the sociolinguistic issue, but fails to allow for intrasense accommodation. It concludes with a brief consideration of the proper course for productive future discussion.

Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane’s influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose them, the fact that agents engage in dual efforts of will leads to an implausible doubling of the agent’s responsibility. We defend Kane from both objections. We argue against the first by clarifying the nature of contrastive explanation in the context of Kane’s theory and we argue against the second by showing that the kind of doubling of responsibility implied by an agent’s dual efforts of will is, in fact, innocuous.

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies (in particular data science) have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities (e.g., virtues), which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics” (which can be mindless), data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records.

The first part of this essay argues that the very structure and ordering of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae manifests a departure from the typical theological position of his time regarding natural acquired virtues. Resting on a conviction that grace presupposes nature, Aquinas uniquely holds that natural virtues perfective of human nature can be acquired prior to grace, which can be elevated and incorporated by grace into the properly Christian life. The second part of this essay offers a case study of the virtue of patience that illustrates the argument of the first part of the paper.

No abstract available.

According to many virtue ethicists, one of Aristotle’s important achievements was drawing a clear, qualitative distinction between the character traits of temperance (sophrosyne) and self-control (enkrateia). In an influential series of papers, John McDowell has argued that a clear distinction between temperance (or virtue, in general) and self-control can be maintained only if one claims that, for the virtuous individual (but not for the self-controlled), considerations in favor of actions that are contrary to virtue are “silenced.” Some virtue ethicists reject McDowell’s silencing view as offering an implausible or inappropriate picture of human virtue, but they argue that (contra McDowell) virtue can still be clearly distinguished from self-control by the absence of motivational conflict alone. In this paper, I argue that this criticism of McDowell is at most half right. If the silencing view is false, so that virtue can have a cost and the virtuous person can justifiably feel negative emotions in response to that cost, there is no principled reason why the virtuous person cannot also have motivational conflict. So, if one rejects the silencing view, then one must allow that the distinction between virtue and self-control is at most a matter of degree.

When facts are proven within the formal process of legal proof, in virtue of what are they proven? This deceptively simple question is both a matter of enormous practical importance and a matter of intense, ongoing dispute within evidence scholarship. A conventional story purports to answer this question in terms of probabilistic facts (or, alternatively, in terms of beliefs about probabilistic facts). An alternative to this conventional story answers this question in terms of explanatory facts (facts about the relationships between possible explanations, evidence, and disputed events). This article examines legal proof, and the debates in legal scholarship, through the lens of “grounding.” In employing this perspective, one asks: in virtue of what are facts proven within legal proof? Another way of asking this question is to ask: what grounds the fact that a disputed fact is proven, when it is proven? This article argues for a general thesis and a specific thesis. The general thesis is that the philosophical literature on grounding provides a useful analytical framework for understanding both legal proof and the ongoing debates in legal scholarship. The specific thesis is that when facts are proven within the process of legal proof, they are proven in virtue of various explanatory facts. The article concludes by discussing some of the implications of the analysis for philosophers analyzing the epistemology of legal proof.

While critics have remarked how The Sunset Limited stresses White's identity as a professor, they have had little to say regarding what this fact and White's suicidal longing reveal concerning McCarthy's view of the contemporary university. This article fills this gap by scrutinizing White's death wish through the lens of the academy's engagement with virtue. Drawing upon John Henry Newman's understanding of the relationship between the university and character formation, as well as traditional formulations of classical and Christian virtues, I show how White's arguments in favor of self-annihilation are grounded in an education lacking any pursuit of virtue of either kind. Representative of the modern academy, White has located all value not in an ethical consideration of how to be a good man in community with others, but in the artistic achievements of humanity; his vocation has concerned itself with aesthetics at the expense of virtue. Divorced especially from the theological virtues, the education White professes darkness by combining intellectual pride with moral skepticism in such a way as to subvert human solidarity, individual purpose, and indeed the project of the university itself.

