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Despite grand visions of a cosmopolitan planet living in peace, the first globalization at the turn of the 20th century descended into World War I as the old empires scrambled to preserve themselves as others sought self-determination. Powers on the losing end of that war reasserted themselves in yet another worldwide calamity within decades. After World War II, in the early 1950s, with the victorious American-led alliance in the driver's seat, institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods arrangements created a global stability that enabled peace, prosperity and the “rise of the rest.” In 2014, the world order is shifting again with the rise of China reviving in Asia the very kind of nationalist rivalries that led Europe to war twice in the 20th century. Will we be able to build new institutions that accommodate the new powershift without resorting to war, or will the second globalization collapse as well? Top strategists from the US, Japan and China respond to this momentous question.

There is no global mechanism that can guarantee security effectively in the face of the growing threat of political chaos, stemming from the recent political awakening of humanity.There is no global mechanism that can guarantee security effectively in the face of the growing threat of political chaos, stemming from the recent political awakening of humanity.

FROM 1917 TO 1945 THE USSR was the only state which claimed that it was actively engaged in building socialism on the basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. From about the late twenties to about 1956, the USSR subscribed to a pattern of practices and principles which had become known as "Stalinism" and which combined ideology and power in one total system for the building of socialism. It was this system embracing both norms and means that guided the social and political transformation of the East European countries which had more recently undertaken the task of such "socialist construction." Because of its prior claim and longer experience (arguments made more weighty by power) the USSR claimed to possess a peculiar insight into the workings of Stalinism. Soviet monopoly of this unity of theory and practice meant that anyone who criticized Stalinism could only do so on the basis of either ideology or power, but not both.' Thus in the case of the StalinTito rift of 1948, ideological trimmings to the dispute came only later. Tito had achieved his power by accepting and practicing Stalinism, and the Stalin-Tito rift revolved about, and was resolved on, the power plane. Gomulka failed in 1949 because his ideological opposition was divorced from effective power.2 In the

The experience of modern totalitarian regimes suggests that they are not likely to perish through internal revolt unless that occurs at a time when the totalitarian regime is in mortal danger from an external challenge, as in the marginal Italian case, or these the totalitarian movement in power is about to undertake decisive measures to turn the country into a totalitarian system, as in the case of the counter-revolution against Peron in Argentina. Other than that, and even considering the succession crises, modern totalitarian regimes have shown themselves capable of maintaining their totalitarian character in spite of domestic and foreign opposition. More recently it has been argued (e.g., by I. Deutscher, Russia: What Next) that modern totalitarian regimes, if not overthrown by external forces, will nevertheless in the end be quietly and inevitably transformed into more democratic states by the subtler but irresistible influence of rationality inherent in the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus that no modern state can do without. This proposition will be developed more fully and given critical consideration in subsequent pages in order to test whether rationality, regarded in this context as a certain mode of thought and behavior induced by the requirements of modern industrialized and bureaucratized societies, is in fact incompatible with modern totalitarianism.

Four basic and meaningful trends are currently developing in the Sino-Soviet bloc. A most important trend is the emergence of diversity within Communist unity. Stalinism was characterized by political and ideological uniformity, centralization, and homogeneity. Today, a far more complicated pattern of relations prevails. A second trend, related to the first, is the weakening of ideological unity and the decline of ideological zeal within the Communist bloc. A third trend involves the energetic development of the economic and political integration of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union remains an autarchic economy. Otherwise, efforts are being made to develop specialization in the economic development and production of the various Communist countries. This division of labor contributes to greater interdependence. The Asian states, to date, are not part of this joint economic enterprise. The fourth trend is a general sense of historical momentum reinforced, on dubious intellectual grounds, by Soviet technological, especially space, advances. The West should avoid premature and rash actions of either a provocative or an unnecessarily compromising character. Beyond that, it is in the Western interest to promote stability among those Communist elites already inclined toward moderation and greater radicalism among those which are more militant.

The policies of containment and of liberation were based on the premise that there is a united Soviet bloc. The purpose of containment was to prevent Soviet expansion; the purpose of liberation to roll back Communist frontiers. These policies have ceased to be relevant for the sixties. Today, the unity of the Communist camp is being strained by the increasingly open Sino-Soviet dispute.

The purge is inherent in the totalitarian system but it differs in form depending on circumstances and stage of development of the system. Ob jectives of a purge are: the cleansing of the party, the restoration of its vigor and monolithic unity, the elimination of enemies, and the establishment of the correctness of its line and the primacy of the leadership. Communist purges are of two types: purges whose content is programmatic and whose form is non violent, and purges whose content might or might not be programmatic and whose form is violent. In the satellites, purges were most violent in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. After Stalin's death during the "New Course" there followed a time of "anti-purge" purges which in some countries shook the foundation of Communist control. The dramatic events of fall 1956, however, again produced pressures for further purges.—Ed.

“WE ARE living in an age in which all roads lead to communism,” Molotov proclaimed confidently in 1947. Kaganovich re-echoed him in 1955 by maintaining that “if the nineteenth century was a century of capitalism, the twentieth century is a century of the triumph of socialism and communism.” This serenely optimistic viewpoint sees the victory of communism as all-inclusive, leaving no room for any mutual adjustment between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Indeed, the First Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita S. Khrushchev, has repeatedly made it clear that the concept of coexistence relates simply to a transitory phase prior to the final assertion of the Communist mode of life over the entire globe. It would be idle to dismiss these claims as mere expressions of blind fanaticism, for whatever the element of fanaticism in the thinking of Soviet leaders may be, such proclamations of faith in final victory are also supported by observation of recent trends in world affairs.

