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The central unifying element in the philosophy of Peter Browne (d. 1735) is his theory of analogy. Although Browne's theory was originally developed to deal with some problems about religious language, Browne regards analogy as a general purpose cognitive mechanism whereby we substitute an idea we have to stand for an object of which we, strictly speaking, have no idea. According to Browne, all of our ideas are ideas of sense, and ideas of sense are ideas of material things. Hence we can conceive of spiritual things – including even our own spirit – only by analogy. One interesting application Browne makes of his theory is an account of how concepts such as knowledge can be correctly applied to beings that have no intrinsic properties in common, such as non-human animals, humans, angels, and God. I argue that this is best understood as what, in the contemporary literature, is known as a ‘multiple realizability’ problem and that Browne's solution to this problem has important similarities to functionalist theories in recent philosophy of mind.

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind-body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here, we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts’ spacing (Crutch and Warrington, 2007; Strappini et al., 2017b). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, which impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here, we define a psychological property of restored object identification, and we cross-reference the data of visually impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy, six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e., restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. Whereas the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus, similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence.

Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument.

The aim of this paper is to scrutinize active externalism and its repercussions for externalism about mental content. I start from the claim that active externalism is a version of content externalism that follows from the extended cognition thesis as a thesis about cognitive vehicles. Various features of active content externalism are explored by comparison with the known forms of passive externalism – in particular with respect to the multiple realizability of the relevant external content-determining components and with respect to mental causation. A crucial result is that social externalism is already a version of active externalism. I conclude with a first sketch of a general account of meaning inspired by extended cognition: a use theory supplemented by a functional-role account.

The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended mind thesis according to which mentality extends, not only beyond brain, but beyond body as well. In this paper, we seek to dispel these three misconceptions by explaining what strong embodiment does and does not entail.

Sider�s Writing the Book of the World is an outstanding work. In an earlier review (Schaffer forthcoming) I called it �masterful� and �required reading�, while worrying about Sider�s notion(s) of structure. Here I offer the further praise of further discussion, centred on a separate worry concerning whether Sider�s metaphysical semantics can handle multiple realizability. Metaphysical semantics is supposed to connect the non-fundamental to the fundamental in a distinctively linguistic way, explaining how non-fundamental truths can be grounded in fundamental facts, and so inducing a radically eliminative vision of the non-fundamental as mere talk. I wonder how the story goes when a single non-fundamental truth can be grounded in many different fundamental facts. For instance, the truth that Moore has hands can presumably be grounded in many different distributions of fields, arrangements of particles, vibrations of strings, or whatnot. I am asking how metaphysical semantics can accommodate this sort of multiple realizability. Multiple realizability came to prominence in philosophy of mind in the 1970s, raising problems for reductive versions of physicalism. I think that it raises analogous problems for Sider�s eliminative view of the non-fundamental. Just as one cannot identify the mental state type pain with a specific brain state, so one cannot equate the non-fundamental truth that Moore has hands with a specific fundamental fact. And just as multiple realizability ultimately favours non-reductive treatments of mental state types, so I think it ultimately favours non-eliminative treatments of the non-fundamental truths. Overview: In Section 1 I describe metaphysical semantics, and identify three conditions of adequacy. In Section 2 I propose three ways for metaphysical semantics to treat multiple realizability, and in Sections 3�5 I argue that none of these three ways can satisfy more than one adequacy condition. I conclude in Section 6 that the underlying problem lies with Sider�s �

Jerry Alan Fodor (born 1935) is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist, developed, in particular, the concept of multiple realizability arguing for nonreductive physicalism. Jaegwon Kim (born 1934) is a Korean American philosopher, in his works he, in particular, posed the famous exclusion problem arguing against nonreductive physicalism. Their contradictory points of view on the relationship between mental phenomena and the corresponding physiological processes have initiated ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind and are significant for the problems under consideration in the present book. So in this chapter we elucidate the basic ideas proposed by Fodor and Kim and discuss a way to overcoming their contradiction I call the Fodor-Kim dilemma.

Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, powerful language available. On a semantic view, traditional notions of multiple realizability are thus very hard to motivate. At best, one must abandon either the idea that multiple realizability is an interesting scientific notion, or else admit that multiply realizable properties do not automatically block scientific reductions.

The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.

