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In less than two decades, Russians have come to support their regime, but the 2008 world economic crisis questions whether this support can continue. Drawing on a June 2009 New Russia Barometer survey, the article asks how much difference the economic crisis has made for political support. A model with hypotheses about the potential influence on political attitudes of socialization and political performance as well as economic conditions is set out. Statistical analysis is used to compare the importance of macro-economic evaluations of the national economy with microeconomic household conditions. Determinants of regime support in 2009 are compared with pre-crisis NRB surveys. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.26.1.38

Was the 2007 Russian Duma election fair? International observers have agreed that it was unfair. Survey data from the 2007 Russian Duma election finds that most Russians disagree with international observers and they also disagree among themselves about the fairness of the Duma ballot. This article tests hypotheses about popular response to that election, accounting for differences in opinion, partisanship, the performance of the government, and individual socio-economic characteristics. The extent to which those who saw the election as unfair are less likely to support the political regime is also tested. The conclusion considers conditions in which perceptions of an unfair election can encourage positive change in a regime or the strengthening of authoritarianism.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00283.x Byline: William Mishler (1), Richard Rose (2) Abstract: When the Soviet Union collapsed, most Russians had lived their entire lives in a quintessentially authoritarian culture. Having been socialized in this environment, how could citizens acquire the attitudes and behaviors necessary to support a new, more pluralistic regime? Cultural theories of political learning emphasize the primacy of childhood socialization and hold that altering initial attitudes is a decades-long process that depends on generational replacement. Institutional theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances regardless of socialization. Lifetime learning integrates the competing perspectives. Multilevel models using New Russia Barometer data from 1992 to 2005 confirm the persistence of some generational differences in Russian political attitudes but demonstrate even larger effects resulting from adult relearning. Lifetime learning provides the most comprehensive account and suggests that Russians would quickly acquire the attitudes and behaviors appropriate to democracy-if Russian elites supply more authentic democratic institutions. Author Affiliation: (1)University of Arizona (2)University of Aberdeen Article note: William Mishler is professor of political science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 (mishler@email.arizona.edu). Richard Rose is professor of politics, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland AB24 3QY (prof_r_rose@yahoo.co.uk).

The article estimates the shift in regime in European nations, mainly from communist to populist and democratic regimes mainly with the support of its citizens.

The more important Vladimir Putin is said to be for mobilizing support for the Russian regime, the greater the potential void when he leaves office. This article empirically tests the impact that Vladimir Putin has had on public opinion through an original analysis of New Russia Barometer data. After reviewing the multiple roles of a president, it reports how the Russian public has evaluated President Putin's popularity during his period in office. It then tests the extent to which this evaluation has added to support for the Federation regime. Based on these findings, it draws conclusions about the impact of succession on the consolidation of the institutions of the Russian Federation.

Trust in political institutions and in other people is hypothesized by cultural theories to be essential for making democracies work. Trust is equated with diffuse support and linked to the stability and effective functioning of democratic regimes. Institutional theories, in contrast, question the importance of trust for democratic support and emphasize institutional performance instead. A structural equation model using New Russia Barometer survey data tests cultural and institutional theories of regime support. The results confirm cultural arguments that institutional trust encourages political involvement and contributes to public support for democratic ideals, whereas they contradict the hypothesis that trust is critical for political support. Much stronger support exists for institutional theory's claims about the importance of economic and political performance. Cultural influences, however, appear somewhat larger than institutional theories allow and may become larger still during the longer term, suggesting the need to integrate cultural and institutional theories. Keywords: trust; democracy; culture; institutions; Russia

To advance understanding of the present-day Russian regime, three political scientists set out a model of political authority in democratic and undemocratic regimes. New Russia Barometer surveys, especially a post-presidential election survey in March 2004, are used to document the amount of resigned acceptance of the Putin regime. The article reviews alternative hypotheses about why people may differ in their view of authority and tests the hypotheses statistically. The authors then consider circumstances, both economic and political, that might upset this equilibrium.

This article discusses the survival of democratic regimes on the public willingness and support, which is often difficult to measure. The authors examine the failure to appreciate new regimes and established democracies in the process of democratization, and the tendency of scholars to mismeasure because of their reliance on idealistic measures; the authors suggest using realistic measurement to explain support for old and new regimes.

An overview is presented on what citizens in post-communist nations expect from democratic government. They indicate a desire not only for freedom of speech and freedom to vote their conscience, they also desire a government that is free of corruption and holds itself to its own rules.

This article discusses the international dissemination of ideas about economics, social welfare and public policies, suggesting ways in which Great Britain can be influenced by other countries' political and social methodologies. Interdependence between states has internationalized policy-making; based on the effectiveness of public policies in the other countries, the British government can be better informed in the decision-making process.