The Second Epistle of Peter is one of the least studied texts of the New Testament. It is usually compared with 1 Peter and/or Jude and indeed shows some similarities and some differences with these texts. But little attention is paid to the originality of 2 Peter both in its interpretation of texts from the Jewish tradition and in the application of intertextual strategies to elements of Greek philosophy. 2 Pet 1:5-7 is undoubtedly one of the most Hellenized passages of the epistle. Not only did the narrator use a hierarchical catalog of virtues popular in Greek literature, but also terms that are commonly associated with ethics, especially the stoic ethics (faith – πίστις; virtue – ἀρετή; knowledge – γνῶσις). This article aims to present the manner in which the narrator in 2 Pet 1:5-7 enters into dialogue with Greek ethical texts and how he transforms, innovates, and reinterprets these texts. In other words, what intertextual strategy he uses.

Ф.М. Достоевский положил начало тому пути развития русской философской мысли, основой которого стали экзистенциальные и духовные искания человека. Вот краткий список вопросов, которые задал человечеству русский писатель: «Если Бога нет, то все позволено?» Безбожие может выступать как богоборчество и отрицание высших человеческих качеств, но может не исключать и прекрасных качеств души. Ценности человеческой жизни, любви, семьи, социальной справедливости могут иметь гражданское основание, но только понимание их сакральной основы делает их подлинно всечеловеческими. «Со Христом или с истиной?» Ответ: конечно, со Христом, ибо Он и есть Истина. В своем вопросе Достоевский имел в виду истину логическую, умственную. «Тварь ли я дрожащая или право имею?» Трансцендировать наличные рамки — сущностное свойство человека. Но тут есть два пути: один — переступить в себе человеческое, другой — переступить в себе античеловеческое. «Стоит ли гармония слезинки ребенка?» XX век пытался опровергнуть ответ Достоевского на этот «проклятый вопрос», пытаясь утвердить некие образцы гармонии в жизни. Но нужно ли пытаться построить «царство Божие» на земле, которое и будет всемирной гармонией? Или страдания человека, та самая «слезинка», важнее любых утопических проектов? «Обратить камни в хлебы — самая ли великая мысль?» Если задача внутреннего роста души оказывается второстепенной в сравнении с задачами экономическими, то достичь социальной гармонии невозможно. Не изменятся люди — не изменится ничего, кроме внешних проявлений их жизнедеятельности. «Зачем я непременно должен быть добродетельным?» Вопрос о добродетельности — не просто экзистенциальный, но онтологический. Отринув добродетельность, можно уничтожить все вокруг и самого себя. Как в физическом, так и в духовном смысле.

RESUMO Este texto pretende apontar aspectos da agência moral aristotélica, que pressupõe que existe algo, o caráter, que sustenta a existência de linhas robustas do ponto de vista do comportamento, moral, da nossa constituição moral, e que acaba por definir o modo pelo qual agimos, e, por conseguinte, operando como algo que realmente nos define. Essa noção de caráter é majoritária entre os comentadores de Aristóteles, ainda que interpretações distintas possam ser defendidas sobre o alcance dessa disposição de caráter em Aristóteles. Tal concepção grassou ao longo dos tempos, mas vem sendo questionada - ao menos sua leitura mais tradicional - por estudos recentes acerca da psicologia social, que atenua ou rejeita a ideia de um caráter que sustente a nossa agência moral, afirmando que não é este, mas as situações que determinam o agir. Nessa perspectiva, temos especialmente Nisbet, Ross, Doris e Harman, os quais, a partir dos resultados concernentes à psicologia social experimental, chegam a afirmar que não haveria isto que entendemos por caráter, o que implicaria em um sério problema para a conhecida ética das virtudes, já que esta requer, na maior parte de suas formulações, a ideia de um caráter absolutamente robusto (Harman), que nos permitiria prever o comportamento de um agente em uma dada circunstância (Doris). ABSTRACT This text intends to point out aspects of the Aristotelian moral agency, which presupposes that there is something, the character, which supports the existence of strong lines from the point of view of behavior, morals, of our moral constitution, and which ends up defining the way in which we act, and therefore operating as something that really defines us. This notion of character is the majority among Aristotle’s commentators, although different interpretations can be defended about the scope of this character disposition in Aristotle. This conception has spread over time, but it has been questioned - at least its more traditional reading - by recent studies on social psychology, which attenuates or rejects the idea of a character that supports our moral agency, stating that this is not the case, but the situations that determine the action. From this perspective, we especially have Nisbet, Ross, Doris and Harman, who, based on the results concerning experimental social psychology, even claim that there would not be what we understand by character, which would imply a serious problem for the well-known ethics of virtues, as this requires, in most of its formulations, the idea of an absolutely robust character (Harman), which would allow us to predict the behavior of an agent in a given circumstance (Doris).

