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In 'The Arch and the Keystone,' Mythlore 38:1 (Fall/Winter 2019), 5-17, Tolkien scholar Verlyn Flieger argues that the conflicts and contradictions she sees in Tolkien's essays and fiction do not call for harmonization but rather should be embraced for what they are: 'two opposing and conflicting sides of one person, whose contention makes him who he is as well as what he is, the keystone that creates the arch' of The Lord of the Rings (16) out of the friction of the two sides. Her argument has the virtue of helping us to take both darkness and light in the legendarium with full seriousness. Unfortunately, the alleged contradictions, e.g. between the despair of the Beowulf essay and the hope for eucatastrophe in the essay 'On Fairie Stories,' reflected by light and darkness in The Lord of the Rings, are created by Flieger's failure fully to understand Tolkien's biblical worldview, where the impossibility of salvation in this life does not contradict, but is the logical setting for, the hope of a redemption not fully realized until the next. Thus an understanding of Tolkien's biblical eschatology dissolves the alleged tension and lets us supplement Flieger's keystone with the cornerstone of Tolkien's worldview, which shows us that the coherence, rather than the contradiction, of Flieger's elements can also function as a useful window on the power of Tolkien's sub-creation. Additional Keywords Mythlore; Keystone or Cornerstone? A Rejoinder to Verlyn Flieger on the Alleged 'Conflicting Sides' of Tolkien's Singular Self; Donald T. Williams; eschatology; history; time; eternity; worldview, The unmatched refracting power of Tolkien's secondary creation of Middle-earth as a lens to bring into pregnant focus the sheer concentrated goodness of the primary creation, the poignant mixture of [...]

I. Introduction Several philosophers, in both Buddhist philosophy (see, e.g., Zahavi, Thompson, and Siderits 2011) and Western philosophy (Unger 1979a, 1979b, 1979c; Stone 2005) have claimed that the self does [...]

This article will argue that Tao Yuanming [phrase omitted] (ca. 360-425) recognized a tension between being himself (ziran [phrase omitted]) and the natural transformations of the world (hua). While he [...]

Introduction This essay investigates the Zhuangzian theory of the self, which has long been the subject of a heated and controversial debate in Chinese intellectual history. According to an interpretation [...]

One of the most important and least well-understood notions in Watsuji Tetsuro's philosophical oeuvre is the concept of fudo [phrase omitted], which has been variously translated into English as climate [...]

But if the self were equal to the aggregates It must, since there are many, be a multiplicity And it would be substantial, visible like every other thing And not [...]

The question of selfhood is often the question of what it is that asks this question in a momentary or in an enduring way throughout one's life. It is an [...]

Buddhist reductionism (BR) is the view that there is no self and that, strictly speaking, our talk of persons should be better understood as talk of fictional entities. (1) The [...]

This essay offers a new interpretation of the butterfly dream in the Zhuangzi, which has been the focus of vigorous inquiries and heated debates in recent years. The novelty of this attempt lies in identifying a line of reasoning in the 'Qiwulun' chapter that embodies a deep puzzle about the nature of self and in unpacking how the butterfly dream passage at the end of that chapter addresses the puzzle in question. Such a reading is cast within a larger context of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, where death is a major theme. The idea of interpreting the butterfly dream in connection with the issue of death is not new. However, this idea has never been made sufficiently clear. An attempt will be made to provide a sensible and plausible reading of the butterfly dream that it is hoped will be relevant and beneficial to contemporary philosophy of self and death., Identifying the theme of self and death as central to the 'Qiwulun'--or Discussion on Making All Things Equal (3)--is at odds with a majority of interpreters: they tend to see [...]

At the turn of the nineteenth century diverse disciplines diagnosed the dissolution of the Cartesian notion of the self-from Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis to Ernst Mach's materialist devastation of the psyche [...]

THOMAS AQUINAS FREQUENTLY uses the maxim liber est causa sui--a sentence most easily translated as 'The free is the cause of itself.' (1) Thomas usually cites this maxim, which he [...]

