Search

The collapse of the Muammar Qaddafi regime was ostensibly the prelude to a democratic Libya. The 2012 election elicited much optimism. By 2014, the domestic situation had taken an unexpected turn for the worse, resulting in two governments, one in the east and one in the west, each supported by numerous militias. While the civil war has pitted Libyans against Libyans, foreign interventions on behalf of opposite side in the conflict have hindered the end of the civil war. Indisputably, foreign interference had begun well before the civil war; however, the military backing to the protagonists has become more pronounced since 2014. The foreign powers involved in the Libyan conflict aim to fulfill specific interests, some of which deriving from the rivalries between those countries. Unless those foreign powers have achieved their goals in Libya, an end to the civil war anytime soon remains unlikely, occasional ceasefires notwithstanding.

European–North African (Maghreb) relations security relations are extremely complex. However, they are structured around three main issues: terrorism, migration, and resolving the multifaceted problems in the Sahel. The complexity of the relations between the two shores is essentially due to divergent policies and the North African states’ perceptions regarding the three issues; the divergent views are aggravated by the intra-North African tensions. While the European countries have overall relatively coherent common policies and strategies, the North African state, because of their rivalries and/or suspicions about each other, prefer to deal bilaterally with Europeans on those issues. Such disparate approaches have made EU–North African security relations more complex. Therefore, the authors of this chapter analyze the bilateral security relations, revealing implicitly the failure to build a security community between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

After the 2011 revolution, the new Libyan authorities launched a political and constitutional debate, which focused, inter alia, on democracy and the role of women in the new order. The autonomous initiatives of women’s associations, which demanded female quotas and equal rights, is an important aspect of the post-revolution reality and highlights the contradictions between the cultural conditions and the policies of the authoritarian past in a society that for the most part aspires for equal rights, the nature of its neo-patriarchy1 notwithstanding. In this article, the authors analyse the historical trajectory of women’s claims and the contributions of women’s associations to the constitutional debate for women’s rights. Women’s activism has characterised this new era, one full of incongruities, such as the opposition of past ideas against innovative, more modernist, progressive ones.

This chapter examines China’s presence in Algeria through its multifaceted relations—political, economic, diplomatic, energy, military, cultural, and commercial. It looks at how the two countries view the interests that bind them and what factors account for the considerable development of these relations. China considers Algeria a pivotal state and a geopolitical asset in North Africa. The authors seek to understand why despite the close ties between the two countries, China has not sided with Algeria on the conflict in Western Sahara, a question critical to Algeria’s national security interests. Despite their strong development, relations between Algeria and China have yet to reach their potential, the “global strategic partnership” binding them notwithstanding.

The Islamist movement in Algeria and Islamist ideas (politicized/revivalist, Islamic reformism) date back to the colonial period. While Radical Islamist Groups (RIGs) and Salafi Jihadist Groups (SJGs) have demonstrated a high level of violence more noticeably in the 1990s, following the return of the so-called Afghans, who had trained and fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan, radical Islamism has emerged at different periods in Algeria’s history. In the 1960s, RIGs sought to intimidate Westernized youth and women. In the 1970s and 1980s, SJGs almost destroyed the state through a ferocious armed insurgency. The major SJGs in Algeria, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jund-el-Khalifa, are part of the transnational extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda and, since 2014, the so-called Islamic State (IS), respectively. Political Islam in Algeria took different forms, from quietist groups to peaceful Muslim Brothers to sanguinary armed groups, such as the Armed Islamic Groups (GIAs) of the 1990s or the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which succeed the Salafi Group for Preaching and CombatSGPC. Whatever form the movement has taken more recently, one cannot understand Islamism without scrutinizing Algeria’s colonial history and the enduring crisis of identity it has engendered among Algerian Muslims. Soon after the colonial invasion, resistance to France was often expressed in Islamic terms, such as jihad, or holy war, against infidels. During the war of national liberation [1954–1962], the nationalist movement referred to the fighters as mujahideen (holy warriors). Algerian identity itself is often expressed in relation to Islam, which dominates social and cultural personality. Islam and Islamism have served as means of opposition to the successive incumbent regimes since independence. Indeed, opposition to the socialism of the 1960s and 1970s emanated from religious figures. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Islamic Salvation Front ak.a., FIS), a mass party, sought to seize power to establish a state in which Shari’a Law could be implemented. The cancellation of the electoral process resulted in bloody civil strife that pitted the security forces against SJGs of different denominations. The civil strife claimed the lives of perhaps 100,000 people, mostly civilians. However, Algerian Islamism also has elected representatives, with legal Islamist parties represented in the government. Islamism, or Islamist ideas, present during the anticolonial struggle are interwoven with the radical jihadi groups that exist in the region and country today. Algeria went through an almost decade-long, atrocious period of civil strife that abated by the end of the 1990s. The ensuing 2005 National Charter on Peace and Reconciliations provided a political framework for stability in the country.

