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Cet article propose une lecture de Temps et récit II de Paul Ricœur. Ce livre qui porte sur l’idée de configuration du temps dans le récit afin d’assurer la continuité entre la préfiguration du récit et sa refiguration, et qui cherche à comprendre la spécificité du récit de fiction par rapport au récit historique, est un discours à trois dimensions : philosophie, théories du récit et œuvres majeures de la littérature. Il pose un certain nombre de problèmes théoriques qui seront envisagés ici dans leur rapport au champ théorico-littéraire au cours d’une réflexion critique nourrie par la lecture du roman Mrs Dalloway de Virginia Woolf.

A pesar de que Paul Ricoeur no ha escrito una obra sobre Spinoza, muchos autores han señalado la relevancia del pensamiento del filósofo holandés, y sobre todo de su Ética, en la obra de aquel. Este trabajo busca evidenciar la importancia de la noción spinoziana de conatus en la propuesta hermenéutica y ontológica del filósofo francés, analizando de modo específico un importante nodo conceptual del último estudio de Sí mismo como otro. El análisis tendrá particularmente en cuenta los pasajes de la obra de Spinoza que cita, buscando ampliar su comprensión en el contexto en que se encuentran, para ver si, de esta manera, se puede confirmar la mencionada relevancia de la filosofía de Spinoza en la filosofía de Ricoeur.

Proponemos una teoría estética basada en un enhebrado cronotópico del discurso creativo que replantea las lógicas de constitución del sujeto. Tomamos como hilo conductor la película La voz de la luna (La voce della Luna, 1990) de Federico Fellini, cuyo surrealismo, lejos de suponer una construcción al azar de un relato, revela una sofisticada narrativa desde lo circunstancial (y no desde el sujeto o el objeto). Es aquí donde confluimos con las tesis más radicales de Antonin Artaud y su proyecto político basado en el teatro de la crueldad y la reificación del fragmento-órgano. Concluimos con un alegato por una narración vital, que trascienda la obra, disipe la posición del sujeto en la misma (lo que Jacques Derrida denomina Forcener le subjectile) para que el sentido de la humanidad, en lo ínfimo y fragmentado, trasparezca.

The philosophy of language is a field that covers all kinds of philosophical reflections on language since Antiquity. In addition to the philosophy of language, there is a much newer branch of philosophy called “philosophy of linguistics.” Just like the philosophy of history, philosophy of biology, etc., the philosophy of linguistics focuses on the structure of linguistics by taking a specific science as its subject. It presents meta-theoretical information by trying to explain the underlying foundations of linguistic theories. In the first part of this article, we review the noteworthy theoretical attempts to ground the philosophy of linguistics. In the second part of the article, we briefly describe Ricoeur’s and Itkonen’s attempts at the philosophy of linguistics in response to the question of “how does the philosophy of linguistics work in practice?” Thus, we have tried to provide two concrete examples for the philosophy of linguistics: the first one concerning the 20th century, and the second, the 21th century. We found that both of them – albeit for different reasons – showed a consensus in putting Saussure, the founding father of linguistics, in the firing line. Whether the emergence of the philosophy of linguistics damaged the legitimacy of the traditional philosophy of language is discussed in the concluding section of our article.

Abstract In Ricoeur’s last works, we can find what he calls a poetics of love. Choosing the “dialectic” path of a comparison between love and justice, Ricoeur claims that justice lies in the rule of equivalence (give to each his own); the disorientation of love, instead, suspends the return, the equivalence, the exchange. Love does not say: “do ut des”, but rather (if we can transform the expression) it says “do ut dem”, to offer without expecting anything in return: this is what Ricoeur calls a “first gift”. However, it is an expectation that is always open to the possibility of a “surprise”: the surprise of a “second first gift” able to fulfill the gratuity of the original act of donation. This essay questions this possibility of “mutual gift”.

The study of imagination has always had a significant role in the study of art and aesthetics. And imagination plays a central role in Ricoeur's philosophical system; a subject that has received less attention. It was Ricoeur's goal to bring the productive aspect of imagination back to the main text of philosophy, by presenting a critical reading of the history of philosophy. By using Emanuel Kant's imagination analysis, Ricoeur revived the various dimensions of imagination in the field of perception, to achieve a comprehensive theory of productive imagination. This paper attempts to address the importance of painting as a work of art and its relevance to reality, by studying the path taken by Ricoeur to present a theory of productive imagination. In this regard, explaining the role of Iconic Augmentation, which is one of the latent characteristics of the productive aspect of imagination, better defines the action present in the image and the dialectical position of language and image. Ultimately, painting, as a fictional work that its idea's reference is not merely a representation, becomes more real as its imaginativeness increases. The result is a new approach to describe the nature of painting as a work of art.

