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Southern politics is changing. Movers are altering the partisan and ideological landscapes of their new homes, where population growth spurs support for Democrats and greater progressivism. Stayers in communities vacated by these movers—often looking for better jobs and brighter economic futures—are changing as well. In many cases, these (largely white) communities are shifting in the conservative direction and are increasingly likely to vote Republican. As these dynamics alter the southern political landscape, the differences between high-growth areas and low-growth areas are only accelerating. Still the defining feature of southern politics, race relations are more complicated as the prominence of Latinos grows. Absent a wholesale reinvention of southern politics along the lines of class or (possibly) age, the current partisan trajectory does not bode well for Republicans. The COVID-19 pandemic will not change that.

Southern movers have both a direct and an indirect impact on the growth of Democratic attachment and support and the increase in geographic polarization within the region. Relatively young, well educated, and progressive, they have a straightforward direct political impact on the places to which they are moving and the places they have left. However, movers also influence the partisan and political orientations of their new neighbors and the neighbors they left behind. Based on “contact hypothesis” dynamics associated with their increased interaction with these progressive newcomers, long-term white residents (stayers) in high-growth areas become more progressive. Conversely, whites in the areas vacated by the young movers respond to the threat facing their declining communities with greater conservatism and an increased attachment to the Republican Party. These migratory effects—both direct and indirect (at least among whites)—undergird the political sea change occurring in present-day southern politics.

Just as at predicts movers influence the partisan attachments and ideological orientations of white stayers, movers and stayers theory leads us to expect stayers of color to respond to movers and the broader population growth (and decline) their migratory patterns produce. However, the effects on people of color are likely to be subtler than the effects among white stayers. Likewise, people of color are likely to respond differently to community decline than whites because their baseline attachments to the Democratic Party are much stronger. African American stayers in declining communities maintain their attachment to the Democratic Party rather than shifting toward the Democratic Party rather than the Republican Party. In high-growth areas, African American stayers also become more ideologically progressive. While results for Latinos are more muted, the strikingly large proportion of Latino stayers in high-growth communities—and high-growth states—suggests they will be an increasingly important facet of 21st-century southern politics.

Research on presidential greatness has a long history in the study of the American presidency. A prominent aspect of this literature is the study of presidential ratings generated from surveys of both experts and average Americans. A considerable body of research suggests that a relatively small number of factors—such as time in office, intellectual brilliance, and whether a president was assassinated—explain a great deal of the variation in the ratings. However, this list of variables includes no indicators of policy performance. We propose two such measures—one focusing on economic outcomes and one focusing on the outcomes of military conflict—and provide rationales for the hypothesized relationships between these measures of policy performance and presidential ratings. We find evidence of a substantial relationship between economic policy success and presidential ratings. However, there is no evidence of a relationship between foreign policy success and presidential ratings.

Theories involving coattails, surge and decline, presidential popularity, and the economy ascribe little importance to presidential efforts to influence congressional elections. Since such efforts do occur, we ask: What happens when a president campaigns for fellow partisans? We examined President George W. Bush's decisions to campaign for certain House candidates in 2002, and we assessed the effect of his visits on Republicans' electoral successes. Both the competitiveness of a race and the president's electoral self-interest increased the likelihood of a visit on behalf of a candidate. Neither party loyalty nor presidential support in Congress had an effect. We conclude that presidential campaign visits significantly enhance candidates' electoral prospects.

One important catalyst for the onset of the Civil War was the Presidential Election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. Lincoln, competing against three other candidates, won the election with the smallest percentage of the popular vote in American history. Given the circumstances, a slightly different electoral slate might have engineered his defeat. We examine this possibility by focusing on the candidacy of John C. Breckinridge, the final entrant into the race. Historians disagree over the rationale behind Breckinridge's candidacy. Some argue that it was a desperate effort to defeat Lincoln; others suggest that it was designed to insure Lincoln's victory. Using election counterfactuals and applying spatial voting theory, we examine these arguments. Our evidence suggests that Breckinridge had no reasonable chance to win. Support for Breckinridge's candidacy was only reasonable if the intention were to elect Lincoln.

