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Abstract: To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children’s performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb “know”) and poorest for intentional opacity (using “mean to”), with quotational opacity (using “said”) falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children’s sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Examines the relationship between acquisition of a theory of mind and the capacity to hold in mind in children. Reference to literature on children's theory of mind; Debate on the acquisition of the theory of mind in children; Relationship between computational resources and the acquisition of the theory of mind.

Comments on the research undertaken by C. Heyes on the theory of mind in primates and humans. Attributions of the theory of mind in children and animals; Elements altered by Heyes in making the proposed task suitable for children; Critical issue in the theory of mind.