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.

Even prior to the country's independence, Africa has always been central to Algeria's foreign policy. Algerian nationalists not only found support on the African continent in their struggle for independence, but they also sought to contribute to the decolonization of Africa and to free it from all forms of neocolonialism. Algerian diplomacy became even more involved in African affairs after independence. Using the Role Approach, this article shows how Algerian policymakers exercised various roles within the structures of the Organization of African Unity and, to this day, in those of the African Union to serve the country's perceived national interests. While from the 1960s through the 1990s, Algerians played the roles of developer, mediator, and anti-imperialist, since the 1990s, they have played the role of antiterrorist in order partly to regain the credibility that the regime had lost during the domestic civil strife. The antiterrorist role has been relatively successful as the country succeeded in gr...

Since the establishment of the Chin-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004, the two sides have forged special political relations. Such a special relationship, different from that of a milit...

"Djibouti is the only country in the world in which US, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese military forces are stationed simultaneously; China will soon have a presence there as well. The US military deployment in Djibouti has shifted from a soft military presence to an arrangement of significant strategic import, and from a small outpost to a large garrison in the past two decades. The internal dynamics of the US deployment are geopolitical, as the US presence facilitates the carrying out of its strategies regarding antiterrorism, anti-proliferation, the protection of energy investments, and anti-piracy. The external dynamics of the US deployment are geo-economic: the government of Djibouti, as the host nation, reaps economic windfalls from the US presence in this strategically located country. Given that the United States has failed since 2008 to persuade any country on the continent to host AFRICOM, the base in Djibouti is likely to remain the only one in East Africa. Djibouti may be part of a pattern whereby some small African nations, such as São Tomé and Príncipe, collect revenue through the provision of military bases to big powers." (author's abstract), "Dschibuti ist der einzige Staat der Erde, in dem gleichzeitig US-amerikanische, französische, deutsche, italienische, spanische und japanische Streitkräfte stationiert sind; in naher Zukunft wird auch China präsent sein. In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten wurde die zunächst schwache US-Präsenz in Dschibuti zu einer großen Garnison von beträchtlicher strategischer Bedeutung ausgebaut. Für die USA ergeben sich geopolitische Vorteile, denn der Stützpunkt in Dschibuti erleichtert die Umsetzung von Strategien gegen Terrorgruppen, Proliferation und Piraterie sowie zum Schutz von Investitionen im Energiesektor. Für die Regierung Dschibutis ergeben sich geoökonomische Vorteile: Die gastgebende Nation in strategisch günstiger Lage zieht ökonomische Mehreinnahmen aus der Präsenz des US-Militärs. Nachdem es den USA seit 2008 nicht gelungen ist, einen afrikanischen Staat zur Stationierung von AFRICOM zu bewegen, wird die US-Basis in Dschibuti voraussichtlich die einzige in Ostafrika bleiben. Das Land könnte zum Vorbild für einige kleinere afrikanische Nationen, wie São Tomé und Príncipe, werden, über Militärbasen von Großmächten Einnahmen zu generieren." (Autorenreferat)

