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The key idea of this article is that, for the first time, on the example of the domestic and foreign policy of the Canadian Liberals, led by Justin Trudeau, we discuss the problems and prospects of Canadian Liberalism. The recent defeat of the Conservative Party of Canada in the 2019 parliamentary elections gave the impression that only the Liberal Party contributes to the prosperity of the modern Canadian state. The closest attention to the activities of the Liberal Party allows us to identify its absolute advantages and corresponding shortcomings. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyze and investigate both the indisputable advantages and current shortcomings of the Liberal Party in power, and against this background to determine the effectiveness, or vice versa, the incompetence of Canadian liberalism as a political ideology. At the same time, according to the author, it is necessary to separate objective and subjective factors associated with the presence of liberals in power. The objective ones are related to how the Liberals program settings meet the needs of the time, while the subjective ones characterize how an individual, and, above all, the party leader, implements the partys requests and the electorates hopes. In this regard, the reputation of its leader is of crucial importance. On the basis of the considered source base, and, first of all, the electoral programs of Liberals under Trudeau, since coming to power in 2015. In the first part of the article, the author presents a comparative analysis of the results of the liberals in the parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2019, explaining the reasons for the victory of the latter, and obtaining, respectively, a parliamentary majority, and then a minority. The second part of the article is devoted directly to the aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Liberals in 2015-2020. The author comes to the conclusion that the Canadian liberalism, implemented by Justin Trudeau is currently the leading political ideology that unites a significant part of the electorate.

Background: This study focuses on the representation of Syrian refugees in Canadian online news media. It examines 375 articles selected from three of the most visited Canadian news sites, namely the Toronto Star, which favours the Liberal Party, and the Toronto Sun and National Post, which favour the Conservative Party. Analysis: The basis of this research is a topoi analysis, whereby instances of the topos of burdening are identified, examined, and categorized as either positive or negative. Conclusion and implications: A distinction is drawn between the depiction of Syrian refugees in conservative- and liberal-leaning news sources. The findings aim to provide some insight into the possible impact of media representation on both the Syrian refugees and the Canadian public. Contexte: Cette etude porte sur la representation des refugies syriens dans les medias d’information canadiens en ligne. Elle examine 375 articles choisis a partir de trois des sites de nouvelles canadiens les plus visites, a savoir le Toronto Star, partisan du Parti liberal, le Toronto Sun et le National Post, partisans du Parti conservateur. Analyse: Cette recherche se fonde sur l’analyse de topoi pour identifier, examiner et categoriser des topos sur les fardeaux comme etant positif ou negatifs. Conclusion et implications: Cette etude etablit une distinction entre la maniere dont les sources de nouvelles a tendance conservatrice depeignent les refugies syriens et la maniere dont les sources a tendance liberale le font. L’objectif est de mieux comprendre l’impact possible des representations mediatiques sur les refugies syriens ainsi que sur le public canadien.

At the turn of the 20th century, the Palace of Westminster became the witness to one of the most significant and long-lasting power struggles between the Houses of Parliament regarding the influence of each chamber on the implementation of the legislative function in the parliamentary procedure. This paper, written as part of broader studies on the internal transformations of the British Parliament, presents the social and political background of the supremacy war that was openly waged between two political forces, i.e., the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, reinforced by their respective tactical allies. An attempt is also made to discuss the legal result of the dispute, which notably came in the form of “The Parliament Act 1911”, as well as to trace – based on the current state of knowledge and the preserved shorthand notes and transcripts of parliamentary speeches – the general climate of this conflict and its social and political contours.

Tras casi una decada de gobiernos conservadores en Canadá, en 2015 regresó al poder el Partido Liberal, encabezado por Justin Trudeau. La victoria alcanzada con un amplio margen de apoyo le permitió implementar una agenda progresista, que contemplaba entre sus prioridades impulsar la igualdad de género de manera transversal, lo que llevó –entre otras cosas– al desarrollo de una política exterior feminista (PEF). El propósito de este artículo es analizar la conceptualización, instrumentación y resultados de esta iniciativa canadiense, a fin de identificar lecciones que puedan ser de utilidad para México, a un año del lanzamiento de su propia PEF.

espanolEn Regeneracion, los anarquistas del Partido Liberal Mexicano, de 1911 a 1918, llamaron al proletariado estadounidense y europeo a realizar una revolucion mundial que terminara con el capitalismo y toda forma de autoridad. Su pretension era formar conscientes que expropiaran todos los medios de produccion, por lo que permanecieron en Los Angeles, California, donde tenian las condiciones para editar Regeneracion y tener multiples contactos con la prensa acrata de Estados Unidos y Europa. Basados en la mencionada publicacion, se demuestra que concibieron su actividad como parte de la lucha revolucionaria anarquista que ya habia empezado en Mexico y buscaron la ayuda de los trabajadores del mundo, tanto para que arribaran a nuestro pais como para expandir las expropiaciones en el orbe. Los anarquistas del Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) han sido analizados solo como parte del proceso revolucionario en Mexico. Desde ese angulo se han conformado una serie de afirmaciones sobre su actuacion, mismas que se han convertido en un espacio comun acerca de sus intenciones revolucionarias. Sin embargo, no se aborda su llamado insistente a la revolucion mundial, lo que obliga a una interpretacion mas compleja, que no se apega a las limitadas explicaciones que surgieron en la posrevolucion. EnglishIn Regeneracion, the anarchists of the Mexican Liberal Party, from 1911 to 1918, called on the American and European proletariat to carry out a world revolution that would end capitalism and all forms of authority. Their intention was to make them aware that they would expropriate all the means of production, so they stayed in Los Angeles, California, where they had the conditions to edit Regeneracion and have multiple contacts with the acrat press in the United States and Europe. Based on the aforementioned publication, it is shown that they conceived their activity as part of the anarchist revolutionary struggle that had already begun in Mexico and sought the help of the workers of the world, both to arrive in our country and to expand expropriations in the world. The anarchists of the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) have been analyzed as part of the revolutionary process in Mexico. From that angle, a series of statements about his performance have been made, which have become a common space about his revolutionary intentions. However, their insistent call for world revolution is not addressed, forcing a more complex interpretation that does not adhere to the limited explanations that emerged in the post-revolution.