A growing literature suggests that interminority conflict is an increasingly important component of interethnic/interracial dynamics. Interminority conflict theory predicts: (1) the spatial proximity of ethnic/racial groups is directly related to animosity between the groups and (2) interminority animosity will be greatest among the poorest segments of the population. Using data from the 1994 Los Angeles Times California Exit Poll and the U.S. Census, I evaluate these hypotheses in the context of African American voting on California's Proposition 187. The data provide no support for the interminority conflict perspective. Proximity to significant Asian populations tended to reduce African American support for 187, while proximity to significant Hispanic populations had no impact on vote choice. Similarly improvement in personal financial outlook was positively related to support for Proposition 187. These findings insinuate that interminority conflict-at the individual level-may by rarer than the interminority conflict literature suggests. One of the most contentious issues on the national political agenda is the issue of immigrant access to social services. The national-level prominence of this issue became manifest in the debate over the 1995 overhaul of the welfare system-particularly in the discussion, and subsequent passage, of restrictions on social service provision for documented and undocumented migrants. A harbinger of the migrant-related components of welfare reform was the 1994 passage of Proposition 187 in California-an initiative designed to bar undocumented migrant access to state-level social service programs, health care services (excepting emergency care), and public education at the elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels.1 Given the size of the migrant population in California-particularly the undocumented migrant population (Hernandez and Robinson 1995)-California's leadership in this area is not surprising. Just as disputes concerning immigration have strong racial/ethnic overtones (Edmonston and Passel 1994), the controversy over the provision of social services to migrants (documented and undocumented) is a racially charged issue. If more generous social policies foster further immigration, then those policies lead to an increase in the relative size of the Hispanic and Asian populations in the U.S. More conservative policies toward social service provision might reasonably be expected to check the relative advantage accruing to these population groups. Thus, the level of social services available to migrants may impact the racial/ ethnic composition of the U.S. population. Not surprisingly, the demographic impact of immigration policy decisions has significant political implications. As the relative size of the Asian and Hispanic populations increases, a redistribution of resources and government services from Anglos and Blacks to Asians and Hispanics is likely Likewise, some existing problems (e.g. unemployment) may be exacerbated. And the impact of immigration policies will not be limited to a specific set of restricted locales. Since states with large migrant populations also tend to have large populations in general (California, Texas, Florida, and New York, for example)-and thus control large numbers of electoral votes and seats in Congress-immigration policy choices will affect national politics. Given these circumstances, the demographic implications of immigration policy choices may foster and/or exacerbate interracial competition. Though much of the research on interracial dynamics focuses on interactions between minorities and Anglos (tiles 1977; tiles and Evans 1985, 1986; tiles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Key 1949; Sigelman et al. 1996; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Wright 1977), a growing body of literature examines the character of interminority interactions, particularly in what are considered "competitive" situations" (Falcon 1988; MacManus and Cassel 1982; McClain 1993; McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain and Tauber 1998; Meier and Stewart 1991; Oliver and Johnson 1984; Olzak 1992; Welch, Karnig, and Eribes 1983). …

Although scholars have studied the item veto and its effects-at the state-level-for years, there is considerable disagreement over the national-level political and fiscal ramifications of the implementation of the item veto. Our analysis is the first empirical examination of the use of the item veto at the federal level. We find that partisan politics and an interest in fiscal austerity played little or no role in the president' decision-making calculus on recent defense appropriations vetoes. Programmatic goals, on the other hand, played a significant role in determining whether or not projects were vetoed.

The Tea Party is the most significant political movement in 21st century American politics. First, it has had an extraordinary effect on the Republican Party. A boon to conservative Republicans, it has made life difficult for moderate Republicans, particularly those who are elected officials. Somewhat surprisingly, given the burgeoning literature on the mass-level Tea Party, the Tea Party in government has generated relatively less interest (or scholarship). And what research there is on the Tea Party in government suggests that the foundations of the movement in the mass public are not easily translatable into Tea Party legislators’ incentives or their actions (see, for example, Arceneaux and Nicholson 2011 and Gervais and Morris 2012). One reason for the dearth of research on the Tea Party in government is the difficulty associated with identifying which legislators are “true” Tea Party members. While Tea Party Caucus membership has been used to identify Tea Party members, it is a flawed measure, and now that it is dormant, it has lost even the limited usefulness it once had. In this paper, we address this limitation of the current literature. We use an array of different types of data to tap into a politician’s connection to the Tea Party. This data include campaign contributions from organizations explicitly tied to the Tea Party movement, endorsements from Tea Party organizations, and the prevalence of joint media references to individual politicians and the Tea Party. These data suggest that Tea Party attachment is a multi-dimensional variable. We label the various types of Tea Party supporters as Black Tea, Green Tea, White Tea, and Coffee, and we demonstrate that the ideological dispositions and institutional positions of members vary according to their type of Tea Party attachment. We conclude with a discussion of our future research and the significance of organized variation in Tea Party attachment for legislative policymaking.