In this paper, I investigate how different views about the vertical and horizontal structure of reality affect the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalism. This debate is commonly assumed to hinge on whether there are high-level, special science properties that are distinct from low-level physical properties and whether the alleged multiple realizability of highlevel properties establishes this. I defend a metaphysical interpretation of non-reductive physicalism in the absence of both of these assumptions. Adopting an independently motivated, discipline-relative account of natural properties and appealing to a phenomenon I call “multiple determinativity,” in which a single physical property simultaneously realizes different kinds of special science properties, is sufficient to show that some special science properties are irreducible to physical properties and that non-reductive physicalism is not merely a terminological variant of reductive physicalism. For roughly the past forty years, discussions of reductive and non-reductive physicalism have centered on a number of related debates, including the nature and extent of multiple realizability (MR) and whether the MR of a property grounds its irreducibility (e.g., Putnam 1967; Lewis [1969] 1980; Fodor 1974; Kim 1998; Shapiro 2000; Gillett 2003). These debates have commonly been articulated against the background assumption that there is a “vertical” structure of reality. For instance, Jaegwon Kim writes: For much of [the 20th] century, a layered picture of the world . . . has formed a constant—tacitly assumed if not explicitly stated—backdrop for debates on a variety of issues in metaphysics and philosophy of science—for example, reduction and reductionism, the mind-body problem, emergence, the status of the special sciences, and the possibility of a unified science. (1998, 16) As Kim also notes, “sometimes the layered model is couched in terms of concepts and languages rather than entities and their properties” (ibid.). Indeed, some philosophers have voiced skepticism about the existence of metaphysical levels in nature. They argue that levels

This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is “no”. I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.

Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive” and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility.

John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity's having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle's employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell's structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle's problem with computational cognitive science, and refutes it by suggesting how our understanding of computation is far from implying the structuralism Searle vitally attributes to it. On the way, I formulate and argue for a thesis that strengthens Newman's case against Russell's structuralism, and thus raises the apparent risk for computational cognitive science too.

Some philosophers have argued that so long as two neural events, within a subject, are both of the same type and both carry the same content, then these events may jointly constitute a single mental token, regardless of the sort of causal relation to each other that they bear. These philosophers have used this claim—which I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” position—in order to argue that a split-brain subject normally has a single stream of consciousness, disjunctively realized across the two hemispheres. This paper argues, against this position, that the kind of causal relations multiple neural events bear to each other constrains the mental tokens with which functionalists who are realists can identify them.

In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are right, then a sizeable number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, etc., subscribe to a view that is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. In this article I show that Bennett and Hacker's arguments against NM, whether construed as arguments for the meaninglessness of or the falsity of the thesis, cannot withstand scrutiny: when laid bare they are found to rest upon highly dubious assumptions that either seriously mischaracterize or underestimate the resources of the thesis.

Mind, it is increasingly fashionable to assert, is an intrinsically embodied and environmentally embedded phenomenon. But there is a potential tension between two strands of thought prominent in this recent literature. One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine details of a creature’s embodiment as a major constraint on the nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The other depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for multiple realizability than ever before). The present paper displays the tension, scouts the space of possible responses, and ends by attempting to specify what the body actually needs to be, given its complex role in these recent debates.

Traditionally, it is believed, that the primary function of the cerebellum is to coordinate movement. During the past three decades, it has been controversially discussed, whether the cerebellum may also contribute to cognition and mental states like emotions. In this paper, no position relating to this controversy will be taken. Instead, the hypothesis of non-motor functions of the cerebellum will be viewed from the position of the philosophy of mind. The remarkably uniform microscopic structure and neuronal networks of the cerebellum have led to computer analogies by several authors. The main idea of functionalism, i.e., a theory within the philosophy of mind, is that the mental relates to the physical as computer software does to hardware. This raises the question, whether a cerebellar contribution to cognition and mental states would support functionalism in the philosophy of mind. No support of functionalism could be found in this study, investigating the classical philosophical arguments pro and con functionalism such as those of multiple realizability, the Chinese room and the explanatory gap, while taking the results of cerebellar research into account. On the other hand, philosophical reflection suggests a careful use of the phrases "cognitive dysmetria" (Andreasen et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 1996;93:9985-90) in the context of mental illness and of "dysmetria of thought" (Schmahmann Arch Neurol. 1991;48:1178-87). According to the argument of the explanatory gap there is at present little support for the assumption that the phenomenal experiencing of an altered emotion can be reduced to the dysmetria of movement.

According to a familiar view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are realized by physical states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called realization physicalism. But what is realization? I argue that recent approaches to realization, represented by Carl Gillett's ‘dimensioned’ view, fail to acknowledge some textbook cases of realization. I also argue Gillett's account in particular admits realization relations that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I offer my own account of realization, and argue that it is superior not only in passing the above tests but also in its utility for answering questions about multiple realizability.

