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THE CHINESE "SELF-DEFENSE counterattack" into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) on February 17, 1979 may prove to be a turning point in -the history of the Marxist-Leninist movement. It was the first invasion of a communist country by another without any pretence of an ideological justification, or "invitation" by that country's people. Moreover, it flies in the face of the Maoist doctrine of Third World solidarity.1 Such long-ranging issues deserve careful consideration, and will be touched on in this article. The events are still so recent, however, and so many critical facts remain unknown, that the full political implications cannot yet be discerned. Instead, this article will concentrate on a single issue: What does the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 indicate about the military capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC)? This issue needs to be addressed, if for no other reason, because a widening circle of writers and decision-makers seem to regard the PRC as one leg of the global "superpower triangle."2 This study will consider three main topics: China's military-strategic objectives; the actual conduct of military operations; and, finally, what the military results indicate about Chinese military capabilities and prospects.

New administration under “Jimmie” Davis pledges itself to continue policies initiated by Governor Sam H. Jones; many unsolved problems offer challenge to new executive.

Professional Military Education (PME) in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a subject of political dispute since 1949. This chapter, however, concentrates on the ‘second revolution’ since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. This period has seen a return to many of the PME institutions of the 1950s, which were discontinued during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76).

B ETWEEN the exhortations of various federal agencies on the one hand and the execrations of certain Negro newspapers on the other, it is not easy to get very much precise information about the roles actually being played by colored workers in American business and industry. Particularly is this true in the South, where current manpower needs and government rulings come into conflict with many time-worn attitudes and practices. Our purpose is to summarize an investigation of selected aspects of this situation in the spring of 1943. New Orleans, the locale of the study, has a population of more than half-a-million, 30.1 per cent of its total being reported as colored in I940. A special census tabulation reveals that 32.59 per cent of the 177,312 persons employed in the city in March 1940 were Negroes. The employment of large numbers of Negroes affords, therefore, a wide range of situations for inquiry. The data presented have been obtained from I75 firms, employing a total of 44,740 persons, 8,306 of whom are Negroes. Since 68.o per cent of all Negro women employees in the city are in domestic service, and a great many Negro men are also employed as gardeners, etc. (not to mention those who are self-employed), our figures are by no means representative of all Negro workers. The firms sampled, however, are a reasonably adequate cross-section, both as to size and type of enterprise, of the more important kinds of business and industry in New Orleans.' To each of the firms a questionnaire was