Why do some Hispanic-Americans support ( Vente) and others oppose ( Quedate) the liberalization of immigration policies?1 In this study we attempt to ascertain which combination of demographic, attitudinal, and contextual factors determines Hispanic public opinion toward legal im migration. In a departure from previous research, we conduct an advanced multivariate analysis and utilize an existing national-level sample of His panics. While we find only limited evidence that Hispanic public opinion on immigration varies among nationalistic subgroups (e.g., Cuban-Ameri cans, Mexican-Americans, etc.), we do find that level of acculturation and perceived economic threat influence Hispanic opinion on legal im migration. We also find that Hispanics residing in areas with large illegal migrant populations, and those with more negative attitudes toward the impact of Hispanics on American society, tend to favor more restrictive immigration policies. Finally, we examine the implications of these find ings for future studies of public opinion toward immigration and for the development of immigration policy

Based on a nationally representative survey done in 2016, this article examines the attitudes and activities of agricultural and life science faculty at US land grant universities with respect to open access/open source versus commercialization of research. The findings reveal pervasive faculty support for open scientific inquiry and sharing of knowledge and relatively low levels of participation in and laboratory market funding associated with commercialization activities. These results point toward the potential timeliness of a reassessment of public universities policies and public relations with respect to open science and commercialization.

Currently, forty-eight states allocate Electors on a winner-take-all basis. Only Maine and Nebraska have a distinctive allocation mechanism, and in both of these cases, the winner of the state’s popular vote receives two Electors (those representing the senators) and the remaining Electors are distributed according to the popular vote in each of the congressional districts. This paper focuses on the political implications — historical, current, and future — of the adoption of the Congressional district allocation procedure by all of the states. We begin by assessing the historical impact of an ex ante universal adoption of the Maine-Nebraska allocation rule by all fifty states during the post-World War II era. After estimating the effect of this institutional change on the outcome of each election, we identify those districts and states which would have been the “battleground” constituencies for each election. We then assess the number and location of each of the battleground areas. We are particularly interested in the geographic dispersion of battleground districts relative to battleground states. We present data on this dispersion for recent elections and discuss the electoral implications of this dispersion in the context of widespread use of the Congressional district allocation procedure.

Research on the historic relationship between Congress and the president is often dominated by a focus on interparty conflict, and this conflict has become more prevalent in recent years because of the increasing frequency of divided government. One of the presumptive effects of interparty conflict during periods of divided government is “gridlock” – a significant obstruction to the development and passage of significant legislation of any type (see Gilmour 1995). Recently, however, the divided government explanation for gridlock has come under significantly more analytical scrutiny, and the most recent and thorough research on the causes of gridlock have produced a puzzling result: the absence of a relationship between partisan control of the legislative and executive branches and legislative productivity. In short, prominent recent research (Mayhew 1991) suggests that the rate of development and passage of significant/major legislation is the same during periods of divided government as it is during periods of united government. For those who take partisan conflict seriously, this is a puzzling result. Likewise, if partisan relationships are the foundation of presidential power (as Skowronek suggests), these results are a puzzle that must be solved. With this puzzle in mind, let us take a closer look at the recent research on interparty conflict and relations between Congress and the president. After we review this literature, we will return to this puzzle and identify several relevant research questions and some hypothetical answers to those research questions.

