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This article compares the failed military coups in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002) with the successful 1999 military putsch in Pakistan in order to identify what factors affect coup outcomes in third-wave democracies. The unity of the armed forces in support of the Pakistani coup, and its division in the two Latin American cases, are critical in explaining the divergent outcomes. In turn, the degree of cohesion within the military in each case was affected by perceptions of domestic support and international reaction to military rule. In Ecuador and Venezuela there was greater public antipathy for military rule and stronger international opposition. This increased the armed forces' perceptions of the costs of governing, fostering divisions within the officer corps that ultimately scuttled the coups. In contrast, the successful coup in Pakistan was largely attributable to the unified military, which was a product of greater domestic and international tolerance of military rule.

The prominent role of Pakistan's army in politics has deep historical roots in the country's founding. The principal mechanism for implementing the policy tripod is what Husain Haqqani calls the mosque-military alliance. This refers to a partnership formed over the years, in which military rulers use religious parties and groups as instruments for achieving domestic and foreign policy aims in exchange for the country's deepening Islamization. When a political brawl in East Pakistan's provincial assembly resulted in the death of the deputy speaker, this provided the pretext for the county's first military coup. Left-wing opponents of the regime found a home in the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). While Zia spoke of his desire for a quick return to electoral democracy, he reneged on those promises and retained power until his death in a suspicious plane crash in August 1988. In the period following Musharraf's eight-year rule, there have been some hopeful signs for Pakistan's democracy.

This article evaluates the implementation of Mexico's Municipal Reform of 1983 in three states: Chihuahua, Oaxaca and Yucatán. The research focuses on one element of the reform, the transfer of public services from the state to the municipal level. The case studies were selected to examine the impact of two key variables on reform outcomes: fiscal capacity and partisan control of state and municipal governments. Counter to expectations, the reform has not advanced more in municipalities with greater fiscal capacity. Also counter to expectations, there is no evidence that devolution advanced more in municipalities controlled by the opposition. This is due to the fact that state governors have a high degree of discretion that allows them to block implementation for partisan motives rather than rational/technical ones. The Municipal Reform of 1999 attempts to remedy this problem by limiting gubernatorial discretion while increasing the legal recourse municipalities have in soliciting the transfer of services. This recourse includes filing suit before the Mexican Supreme Court.