In the aftermath of the 2019 election, the re-election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals brought out a significant amount of regional tension, in particular in the West. Trudeau, it was claimed, and those in the Liberal Party more generally, represented a central Canadian “Laurentian elite,” which did not care about Western Canadian or other regional interests. This article takes stock of this claim. To do so, it will examine the history of the “Laurentian elite” concept to clarify the idea. It argues that indeed, the Trudeau Liberals have governed as classic representatives of the “Laurentian consensus” on what is “good” for Canada, a consensus that reflects a broader philosophy on how to govern the state. This philosophy focuses on protecting key central Canadian economic interests (for example, dairy farmers and manufacturers like SNC Lavalin or Bombardier), while also supporting free trade in other sectors less important to the central Canadian economy (such as defending oil exports through the new NAFTA agreement). Other examples of Trudeau’s commitment to the Laurentian consensus include a more cooperative federalism (such as in immigration and labour market policy), more money for social programs (the Canada Child Benefit, CPP enhancement, and possible Pharmacare), expanding individual rights and liberties (cannabis legalization, opposition to Quebec’s Bill 21), and the promotion of official language communities. The paper will conclude with a brief contrast with the policies of Trudeau’s predecessor Stephen Harper, to find that while the prior Conservative government did not pursue a Laurentian agenda per se, Prime Minister Stephen Harper himself must nevertheless be seen as closely aligned with the “consensus” as well. Suite à l’élection de 2019, la victoire des Libéraux de Justin Trudeau a révélé des tensions régionales significatives, en particulier dans l’Ouest. Elles venaient du sentiment que Trudeau, et le Parti libéral en général, représentait le point de vue d’une élite « laurentienne » basée au centre du Canada, qui se souciait peu des intérêts de l’ouest du Canada et des autres régions. Cet article entend examiner cette affirmation. Pour ce faire, il présentera l’histoire du concept d’élite « laurentienne » pour le clarifier, montrant qu’en effet, les Libéraux de Trudeau ont gouverné comme des représentants classiques du « consensus laurentien » sur ce qui est bon pour le Canada, consensus qui reflète une philosophie plus large du gouvernement de l’État. Cette philosophie donne la priorité à la protection d’intérêts économiques clés du centre du Canada (comme le secteur laitier et les groupes industriels comme SNC-Lavalin et Bombardier), tout en soutenant le libre échange dans d’autres domaines moins importants pour l’économie du centre du Canada (par exemple, la défense des exportations pétrolières via la nouvelle version de l’ALENA). D’autres exemples de l’adhésion de Trudeau au consensus laurentien incluent un fédéralisme plus coopératif (par exemple, pour l’immigration et la politique du marché du travail), plus d’argent pour les programmes sociaux (création de l’Allocation canadienne pour enfants, augmentation de la Pension de retraite du RPC, et peut-être Pharmacare), un élargissement des droits et libertés individuels (légalisation du cannabis, opposition à la Loi 21 du Québec), et la promotion des communautés de langues officielles. L’article conclura par une brève comparaison avec les politiques menées par le prédécesseur de Trudeau pour montrer que, bien que le gouvernent conservateur précédent n’ait pas adhéré à un programme laurentien en soi, le Premier ministre Stephen Harper n’a pas véritablement remis en cause le consensus.

This paper tackles the issue of analyst bias in performance of comparative political analyses on political discourse, by leveraging data and machine-learning over human prior knowledge. The case studied is characterization of the issue of migration in the Croatian political discourse, which was chosen arbitrarily. We developed a machine-learning system that identifies most prominent features in the Croatian political discourse, with regards to migration and were interested solo in comparative political analysis in political science. This system does not rely on human judgement on the part of the researchers, and can be thus considered to be “objective”, short of possible sampling or selection bias. It is replicable. If provided, the same dataset and algorithm used, same conclusions should be reached by any scientist. This result was achieved by creating a text corpus from news items and press releases extracted from the websites of Croatian political parties currently represented in the Parliament. Available and collected data consist of public announcements mainly from IDS (Istarski Demokratski Sabor / Istrian Democratic Assambly), SDSS (Samostalna Demokratska Srpska Stranka / Independed Democratic Serb Party) and HSLS (Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka / Croatian Social Liberal Party). Data analyzed suggests three dominant phrases of the research process. All political parties had similar political stand towards pointed out issues. Three most significant phrases were determined. First phrase is related to words “Demography” and “Reduction” and finding suggest that most analyzed articles relates towards migration of Croatian citizens in connection to economic hardships of some kind. Phrase two is related to words “Border” and “Croatia-Serbia” which strongly indicates relation to migration and is related towards inter-Balkan migration, mostly connected with consequences of the Croatian War of Independence from 1990’s, and is of most interest to SDSS, a Serb minority party in Croatia. Phrase three is related towards Marrakesh Agreement (Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration), where most of analyzed data shows that parties have a constructive but ambivalent stance towards migration from the third countries. Research conducted on available data, shows that wide spread international migration is not in the focus of most Croatian political parties, while topics and interest for inter-Balkan and Croatian economic/political migration dominates Croatian political spectre