A distinguished social scientist investigates the extent to which Russians today use social capital networks developed in Soviet times or before to produce welfare. Alternative hypotheses are set forth about ways of viewing networks in a modern vs. anti-modern context. Hypotheses are tested with a specially designed 1998 New Russia Barometer survey of all types of social capital networks. Conclusions are drawn about the networks Russians of varying education and socioeconomic status employ to get food and provide income security.

Many Eastern European countries formerly under communist rule appear to be making significant headway in institutionalizing democracy just a decade after the Berlin Wall fell. The preference for democratic values has consistently been demonstrated by voters who time and again have rejected anti-democratic alternatives. In line with the new political and economic realities, 10 post-communist countries have applied for membership in the European Union.

The Labor Party government of Tony Blair is enjoying high levels of confidence and public support following its resounding win in the 1997 UK general elections. The lopsided nature of the victory, and the serious disarray of the Conservative opposition, mean that despite the inevitablity of a mid-term drop in popularity, Labor and Blair can reasonably expect to retain power after the next general election probable in 2002. Blair and his party will, however, confront great difficulties in dealing with the issues of Europe, the election of a Scottish Parliament and general electoral system reforms.

Postcommunist countries as a whole are undergoing an asymmetric divergence from old communist politics. Central and Eastern European states are making progress towards achieving democracy while former Soviet states are nowhere near their neighbors in the democratization process. There is optimism that the democratization process will succeed as demand for undemocratic rule is low. Further contributing to this optimism is the help extended by the European Union in spurring the growth of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Popular trust in social and political institutions is vital to the consolidation of democracy, but in post-Communist Europe, distrust is the predicted legacy of Communist rule. Contrary to expectations, however, New Democracies Barometer surveys of popular trust in fifteen institutions across nine Eastern and Central European countries indicate that skepticism, rather than distrust, predominates. Although trust varies across institutions and countries, citizens trust holistically, evaluating institutions along a single dimension. Both early life socialization experiences and contemporary performance evaluations influence levels of trust. The legacy of socialization under Communism has mostly indirect effects, whereas the effects of economic and political performance evaluations on trust are larger and more direct. Thus, skepticism reflects trade-offs between public dissatisfaction with current economic performance, optimism about future economic performance, and satisfaction with the political performance of contemporary institutions in providing greater individual liberties than in the Communist past.

A study of the 1996 Russian presidential elections is presented. Russia uses a two-ballot system wherein voters first choose from among several candidates and then, consequently, between the two candidates who emerge with the biggest number of votes. This system effectively reduces the capability of a small but noisy minority to prevail over more desirable alternatives. Among other aspects of the election, the study focused on the economic issues at stake, the candidates and their political platforms and the behavior of the Russian voting public.

How have Germans, East and West, responded to dramatic changes in their political and economic regimes resulting from re-unification? Since every German has lived under at least two regimes, evaluations of the present are made in the light of experience of their previous regime, the pre-unification Federal Republic or the German Democratic Republic. This article analyses the 1993 German Re-Unification Survey to test the extent to which Germans have shown a common response, as implied by theories of pan-German culture or, in the case of the GDR, that Sovietisation matters. In both parts of Germany, people are divided. It then tests three competing hypotheses about the causes of differing evaluations of regime change. At first glance, economic costs and benefits appear most important. But a causal model shows that context - evaluating regimes in the light of experience of the GDR or the Federal Republic - is most important, indirectly and directly. A follow up survey shows that positive responses are increasing in both parts of Germany., The German Democratic Republic is a special case in the transition to democracy because the German question is too important to be left to the Germans alone. Klaus von Beyme(1) [...]

The majority of the ex-communists in the central and east European post-communist societies can influence efforts to free these nations from the oppression of the Communist state. Surveys in these countries undercut the notion of communists as true believers in communist ideologies. Of those surveyed, 60% approve the present political regime and 69% approve of future economic plans. Only 17% ex-communists and 14% non-communists favor the return of communism. Communism has negligible popularity among the new generation. Consolidation of democracy in the ex-Communist states is discussed.

Winston Churchill's hypothesis that people prefer democracy as it is a lesser evil compared to other types of regime assumes that they have experienced both democratic and undemocratic regimes. A New Democracies Barometer survey shows that very few people living in post-Communist countries support authoritarian rule. The majority is suspicious of authoritarianism due to the political experience of Communist rule. However, the hypothesis does not apply in a country that has not yet introduced democratic institutions.

Regression analysis of the 1993 and 1994 survey data from eleven post-communist countries shows that the younger generations generally disapprove the communist regimes while the older generation show marked differences in attitudes. Individuals with higher education show lower support to the communist government. The effect of generation is direct while the influence of education is indirect.