El hábito es una de las encrucijadas filosóficas en las que el dilema entre naturaleza y libertad se pone de manifiesto. El artículo expone la descripción que Paul Ricoeur ofrece sobre esta noción en Lo voluntario y lo involuntario (1950) y defiende que el hábito constituye una genuina y paradójica forma de libertad, pues ésta se realiza gracias y a través de la necesidad. Se tiene en consideración el difícil punto de partida de Ricoeur, quien, por una parte, rechaza lo que él denomina la explicación cosmológica de Tomás de Aquino y, por otra, acoge la novedad del cogito cartesiano, siendo a la vez consciente de las limitaciones dualistas que el planteamiento conlleva. Inspirándose en Ravaisson, Ricoeur rechaza una interpretación maquinal del hábito y se acerca a la idea clásica de segunda naturaleza. En el artículo se muestran los problemas de Ricoeur en el empleo de este término y se señalan los límites de la propuesta del autor, para quien, al final, no hay sistema entre lo natural y lo libre.

En este artículo examinamos a grandes rasgos la alternativa a la idea de lucha en el proceso de reconocimiento mutuo. Analizamos los conceptos que en nuestras sociedades modernas han dado lugar a estados de paz concretos, y que habiendo emergido de la tradición cristiana, tienen una sedimentación semántica que nos invita a desentrañarla. La philia, el eros y el ágape son aquí nuestros conceptos clave. Descubrimos cómo el ágape se distancia del eros platónico y de la philia aristotélica en la forma de la infinitud y de la incondicionalidad, cómo se dona a sí mismo sin esperar la reciprocidad y sin resistirse a llevar la iniciativa en el establecimiento de las relaciones pacíficas, pudiendo llegar a tener suma importancia en el orden democrático.

Cet article présente une réflexion à propos de la souffrance des professeurs des écoles au Brésil. L’examen de ce phénomène a été réalisé à partir de la définition que Paul Ricœur propose de la « souffrance », à l’occasion de sa conférence « La souffrance n’est pas la douleur ». Dans le pays étudié, la souffrance est souvent liée à la précarité de l’exercice du métier d’enseignant : les classes en sureffectifs, les bas salaires, le cumul des postes, les ressources matérielles dégradées et insuffisantes. Nous visons, cependant, à examiner les phénomènes de la souffrance à partir de la condition désignée dans nos recherches comme « précarité symbolique du métier d’enseignant ». De cette condition découle un changement dans la possibilité pour l’enseignant d’exercer ses capacités en tant qu’agent humain, ainsi que dans sa relation avec les autres. C’est donc à partir de ces deux axes que nous proposons une phénoménologie de la souffrance enseignante.

Selon Paul Ricœur, « l’anthropologie est devenue une tâche urgente de la pensée contemporaine ». Celle qu’il élabore dans l’ensemble de son œuvre repose sur sa phénoménologie herméneutique (dont l’originalité tient notamment à l’héritage qui lui vient de la philosophie réflexive), au point que cette dernière suffit selon nous à en dessiner les grandes lignes. Elle permet de doter le monde de régularités qui le rendent habitable et de doter chaque homme d’un soi. Elle prend aussi à bras le corps les difficultés de l’intersubjectivité qu’Edmund Husserl ou Martin Heidegger avaient laissé non résolues et fait de cette intersubjectivité une clef de sa philosophie. L’homme est alors plus qu’un habitant du monde : il habite une cité qu’il contribue à édifier. Le thème du « nouveau » permet de consolider l’une des leçons que l’on peut tirer de l’œuvre de Ricœur : pour vivre ensemble, il faut vivre. L’anthropologie ricœurienne ne réclame alors aucune éthique ajoutée pour que cet élan vitaliste apparaisse via sa phénoménologie herméneutique.

RESUMO A teoria da atestação em Ricoeur aponta para a necessidade da relação dialética entre o sujeito e a alteridade na reflexão ética. Entretanto, posicionamentos críticos a essa teoria argumentam que o uso do sujeito como ponto de partida dessa reflexão inviabiliza uma genuína percepção da alteridade. Ao considerar esse debate, o presente artigo objetiva analisar as implicações dessa dialética ricoeuriana para a construção ética, especialmente no entendimento da compaixão. O percurso metodológico de análise inclui uma perspectiva preliminar da noção ricoeuriana de alteridade do sujeito em La symbolique du mal e De l’interprétation, uma problematização da relação entre atestação e ética em The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy e dos conceitos de ética e alteridade na perspectiva da atestação em Soi-même comme un autre e Parcours de la reconnaissance. Finalmente, o estudo observa repercussões das articulações entre o sujeito e a alteridade para a compaixão na reflexão ética, em diálogo com a contribuição de Martha Nussbaum. Sem negar os riscos de reduplicação do sujeito na pretensa percepção da alteridade, o artigo conclui que a dialética entre o sujeito e a alteridade é necessária para uma melhor compreensão e desenvolvimento de si mesmo e do outro.