By the end of 2011, the US had closed all hard military bases in Iraq, but its “soft” military presence remained using private security contractors, military and intelligent officers located in the US embassy and in US consulates, US military training officers and consultants, and deployed special operation forces. Such soft military presence is of great importance and significance. At the national level, it helps Washington to stabilize and control the Iraqi situation; at the regional level, it can secure a strategic balance between Shi’a and Sunni sectors, which is essential for the US to respond to a rising nuclear Iran; at the global level, this soft military presence helps to cut US military expenditure and shift its strategic focus from the Greater 1 Dr. SUN Degang is an Associate Professor of the Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, an Honorary Research Fellow at Middle East Peace Studies Center, Shanghai Jiaotong University, and a visting scholar at Oxford University, UK. This research is the product of Chinese Ministry of Education Key Research program “Western Powers’ Military Bases in the Middle East after the End of the Cold War” (10JJDGJW022). This article was also funded by the Chinese Ministry of Education Key Research Program “Islamic Middle East Region and the Transition of International System” (08JZD0039) and the Academic Innovation Team of Shanghai International Studies University (“Big Powers’ Middle East Security Strategies Since 1991”). The author is indebted to Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies and Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, University of Oxford for their great supports. 2 Dr. Yahia ZOUBIR is Professor of International Relations & International Management, Director of Research in Geopolitics, EUROMED MANAGEMENT, Marseille, France. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 6, No. 3, 2012 86 Middle East to the Asia-Pacific regions. The soft military presence in Iraq reflects Obama’s “New Thinking” Doctrine on military deployment in the Middle East, which resembles lily-pads with stronger mobilization and flexibility.

In the late 1980s, prospects for Maghreb integration were high; the process of integration reflected the aspirations of Maghreb states and societies. However, analysis shows that the process was merely a response to internal and external events of that period, namely, economic difficulties, ‘fortress Europe’, and the rise of radical Islamism. Following the Arab Spring, incessant calls for unity have re-emerged. Once again, these calls for unity, after a long period of tense relations, especially between Algeria and Morocco, have resulted from internal and external constraints. The threats to the incumbent regimes and/or the insecurity prevailing domestically and at the borders have compelled the Maghreb states to seek greater cooperation to overcome the hardships with which they are faced.

The 42-year dictatorship in Libya finally collapsed in October 2011; it took the Western-backed armed uprising seven months of intensive fighting to defeat Qaddafi's loyalist forces. The fall of the Qaddafi regime is a welcome development in the Middle East and North Africa region. But, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, Libya does not have a standing army or a reliable potential force that can bring the necessary stability for a political transition. The tribal nature of the country and the difficulty of disarming the rebels and other groups pose serious challenges to the new authorities in Tripoli. Unless these issues are handled effectively, Libya will undergo a long period of unpredictability.

The Western Sahara conflict is a 32-year old case of decolonisation that has been on the UN Security Council's agenda since 1991. Despite the straightforwardness of the stalemate in terms of international legality, the UN has been unable to implement its own provisions on the issue. The UN's failure is due to the contradictions arising from the interaction throughout the conflict between international law and geopolitics. Morocco's supporters in the UNSC have not only allowed it to systematically violate international law but have encouraged Morocco to formalise its irredentism through its “Autonomy Initiative”. This behaviour is perilous not only for the stability of the Maghreb but for the UN system as well.

In this article, US policy towards the Western Sahara conflict is analysed from a geopolitical perspective. It is postulated that after 9/11, the US favoured a “compromise” that, while still favourable to Morocco's interests, offered Algeria and the Polisario Front a way out of the stalemate. Acceptance of the Baker Plan II would seem to promise a reawakening of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Because the conflict is seen as an obstacle to other strategic goals, US hegemonic power seeks a solution that would continue to strongly safeguard Morocco's interests while also consolidating the pronounced rapprochement with Algeria. The objective is the establishment of a regional trade bloc.

Four years after the death of King Hassan II, it is necessary to assess the domestic situation in Morocco and also to analyse the question of Western Sahara, a conflict that is often neglected. Undoubtedly, the conflict has domestic, regional and international implications for the Kingdom of Morocco. The early months of his successor's rule suggested that rapid change was on its way. The reality, however, is that, after an initial flurry of activity, the political scene, both in the domestic and foreign spheres, appears to have stagnated. The result is that one dominant issue, that of Western Sahara, is still unresolved and is beginning to create a major problem in terms of Morocco's foreign policy. This article examines the implications.