Overview Having ended 2019 looking more stable than at any time since the 2018 Tasmanian election, the Liberal government was again shaken by the sudden resignation of Premier Will Hodgman in January. Treasurer Peter Gutwein won a two-way contest with State Growth Minister Michael Ferguson for the premiership and had little time to settle into the job. As with all other jurisdictions, Tasmanian politics were upended by the impact of the coronavirus pandemic during the half-year to the end of June. However, fresh leadership of the governing Liberal Party in January combined with the emerging health crisis in March helped tighten the government’s authority and popularity.

The aim of the article is to introduce into international scientific circulation "Journals of Congresses of Farmers of Chernihiv Province" - an important source on the history of the Zemstvo liberal movement in northern Left Bank Ukraine.The methodological basis of the work was content analysis, principles of scientific synthesis, generalization and comprehensiveness. The scientific novelty of the work is that, in fact, for the first time in historiography, the question of the urgent need to study the agrarian question in the activities of the provincial nobility Liberal Party of Northern Ukraine as an organic and integral part of economic policy of this political current in the liberation movement of the Russian Empire Reforms Conclusions. The author of the article came to the conclusion that the found "Journals of Congresses of Farmers of the Chernihiv Province" reveal the essence of the agrarian policy of the opposition aristocratic front of the region. Content analysis of magazine protocols shows that congresses of farmers, in the conditions of extremely short liberalization of public life of the Russian Empire in the early 80s of the XIX century, became an effective tool in forming the foundations of agrarian policy and economic programs of the provincial nobility Liberal Party of Northern Ukraine. The agrarian question occupied, though not the leading, but a proper place in the coordinate system of the economic program of provincial nobility liberalism. It should be acknowledged that the opposition aristocratic front of the region before the provincial nobility counter-reform of 1890 considered it premature to pose the problem of fundamental modernization of the agrarian system of the Russian Empire: both because of the policy of industrial protectionism of the supreme power, and because of the financial incompleteness of the peasant reform of Olexander II.

This article reassesses the electoral decline of British Liberalism in the 1920s, especially the catastrophic defeat of 1924. A leading explanation for this disaster is that the Liberals were ‘fighting to lose’ by leaving nearly 250 constituencies uncontested. David Lloyd George is widely seen as deliberately seeking to destroy his party by refusing to finance candidates through his infamous ‘fund’, so he could lead what remained after electoral evisceration. His actions are widely credited with stymieing prospects of a Liberal recovery in the next election, 1929, which confirmed the party's permanent replacement by Labour. Through a wide-ranging statistical reanalysis, supported by a study of grassroots constituency campaigns, this article argues that the lack of candidates was a negligible contributor either to Liberal annihilation in 1924, or to Liberal failure to recover in 1929. The sharply deteriorating health of the party was already felt keenly at the grassroots before, not after, the seemingly freak result of 1924 was known. We thus argue that, contrary to the judgement of historians and contemporaries, the 1924 result represented the truer reflection of the party's fundamental interwar strength, with 1923 the exception. The inaction of Lloyd George in 1924 thus can be interpreted as pragmatic rather than Machiavellian.

The Quebec provincial election of October 2018 marked the end of an era. It saw the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) suffer the worst defeat of its history and the election of agovernment, the first in a...

Overview The second half of 2019 saw improved fortunes for the governing Liberals in the state parliament, and a further decline in prospects for Labor, while the two Greens maintained their high profile by challenging the government, especially on its development plans in environmentally sensitive areas. A reshuffle at the end of June designed to inject new blood and vigour into the Hodgman ministry did little to mend a fractious relationship with rebel Liberal speaker Sue Hickey or to quell the considerable instability within the parliamentary Liberal Party that was a hallmark of the first six months of 2019. Against a background of a booming economy, hospitals and housing continued as major social issues and Premier Will Hodgman earned criticism from Liberal insiders for failing to make more progress on conservative economic development and social policies. Despite that, the government emerged looking more stable towards the end of the year after a substantial shift in the dynamics of parliament. This followed a surprise resignation by Shadow Treasurer Scott Bacon and the election in his place of former Labor MP-turned conservative independent Madeleine Ogilvie, whose parliamentary support gave the government some key legislative wins.

Jair Bolsonaro's victory in the 2018 elections is the result of numerous factors, including the action of fractions of the Brazilian business community. This article analyzes entrepreneurs that contributed to the election of the candidate of the Social Liberal Party, as well as their contributions to candidates for the House of Representatives. In the beginning of the 20th century, the practice of entrepreneurs supporting their representatives in the political world with the purpose of obtaining economic benefits became common. Bolsonaro received support from the business community, and his government has rewarded them with favorable public policies, as well as the appointment of some of them to important positions. These contributions, responsible for the candidate's growth in the campaign, took place through donations, coercion, fake news and indirect support. The survey was carried out in the press and on the websites of the Superior Electoral Court and the Federal Prosecutor Office for Labor Relations.