This article reviews recent evidence from the fields of cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, behavioral neuroscience, and social psychology that call into question the model of the self that underlies current dominant approaches to ethics in Western philosophy, pointing to the crucial role of affect, embodiment, and metaphorical extension in moral judgments and decision making. It then examines the implications of these results for moral philosophy, concluding that the virtue-ethical model of self-cultivation more accurately represents how real human beings engage in moral reasoning, and is also better adapted as an educational technique to the evolved cognitive architecture of human beings than deontological or utilitarian approaches. Finally, turning to early Confucianism, it will suggest some of the ways in which Mencius' views about morality and ethical education strikingly anticipate findings coming out of the modern Western cognitive sciences, and therefore how thinkers such as Mencius can serve as an important conceptual resource in envisioning what an empirically responsible modern virtue ethic might look like., In his well-known 1994 work Descartes' Error, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio describes his work with patients suffering from damage to the prefrontal cortex, a center of emotion processing in the [...]

Introduction The utilization of Western canonical thinkers to inform and understand thinkers from India and China is nothing new. More specifically, it is very tempting for a Western-trained philosopher to [...]

1. Introduction A principle of self-ownership has broad appeal in moral and political philosophy, in several distinguishable respects. The first of these is its appeal across the political spectrum. Although [...]

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I elicit a number of ways in which, according to the Sartre of The Transcendence of the Ego, we can miss the truth about our own [...]

The relation between the concepts of the subject of apperception, the phenomenal self, and the noumenal self has long puzzled commentators on Kant's theoretical account of the self. This paper argues that many of the puzzles surrounding Kant's account can be resolved by treating the subject of apperception and other transcendental predicates of thinking as a dimension of the noumenal self. Yet this interpretation requires a clarification of how the transcendental predicates of thinking can be attributed to the noumenal self without violating the thesis of noumenal ignorance. The clarification is achieved through a careful analysis of the meaning of the latter thesis. The paper's interpretation is then shown to be consistent with Kant's rejection of traditional ontology and with the dual-aspect view. The paper's final section argues that transcendental predicates are properly construed as logical predicates but must be distinguished from ordinary examples of the latter.

The conception of subjectivity that dominates the Western philosophical tradition, particularly during the Enlightenment, sets up a simple dichotomy: either the subject is ultimately autonomous or it is merely a causally determined thing. Fichte and Freud challenge this model by formulating theories of subjectivity that transcend this opposition. Fichte conceives of the subject as based in absolute activity, but that activity is qualified by a check for which it is not ultimately responsible. Freud explains the behavior of the self in terms of biological drives and social pressures, yet both forces are actively interpreted by the subject itself. The tensions that arise from these very different approaches show that both Fichte and Freud are trying to overcome this deeply imbedded dichotomy between freedom and determinism. Although some would respond to these tensions by trying to forge a Hegelian synthesis, such a resolution covers over the paradoxical nature of finite subjectivity.

Abstract: This paper examines the ethical status of animals and nature within the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins. Though Calkins held that her self-psychology and absolute personalistic idealism were compatible [...]

In a series of books and articles published over the past two decades, the authors have developed a five-stage system for identifying and modifying the mythic structures that guide individual development. In this essay, they draw upon the integral relationship between personal and collective myths in applying this five-stage model to contemporary social issues. They focus, in particular, on the mythic conflicts that underlie the tensions between progress and sustainability and between individualism and community. based on the contradictory designs inherent in a prevailing myth and in an emerging myth, the authors present a dialectical model that is formulated to lead to a new myth that incorporates the most functional elements of old and emergent forces, while transcending their limitations. The essay closes with a discussion of social actions that may embed a new myth within a culture, along with the conditions that are required to effectively reinforce and maintain it. KEYWORDS: community, conflict, future, individualism, myth, mythology, psyche, progress, sustainability

1. It must be obvious to any student of the liberal state that the rational burdens on persons in all versions of liberalism are considerable. Two of the controlling thoughts [...]