This article briefly presents the relationship between philosophy and religion in the work of Paul Ricœur, demonstrating how he established a dialogue between both languages, both methodologies – that of philosophy and that of religion – in his philosophical and biblical hermeneutics. The article briefly recaps Ricœur’s personal and intellectual trajectory and the way he dealt with this double allegiance, showing the differences between biblical and philosophical hermeneutics but also their relation in Ricœur’s works

Este texto apresenta o dossier temático “Temas clássicos em Ricoeur: hermenêutica, religião, reconhecimento”. A apresentação explica a origem dos artigos, procedentes do VII Congresso Ibero‑Americano sobre o Pensamento de Paul Ricoeur, “Ricoeur e os Clássicos”, expõe de forma sucinta a importância da reflexão sobre os clássicos no contexto da hermenêutica ricoeuriana, e introduz cada um dos artigos do dossier. A hermenêutica bíblica e a relação entre filosofia e religião, a própria noção de “clássico”, bem como a investigação da questão do reconhecimento são exemplos de temas clássicos explorados aqui, no contexto do pensamento de Ricoeur.

In this article, we examine two philosophical theories of recognition: those of Paul Ricoeur and Alexandre Kojève. We trace this line of development in the theory of recognition as a return from Ricoeur to Kojève. Our hypothesis is that over the past twenty years, the theory of recognition has undergone a change in content and has transformed into a theory of misrecognition. In turn, the theory of misrecognition is grounded in the struggle between subjects and brings us back to the discourse of the struggle between the Slave and the Master. This transformation from struggle to reciprocity and vice versa, we argue, suggests that a theory of identity formation as a process of resistance to assujettissement is in demand at this moment in history. In the 2010s, as the theory of misrecognition took shape primarily in the English‑speaking world, the constitution of the subject began to be understood once again as the outcome of struggles within feminist, Marxist, and other emancipatory theories. We examine both Ricoeur’s arguments against Kojève, Althusser, and the theory of misrecognition in general, as well as the «return» of Kojève’s arguments in the contemporary theory of misrecognition.

Tão fecunda quanto paradoxal, a noção de clássico implica uma referência de excelência que só é reconhecida retrospectivamente, uma inserção histórica tanto quanto um valor intemporal, a autoridade de uma tradição bem como a liberdade criadora de uma apropriação actual, o elitismo da recepção aliado à popularidade do acesso. Após uma sinopse etimológica e lexicográfica, este artigo explora a noção de “clássico” na hermenêutica de Paul Ricœur. De facto, é todo o espectro da teoria da interpretação, mas também da tradução e da leitura, que pode ser mobilizado para tratar desta noção, ambivalente na própria utilização que dela faz o autor de Temps et Récit. A hermenêutica começa a ser a “arte de compreender os clássicos” no sentido lato do termo: textos sagrados e profanos na encruzilhada de horizontes geográficos e históricos. Explicação e compreensão, crítica e pertença, afastamento e desdistanciamento, são tantas dicotomias metodológicas através das quais se desenvolve a ideia do carácter plural e activo da recepção dos clássicos. Tanto quanto a sua teoria, é também a prática ricoeuriana que evidencia a sua concepção dos “clássicos”. Paul Ricœur é um leitor-pensador que mediatiza as tensões tanto quanto articula as oposições entre os autores canónicos a partir dos quais elabora o seu próprio pensamento. Estes são alguns dos desafios da impensabilidade e da indispensabilidade dos "clássicos" e da própria noção de "clássico".

This article aims at disambiguation or better say, decontradiction of the concept of ideology by referring to Ricoeur's opinions about ideology. Ricoeur calls his method of studying ideology phenomenological. Why phenomenology? Because the term ideology, when placed in a polemical framework, will suffer from both "bad use" and "abuse". Only with a serious semantic approach and a correct explanation of the conditions that this concept depends on, can we put an end to this abuse. Such a task is possible in the light of an approach that Ricoeur calls "developmental phenomenology", "a rising analysis of the concept" and "an attempt to explore the subsurface of the obvious meaning of ideology to reach its fundamental meanings". The attempt is to disambiguate this concept, which is at first glance polemical and controversial, so that a clearer and fairer definition of it would be presented. Based on Paul Ricoeur's work titled Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, which was delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975, and his other articles and works on ideology and phenomenology, this article has tried to answer the two main questions of this field together with Ricoeur: a) Who were the main theorists of the concept of ideology? b) How many major definitions can be extracted from the phenomenological study of ideology? The extract of the intertwined answer to the two mentioned questions is that Ricoeur, while examining the works of people such as Marx, Althusser, Mannheim, Weber, Habermas and Geertz, questions the common and negative perceptions of ideology, and based on a detailed and deep examination of the works of the mentioned thinkers, comes to three major and specific definitions, or in other words, three stages or functions of ideology; the first one based on Marx's definition, the second one based on Weber's attitude and the last one based on Geertz's views about this term. Ricoeur calls these three definitions, stages or functions respectively, ideology as "ambiguity of reality", ideology as source of "power legitimacy", and finally ideology as source of "social cohesion". Based on such an analysis of ideology, in the second part of the article, the different functions of utopia have been discussed, and while emphasizing the positive aspects of utopia, it has been concluded in conformity with Ricoeur that a society without utopia is a dead society.