From 1970 to 2018, either the Quebec Liberal Party or the Parti Quebecois won the elections in Quebec. The Coalition Avenir Quebec ended this long period of bipartisan alternation by winning a majority of seats in the 2018 election. Using datasets that cover five elections (2007, 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2018) over a period of 11 years, we provide a unique longitudinal perspective of citizens’ vote choice calculus. More specifically, we analyse long-term factors that are known to be crucial to make sense of electoral outcomes. Do factors such as generations, sex, attitudes towards Quebec sovereignty and party identification have the same weight in voters’ calculus over time? Our results show a relative stability, but also several interesting variations, especially regarding the effect of support for Quebec independence. This perspective deepens our understanding of recent political developments in Quebec politics.

The Swiss federal elections of 20 October 2019 were a major success for the green parties. The Green Party (GPS) won 13.2% and the Green Liberal Party (GLP) 7.8% of the votes. The two green forces ...

The 2018 Ontario provincial election marked a decisive shift in the political direction of Canada’s most populous province. The election brought an end to the long reign of the Ontario Liberal Party (2003–2018), whose government devolved into a series of scandals that resulted in a third-place finish. The Liberal’s defeat came at the hands of the Progressive Conservative Party led by former Toronto city councillor, Doug Ford. The Progressive Conservative’s victory was propelled on the back of Ford’s deeply populist campaign where he promised to reassert the interests of ‘the people,’ expel the influence of elites and special interests, and clean up government corruption. This campaign discourse led many political opponents and media pundits to accuse Ford of importing the nativist, xenophobic, and divisive rhetoric of other radical right-wing populist leaders. This article advances the argument that rather than representing the importation of ‘Trumpism’ or other types of radical right-wing populism, Ford’s campaign is better understood within the tradition of Canadian populism defined by an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism. In appealing to voters, Ford avoided the nativist and xenophobic rhetoric of populist leaders in the United States and Western Europe, offering a conception of ‘the people’ using an economic and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centred upon middle class taxpayers. This article makes a contribution to both the literatures on Canadian elections and populism, demonstrating the lineage of Ford’s ideological commitment to populism within recent Canadian electoral history, as well as Ford’s place within the international genealogy of right-wing populism.

Since 2008, when Barack Obama won the United States election thanks to Facebook, that success model has been improved year by year, and at present Social Media has become the main channel of communication in electoral campaigns, ahead of traditional media (TV, radio, newspapers). The novelty of this communication mechanism can be described by decentralizing the communication to social groups of online opinion leaders and eliminating the horizontal dimension, in which mass-media and political actors played fundamental roles in disseminating the political message to the public. In Social Media, the message is decentralized from source (political actor's Facebook page) by some ordinary users, which in time become influential leaders in the virtual environment. Moreover, political parties that managed to mobilize most fans to disseminate political information in their social groups (strong and weak links) managed to achieve better electoral scores. Our study focused on analyzing the campaign on Facebook in the electoral campaign of the main three parties in Romania, which won the most mandates in the European Parliament: the National Liberal Party (yellow), the Social Democratic Party (red) and the Union "Save Romania" (blue). The election campaign took place from 27 April 2019 to 25 May 2019 and the voting day was on 26 May 2019.

Introduction. Purpose. Among the numerous programmatic principles of the Zemstvo liberal movement in the north of the Left Bank of Ukraine (60-80s of the XIX century) - an extremely relevant but little-studied problem of Ukrainian historical science, one of the least studied is the ethno-confessional policy of liberal Zemstvos of northern Ukraine. question ‘‘ in the Russian Empire. Since the representatives of the opposition front of the Northern Left Bank did not leave the descendants of the printed work, which was specifically devoted to this topic, it is very difficult to talk about its holistic vision of the Zemstvo liberation movement in the Russian Empire. Thus, the article attempts to crystallize the basic contours of the vision of the members of the progressive party on the “Ukrainian question”, using the historical sources we have found. Results. Conclusion. The article, based on little-known and little-studied sources, shows the vision of the Zemstvo liberals of northern Ukraine on the “Ukrainian question” in the Russian Empire in the 60-80s of the XIX century. The author’s detailed analysis of historical documents showed that members of the Zemstvo opposition of the Northern Left Bank had formed a position on this issue at the beginning of their ascetic work. Archival sources convincingly prove that the “Ukrainian question” took its rightful place in the system of values and guidelines of the Zemstvo Liberal Party of Northern Ukraine. And although economic and social problems were dominant in the programmatic principles of the opposition aristocratic front, the Ukrainian cause did not find itself outside the coordinate system of ethno-confessional policy and the integral humanitarian program of the studied liberation movement in the Russian Empire. Even in the context of the functioning of anti-Ukrainian legislation in the Russian Empire, the Zemstvo Liberal Party of Northern Ukraine, risking its political future, continued to work for the good of the Ukrainian cause. Using legal and legitimate legal principles, basic laws of pedagogy and linguistics, advanced achievements of statistical science, which were difficult to oppose, progressive Zemstvos managed to systematically ask for the needs of Ukrainian-language educational literature and the need for at least primary education in their native Russian language. despotism was undoubtedly a civic feat.

Australian Governments’ Stance on Illegal Immigration in 1996–2018 Australia is well known for its strict immigration policy. It results from the country’s constant struggle with the flow of illegal migrants, brought to Australian shores through human smuggling. The author analyses immigration policies of five Prime Ministers representing two major Australian parties: the Liberal Party of Australia and the Australian Labor Party. Starting with the premiership of John Howard (1996–2007), and ending with Malcolm Turnbull’s era (2015– –2018), the author examines the situation of illegal immigrants in Australia and changes in immigration and asylum policies.