While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is sedom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through any differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple specification. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept of relativized multiple realizability. The last section presents a survey of the ontological, explanatory, and methodological consequences of this analysis of multiple realizability.

Straipsnyje tiriamos dvi XX a. viduryje isplėtotos funkcionalistinio sąmonės aiskinimo kryptys: D. Armstrongo ir D. Lewiso analitinis funkcionalizmas ir H. Putnamo komputacinis funkcionalizmas. Siekiama parodyti, kad sios dvi kryptys is esmės sutampa metodologiniu požiūriu, taciau jų atstovai suteikia savųjų teorijų metodologiniam pagrindui skirtingas ontologines interpretacijas. Sutardami, kad fizikinio būvio ir funkcinio būvio sąvokos skiriasi, jie nesutaria dėl to, ar funkcinio būvio sąvoką reikia laikyti isskiriancia atskirą ontologine būvių kategoriją, ar si sąvoka isreiskia tik skirtingą tų pacių fizikinių būvių identifikavimo realiame pasaulyje būdą. Siame nesutarime is esmės užsimezga siuolaikinei sąmonės filosofijai būdinga kontroversija klausimu: savybių ontologija turi būti rekonstruojama intensiniu ar ekstensiniu pagrindu? Pagrindiniai žodžiai: funkcionalizmas, materializmas, įvairiopa realizacija, reduktyvistinės sąmonės teorijos. FUNCTIONALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: METHODOLOGY OR ONTOLOGY? Jonas Dagys Summary The article investigates two functionalist accounts of the mind developed in the middle of the 20th century: analytical functionalism of David Armstrong and David Lewis and computational functionalism of Hilary Putnam. The aim is to show that the two accounts are identical from the methodological point of view, but their proponents give different ontological interpretations to the methodological base of their theories. While they agree that the concept of ‘functional state’ is different from the concept of ‘physical state’, they nevertheless disagree on whether ‘functional state’ should be taken to designate a distinct ontological kind of states or it should be taken as expressing a different way of identifying the same physical states in the actual world. This disagreement could be taken to mark the beginning of the controversy characteristic of contemporary philosophy of mind regarding the question whether the ontology of properties should be reconstructed on the intensive or extensive basis. Keywords: functionalism, materialism, multiple realizability, reductive theories of mind.

Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.

Cybernetics promoted machine-supported investigations of adaptive sensorimotor behaviours observed in biological systems. This methodological approach receives renewed attention in contemporary robotics, cognitive ethology, and the cognitive neurosciences. Its distinctive features concern machine experiments, and their role in testing behavioural models and explanations flowing from them. Cybernetic explanations of behavioural events, regularities, and capacities rely on multiply realizable mechanism schemata, and strike a sensible balance between causal and unifying constraints. The multiple realizability of cybernetic mechanism schemata paves the way to principled comparisons between biological systems and machines. Various methodological issues involved in the transition from mechanism schemata to their machine instantiations are addressed here, by reference to a simple sensorimotor coordination task. These concern the proper treatment of ceteris paribus clauses in experimental settings, the significance of running experiments with correct but incomplete machine instantiations of mechanism schemata, and the advantage of operating with real machines ??? as opposed to simulated ones ??? immersed in real environments.

PurposeThe paper examines the dependence of the positivist and welfarist preference satisfaction paradigm of neoclassical economics upon an implicit functionalist philosophy of mind. Functionalism is the doctrine that mental states are strictly materialistic and understandable in cause‐effect terms. An important aspect of functionalism is the multiple realizability thesis, namely, that mental states can be realized in any type of hardware, whether human brain or computer.Design/methodology/approachThe approach used involves investigating the fact‐value distinction after Robbins in terms of the positivist meta‐ethical view known as emotivism, and then explaining emotivism as inherently functionalist. Functionalist thinking itself is explained in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind.FindingsAn important finding is that the preference satisfaction paradigm can be shown to be as suitable to artificial intelligence systems as to human beings. A consequence of this is that normative concerns are increasingly difficult to address in connection with the neoclassical thinking about economic agents.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper does not investigate more recent research programs in economics (such as behavioural economics) that depart from basic neoclassical assumptions.Practical implicationsA practical implication of the paper is that it shifts attention to previously un‐emphasized aspects of neoclassical thinking.Originality/valueThe paper's value to explain the relation of economics to ethics in neoclassical economics in connection with functionalist philosophy of mind.

American philosopher, Hilary Whitehall Putnam (1926–) is one of the most influential analytic philosophers of our time. He is particularly well known for his contributions to philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. His work is also marked by a critical engagement with his own earlier views and several changes of key philosophical positions. This article distinguishes between early, middle, and late periods in Putnam's writing and discusses the most seminal ideas of each period. Particular attention is paid to Putnam's treatment of the question of realism over the three periods.

Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat of Putnam's intuition alone. I distinguishfour interpretations of the multiplerealizability intuition. Some commonformulations of multiple realizability arealmost certainly true, while others are not atall plausible. I argue that the plausible formsof multiple realizability do not impugn theprospects for a mind-brain Identity Theory.

The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. I raise difficulties for one anti-reductionist response to the DisjunctiveMove, the Explanatory Response.

Most physicalists today believe that mental properties can be neurologically realized in many different ways. If some brand of functionalism is correct, then an internal event realizes a mental property in virtue of playing the right functional role, and not because of its intrinsic physical features. This allows that events that differ in neural type might realize the same mental property, the only constraint being that each of these event can play the functional role definitive of that mental property. The belief in multiple realizability is one of the main reasons for the popularity of non-reductive physicalism. If mental states are multiply realizable at the neural level, then they are also multiply realizable, and to a far greater degree, at more basic levels of physical structure ‐ e.g., the molecular, atomic, and subatomic levels. Of course, the properties of the physical sciences are also multiply realizable; the property of being a carbon atom, for instance, is multiply realizable with respect to subatomic features. However, the problem with mental properties is that they, unlike chemical properties, are thought to be multiply realizable with respect to the entire range of features mentioned by the physical sciences. That is, for any mental property M, and for any event of physical type P, it is possible that M is realized by an event of some physical type other than P. If so, and if this possibility is nomological as well as metaphysical, then mental properties are irreduciblein the sense that (NR1) there are no nomologically true biconditionals connecting mental properties with physical properties (i.e., properties of the physical sciences). Given that property-identity requires biconditionals that are (at least) nomologically true, it would also follow that

This chapter argues for the relevance of the notion of reduction and the fruitfulness of the explication. The concept of reduction defined in the previous chapter is key to an understanding of the reduction-debate in the philosophy of mind. Reductive identity-theories, type-identity theories as well as token-identity theories, and models of functional reduction conceive of reduction precisely as described above: These theories are supposed to reconcile strong unity with diversity and directionality; according to this conception, a reduces to b only if a = b. Type-identity theories are underdetermined with respect to directionality; the proposal offered here fixes this deficiency in a natural way. Classical versions of type-identity theory can be interpreted in terms of the explication offered here. The idea that reduction is tied to conceptual diversity is pertinent in the writings of early type-identity theorists. The explication of reduction offered here also sheds light on more recent forms of type-identity theory, according to which type-identifications are achieved via contextualized kinds or via “disjunctive” kinds. Notions of token-reduction, type-reduction, and functional reduction can be defined within the present framework, and the doctrine of non-reductive physicalism can be characterized.

Series Editors' Preface Notes on Contributors PART I: METAPHYSICS OF MIND 1. The Cartesian Argument Against Physicalism Philip Goff 2. A Call for Modesty: A Priori Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem Eric Funkhouser 3. Verbs and Minds Carrie Figdor 4. Meanings and Methodologies Justin C. Fisher 5. Entangled Externalisms, Mark Sprevak and Jesper Kallestrup 6. The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification Declan Smithies 7. The Metaphysics of Mind and the Multiple Sources of Multiple Realizability Gualtiero Piccinini and Corey J. Maley 8. The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism Adam Pautz PART II: MIND AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 9. Problems and Possibilities for Empirically-Informed Philosophy of Mind Elizabeth Irvine 10. Psychological Explanation, Ontological Commitment, and the Semantic View of Theories Colin Klein 11. Naturalizing Action Theory Bence Nanay 12. The Architecture of Higher Thought Daniel A. Weiskopf 13. Significance Testing in Neuroimagery Edouard Machery 14. Lack of Imagination: Individual Differences in Mental Imagery and the Significance of Consciousness Ian Phillips 15. A Beginner's Guide to Group Minds Georg Theiner Index

Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not wholly a matter of metaphysics but is, at least to some degree, a matter of convention as well. The central point is that physical sciences and mental sciences have somewhat different criteria for individuating kinds.

This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state-physical state to function-mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists themselves have claimed. Copyright 2008 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

Fodor's work focuses on the philosophical problems about psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, theories of cognitive architecture (modularity, interactionism, etc.), psycholinguistics (especially, parsing), and child's theory of mind. His experimental work especially emphasizes the last two topics.

For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well.