An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But thi...

This paper defends two main theses related to emerging deepfake technology. First, fears that deepfakes will bring about epistemic catastrophe are overblown. Such concerns underappreciate that the evidential power of video derives not solely from its content, but also from its source. An audience may find even the most realistic video evidence unconvincing when it is delivered by a dubious source. At the same time, an audience may find even weak video evidence compelling so long as it is delivered by a trusted source. The growing prominence of deepfake content is unlikely to change this fundamental dynamic. Thus, through appropriate patterns of trust, whatever epistemic threat deepfakes pose can be substantially mitigated. The second main thesis is that focusing on deepfakes that are intended to deceive, as epistemological discussions of the technology tend to do, threatens to overlook a further effect of this technology. Even where deepfake content is not regarded by its audience as veridical, it may cause its viewers to develop psychological associations based on that content. These associations, even without rising to the level of belief, may be harmful to the individuals depicted and more generally. Moreover, these associations may develop in cases in which the video content is realistic, but the audience is dubious of the content in virtue of skepticism toward its source. Thus, even if—as I suggest—epistemological concerns about deepfakes are overblown, deepfakes may nonetheless be psychologically impactful and may do great harm.

La segunda parte del ensayo estudia la compasión en Aristóteles, y más en concreto, en la Retórica y la Poética. La compasión en Aristóteles no es una virtud, sino una emoción o pasión, por eso no se valora excesivamente; en la Poética se insiste en la purgación de la compasión. Pero, la compasión no se contrapone a la virtud, sino que al igual que todas las emociones, se puede vivir de una manera virtuosa, en su justo medio. Aristóteles insiste en que sentimos compasión especialmente por aquellas personas cercanas a nosotros, que padecen un sufrimiento inmerecido, es decir, personas honradas y buenas que sin merecerlo han caído en la desgracia. Esta es la tesis central de Aristóteles, no obstante, en la Poética nos habla de un sentimiento filantrópico, o un sentimiento compasivo hacia todas las personas, independientemente del merecimiento, incluso aunque sean injustas.

Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does excellently? And what exactly makes it a moral virtue, rather than (merely) an intellectual one? Stephen Grimm suggests that an understanding person judges other people’s moral failings accurately without being too permissive or too judgemental. I argue against this view and develop an alternative one. First I demonstrate that judging other people’s failures accurately is neither necessary nor sufficient for being understanding and that Grimm leaves the moral nature of being understanding underexplored. I then draw on a related discussion on the moral virtue of open-mindedness and argue that a virtue is a moral one when it is a corrective to selfish and other weak inclinations that pull us away from feeling and acting as the situation demands. In order to fill in what this means in the case of being understanding, I turn to Iris Murdoch’s notion of attention. Being understanding, I argue, is the virtue of appropriately attending to others who are in a difficult situation.

