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The relationship between evidence, governance and institutions in the pursuit of sustainable development is notoriously complicated. Studying organisations whose roles include managing boundaries between evidence and policy is one way to better understand this relationship. But in spite of the complexity, such organisations often appear - officially at least - to have rather limited remits, with very sharply drawn boundaries. This paper investigates this puzzle through study of the United Kingdom Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), established in 1997 to scrutinise government departments' efforts to integrate environment and sustainable development into policymaking. Gathering and deployment of evidence are critical to its work, and it is able to call as witnesses both members of the executive and experts from outside government. Drawing on Jasanoff's work on issue framing and boundaries, and Owens and Rayner's work on Royal Commissions, this paper employs a broad definition of boundary work to allow potential identification of multiple boundaries shaped by different sorts of boundary work. It investigates what boundaries are drawn, how, why and by whom. Through analysis of EAC reports, and elite interviews, the paper examines the context, consultation processes, roles played and influence of the EAC. The committee is found to play many roles, including analyst, forum for debate and political lever, all of which provide potential for influence on specific policies, and on the nature and space of political debate. The EAC shapes many boundaries using various mechanisms, both informal and institutionally-sanctioned. The rich and subtle variety of these boundaries, and different work carried out around them, confirms that a simple reading of the EAC's remit of government scrutiny falls short of understanding how it works in practice. The results vividly illustrate the politicised nature of sustainable development policy, and informs prospects for 'filling' any gap between evidence and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is widely recognised as a ‘wicked’ policy problem. Agreeing and implementing governance responses is proving extremely difficult. Policy makers in many jurisdictions now emphasise their ambition to govern using the best available evidence. One obvious source of such evidence is the evaluations of the performance of existing policies. But to what extent do these evaluations provide insights into the difficult dilemmas that governors typically encounter? We address this question by reviewing the content of 262 evaluation studies of European climate policies in the light of six kinds of dilemma found in the governance literature. We are interested in what these studies say about the performance of European climate policies and in their capacity to inform evidence-based policy-making. We find that the evaluations do arrive at common findings: that climate change is framed as a problem of market and/or state failure; that voluntary measures tend to be ineffective; that market-based instruments tend to be regressive; that EU-level policies have driven climate policies in the latecomer EU Member States; and that lack of monitoring and weak enforcement are major obstacles to effective policy implementation. However, we also conclude that the evidence base these studies represent is surprisingly weak for such a high profile area. There is too little systematic climate policy evaluation work in the EU to support systematic evidence-based policy making. This reduces the scope for sound policy making in the short run and is a constraint to policy learning in the longer term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With this paper we explore the potential of committees in parliamentary systems of government to influence environmental public policy making. We draw on delegation theory to argue that parliamentary committees are crucial ex post mechanisms used by the legislature (the principal) to monitor the activities of the executive (its agent). To examine this relationship in depth, we focus on the United Kingdom's Environmental Audit (select) Committee (EAC), which is an innovation as the world's first cross-cutting environmental parliamentary committee. We find that delegation theory provides fresh insights into the relationship between the EAC, the legislature, the executive, and the wider public. We find that an incomplete system of delegation in the United Kingdom has left an accountability deficit, meaning that the EAC's ability to exert influence on the executive's environmental policy is limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]