In recent years centrist-liberal parties, such as the German Free Democratic Party (FDP) in 2013 and the British Liberal Democrats in 2015 and 2017, suffered enormous electoral defeats. These defeats highlight a prominent puzzle in the study of party competition and voting behavior; the empty center phenomenon. That is, empirical evidence suggests that most parties do not converge to the median voter's position, despite the centripetal force of the voters’ preference distribution. Using survey data from Canada, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom, this article shows that deterioration of centrist parties’ valence image is followed by a collapse of their vote shares. Using mathematical simulations, this article shows that centrist parties have limited strategic opportunities to regain their support. Differently from other parties, centrist parties cannot alter their policy platforms to compensate for their deteriorated valence image. These results have important implications for political representation and voters–elite linkages.

Here, we examine the understudied merger of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. This systematic study of the process which created the Liberal Democrats in 1988 adds to our understanding of what was a rare but important event in British politics. We demonstrate that it deviated from theoretical accounts of such mergers that stress the need for trust at the elite level. We recognise that inter-party trust can instead develop across the three faces of party organisation. We contribute a new typology for understanding these processes, and argue that existing studies are right to highlight that trust between the party in public office is important but wrong to conclude that its absence precludes mergers from occurring. Instead, we find that a lack of trust between parties in public office restricts the degree of delegation and increases the level of monitoring and formalisation, which can have damaging effects on the parties that emerge.

On 19 October 2015 the Liberal Party of Canada won the general election and Justin Trudeau became Canada’s 23rd prime minister. During both the political campaign and the period after the election,...

Examined in this article is a core power group which supported and sustained Rhee Syngman’s one-man ruling of the country in the late 1950s. So far, this issue was mostly examined within studies that focused on the ruling party Jayu-dang(Liberal Party). According to those studies, coming into the late 1950s an oligarchy-type elite group -composed of several officials including Yi Ki-bung was formed within the Liberal Party, and from 1959 till the next year(when the regime collapsed), the party practically run the country from a dominant status, even sidelining the executive(administrative) branch. This kind of approach allowed us to view the Liberal Party which had only been considered as a tool for Rhee Syngman’s governing so far as yet another political entity that composed the very structure of governance. Yet at the same time, such studies -which also tended to ‘narrow’ the examination to the Liberal Party itself- ended up only discussing whether the party was able to serve as an actual ruling party or not, or emphasizing the existence of oligarchic elite group connecting the party and the cabinet and the expansion of the party"s influence in the operation of the state. In this article a larger focus will be placed on all three sources of power: the Liberal Party, the government’s Cabinet and the Presidential residence, Gyeongmudae[secretariat]. How they connected themselves with each other, and functioned within a singular structure, will be examined. Results indicate that there was a core power group -with Yi Ki-bung at the center- that connected all the above three sources, featuring a radial human network originating from Yi. Also confirmed is that there was a limit to the party’s control over the cabinet, and that the party and the cabinet had quite a ‘checks and balance’ sort of dynamic between them.

This article explores the crisis within the Conservative Party in 1922 over the continuation of the coalition with Lloyd George's section of the Liberal Party, focusing on the actions of the Conservative chief whip, Leslie Wilson. Previously unused papers relating to Wilson's career shed new light on his role in the fall of the coalition. Wilson co‐ordinated opposition to the continuation of the coalition in its existing form, helping to solidify the group of junior ministers opposed to Lloyd George into a cohesive and powerful faction, which then forced the Conservative Party leader, Austen Chamberlain, into making concessions. Above all, Wilson was influential in forcing Chamberlain to agree to a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, at which the rebels won a decisive victory, causing the resignation of Chamberlain as party leader and Lloyd George as prime minister, in one of the most important events in modern British political history.

It is a paradox that the Liberal Party's electoral defeat in 1841 attested to its underlying strength and vitality. This article focuses on the impact on party unity of the free trade measures advocated by the ministry in the months preceding its fall. The Liberal Party's bold electoral platform antagonised its protectionist MPs, a group previously overlooked in the historiography, but fell short of the demands of its radical wing for political reform. While all the ingredients for fragmentation existed, unity prevailed. Protestations of loyalty to the leadership could be heard from the mouths of Liberal MPs of all shades, from stalwart protectionists who coalesced around the ministry on traditional foreign policy grounds through to the most fervent radicals who celebrated its ‘new’ direction. Such findings of cohesion contradict accounts which have hitherto viewed the 1841 electoral defeat as evidence of the party's inchoateness. Indeed, this article shifts the historiographical narrative away from addressing why the Liberals lost to the more pertinent issue of why the losses suffered were not greater. In answering that question, both the sensitivity with which the financial agenda was presented by ministers and the flexibility of different sections of the Liberal Party in interpreting and presenting the free trade measures to the electorate are underlined. Above all, Lord John Russell is rehabilitated as a ‘popular’ leader and his importance in the development of the nascent Liberal Party is unearthed.

A leader from Quebec boosts the fortunes of the Liberal party in that province. This, in turn, has helped make Quebec the veto player in twentieth-century Canadian elections and the Liberals the “natural” governing party. Although Quebec is no longer as critical as before, a leader from the province still makes a big difference. Full impact from the pattern requires more than one election to unfold. Patterns outside Quebec are similar, if fainter: the Liberal party is not punished for choosing a Quebecker and may even be helped. The early success of the pattern moved the Liberals to alternate between Quebec and non-Quebec leaders, such that the party is now led by a Quebecker more often than not. Maintaining alternation has never been easy and is only getting harder.

