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This conclusion sums up the main findings of the contributions to the volume as regards policy change and the role of discourse in Europe. It discusses these results focusing on four key themes that cut across the case studies presented. These four themes refer to discourse; learning; the relationship between the power of ideas and interests as seen through discussions of arguing versus bargaining; and Europeanisation. The case studies provide a very rich resource in our search for theoretical generalisations on these main themes, largely because they illustrate policy change and the role of discourse in Europe under very different sets of institutional and organisational rules (from the WTO to the European Union and domestic settings)., This conclusion sums up what we have learned comparatively about policy change and the role of discourse in Europe. It presents the results of this volume by focusing on four [...]

With the move in EU studies from a focus on European integration to Europeanisation, that is from the process of EU formation to its impact on member states, the number and range of theories and methodologies have proliferated. This article embraces such pluralism. Only by considering a full range of factors policy--problems, legacies, preferences, political and institutional capacity, and discourse--from a variety of perspectives--interest-based rationality, historical path-dependencies, social constructions of action, ideas and discourse--can a complete picture of policy change in Europe emerge. Discourse deserves to be emphasised, however, because it is an often missing, but important, approach to explanation. Discourse, as a set of ideas and a process of policy formulation and communication, helps complete our understanding of policy change when put in relation to other factors and perspectives. Where it helps explain--in which institutional settings and when it helps--by exerting a causal influence--are matters for empirical investigation that are explored in the essays included in this volume., Since the mid-1980s, the European Union, together with its member states, has undergone a major process of transformation. First with the race to the single market by 1992, then with [...]

Two foundations of regulatory choice, precaution and innovation, co-exist in the political system of the European Union (EU). At the conceptual level the two foundations are complementary, and are both endorsed by the EU institutions, albeit in different ways and with different legal status. In the real-life of EU policymaking processes, however, precaution and innovation often become the terrain of polarised views anchored to technocratic or populist positions that erode trust in EU governance. We propose a way forward to this state of play. Instead of seeing the two foundations as opposite, we explore their dyadic relationship. We show that a conversation between the two is possible via an original reformulation of precaution and innovation. The reconciliation of precaution and innovation, we argue, is effective only in a context of social trust about the reconciled definitions. We propose the analytical and normative framework of nonviolence as seal of social trust. Nonviolence can assist the EU and its citizens in the path towards innovation that is socially responsible, future-proof and accountable. It can enhance precaution as internalised commitment of decision-makers as well as scientific and social communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy learning is an attractive proposition, but who learns and for what purposes? Can we learn the wrong lesson? And why do so many attempts to learn what works often fail? In this article, we provide three lessons. First, there are four different modes in which constellations of actors learn. Hence our propositions about learning are conditional on which of the four contexts we refer to. Second, policy learning does not just happen; there are specific hindrances and triggers. Thus, learning can be facilitated by knowing the mechanisms to activate and the likely obstacles. Third, learning itself is a conditional final aim: although the official aspiration of public organisations and politicians is to improve on public policy, policy learning can also be dysfunctional - for an organisation, a policy, a constellation of actors or even democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the causal relationship between crisis, learning and change? How did causality unfold in the key years of 2009–2010 when the European Union had to face the most formidable attacks to the single currency and responded with substantial reforms of the euro area? We question the conventional identification of the cause-and-effect relationship provided by theories of crisis management, integration and policy learning. Drawing on models of contingent learning developed within psychology and behavioural economics, we theorize that surprise produces behavioural change via a fast-paced associative mechanism and that policy learning follows change. We then run our exercise in causal identification through a plausibility probe. We show that our argument passes the plausibility probe. Our conclusions on cognition and situational effects on learning during crises suggest a new research agenda, more sensitive to how individuals behave in the real world and more robust in its micro-foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under which conditions does the open method of co-ordination match the standards for demoi-cracy? To answer this question, we need some explicit standards about demoi-cracy. In fact, open co-ordination serves three different but interrelated purposes in European Union policy: to facilitate convergence; to support learning processes; and to encourage exploration of policy innovation. By intersecting standards and purposes, we find open co-ordination is neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ for demoi-cracy, as it depends on how it has been put into practice. Therefore, we qualify the answer considering the empirical evidence on how normative principles hit the road of implementation. In the final part of this paper, we look into the demoi-cratic effects of the Eurozone's economic and financial crisis on our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Impact assessment is the pivotal instrument in the recent wave of regulatory reforms labeled ‘better regulation’. Although the economics of impact assessment has been the subject of a vast literature, less is known about its political properties. Within a comparative framework, this article provides conjectures on four images of impact assessment – that is, rational policy making, political control of the bureaucracy, public management reform, and symbolic action. Looking at six countries with a long experience of impact assessment and the European Union, the article first builds expectations about the diffusion of the images across countries, and then proceeds to measurement by using both objective and interpretative/subjective indicators. The findings seem to support the public management reform image – a conclusion that suggests further specifications about administrative traditions and change. Sweden and Denmark are not using impact assessment to foster instrumental rationality or increase the political control of bureaucracies and, together with the Netherlands, rank high on the symbolic action scale. The United States – and to a lesser extent Canada and the United Kingdom – have a multi-purpose approach to impact assessment. The case of the European Union defies prior expectations, showing much more usage than anticipated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their attempt to promote “better regulation,” governments have ended up with increasing regulation of rule-making. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a manifestation of this trend. This article draws on the positive political economy hypothesis that RIA is an administrative control device. Rational politicians—positive political economy argues—design administrative requirements to solve problems of political uncertainty. This is a rather abstract hypothesis but with clearly observable implications. Empirical analysis on Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU shows that the modes and level of control vary, with almost no evidence supporting the positive political economy hypothesis in Denmark and Sweden and more robust evidence in the other cases, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The EU scores high, but control has both a political component and an infra-organizational dimension. In between the extremes I find modest levels of political control in Canada and the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important proposition in public policy analysis is that the design and selection of policy instruments is a manifestation of power relations; in other words, 'politics determines instruments'. However, except where it degenerates into tick-the-box routines, instrumentation can also generate its own political effects at the implementation stage - the 'instruments determine politics' argument. Examining the impact assessment (IA) element of the EU's Better Regulation agenda of the European Union, this article argues that procedures and meta-instruments are chosen by policy-makers when there is disagreement on fundamental issues of power. Policy-makers activate meta-instruments that do not address fundamental issues directly, but change procedures of policy formulation. In so doing, however, they create a new structure of opportunity, which produces its own effects on politics. Our findings point to unintended effects of IA, such as administrative coordination and organisational learning, as well as strengthening of the Commission Secretariat General. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the European regulatory state be managed? The European Union (EU) and its member states have looked at better regulation as a possible answer to this difficult question. This emerging public policy presents challenges to scholars of public management and administrative reforms, but also opportunities. In this conceptual article, we start from the problems created by the value-laden discourse used by policy-makers in this area, and provide a definition and a framework that are suitable for empirical/explanatory research. We then show how public administration scholars could usefully bring better regulation into their research agendas. To be more specific, we situate better regulation in the context of the academic debates on the New Public Management, the political control of bureaucracies, evidence-based policy, and the regulatory state in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the conceptual framework of Europeanisation, we trace the influence of the European Union (EU) on Italian politics by combining top-down analysis (that is, how Italy has adapted to pressure coming from Brussels) with a bottom-up examination of how Italian policy makers have encountered the EU in their attempts to pursue domestic policy goals. We find that the foreign policy orientation and policy preferences of the governing coalition determine the posture, style and choice of institutional venues. Taken together, bottom-up and top-down assessments of Europeanisation suggest that, during the second Berlusconi government, the influence of the EU in Italian politics was limited - although not trivial. When the Berlusconi government (2001-06) faced high pressure, it tried to reduce it at source rather than adapting to EU policies. By contrast, the centre-left governments (1996-2001) used pressure as a lever for policy change, while the governments of the 1980s responded to pressure by delaying implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article has three main objectives. Firstly, it seeks to re-formulate the debate on technocracy in the European Union by drawing upon the concept of the EU regulatory state as developed by Majone (1996). Secondly, it illustrates the limits and tensions of a once politicised technocratic policy-making process by tracing the formulation of media ownership regulation. Although media ownership policy has been presented by the European Commission as a typical regulatory policy, it has followed a more politicised path than previous EU regulatory policies. This implies that media ownership policy does not follow the model of technocratic regulation presented by Majone in his characterisation of the EU regulatory state. Thirdly, the paper contributes to the debate on EU regulation by suggesting a new typology of regulatory policies in the EU. In the conclusion, it is argued that politicisation (which includes inefficiency and prolonged conflict) may be the price that the EU is forced to pay in its progress toward a more democratic polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the process of regulatory reform in the European Union (EU). The main argument is that EU initiatives have been cast in a rather narrow conceptual framework, limited to issues such as simplification and better law-making. Although important, these issues are only a component of the wider task of governing regulation. Therefore I introduce and discuss three proposals for re-casting the debate on EU regulation. First, the focus should be shifted from ‘better law-making’ to ‘better regulatory policy-making’. Second, regulatory management, rather than simplification, should represent the strategic objective of EU institutions. Third, regulatory reform should be accompanied by administrative reform. Consequently, the relative impenetrability of the Commission to administrative reform represents a serious obstacle to regulatory reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]