Recent developments in literary theory and philosophy, specifically regarding the role of critique, that inspire the turn to post-critique and realism, respectively, indicate a renewed sensitivity for concerns characteristic of hermeneutic phenomenology. This essay argues that crucial aspects of Ricœur’s articulation of phenomenology and hermeneutics may help to understand and support post-critique and realism and that, in turn, the latter two invite hermeneutics to return to its phenomenological condition. To this end, Ricœur’s understanding of the hermeneutical condition of phenomenology, both in the form of Husserl’s idealist phenomenology and the phenomenology of religion, is revisited; Ricœur’s account of distantiation is critically assessed; and, finally, the interplay of trust and distrust at stake in hermeneutic phenomenology is contrasted with the modern insistence on hyperbolic doubt.

J’examine pourquoi et dans quel sens l’imagination est présente dans un récit portant sur des faits ou des événements réels. Je présente le problème tel qu’il est énoncé par Paul Ricœur lorsqu’il introduit les trois genres du « Même », de « l’Autre » et de « l’Analogue » afin d’expliquer comment un récit peut rendre des faits et des événements « tels qu’ils se sont réellement passés ». J’en appelle, pour la solution, à la notion de « phantasma » d’Edmund Husserl, qu’il considère comme le support de l’imagination pure, comme lorsque j’imagine un centaure. Le phantasma joue dans l’imagination pure le même rôle que les sensations dans la perception. Je soutiens qu’un récit comporte un phantasma – ce qu’il nous permet de visualiser et d’expérimenter à la lecture d’un récit – et que ce phantasma est analogue aux sensations de perceptions que les premiers observateurs avaient de ces faits et événements. Il n’y a donc pas, premièrement, de différence radicale entre la perception et l’imagination : toutes deux comportent un moment de « simple présentation » par le biais de sensations ou de phantasma, respectivement. Deuxièmement, la partie imaginative d’un récit nous permet de faire de nouveau l’expérience de faits et événements bruts sur le mode du « comme si ».

Ce texte défend la thèse selon laquelle il y aurait plus d’un tournant herméneutique chez Ricœur. Il soutient que c’est en se rendant compte des apories liées à son premier tournant herméneutique, celui de 1960, que Ricœur s’est résolument tourné vers les questions et les défis de l’herméneutique, dans ce qui peut être compris comme un retournement de son premier tournant herméneutique. Ce tournant a par la suite pris d’autres formes chez Ricœur et sa philosophie en est devenue une des détours herméneutiques. On se demandera si la voie des détours est toujours la voie royale de l’herméneutique et on se penchera sur la dernière expression de ce tournant herméneutique à la fin de La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli.

Cet article interroge les tensions entre phénoménologie et herméneutique telles qu’elles se cristallisent dans le propos de Ricœur sur la religion, en particulier dans un texte tardif qui a connu plusieurs versions et qui est peut-être le seul où le philosophe aborde aussi directement les questions méthodologiques que soulève une phénoménologie de la religion. Nous tentons de montrer que Ricœur considère en quelque sorte cette dernière avec des œillères, au profit d’une herméneutique de la religion qui, pour modeste et prudente qu’elle soit, se voit forcée de renoncer à prendre en charge l’élucidation de la constitution originaire de l’expérience religieuse.

This article aims to explore a sapiential response to the question of the inner experience of the conflict between the voluntary and the involuntary, which Ricœur alludes to in the first volume of his Philosophy of the Will. I take as my starting point Ricœur’s reference in the conclusion to the three pieces of advice given by Descartes to achieve contentment, which Ricœur equates with the virtues of decision, effort and consent. Building on Ricœur’s assertion that we receive the life of the involuntary into the heart of freedom through attention, I seek to explore how attention can help reconcile the conflicting relationship between the voluntary and the involuntary in everyday experience. I do so by proposing a rereading of these three virtues in the light of the practical mediation of attention.