Despite bold proclamations, the 2015 election was not the last federal election to use the first-past-the post (FPTP) voting system. Reforming Canada’s voting system was a key plank of the Liberal Party’s 2015 platform. From the process to the outcome, the attempt to reform FPTP by the Trudeau government was widely panned. However, the promise to end FPTP was actually one of nine election promises made by the party in their platform. This paper assesses the Liberal’s electoral reform agenda between 2015-2019. Using the pledge method, it explores the complete set of election promises made. In the pledge method, the researcher identifies the pledges made in the election platform and then examines the record of government action in order to determine how many have been fulfilled. This analysis features a detailed assessment of voting system reform, the Electoral Modernization Act and the Leaders’ Debates Commission. This broader approach shows that the Liberals were successful in meeting their electoral reform goals. Of the nine promises made, the Liberals kept six and made considerable progress on two others. Only one promise was broken. While the Trudeau Liberals probably deserve much of the ire they received by breaking their voting reform promise, the 2019 federal election was remarkably different from 2015 in terms of the rules of the electoral game. Malgré des déclarations audacieuses, l'élection de 2015 n'a pas été la dernière élection fédérale à utiliser le système de vote majoritaire à un tour (SVMUT). La réforme du système de vote au Canada était pourtant un élément clé du programme du Parti libéral en 2015. Du processus au résultat, la tentative de réforme du SVMUT par le gouvernement Trudeau a fait l'objet d'un large consensus. Cependant, la promesse de mettre fin au SVMUT était en fait l'une des neuf promesses électorales faites par le parti dans son programme. Cet article évalue le programme de réforme électorale des Libéraux entre 2015 et 2019. En utilisant la méthode de l’analyse des promesses, il explore l'ensemble des promesses électorales faites. Dans la méthode d’analyse des promesses, le.la chercheure identifie les promesses faites dans le programme électoral et examine ensuite le bilan de l'action gouvernementale afin de déterminer combien de celles-ci ont été tenues. Cette analyse comprend une évaluation détaillée de la Réforme du système électoral, de la Loi de modernisation électorale et de la Commission des débats des chefs. Cette approche plus large montre que les Libéraux ont atteint leurs objectifs de réforme électorale. Sur les neuf promesses faites, les Libéraux en ont tenu six et ont fait des progrès considérables sur deux autres. Une seule promesse n'a pas été tenue. Si les Libéraux de Trudeau méritent probablement une grande partie de la colère exprimée à leur égard parce qu’ils n’ont pas tenu leur promesse de réforme électorale, l'élection fédérale de 2019 a été remarquablement différente de celle de 2015 en termes de règles du jeu électoral.

In its 2015 election platform, the Liberal Party committed to take several steps to reduce criminals’ access to handguns and “assault weapons.” In 2018, the government introduced Bill C-71 to carry out many of its election promises. Despite only making minor changes to Canadian law, the bill sparked considerable opposition from the firearms community and the Conservative Party. High profile domestic and international shootings placed pressure on the Trudeau government to implement even stronger gun controls. The Liberals, however, proved reluctant to undertake additional measures, choosing instead to include new commitments in its 2019 election platform. Dans son programme électoral de 2015, le Parti libéral s'est engagé à prendre plusieurs mesures pour réduire l'accès des criminels aux armes de poing et aux « armes d'assaut ». En 2018, le gouvernement a présenté le projet de loi C-71 pour tenir bon nombre de ses promesses électorales. Bien qu'il n'ait apporté que des modifications mineures à la loi canadienne, le projet de loi a suscité une opposition considérable de la communauté des armes à feu et du Parti conservateur. Des fusillades nationales et internationales très médiatisées ont exercé des pressions sur le gouvernement Trudeau pour qu'il mette en œuvre des contrôles des armes à feu encore plus sérieux. Les Libéraux, cependant, se sont montrés réticents à prendre des mesures supplémentaires, choisissant plutôt d'inclure de nouveaux engagements dans leur programme électoral de 2019.

Politicians who appeal to the wisdom of the people and present themselves as defenders of the people are not fortuitous figures in time nor in the forms they adopt in the twenty-first century. Their rise has taken decades. This means that the conditions of exclusion and/or the lack of opportunities for broad sectors of society have found in populist practices powerful and influential leaderships in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In this scenario, Liberal Party Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his team have had to use skillful strategies to successfully minimize populists, who make conflict and polemics their main political capital for their bases. This article outlines these protagonists and their characteristics in North America and the Trudeau government approach to them. Los personajes de la política que apelan a la sabiduría del pueblo y se asumen como sus defensores no son figuras casuales en tiempo ni en las formas que adoptan en el siglo XXI, su ascenso tiene décadas gestándose; de modo que las condiciones de exclusión y/o falta de oportunidades para amplios sectores de la sociedad han encontrado en las prácticas populistas liderazgos poderosos e influyentes en Canadá, Estados Unidos y México. En tal escenario, el primer ministro del Partido Liberal, Justin Trudeau, y su equipo han tenido que emplear estrategias hábiles que resultaron exitosas para minimizar los efectos de estas expresiones, las cuales hacen del conflicto y la polémica algunos de los principales capitales políticos con sus bases. En este artículo conoceremos a los protagonistas y sus características en América del Norte y la posición del gobierno de Trudeau frente a ellos. El populismo es una reacción a la tendencia globalizante de los últimos tiempos. Los excluidos de tales beneficios se han alineado en torno a poderosas figuras mediáticas que denuncian esa realidad, minimizando la gestión política y responsabilizando a las elites del estado de las cosas. Para los políticos liberales contemporáneos como Justin Trudeau, esta realidad ha sido un desafío, pues en medio de marejadas de personajes con dichas características ha tenido que llevar a la práctica una estrategia diversa, para no entrar en el escenario que sus antagonistas desean.