Bir ahlak felsefesi olmasının yanı sıra kozmosun yapısını inceleyen fiziğe, insanların bu yapı içinde nasıl hareket edeceğini gösteren ahlaka ve fizik ile ahlakı koruduğu için mantığa ayrı bir önem veren Stoacılık, doğaya uygun yaşamı insanın amacı olarak kabul eden bir düşüncedir. Determinist, fizikalist ve teleolojik bir karaktere sahip olan Stoa felsefesinde doğa araştırmasının ana hedefi, salt doğal nedenleri yani olayların ilk nedenlerini öğretirken insana ahlaki yaşama yönelik dersler çıkarmasını sağlamaktır. İnsana özgü akıl, doğaya özgü akla dayandığı için doğa araştırmasında esas olan, insana doğanın aklını tanıtırken kendi aklını keşfetmesini sağlamaktır. Bu anlamda doğa araştırması, filozofların doğaya ilişkin söylemlerine ve yapıtlarına işaret etmesi bakımından felsefi eğitimin başlangıç evresinin bir parçasıdır. Fizikle elde edilen bilginin pratiğe yansıması ise insandaki ahlaki dönüşüme katkı sağlar. Bu çalışmada Stoacıların fizik öğretilerinden hareketle ahlaki yaşamı nasıl temellendirdikleri değerlendirilecektir. Bu bağlamda doğada ve insan yaşamında hâkim olan kozmik veya tanrısal düzenin anlaşılmasının doğaya uyumlu yaşam için bir zorunluluk olduğu görüşleri üzerinde durulacaktır., In addition to being a moral philosophy, Stoicism, which gives a special importance to physics that examines the structure of the cosmos, to morality that shows how people will act within this structure, and to logic, because it protects physics and morality, is a thought that accepts life in accordance with nature as the purpose of man. In Stoa philosophy, which has a deterministic, physicalist, and teleological character, the major goal of nature research is to enable people to learn about moral life while teaching only natural causes, that is, the first causes of events. Since the human-specific mind is based on the nature-specific mind, what is essential in nature research is to enable the human to discover his/her own mind while introducing the mind of nature. In this sense, nature research is part of the initial phase of philosophical education in terms of addressing the discourses and works of philosophers about nature. The reflection of the knowledge gained through physics into practice contributes to the moral transformation in people. In this study, how the Stoics ground the moral life based on physics teachings will be evaluated. In this context, it will be emphasized that understanding the cosmic or divine order that prevails in nature and human life is a necessity for life in harmony with nature.

I offer an account of sexual ethics, and thus of an education in sexual morality, that tries to make some sense of how a view of consent as central to those ethics might be combined with an education in certain virtues. I do so by exploring what some see as the shortcomings of a standard of consent, namely, how it can deal with instances of prima facie bad sex. I consider and reject various attempts to show that consensuality is sufficient for morally good sex. I then show how a needed supplement to the standard of consent can appeal to a broader view of why consent matters. This in turn connects to those personal and interpersonal virtues that the 2019 Department of Education guidance on relationships and sex education suggests should be taught. Finally, I provide an account of why more than consensuality is needed in the case of sex. In short, I insist on the critical importance of consent but supplement the standard of consent by an appeal to why consent matters and does so especially in the case of sex.

My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cu...

Several philosophers, known as situationists, have argued that evidence in social psychology threatens to undermine Aristotelian virtue ethics. An impressively large amount of empirical evidence suggests that most people do not consistently act virtuously and lack the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Since possessing moral virtues requires these features, situationists have argued that Aristotelianism does not accurately describe the character traits possessed by most people, and so the theory cannot lay claim to various theoretical advantages such as explanatory power and egalitarian character education. In contrast to previous defenses which either downplay the relevance of psychological evidence or revise philosophical conceptions of virtue to fit the data, this paper appeals to previously neglected psychological evidence on self-efficacy and mental contrasting in combination with “non-idealized” interpretations of Aristotelian moral virtue to support the view that the available empirical evidence is compatible with widespread possession of virtuous character. These “non-idealized” interpretations of virtuous character allow for serious deviations from virtuous conduct, especially in the contexts described by the psychology experiments. Furthermore, decades of research on mental contrasting and self-efficacy suggest that subjects in the psychology experiments acted for reasons and possessed the ability to exercise rational control over their behavior. Hence, situationists are mistaken in thinking that, based on the empirical data, Aristotelianism is deprived of various theoretical advantages.

In the course of this paper, I shall argue that an absolute ineffable God of Islam is contradictory beyond the ordinary categories (substantive or insubstantive) of truth. In order to demonstrate my thesis, I shall refer to a metaphysical and epistemological inquiry. In virtue of both of these inquires, I shall establish that the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’ cannot be false in a substantive or an insubstantive sense. The metaphysical inquiry shall comprise of two related phases. The first phase includes logical realism and anti-realism, while the second phase includes ontological realism and ontological deflationism. I demonstrate that the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’ cannot be considered false in virtue of these outlooks for different reasons. The epistemological inquiry refers to epistemicism. I demonstrate that although this particular view infers an indeterminate truth-value of the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’, it is incompatible with the notion of an absolute ineffable God of Islam. In light of both these inquires, it will become apparent that the contradictory assumption of an absolute ineffable God of Islam cannot be false in a substantive or insubstantive sense. This is because an absolute ineffable God of Islam transcends beyond these very categories of falsehood and truth.