I pursue here a wish of Ricœur: to analyze ideology and utopia from a genetic phenomenology, in the sense of Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations, which “strives to dig under the surface of apparent meaning to the most fundamental meanings.” A single innovative interest guides my proposal between two contrasting phenomenologies of the imagination in Michel Henry and Paul Ricœur: to root, on the one hand, the dialectical mediation of ideology and utopia in the living immanence of the affective imagination and, on the other hand, to inscribe the power of its expression as well as its power to act in the social and cultural field require to hold together the affective immanence of life, the figuration of the social reality and the socio-cultural and historical praxis. The psychoanalytical interpretation of the cultural imaginary to the bending of the affect and the language and the micro-history of the social practices of the representations serve here as “forks caudines,” under which the immanent phenomenology of the affective imagination is led to a hermeneutics of the imaginative practices of the discourse and the action.

Deeper still than that of the differend, we find in Lyotard the concept of discrepancy, which underlines the welcome alterity in the encounter with others. We propose an understanding of Ricœurian anthropology based on this idea, when it is associated with another concept, that of ergodicity, which makes it possible to think the same in the discrepancy. We illustrate it with the trial and the act of judging. We then show that the Ricœurian process of putting rival thoughts into dialogue stems from this anthropology, and that Ricœur presents full coherence. For this, another concept is introduced which describes the mechanism of understanding always restarted, in the sense that each new thought must be able to be encompassed in the gaze cast on the world. Encompassing is a concept in modelling disciplines, which is difficult to translate into French. To illustrate this, we take as an example Ricœur’s “debate” with Jakobson in The Rule of Metaphor.

The paper analyses Paul Ricoeur’s concept of creative imagination and shows how this essential element of human consciousness determines personal and societal identity and how it can be a source of just social norms and of ‘good life’ (vie bonne). The imagination, which is characterized by semantic innovations and a heuristic function, creates a dynamic narrative defining a human being and opens as specific rationality surpassing purely argumentative rationality and allowing to solve conflicts of social norms. The ethical aspect of this process, implying a triple structure I/other/just institutiones, creates conditions for the realization of the dialectic of justice and love in the political space; due to the dialectic, innovative ways for the realization of social justice become possible. Critical questions intended to open up the perspective for further thinking are posed at the end of the paper.

Paul Ricœur and Jan Patočka are considered among the most important phenomenologists of the 20th century. As with Ricœur, Patočka’s philosophy is shaped by an enduring critical confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of Dasein. The present paper aims at analyzing Ricœur’s and Patočka’s convergences and mutual inspirations in their perspectives on the topic of history. More precisely, I will take up the question of the meaning of history in Ricœur and Patočka as profoundly influenced by their readings of Husserl’s Krisis. Then, the attention will be turned to Ricœur’s concept of historicity and Patočka’s notion of care of the soul as concerns involved in the search for meaning in history as an open-ended mediation. In this context, I will discuss Ricœur’s and Patočka’s critical examination of Heidegger’s conception of thrownness (Geworfenheit) and projection (Entwerfen), that is, Dasein’s already-being-in-the-world and its disclosedness, as necessary concepts for understanding their own philosophical approaches to history.

This paper argues that Ricœur’s philosophy operates on the basis of a more expansive conception of rhetoric than it first appears. To show this, I reread The Rule of Metaphor through the “new rhetoric” of Chaïm Perelman. First, I survey Ricœur’s understanding of rhetoric in the 1950s and 60s. Second, I examine Ricœur’s relation to Perelman within the context of the broader “rhetorical turn” of the 1970s. After examining their respective positions, I argue that Ricœur fails to appreciate the full significance of Perelman’s conception of audience. In doing so, I draw attention to the central role that Ricœur himself ascribes to the audience or reader in the “work of meaning.” I conclude by proposing that the rhetorical triad of logos/ethos/pathos may serve as a conceptual matrix with which the rhetorical aspects of Ricœur’s philosophy can be interpreted.

This presentation serves as an introduction to Paul Ricœur’s essay "The Question of the Colonies" (1947). The essay is contextualized in relation to other contemporary anti-colonial writings and to Ricœur’s own later philosophy. The argumentative structure of the essay is clarified, while identifying some difficulties in evaluating it today.

This article reconsiders Paul Ricœur’s political philosophical writings on the task of decolonization and European responsibility in light of a horizon of intercultural dialogue. Departing from the exchange between Ricœur and his former student Enrique Dussel, it discusses the Ricœurian critique of modernity. After giving some background on Ricœur’s reflections on decolonization, it will clarify what Ricœur calls the “crisis of the concrete universal in the thinking and in the historical experience of Western Europe,” and what role cultural difference has in this crisis. Considering Ricœur’s explicitly European perspective, this will lead us to a critical discussion on the envisioned possibility of a world-historical subject. Finally, I will discuss the role of European self-reflection in relation to a horizon of intercultural dialogue and narration from a post-/decolonial perspective.