Overall, Algerian‐Moroccan relations have always been at odds, the existence since 1989 of the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA) notwithstanding. In fact, the UMA has not been operational due precisely to tension between the two countries. Strained relations derive from a historical and post‐colonial evolution ‐ dominated by power politics ‐of which Western Sahara is only one, albeit major, aspect. Thus, a definitive resolution of the Western Sahara conflict will not necessarily mean a definitive ending of the distrust that exists between the two neighbours. However, the core argument in this article is that resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara would greatly improve cooperation between the two countries, thus facilitating regional integration. Furthermore, given the complexity of both the Algerian‐Moroccan relationship and conflict in Western Sahara, any foreign interference that is not balanced will continue poisoning relations and could potentially destabilise the entire region.

Yehudit Ronen Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 2008, Pp.vii + 205, bibliography, index, $55 (hardback), ISBN 978-1-5882-6585-2 Until quite recently, hardly anyone would have expected Qaddafi's Li...

Despite continuing political unrest and violence, Algeria edges towards a more pluralist political system.

Analysing the case of Western Sahara highlights the evolution of US policy towards the Maghreb; it demonstrates that American policy in the region has progressively shifted from reliance on multilateralism to a more pronounced unilateralism, although using the United Nations as an instrument to accomplish that objective. It also shows that the Bush Administration's espousal of the notion of a ‘New World Order’, and the Clinton Administration's ‘aggressive multilateralism’, reflected ideological discourse rather than a genuine attachment to a political strategy.

Since the 1990s, numerous analysts in France and in the Maghreb have been concerned that the United States is showing too much interest in the Maghreb region.1 There were suspicions that the United States, in fact, wished to displace French influence in this area. But what has really happened? What are the United States’ interests in the Maghreb? Is it true that the United States wishes to eliminate French and European influence in the Maghreb? Is it true that a conspicuous U.S. presence aims at countering the growing Chinese and Russian influence in the region? Is it also true that the United States—through various programs, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Millennium Challenge Account—seeks to undermine European initiatives, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), replaced by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008? The main argument in this chapter is that U.S. interest in the Maghreb region has grown considerably and that, in terms of regional security, Washington has already downgraded Europe’s (mainly France’s) influence in what it now considers a strategic area for the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

King Hassan II of Morocco informed the French press in December 1988 that he was willing to talk to the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro, known as the Polisario Front, which had been waging a war of national independence during the previous 15 years. Although the Moroccan Sovereign insisted that the subsequent meetings which took place on 4–5 January 1989 in Marrakesh constituted ‘discussions’ rather than ‘negotiations’, they undoubtedly represented a breakthrough in what has been dubbed by many as the ‘forgotten war’, not least because the mere acknowledgement of the Front's existence was in itself a de facto recognition of the Sahrawi liberation movement.

Belarus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia Ukraine Overview of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia & Serbia/Yugoslavia

The growth of political Islam in the 1970s and the possibility of Islamist parties coming to power in various countries led many scholars and political analysts to question the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Most studies have concentrated on popular Muslim thinkers who were considered Islamic activists such as Sayyid Qutb or Abu ‘Ala Al- Maududi, but no attention has been paid to the thought of the remarkable Algerian Islamic thinker, Malek Bennabi (1905-1973). A French-educated electrical engineer, strongly influenced by the ideas of Rashid Rida and Mohammed Abdu, Bennabi’s most important concern throughout his life was the adaptation of Islamic values to modernity. Very familiar with western civilization-as well as many others-he felt that the Muslim world failed to rise above its inertia not only because it is incapable of absorbing modem technology, but also because its elite borrowed failing ideologies, such as Marxism, without attempting to recapture the best values that were produced by Islamic civilization. In other words, the Muslim world failed to reproduce the experience of such successful nations as Japan. In his view, Japan achieved modernity because “the ‘deadly ideas’ [i.e., materialism] of the west did not make it deviate from its path: It [Japan] remained faithful to its culture, its traditions, and its past.”’ More importantly, throughout his work Bennabi puts most of the blame for the Muslim world‘s predicament, not on western colonialism, but on the Islamic world itself, a notion that m s against the prevailing opinion in the Arab-lslamic world that argues that western powers are mostly responsible for the backwardness of the Muslim world. After his return to Algeria in 1963, following his long exile in Egypt, Malek Bennabi joined the first Islamist organization in Algeria, Al-Qiym al-slamyya (Islamic Values), founded the same year. The association was opposed to the “Marxist” policies of President Ahmed ...

This collection of essays addresses the major problems of the Maghreb countries - Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya - have faced since 1968 and the cultural and economic issues facing them today.