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A prominent line of theories holds that proportional representation (PR) was introduced in many European democracies by a fragmented bloc of conservative parties seeking to preserve their legislative seat shares after franchise extension and industrialization increased the vote base of socialist parties. In contrast to this "seat-maximization" account, we focus on how PR affected party leaders' control over nominations, thereby enabling them to discipline their followers and build more cohesive parties. We explore this "party-building" account in the case of Norway, using roll call data from six reform proposals in 1919. We show that leaders were more likely to vote in favor of PR than rank-and-file members, even controlling for the parties' expected seat payoffs and the district-level socialist electoral threat facing individual legislators. Moreover, using within-legislator variation, we show that the internal cohesion of parties increased significantly after the introduction of PR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The method of candidate selection used by parties can influence a number of outcomes related to party organization and representation. In the past decade, Japan’s political parties have increasingly experimented with an ‘open recruitment’ system for selecting new candidates for national elections, but the degree of centralization in the process varies by party. We use candidate and voter survey data to assess whether the new system of recruitment has resulted in intraparty differences in the policy positions of candidates, and their distance from party supporters and the median voter. We find evidence that the new candidate selection method has resulted in the nomination of more centrist and urban-inclined candidates, an indication of greater responsiveness to voters, and that they exhibit higher levels of policy cohesion than their counterparts selected through traditional methods. However, these differences depend on the degree of party centralization in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]