In this autobiographical essay, introduced by Ernst Wolff, Paulin Hountonji gives an account of his relation to Paul Ricœur. A sketch of his own academic development and his experience of the Parisian philosophy milieu in the 1960s serves as background for his chosing Ricœur as his doctoral supervisor. The essay makes plain the proximities between Hountondji and Ricœur (especially the study of Husserl), but identifies also occasional and missed encounters.

In this anti-colonial treatise, Ricœur reflects on the responsibility of every French citizen and of the French state with respect to colonialism. He establishes five principles that should guide his readers in their reflection on this issue and expresses his support for the independence of the colonies.

This presentation serves as an introduction to Paul Ricœur’s essay "The Question of the Colonies" (1947). The essay is contextualized in relation to other contemporary anti-colonial writings and to Ricœur’s own later philosophy. The argumentative structure of the essay is clarified, while identifying some difficulties in evaluating it today.

This presentation serves as an introduction to Paul Ricœur’s essay "The Question of the Colonies" (1947). The essay is contextualized in relation to other contemporary anti-colonial writings and to Ricœur’s own later philosophy. The argumentative structure of the essay is clarified, while identifying some difficulties in evaluating it today.

In this autobiographical essay, introduced by Ernst Wolff, Paulin Hountonji gives an account of his relation to Paul Ricœur. A sketch of his own academic development and his experience of the Parisian philosophy milieu in the 1960s serves as background for his chosing Ricœur as his doctoral supervisor. The essay makes plain the proximities between Hountondji and Ricœur (especially the study of Husserl), but identifies also occasional and missed encounters.

In this anti-colonial treatise, Ricœur reflects on the responsibility of every French citizen and of the French state with respect to colonialism. He establishes five principles that should guide his readers in their reflection on this issue and expresses his support for the independence of the colonies.

This paper employs Paul Ricœur’s insights to examine how European states should approach their colonial past. First, I explore the significance of historical knowledge for people from formerly colonized countries through the views of several anti-colonial thinkers. Then, referring to Ricoeur’s analyses in History and Truth, Time and Narrative and Memory, History, Forgetting, I examine the grounds and the legitimacy, of a historiography of colonization. I argue that European states should make the history of colonization part of their school curricula, as an expression of Europeans’ debt to the victims of the colonial past, and as a way to prevent the repetition of the colonial crimes.

In this anti-colonial treatise, Ricœur reflects on the responsibility of every French citizen and of the French state with respect to colonialism. He establishes five principles that should guide his readers in their reflection on this issue and expresses his support for the independence of the colonies.

Hermeneutics encounters three current challenges: by more quantitative orientations, by stances that reject pluralism, and by criticism that the hermeneutic field is elitist and esoteric. The article offers a response through Ricœur. The hermeneutic “choice in favor of meaning” insists upon the ontological value of the human condition. It shows the insufficiency of the quantitative approach, the remaining value of pluralistic consideration of what human meaning entails, and the real world consequences of interpretation. Examples in Ricœur show how a hermeneutic choice in favor of meaning is not passive but instead reads texts with a particular orientation even when the text seems engaged in another project. The article’s final part undertakes an internal critique, raising the adequacy of Ricœur’s emphasis on meaning as an affirmation of “being.” The example of Buddhist insistence on “emptiness” is offered as one counterexample. The article concludes by arguing that in our contentious times hermeneutics confirms its contemporary vitality through its choice in favor of meaning even as it retains pluralistic consideration of what that meaning entails.

Between 1962 and 1967/68, Ricœur devoted several courses to the question of language. Even though there are many traces of these lectures in the articles and essays published during these years (and collected in part in The Conflict of Interpretations), they have so far attracted little attention from the research community. However, they mark a decisive turning point in Ricœur’s thinking and lay the systematic foundation of the hermeneutics of the text that he would deploy in his later works. The article first clarifies the place occupied by these courses in Ricœur’s work. It then presents the archival material and characterizes the specific approach of each of the courses on the basis of Ricœur’s preparatory manuscripts. In a final section, three particularly instructive aspects of the courses are discussed: the shift from symbol to metaphor (in discussion with Greimas and Jakobson), the articulation of analytic philosophy and phenomenology (Frege and Husserl), and finally the program of a transcendental foundation of the rules of discourse production (Strawson, Wittgenstein and Chomsky).

