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Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-25T11:01:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2021-04-01 Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) This article aimed to verify the occurrence of convergence and congruence in the positions that the Democratic and Republican parties express about human rights treaties in the Electoral, in the Executive, and the Legislative arenas, in the Post-Cold War (1992-2016). The use of the comparative method guided the study of six specific cases, analyzed using qualitative techniques. The results point to two trends. The first is that the possibility of convergence between the Democratic and Republican parties tends to diminish when their positions on human rights treaties are anchored by ideological perspectives, and the second is that a party’s position on a treaty tends to be congruent among political arenas. Moreover, the divergence of positions between the parties clarifies the liberal internationalist character of the Democratic positions and the conservative isolationist approach of the Republican positions. Ciência Política pela UFSCar Bolsista de Pós-Doutorado da Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) No Instituto de Políticas Públicas e Relações Internacionais (IPPRI) Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) Ciência Política pela UFSCar Bolsista de Doutorado do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) Ciência Política pela UFSCar Bolsista de Pós-Doutorado da Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) No Instituto de Políticas Públicas e Relações Internacionais (IPPRI) Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)

Anti-Russian sentiment - what some call “Russophobia” - is subtle, but visible in the American foreign policy discourse since the end of the Cold War. Most recently, it can be found in the Obama-era discourse about Russia, despite the positive bump in relations after the so-called “reset” of 2009. This paper contends that, among the many irritants in Russia - U.S. relations, anti-Russian sentiment among the American foreign policy leadership is an understudied phenomenon. Russophobia matters because it is present even at times of promise in the relationship; it impedes striking a “normal” relationship with Russia, and it influences policy decisions. This paper conceptualizes Russophobia, considers the source of its persistence in the American foreign policy discourse, and identifies examples of anti-Russian sentiment among key members of Barack Obama’s foreign policy team through an examination of memoirs and personal reflections about Russia. The paper asserts that anti-Russian attitudes in the American foreign policy discourse throughout the post-Cold War era must be identified and understood in order to gain a better understanding of why forging stronger, mutually beneficial relations with Russia continues to evade American policy makers. Anti-Russian sentiment undermined the Obama - Medvedev reset and, while it is certainly not alone responsible for deteriorating relations with Russia, it helped to perpetuate the downturn in relations and must be identified and better understood. The arguments made in this paper and in the selected citations herein, are based upon non-partisan scholarly inquiry and are not a consequence of the author’s personal or political views.

NATO did not dissolve following the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War. Instead, the alliance expanded, in stages—from 16 members at its Cold War peak to 30 in 2020. While NATO enlargement alone did not cause the deterioration of US–Russian relations, it did contribute significantly to that outcome. Champions of NATO expansion aver that it maintains peace in Europe and promotes democracy in East-Central Europe. They add that Russia has nothing to fear. But Russia’s leaders have always seen NATO expansion differently. The article also examines NATO’s enlargement as it relates to US post-Cold War grand strategy. It contends the policy reflects the abiding US commitment to maintaining its global primacy, which, in part, is ensured by perpetuating Europe’s dependence on the USA for an elemental need: security. We conclude by considering the future of NATO and Europe.

Theoretical and practical structure of the power system behind the implementation of the global powers’ foreign and security policies should be analysed with the postmodern understanding. In this context, the global powers’ interests – in their soft or hard forms of manifestation – are crucial elements of democratic development and crisis management within the network strategy in Balkan policies. The security culture is about the states’ security perception and about the tools, which are used to combat specific threats. According to postmodern geopolitics, the Post-Cold War realities – with the axis of global powers – and Balkan policies of these powers are related to the political changes. United States (US) maintains its military superiority in the world order with state actors, and on the other hand, cooperates with the European Union (EU) as an international organisation. According to the post-modern understanding, there is neither a new world order nor a new world disorder in the world today. Instead, there is a security zone in Europe and a zone of danger and chaos outside. Balkan policies of global powers are essential because of the problematic issues in the region. Balkan geography constitutes a critical equation in this regard. This study emphasises that EU democratic development projects are different from the US in terms of strategy and institutional means. Some of the projects are considered within the EU enlargement strategy, while others are viewed as a foreign policy strategy, which is mainly assumed by leading countries like China. Compared to the US, the EU strategy focuses more on non-military operations, and the Balkan policies of these states represent a specific feature of the postmodern geopolitics.