To explore discourses pertaining to immigrants and refugees introduced by the Trudeau Liberal Government elected in 2015. This study employs qualitative methodology in the form of discourse analysis of 9 speeches made by the Liberal Party’s speakers. This study has two main objectives to first conduct a directive discourse analysis to analyze the presence of neoliberal discourses found within the Harper Conservative Government: economic burden, reinforcement of traditional gender roles, security threat within the discourse of the Liberal Party’s speakers. The second objective is to discover new ways of thinking about immigrant and refugees by conductive an exploitative discourse analysis.

Joseph provides an overview on the life, work, and civic roles of Joseph Antenor Firmin. It locates the development of Firmin’s ideas and Firminism as a doctrine within the historical, political, and intellectual context of Haitian history and the Haitian society. In particular, it situates Firmin’s political vision and democratic ideals within Haiti’s Liberal Party and democratic socialism—toward social transformation, national reform, and political stability. The chapter also discusses Firmin’s civic roles as a statesman and minister of finances, economics, and foreign affairs. Overall, the chapter suggests viewing Joseph Antenor Firmin as a social democrat and an activist-intellectual who defended the best interest of the Haitian people and who made a relentless attempt to foster national unity, social coherence, and political stability.

From 1995 to 2006, Canadian trade policy purported to insulate the Canadian health care system from the effects of trade liberalization, largely through reliance upon key general exclusion clauses in the NAFTA and the GATS and other legal strategies. During the Conservative years 2006-2015 the government de-emphasized these strategies, and (more importantly) the international trade agenda increasingly emphasized investment promotion and patent protection. When the Liberal Party returned to government in 2015, personal, structural, and ideological factors all pointed to the retention of the neoliberal trade agenda, but one which was legitimated by more 'progressive' features, such as side-agreements. This paper traces the evolution of 'progressive neoliberalism' in the trade-health interface and argues that we need to recognize the inherent limitations of an approach that preaches harmony and coherence between domestic health care and international trade law.

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This chapter explores why attempts to kindle debate on compulsory voting in Australia have been largely fruitless. The answer can be found in a number of contributing factors: that compulsory voting is compatible with the national political temperament; that it is buttressed by path dependency; that while there have been spikes of dissent about the practice in the Liberal Party (especially from the 1980s to the first decade of the twenty-first century) that opposition never attained a majority position on the right-of-centre side of politics; that the critics of compulsory voting have been reliant on abstract arguments in contrast to its readily demonstrable benefits (namely, the consistently high voter turnout); that the way in which compulsory voting has been enforced by authorities has been generally lenient; and, most importantly, that compulsory voting has enjoyed sustained and widespread public support.

This essay is about ideological change within the Liberal Party in Sweden between its modern founding in 1934 to 2019. In this period there has also been a change in what liberalism is, and its ideological stances has shifted. How has this change affected the Liberal Party in Sweden, and what denomination of liberalism has been the dominant one in the party programs adopted during the period between 1934 and 2019?

The literature on candidate selection has focussed extensively on the degree of inclusiveness and decentralization of the selectorate, as part of the debate on intra-party democracy. However, much less attention has been paid to the degree of openness of candidacies, or selection criteria within parties. Yet parties have a lot of leeway in how they design selection criteria internally. Which guidelines do parties follow when making the crucial choice on which candidates to select for elections? This paper investigates selection criteria from two perspectives: the formal rules set by parties that restrict the candidate’s pool and the (informal) preferences of selectors that shape who gets selected. We aim first at contrasting the degree of party institutionalization and parties’ formal rules in candidate selection and so, we shed light on whether parties formalise their candidacy requirements and candidate selection processes to the same extent as other party activities. Second, the paper investigates the role of the selectorates, and how selectorate’s characteristics matter for the kind of (informal) selection criteria, be they intended at maximizing offices, votes or policies. Drawing on party statutes coded in the Political Party Database (PPDB) and 23 in-depth interviews with selectors, we study three francophone Belgian parties that differ both in terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate who has the final say on candidate selection and in terms of degree of centralisation, and in terms of party institutionalisation: the green party (Ecolo), the socialist party (PS), and the liberal party (MR). Our comparative analysis of parties, selection criteria provides new insights into the secret garden of politics and highlights in particular the major impact of parties, degree of centralization.

Australia’s Black Summer Bushfires of 2019–2020 were an unprecedented crisis in scale and impact. In response, Australian political leaders employed a collective understanding of purportedly unique cultural tropes in their rhetoric to make sense of the crisis to the public. Here we explore how and why these cultural discourses are utilized during moments of ecological and existential crisis, and how they differ according to party and ideology. Using qualitative critical discourse analysis of a key address to the media and the federal parliament, we examine the rhetoric of four Australian political party representatives in their responses regarding these bushfires: Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Liberal Party of Australia; Opposition Leader Anthony Albanese, Australian Labor Party; Richard Di Natale, The Australian Greens; Malcolm Roberts, Senator for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. We show how each actor’s rhetoric interacts with and weaves together their discursive climate policy positions, and adopts Australian cultural signs, symbols, and practices relative to new circumstances. Each actor may vary in expressing cultural tropes; we reveal how culture can be negotiated to align with partisan political agendas, even in moments of unprecedented destruction.