America is beginning to experience certain changes and in the course of so doing it is becoming a "technetronic" society: a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics, particularly computers and communications. The industrial process no longer is the principal determinant of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, and the values of society. America is in the midst of a transition. On the contrary, the instantaneous electronic intermeshing of mankind will make for an intense confrontation, straining social and international peace. The differences were "livable" because of time and distance that separated them. These differences are actually widening while technetronics are eliminating the two insulants of time and distance. The resulting trauma could create almost entirely different perspectives on life, with insecurity, envy, and hostility becoming the dominant emotions for increasingly large numbers of people.

THE Soviet attitude toward the development of European unity has been ambivalent in both politics and economics. The Kremlin, unable to interpret the European movement accurately, has oscillated from one reaction to another. Mean while the processes of change within the Communist world, intensified by the Sino-Soviet schism, were creating the precondi tions for a new historical relationship between the Western and the Eastern parts of the old Continent.

A MERICA was thrust into the world some 30 years ago. That A-\ jolting experience generated in America a degree of unity ** ^ concerning foreign affairs unusual for a democratic and pluralist society. Largely as a consequence of that shock, Amer ica's foreign policy came to enjoy for a quarter of a century the advantage of broad popular support and of a seeming sense of direction. Throughout much of that time, America's involvement in world affairs was characterized by an increasingly activist inter nationalism, by an idealistic optimism, and by a strong dose of populist Manichaeanism. The activist internationalism was in part a reaction to widely shared guilt feelings about America's earlier rejection of the League of Nations, and?as if to erase the past?America now became the most active promoter of interna tional undertakings. The idealistic optimism combined a strong faith in the eventual emergence of a world of united nations with an unprecedented degree of popular willingness to share Amer ica's bounty with others. The populist Manichaeanism reflected the propensity of the masses to demonize foreign affairs, a ten dency easily reinforced by the realities of Hitlerism and then of Stalinism. Both World War II and the subsequent cold war gave Amer ica's involvement in world affairs a clear focus. The objectives of foreign policy were relatively easy to define, and they could be imbued with high moral content. To be sure, periodic frustra tions in the conduct of the cold war prompted different Presi dents to define their policies and priorities in varying terms, but the essential character of America's involvement remained un changed. President Roosevelt focused public hopes on the "four freedoms," but the frustrations of Yalta?a case of unsuccessful Realpolitik at variance with the prevailing idealism?led not long afterward to President Truman's call for the containment of Stalinism and for the reconstruction of Europe. The frustra tions of the Korean War in turn led to President Eisenhower's "Crusade for Freedom," including even the goal of liberating Eastern Europe (and thus repudiating Yalta). U.S. passivity in

THE United States has never had a realistic and effective foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. During World War II the official American position was that the disposition of Eastern European problems should await the peace settle ment, but this was primarily a rationalization for a lack of policy. After the war, when the area became dominated by the Soviet Union (to some extent because of Western passivity), the Amer ican interest in Eastern Europe was overshadowed by the policy of containment. Containment was meant to halt further expan sion of Communism, but by its nature it had only indirect bear ing on areas already under Soviet domination. As a result, Soviet control of Eastern Europe was not seriously contested by the West during the period roughly from 1948 to 1953. The Eisen hower Administration then enunciated the policy of liberation. Subsequent events increasingly demonstrated the lack of realism and purpose behind this, and it soon became an empty slogan. The popular risings in East Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956 were the final nails in its coffin. Since 1956 there has been uncertainty about the goals and means of American policy toward Eastern Europe. It is by now fairly well agreed that the situation there is far more diverse than was the simple Stalinist pattern of uniformity. It is also recognized that the new situation offers both a challenge and a hope to the free world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to discuss the goals of American policy in Eastern Europe and the most effective means for pursuing them. In dealing with the Communist r?gimes in Eastern Europe, American policy must operate on two levels: it must consider the r?gimes as such and it must consider the peoples they rule. To focus on one alone distorts our appraisal and prevents us from taking advantage of existing opportunities. In dealing with areas outside their bloc, the Communists have always realized that in order for foreign policy to be successful it must operate simulta neously on more than one level. A dual policy is equally necessary for the United States.

THE dates May 22, 1947, and May 22, 1972, span exactly 25 years. On May 22, 1947, President Truman signed a congressional bill committing the United States to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet designs, and the United States thereby assumed overtly the direct leadership of the West in the containment of Soviet influence. Twenty-five years later to the day, another American President landed in Moscow, declaring to the Soviet leaders that "we meet at a moment when we can make peaceful cooperation a reality." Viewing the past 25 years of the cold war as a political process, this study seeks to evaluate the conduct of the two competitors and to draw some implications from the experience of a quarter? century's rivalry for the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. Its pur pose is thus neither to seek the causes of the cold war nor to assign moral or historical responsibility for it. To accomplish the above, two preliminary steps must be taken. The first is to identify the principal phases of the cold war, view ing it as a process of conflict and competition. The purpose of the periodization is to delineate phases of time in which the competi tive process was dominated by a discernible pattern of relations; in its simplest form, this involves identifying phases in which one or the other side seemed to hold the political initiative, either on the basis of a relatively crystallized strategy and/or through more assertive behavior. Second, it is necessary to focus on several dynamic components at work in the competitive process, the interaction of which shaped the relative performance of the two powers. Reference will be made within the several phases of the competition to the relative international standing of the two rivals, to their relative economic power, to their relative military power, and to the relative clarity and purposefulness of national policy, including the degree of domestic support for that policy. Finally, it must be acknowledged that this writer sees the cold war as more the product of lengthy and probably ineluc table historical forces and less as the result of human error and