Imagination is most traditionally assumed as something that is a contradiction of reality. Accordingly, it is considered as a faculty that is merely able to evoke our emotions and feelings and implies unreal things that do not contribute to cognition. This is one of the most important themes of Paul Ricoeurˊs theory. By analyzing and criticizing other theories, he tries to go over this contradiction and emphasizes the functional aspect of imagination and its contribution to reality. By exploring through various texts of Ricoeur, in order to achieve an organized framework, this article seeks to show how imagination can play a main role in the construction of reality. Therefore, by taking up Ricoeurˊs claims, first of all, we explain his verbal turn which has two functions and also significant consequences. These functions include schematizing synthesis and projecting new meanings, which elaborated on three levels. In this way, it can be seen how a poetic schema creates a picture by inventing a new meaning, which indirectly refers to reality and hence defamiliarizes it. Finally, we try to point out the most key consequences of this new understanding.

Beyond the disparate and mainly fleeting references to life in Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another, whether as life as power, living well and with others, or as Ricoeur’s attempt to develop a concept of embodied subjectivity as flesh, which is presumably living flesh, not dead flesh, a further and arguably primordial life principle needs emphasis, namely, living space. Ricoeur’s recognition of the vital significance of space primordiality, as a pivotal dimension that is even prior to language, offers a significant conceptual leap in Ricoeur’s later work, Oneself as Another. Ricoeur’s proposed ontology of the flesh is one dimension towards expression of an authentic phenomenology of spatiality, though not necessarily the only one. Building upon but going beyond Ricoeur, the article explores concentric and diametric spatial interplay in relation to the early Heidegger’s existential spatiality, Angst and care, as candidate living spatial movements. This proposed primordial spatial discourse re-examines Ricoeur’s conatus as power to act, and his quest for a structure of relation to the other that is not closure, separation, or diametric opposition.

Questioning Ricœur’s positioning of Aristotle and Augustine as the founders of the two mutually exclusive conceptions of time that dichotomize the Western tradition, this article suggests that what Ricœur describes as the aporetics of temporality is a product of the modern social time regime. Extracting Aristotle and Augustine’s conceptions of time from this modern problem reveals the Aristotelian so-called “naturalist” view of time as one that rather unifies humans and their world through symbolic mediation, while Augustine’s alleged “subjective” conception of time is read rather as expressing the subordination of time to divine transcendence.

The paper aims to analyse and understand tensions and meanings in the notion of mimesis in the perspective of philosophical anthropology. Classical mimesis theories, which stretch from classical antiquity to modern works by E. Auerbach or P. Ricoeur, are often associated with poetics, narratology or other literature theory studies. V. Podoroga talks about anthropological and phenomenological mimesis, not only about ‘external’, Aristotelian version, but also about internal mimesis. He focuses on the experience of the body as the basis of mimesis. The author explains how mimesis in Podoroga’s version acquires new meanings and demonstrates how Podoroga’s matrixes of anthropograms complement, discuss and transgress hermeneutical models of Ricoeur. The author claims that the method of Podoroga brings us to some kind of a unique ‘system’, that could be compared to the ideas of ‘the death of the author’ (R. Barthes) or ‘the open work’ (U. Eco). Podoroga shows us an alternative, non-semiotic and mimetic approach in contemporary thought, that has not been widely discussed yet in both Russian and English sources.

Partimos de la idea que la pedagogía se centra en un sujeto de la educación que necesita de nexos con lo posible desde el anclaje a experiencias existenciales. El objetivo es recurrir a la concepción de carácter ricoeuriana desde la emergencia por abarcar cuestiones de constitución y de validez en función de proporcionar sentido y entidad a la formación. El resultado radica en que la reflexividad otorgada por Ricoeur a la noción de carácter nos facilita aceptar la idea de acción como constructo psicosocial orientado hacia una apertura de sí encauzada al reconocimiento de sí con relación a los otros. Concluimos que la noción de carácter permite aproximar la disciplina pedagógica a la realidad educativa, dilucidando la complementariedad de expectativas que se encuentran inscritas en su dinámica de funcionamiento, remarcando la simetría latente entre hechos y análisis.

In this paper, I argue for a revaluation of Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity in light of what Miriam Kyselo has coined “the body-social problem” in enactivism (Kyselo 2014). It is my contention that while phenomenological perspectives upon the body and the self are considered relevant in enactivism, the hermeneutical, discursive facets are understood as a less essential facet of the self, for instance as the self’s reflexive side, that gives expression to an experiential self (Zahavi 2007: 182-184, 2014: 57-59). Yet, it is in language that the self is addressed by others and that the self reflects upon itself and understands itself. Especially in order to understand aspects of identity which are of importance for the social situation of the self, such as gender, the way we are addressed by others and address ourselves by means of language need to be taken into account.

Este artigo investiga as possíveis relações entre Deleuze e Ricoeur. A hipótese parte da noção de uma crítica à filosofia moderna a partir da liberdade e de ontologia como afirmação da vida, mostrando a possível aproximação entre ambos a consequência para se pensar o Ensino de Filosofia.