The October 2008 edition of the journal PS: Political Science and Politics included a symposium entitled “Forecasting the 2008 National Elections.” This symposium included a set of articles in which more than a dozen political scientists predicted the outcome of the presidential election (who would win and by what percentage of the popular vote). Though the articles were published in October, because of the time necessary to review and edit the manuscripts and prepare them for publication, they were all completed by the middle of the summer. In fact, all of the data on which the predictions were based was available prior to Labor Day, the traditional beginning of the general election campaigns. This is important because it indicates that all of the predictions in each of the articles preceded the beginning of the general election, so neither the general election campaign of then-Senator Obama nor Senator McCain influenced the results or predictions in any way. As each article included its own particular model for predicting the partisan distribution of the popular vote, it should come as no surprise that there was some variation in the predictions. While some symposium participants thought the election would result in a relatively easy victory for Obama (see Abramowitz 2008, Holbrook 2008), others thought Obama would win in a nailbiter (see Cuzan and Bundrick 2008; Norpoth 2008). The editor of the symposium, James Campbell, actually predicted a very close McCain victory.

During the second term, particularly the latter part of the second term, of George W. Bush's administration, the content of the Bush “legacy” frequently arose as a topic of conversation among political pundits and as the focus for op-ed pieces in major national newspapers. Political scientists and legal scholars were also interested in the potential role of the second Bush administration in charting the future ideological course of the Supreme Court. Initial returns suggest that there is a wide perception that George W. Bush's influence on the Court will be felt for quite some time. According to David Yalof, a prominent student of the relationship between the presidency and the judiciary: As George W. Bush approaches the final year of his presidency, pundits are considering what legacy the 43rd president will leave to the nation.… one area where scholars are in a better position right now to assess the Bush legacy is his impact on the federal judiciary and, indirectly, on the state of constitutional law. Stated simply, George W. Bush may have done more to transform the constitutional landscape in a conservative direction than any president in the past century, including Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon. (2007) This characterization of Bush's legacy is not unique to Yalof; it is an increasingly common contention among scholars and journalists from both the right and the left. Maggie Barron argues that Bush's final State of the Union address: … was about legacy-building. But the President spent only a moment of his hour-long speech on a subject that could be his most enduring legacy of all, one that will have an impact long after troops are out of Iraq and the housing market has recovered – the makeup of the judicial branch.[2008]

Throughout this text, I presume a basic knowledge of American politics. Political science majors who have taken an introductory course in American government should have this basic knowledge. Most readers will have taken other courses in American government – courses on Congress, interest groups, voting, parties, the Court, public policy – and the information and insight you have gained in these other courses will serve you well as you study the presidency. However, a scientific study of the presidency requires a substantive background rarely taught outside of courses specifically focused on the presidency and the executive branch. I present some of the more detailed background information in the chapters that follow; this chapter includes the most fundamental aspects of that background knowledge – the “nuts and bolts” of the presidency. The organization of this chapter largely mirrors the overall organization of the book. After an introductory section focusing on the Founding era – especially the Founders disagreements over the character and scope of presidential power – there are relatively brief informational sections on each of the following: 1. the historical development of the office of the presidency including a discussion of presidential powers (both formal and informal) 2. the selection process 3. presidential relations with Congress 4. presidential relations with the Supreme Court 5. the broader Executive branch 6. the president's role in foreign policy making 7. the president's role in economic policy making Each of these sections includes information that will support your mastery of the related material included in subsequent chapters.

(1990). GDR Economic Policy during the Honecker Era. Eastern European Economics: Vol. 29, The Last Days of Socialism in the GDR, pp. 5-29.

Since 1960, no area of the country has undergone greater political change than the South. One of the manifestations of this political transformation is a significant liberalization in the roll call voting behavior of Southern Democrats. The two most prominent explanations for this behavioral shift take a spatial perspective. One focuses on the leftward pull of an increasingly liberal Democratic constituency (due to the mobilization of black voters)-"constituency-pull" liberalism, and the second focuses on the leftward push of an increasingly powerful Republican Party-"opponent-push" liberalism. In contrast, we hypothesize that the liberalization of Democratic Senators from the South was a result of the interaction between the rise of the Republican Party and the mobilization of the black electorate. Using data for Southem Senators and states from 1960 to 1995, we implement a time series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis to evaluate the competing explanations. We show that the liberalization of voting pattems was a direct result of the joint growth of the Republican Party and the black electorate. Clearly, the effects of the opponent-push and constituency-pull dynamics are interdependent. As the first time series cross-sectional analysis of the effect of black mobilization and Republican strength on Southem Democratic Senators, this research contributes to the study of Southem politics, party systems, and the dynamics of legislative representation in a democratic system.