The theme of our conference is 'The Concept of a Person'. One of the most original attitudes of the Buddha towards this problem was to have dissuaded his followers from clinging to the concept of 'person'. The word 'person' in Pali is puggala (= individual), which represents in early middle Indian dialect puthakala, a derivation of Sanskrit: prithak (= prith or prath + anc = separately, one by one). [2] Puggala means person or man, an individual as opposed to a group. Its equivalent in Sanskrit is pudgala, which means a personal entity or an individual. If there were any unique and permanent substance unifying this personal entity, it would be the self the soul, attan in Pali and atman in Sanskrit. The self and the person are closely related to each other. I will trace the evolution of these two notions as treated in some Buddhist texts, firstly in the primitive basic Buddhist texts in verse or in short sentences, secondly in the prose part of some sutras and finally in later developed Mahayana Buddhist texts. Then I will confront these notions with the experience of their followers, by taking the example of Zen master Dogen (1200-1253)., I. Primitive Buddhist Texts. Theragatha, Therigatha, Dhammapada, Suttanipata (5th-3rd Centuries BC) The most ancient and basic Buddhist texts were composed in verse or in short sentences so as to be [...]

Neuroscientific evidence requires a monistic understanding of brain/mind. Truly appropriating what this means confronts us with the vulnerability of the human condition. Camus's absurd and Tillich's despair are extreme expressions of a similar confrontation. This crisis demands a type of courage that is consistent with scientific truth and does not undermine the spiritual dimension of life. That dimension is not a separate substance but the process by which brain/mind meaningfully wrestles with its crisis through aesthetic symbols, religious faith, and ethical affirmation. The validity of these activities does not depend upon human autonomy but instead upon the fact that they exist. Furthermore, they constitute the self, which Dennett calls a 'center of narrative gravity.' Keywords: absurdity; aesthetics; brain/mind; courage; despair; ethics; meaninglessness; religious faith; self.

An analysis of the metaphysics of personal identity suggest that an individual's desire to anticipate the future amounts to a desire for first-personal access to a future point of view. Views on link between identity and perspective suggest that an individual can only pretend to think of another person as 'me' in the notional first-person. Memory and intention, the modes of projective thought, make a person self to himself. Hence, engagement with future experiences coincides with an ability to regard the subjects unselfconsciously as me. Thomas Nagel's views are discussed.

Soren Kierkegaard believed that the self's relation to God was a necessary condition for its freedom and that the social other was merely the self's idea rather than a reality. The individual's relation to God increases the self's freedom, deepens awareness of individual responsibility and allows it to act freely according to its conscience. The social other restricts the self's freedom and forces it to engage in actions disapproved by the individual's conscience. Thus, contrary to the view of his critics, Kierkegaard's presents a coherent account of the self and the social other.

The present paper attempts to clarify the cognitive conditions which make it possible to define so-called reality from five individual criteria and a confrontation to the paradigms of the community. Reality unfolds from potentially infinite reiteration, but can actually be caught only through finite operations. Our access to discoveries and increased knowledge depends upon abduction which enables us to probe the viability of unlikely hypotheses. Man becomes autonomous through using abduction; that is to say through interacting within the family and the constraints of social ecosystems which built his identity, and his conflictual access to the construction of reality. KEYWORDS: pointers of reality, cognition, frameworks of reference, self-identity, abduction, autonomy.

Jose Ortega y Gasset formulated the ecological philosophy which states that life is a constant interaction between individuals. Despite its originality, ecological philosophy is variously evaluated as it does not contribute to a definite understanding of the individual self.

The manner in which Edith Stein explores the relation between truth and art in her philosophy of understanding the self is discussed. She argues that working towards being one's true self is similar to an artistic creation, as art helps to distinguish between the truth of a subject and what it ought to be.

Prudential and moral concerns are connected by duties to the self. Once these duties are seen as equally important as duties to others, the relationship between morality and prudence can be properly understood.

1. Introduction The highest principle of Kant's theoretical philosophy is that all cognition must 'be combined in one single self-consciousness' (A 117a, B 136).(1) Elsewhere I have tried to explain [...]