Prospects for the successful consolidation of democracy in post-Communist Europe hinge substantially on the trajectory and determinants of popular support. Surveys in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania demonstrate that public support for post-Communist regimes is higher on average than support for the former Communist regimes. However, there is less support for the new economic systems in comparison with the former planned economies. Among the determinants of increased support, economic hopes (prospective evaluations) have consistently greater influence than evaluations of the current or past economic conditions or than social structure characteristics. Lingering fears of the old regime are important sources of support for current regimes as well. Because the majority of East Europeans expect future economic conditions to improve rapidly, support for the new regime is expected to remain stable or increase with time. Even making 'worst case' assumptions that fears of communism will fade and economic hopes will be frustrated, support for the new regimes should remain positive for the foreseeable future.

Communist states, which ruler according to their own conceptualization of polity, create distrust among citizens, regarding state institutions. Though corruption abounds in democratic countries, there nevertheless two- communication between the public and the institutions of government. Institutions such trade unions, universities, churches, business associations and the news media take decades to create and lend the key ingredient of trust in mediations. The legacy of distrust in state institutions in post-communist countries makes privatisation difficult in the absence of appropriate civilization.

An analysis of the 1992 British election results to assess the effects of long-term and short-term factors proves that long-term factors, namely the improved living standards of workers, caused Labor to lose the election. A high standard of living for workers implies property ownership and better access to education which leads to a lack of interest in union activities. If this trend continues, Labor could lose out to the Liberals and the Conservatives could continue to form governments into the 21st century, despite enjoying the mandate of just 40% of the British voters.

School meals today are provided on a compromise basis; some pupils are charged and others are not. The compromise thus rejects two types of universalistic principles: allocating private benefits by the market and provision of merit goods collectively free of charge. The article examines, empirically and conceptually, the changing meaning of school meals; the demand and supply of school meals and the allocation of public subsidies to non-needy children; conflicting goals of expert nutritionists, egalitarians, redistributionists, efficient managers, and parents and children. The article concludes by considering political constraints on rationalising the programme in the name of universalistic principles. These constraints include the inheritance of commitments from previous governments, collective responsibility of spending and Treasury ministers; intra-party divisions between frontbench and backbench MPs; and low political salience of charging as an issue.

This paper compares the different ways in which comparative analysis is undertaken by political scientists today. The first section explains why concepts are a necessary attribute of comparison; it is followed by a discussion of what comparison is not, i.e. studies that emphasize the incomparability of a country, lack concepts or, as in 'landless' theory, ignore real countries. The commonest form of comparative analysis, countries examined as parallel independent cases, is the subject of the third section. The conclusion considers implications of countries no longer being totally autonomous actors but becoming permeable or interacting due to the growth of international interdependence.

Countries of the former Soviet Union may qualify for membership in the European Union based on their current political structures. Although some have evinced a dissatisfaction of democracy, all use the democratic remedy of voting ineffective officials and parties out of office. Inclusion of these countries in the Union could significantly expand its economic influence.

The extent to which e-governance develops in a country is a function of the collective national and local capital supplying IT services and of informal social and human capital creating a demand for e-governance. A diffusion model of Internet access shows that it is more realistic to think of cross-national differences in terms of leading and lagging countries.

This article explores Muslim public opinion regarding democracy in Central Asia. The author maintains Muslims are divided among themselves regarding political views, but results of his study show that being Muslim does not make a person more or less likely to reject or accept democracy.

Monetary policies from the perspective of elected officeholders who must balance non-economic pressures, against concerns of central bankers with monetary constraints are examined. The differences in political priorities for economic policymaking between countries are discussed.

The fresh approach to the currency choices of government is mentioned. An economic model of an optimal currency area, and the relevant and often conflicting applications of the model by academic economists are summarized.

Popular trust in political institutions is vital to democracy, but in post-Communist countries, popular distrust for institutions is widespread, and prospects for generating increased political trust are uncertain given disagreements over its origins. Cultural theories emphasizing exogenous determinants of trust compete with institutional theories emphasizing endogenous influences, and both can be further differentiated into micro and macro variants. Competing hypotheses drawn from these theories are tested using data from 10 post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Aggregate data on economic and political performance are combined with survey data on interpersonal and political trust, political socialization experiences, and individual evaluations of national performance. Results strongly support the superiority of institutional explanations of the origins of political trust, especially micro-level explanations, while providing little support for either micro-cultural or macro-cultural explanations. This encourages cautious optimism about the potential for nurturing popular trust in new democratic institutions.

A team of British-based social scientists draw on data from regular VTsIOM pre-campaign and presidential campaign polls and the post-election ninth New Russia Barometer survey to specify the breadth, commitment, and durability of support for Vladimir Putin. What were the political, economic, and social characterisitics of his broad-based electoral support? Given Putin's 'triangulated' appeal to Russians, how strongly is the electorate committed to the new president -- and how different is his commitment from that of Gennadiy Zyuganov? What do post-election polls and events tell us about the potential durability of the support of a person who was a political unknown six months before he first became a president?

An author recalls his meeting with the U.S. President George W. Bush on his insights into the divided society of Northern Ireland that can be applied to challenges in Iraq.