Este artículo realizó un análisis desde la categoría hermenéutica del símbolo según Paul Ricoeur de la novela de José Saramago Ensayo sobre la ceguera, en que, después de definir la categoría de análisis, su importancia y relevancia y el impacto que su comprensión puede tener para comprender situaciones actuales y pertinentes de nuestra sociedad, se procede a desarrollar la categoría con los símbolos escogidos en la novela del pecado, la mancha y la culpa. Haciendo uso no solo de los textos referentes a la hermenéutica de Ricoeur, sino también de La simbólica del mal, se propone un recorrido conceptual para dilucidar cómo se configuran los sentidos y significados de los símbolos del mal en nuestra cultura y mediante esta comprensión abordar la situación del aparato simbólico de la novela de Saramago. Llevar a cabo un análisis de estas categorías hermenéuticas en una novela como Ensayo sobre la ceguera se convierte en la oportunidad de evidenciar un significado y un sentido diferentes de una novela que ha mostrado claramente su relevancia en épocas anteriores y que hoy, en una pandemia, nos invita a repensar ese mundo y a enfrentarnos al hecho de entender nuestra propia ceguera y la ceguera del mundo en medio de una velocidad vertiginosa que nos exige asumir nuestra realidad de otra forma. En palabras de Ricoeur, el símbolo da qué pensar y es momento de que pensemos a través de nuestros propios símbolos la realidad que se nos plantea en la novela de Saramago y la extrapolemos a las realidades que se configuran cada día en nuestro mundo occidental.

Este artículo plantea un análisis hermenéutico del cuento “Embargo” de José Saramago, parte del libro Casi un objeto, a partir de la propuesta de comprensión textual de Paul Ricœur. Para ello, se toman, como punto de partida, los dos movimientos hermenéuticos básicos que, según el filósofo francés, hacen parte de esta tarea: explicar e interpretar. En este aspecto, la explicación se asume como el ejercicio de hallar el sentido en el relato y esto apunta a encontrar los nexos que existen entre sus partes constitutivas y la obra como un todo. A su vez, la interpretación se entiende como el proceso de actualización y apropiación de la obra por el lector, de tal manera que le resulte posible incorporarla a su experiencia vital en el acto de lectura. Así pues, el ejercicio hermenéutico se realiza apelando a categorías tomadas de la narratología que permiten efectuar la explicación: revelar las relaciones internas de la estructura narrativa, mientras a la par se argumenta la hipótesis u horizonte interpretativo que se propone para el cuento: el mundo de los sueños como una realidad alternativa que enfrenta al soñador con sus deseos y sus esperanzas, pero que también lo confronta con los miedos y las angustias propias del vivir.

O trabalho apresenta a hipótese de Jean Grondin para a reconstrução histórica do conceito de hermenêutica. Explora, por um lado, a revisão crítica proposta por ele para desfazer a noção de compêndio histórico e, por outro lado, procura compreender como a noção de universalidade da perspectiva hermenêutica, que tem sua raiz em Gadamer, opera como fio condutor na reconstrução da heterogeneidade de seu ponto de vista universal, desfazendo a idéia teleológica dessa história. Na retomada dos principais expoentes dessa tradição, procuramos, no jogo de continuidade e descontinuidade, entender as razões da ausência de Paul Ricoeur e a influência do perspectivismo de Nietzsche na condução da história da hermenêutica contemporânea.

In Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur proposes a new ethical theory that integrates Aristotle’s eudaemonist virtue ethical outlook with Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. The goal is ambitious, and recent discussions in anglophone philosophy have made its undertaking look to be founded on a confusion. The new argument goes that the ethical justification at work in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions is of opposed kinds. Attempts to integrate them, as a result, are either incoherent, or, in the best case, simply minor variations on one or another predominant ethical outlook. The essay grants the opposed kinds thesis and argues that despite its apparent impossibility, Ricoeur nevertheless does succeed in integrating two ethical approaches, including their different sources of justification, to produce a novel and thus ethically interesting theory. The essay closes, finally, with a reflection on how this method might be developed one step further to include an insight by Emmanuel Levinas on the look of the Other, and so make for an ethics of recognition.

Presento en este texto el artículo de P. Ricoeur El sufrimiento no es el dolor. Tras contextualizarlo paso a indicar cuáles son sus temas vertebradores para después, en un segundo momento, indicar su relevancia y trascendencia. Se trata de un trabajo muy importante en la trayectoria del pensador francés, pues nos permite entender mejor su propuesta de fenomenología hermenéutica, así como su dimensión ética. Además, la antropología del sufrimiento que nos ofrece permite vertebrar las líneas fundamentales de una ética (y política) del cuidado –sugerente, actual y llena de posibilidades.