El presente trabajo estudia el impacto causado por la sátira liberal en el partido servil dentro del emotivo (apocalíptico para muchos de ellos) contexto de las Cortes de Cádiz. La ley de libertad de imprenta y el letargo (y posterior abolición) inquisitorial dejaron a los defensores del orden tradicional sin más recurso que sus propias palabras en un momento en que era fundamental convencer a una opinión pública cuyo sentir marcaba el pulso del proceso constitucional. En primer lugar se estudia el rechazo servil a la sátira (sobre todo a aquella destinada a zaherir a la Iglesia), considerada como propia de la frivolidad de los liberales y nada adecuada a la gravedad de la situación española; en segundo lugar, se comprueba que el partido servil terminó por entrar con fuerza en esa guerra satírica, aunque lo justificase como un mal necesario. Al mismo tiempo, se comprueba hasta qué punto el humor terminó por perfilar la imagen que formaron los dos bloques políticos del momento, tanto de de sí mismos como del otro. This paper analyses the impact of liberal satire on the traditional party (the so-called «Serviles») during the emotive (even apocalyptic for many) context of the Cadiz Cortes. Both the freedom of the press and a lethargic (and eventually abolished) Inquisition forced the reactionaries to face the need to win public opinion over by means of parliamentary debate, which was crucial for the ongoing constitutional process. The serviles’ rejection of satire, mainly the anticlerical variety, is analysed in the first place. It was considered typical of ‘frivolous liberals’ and unsuitable for Spain’s difficult times. Secondly, we observe that those allegedly serious people entered the satirical war willingly, even though they justified it as a necessary evil. At the same time, this essay studies to what extent humour ended up shaping the image of both liberals and serviles in terms of self-awareness and also in their perception of the other. Investigación financiada a través del proyecto «El humor y su sentido: discurso e imágenes de lo risible desde la Ilustración hasta hoy» (HAR2017-84635-P), perteneciente al Programa estatal de fomento de la investigación científica y técnica de excelencia del Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación.

This article traces the rise of neoliberalism in Denmark to the so-called crisis of the welfare state in the early 1970s, where a new liberal offensive was launched withinthe ranks of Venstre – The Liberal Party of Denmark. The article shows how new liberal ideas were launched by a generation of politicians who all connected the crisis of the welfare state to a growing public sector, which they regarded as inefficient and undemocratic. In the attempt to counter the crisis in question, they did not aim to abolish the welfare state but to reduce its size and change its content. The aim was first of all to create competition in the public sector. In this process, the liberal politicians launched new ideas concerning decentralization, free choice in the public sector, and economic growth, which formed the pillars of the new liberalism that was developed within Venstre in the 1970s.

The Dutch theologian, journalist and politician Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920) started his career in a dominantly liberal political and ecclesial culture. He developed a political program that opposed the secular and intolerant development promoted by the reigning liberal party, but at the same time left room for that liberal view. From the 1890s on, Kuyper implemented a societal structure in the Netherlands that was non-secular and tolerant at the same time. His solution reversed the common idea that progress and secularization were inseparable, but at the same time generated new questions about the face of Calvinism as a civil religion and the limits of its tolerance.

‘Until 1918, in principle, and 1928 in practice, women’s political activity in Britain was defined as beyond the frontier of formal citizenship’ (Abrams and Hunt, 2000). This article explores the campaign of one such frontier woman, Helen Taylor, to become the first woman MP. Taylor accepted the nomination of Camberwell Radical Club to stand as the Independent Radical Democrat candidate for Camberwell North in the November 1885 election. The radicals of Camberwell were, thereby, directly challenging the 1832 Reform Act which had legally excluded women from full citizenship. This article locates Taylor in the historiography of resistance to elite political culture, by radical clubs, in 1885. Links were made between Taylor’s candidature and that of previous non-elite candidates, namely the attempt of Daniel O’Connell, David Salomon and Charles Bradlaugh to breach the frontier of full citizenship for Catholics, Jews and atheists in previous elections. The Liberal Party had become more centralised through the power of local Liberal Associations and committees based on the Birmingham caucus model (Lawrence, 1998; Parry, 1993). This led to some radical clubs challenging the Liberal establishment ‘wire pullers’ and standing their own candidates, creating triangular contests between the Liberal, Independent/Radical and Conservative candidates (Owen, 2008). This article further explores the anomaly of all three Camberwell North candidates openly supporting Home Rule, in an election where the contentious Irish question has been identified as being avoided by the majority of candidates (Biagini, 2007). In Camberwell North this saw two factions of Irish nationalism endorsing separate candidates. The provenance of Taylor’s feminism, socialism and anti-imperialism is also examined, which rescues the campaign from being the actions of a well-connected upper middle-class eccentric. The only previous detailed exploration of Taylor’s candidature claimed it was the idiosyncratic whim of a political maverick whose manifesto would need explaining to the electorate (Pugh, 1978). On the contrary, Taylor’s candidature and manifesto were located in contemporary socialist, radical and liberal politics and no such explanation would have been necessary. It was very much of its time.