Aristotle sternly rejects Platonic dualism, but nevertheless resists an ancient version of the identity theory of mind and body.1 Equally dissatisfied with each of these alternatives, he endeavors to analyze the relationship between soul and body by employing the notions of form and matter introduced in the Physics and articulated and expanded in the Metaphysics (Meta.). Thus, in the De Anima (DA) we find the familiar claim that “the soul is a substance as form of a natural body having life in potentiality” (DS 412a19–22),2 which Aristotle proceeds to illustrate by suggesting that the soul bears the same relation to the body as the shape of a candle does to its wax (DA 412b6–7). Both the claim and its illustration are in some ways obscure. But it is reasonably clear that these remarks represent Aristotle’s attempt to provide a workable alternative to both Platonism and an austere form of the identity theory. Aristotle is perhaps the first philosopher to seek an account of mind-body relations which captures the insights of these theories while avoiding their individual shortcomings. Indeed, Aristotle self-consciously views his position in the philosophy of mind in much the same way contemporary functionalists view their own. Like the contemporary functionalist, Aristotle seeks a theory of the mental which avoids what he regards as the excesses of his predecessors: his preferred account would capture the supervenience of the mental on the physical without identifying mental state types with physical state types. Moreover, beyond having analogous historical vantage points, Aristotle and contemporary functionalists share deep theoretical commitments. So deep are these commitments that it is fair to regard Aristotle as the first functionalist.

A number of influences have combined to make reductionism an unpopular position in recent philosophy of mind and psychology. Davidson's Principle of the Anomalousness of the Mental, the multiple realizability arguments of Putnam, Fodor, and others, and attempts to characterize supervenience or dependency as the appropriate nonreductive relation to seek between psychological and physical kinds are the most well-known objections (Kim 1989). And these have found their mark. Being a psychophysical reductionist nowadays, as Jaegwon Kim aptly puts it, "is a bit like being a logical positivist or a member of the Old Left-an aura of doctrinaire naivete hangs over such a person" (1989, 32). This aura is mistaken, however, in light of the development over the past decade of a new brand of psychophysical reductionism, built upon a novel general account of theory reduction in science (Hooker 1981; P. M. Churchland 1979, sec. 11 and chap. 4, and 1985; P. S. Churchland 1986, chaps. 7, 9; Enc 1983; Bickle 1991, 1992c). From this "new wave," the reductionist thesis gets reformulated as. the broadly empirical prediction that developed psychological theories ultimately will stand in the intertheoretic reduction relation (construed in the novel fashion) to developed counterpart theories from cognitive and computational neuroscience.1 The empirical evidence mustered in defense of this prediction is drawn from work now being pursued in the relevant sciences; and some work from recent neuroscience is already demonstrating reductive potential of the relevant sort for sophisticated psychological

INTRODUCTION It is part of today's conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind that psychological states are “multiply realizable”, and are in fact so realized, in a variety of structures and organisms. We are constantly reminded that any mental state, say pain, is capable of “realization”, “instantiation”, or “implementation” in widely diverse neural-biological structures in humans, felines, reptiles, mollusks, and perhaps other organisms further removed from us. Sometimes we are asked to contemplate the possibility that extraterrestrial creatures with a biochemistry radically different from the earthlings', or even electro-mechanical devices, can “realize the same psychology” that characterizes humans. This claim, to be called hereafter ‘the Multiple Realization Thesis’ (“MR”, for short), is widely accepted by philosophers, especially those who are inclined to favor the functionalist line on mentality. I will not here dispute the truth of MR, although what I will say may prompt a reassessment of the considerations that have led to its nearly universal acceptance. And there is an influential and virtually uncontested view about the philosophical significance of MR. This is the belief that MR refutes psychophysical reductionism once and for all. In particular, the classic psychoneural identity theory of Feigl and Smart, the so-called “type physicalism”, is standardly thought to have been definitively dispatched by MR to the heap of obsolete philosophical theories of mind. At any rate, it is this claim, that MR proves the physical irreducibility of the mental, that will be the starting point of my discussion.

AS FAR as anyone knows, different organisms are often in psychological states of exactly the same type at one time or another, and a given organism is often in psychological states of exactly the same type at different times. Whenever either is the case, we shall say of the psychological states of the organism(s) in question that they are type identical. One thing that currently fashionable theories in the philosophy of mind often try to do is characterize the conditions for type identity of psychological states. For example, some varieties of philosophical behaviorism claim that two organisms are in typeidentical psychological states if and only if certain of their behaviors or behavioral dispositions are type identical. Analogously, some (though not all) varieties of physicalism claim that organisms are in type-identical psychological states if and only if certain of their physical states are type identical. In so far as they are construed as theories about the conditions for type identity of psychological states, it seems increasingly unlikely that either behaviorism or physicalism is true. Since