Aims & Backgrounds: The US and the Soviet Union led the east and the west camps during the cold war and the geopolitical order was laid on the foundation of the rivalries between these two superpowers. But, after the collapse of the bipolar system, the US became the undisputed power in the international arena and the geopolitical order underwent changes during three decades after that and the conflicts between the superpowers was continued. Based thereon, the current study aims at explaining the geopolitical structure after the cold war and the method of power distribution in the situation after the collapse of Soviet Union up to the present time. Methodology: The present study makes use of a descriptive-analytical method using qualitative content analysis and reviewing literature and the theories presented through reasoning and inference to find answers to three key questions in line with perceiving the relations between the superpowers after the cold war. The method of data and information Collectionis library and documentary. Findings: The present study will show that the world witnessed a geopolitical transition after cold war and that no power is in a hegemonic position currently and the world is bearing witness to a spectrum of unipolar, bipolar and multipolar fluid powers. The conflict between the superpowers can be explained based on subjective and objective geopolitical factors. Conclusion: Powers have chosen such strategies as withdrawal, bandwagoning and, balance of power which is including soft and hard in respect to one another according to the type of conflicts

O modelo do Antropoceno refere-se às perturbações na superfície terrestre causadas pela intensa atividade humana. Estando associado a um novo intervalo na história geológica da Terra, ele tem sido abordado por diversas áreas de conhecimento das chamadas ciências da Terra, chegando agora até às ciências sociais e humanidades, desde a sua implantação. As Relações Internacionais (RI) procuram uma melhor especificidade de suas funções diante do Antropoceno, alargando seu campo de atuação. No campo da Segurança, afirma-se que os atores estejam mais conectados e comprometidos entre si e que o significado de Segurança baseado no ator estatal e nos setores político e militar não faz mais sentido no modelo antropocênico e que a transdisciplinaridade (para a disciplina de relações internacionais e além dela) deva ser afirmada. Colaborando com um manifesto lançado em conferencia patrocinada pela Revista Millenium, da London School of Economics trazemos o corte temporal do pós-Guerra Fria para alargar o debate sócio-ambiental em termos transdisciplinares ao campo dos estudos de segurança. O Antropoceno prenuncia uma época de insegurança. Embora a atenção à segurança como ameaça tenha crescido nas últimas duas décadas em um franco estímulo ao debate do pós-Guerra Fria e a securitização seja visível no sistema global, persiste um grande número de nexos de segurança em construção transdisciplinar que merecem reexame crítico diante do fenómeno da degradação ambiental criada dentro do Antropoceno conceitual, que preconiza uma ameaça bipolar humano- natureza., The Anthropocene model refers to disturbances on the earth's surface caused by intense human activity. Being associated with a new interval in the geological history of the Earth, it has been approached by several areas of knowledge of the so-called Earth sciences, reaching now to the social sciences and humanities, since its implantation. International Relations (IR) seek a better specificity of their functions vis-à-vis the Anthropocene, expanding their field of action. In the field of Security, it is stated that the actors are more connected and committed to each other and that the meaning of Security based on the state actor and in the political and military sectors no longer makes sense in the anthropocentric model and that transdisciplinarity (for the discipline of international relations and beyond) must be affirmed. Collaborating with a manifesto launched at a conference sponsored by the Millennium Journal, of the London School of Economics, we bring the post-Cold War time cut to broaden the socio-environmental debate in transdisciplinary terms to the field of security studies. The Anthropocene foreshadows a time of insecurity. Although attention to security as a threat has grown in the past two decades in a frank stimulus to the post-Cold War debate and securitization is visible in the global system, a large number of security nexuses in transdisciplinary construction persist that deserve critical review in the face of phenomenon of environmental degradation created within the conceptual Anthropocene, which advocates a bipolar human-nature threat., (undefined)

The post-Cold War era is placing the defense industry at a crossroads. If, on the one hand, it is under great pressure to guarantee warlike efforts around the world, with tight budgets and uncertain lead-times, on the other hand, it is seen as a central instrument for national sovereignty and foreign policy. The purpose of this research is to report the state-of-the-art of the existing literature and explore the most relevant research areas in order to provide the conceptual basis for further empirical research. To do so, this study uses a preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis (PRISMA), which is an adequate technique as it allows one to discover concepts, ideas, and debates about the defense industry. The results evidenced three different approaches to the defense industry&mdash, integration, autarky, and domination. In that regard, we present several case studies in which the defense industry is used as an instrument of foreign policy or national sovereignty. Future studies may focus on empirical research to validate the theoretical findings or to identify variables that lead some defense industries to seek synergies, resorting to mergers and acquisitions, while other defense companies prefer to obtain State funds.

The chapter shows how the social and political changes in Finnish society in the early 1990s were reflected in the images of C. G. E. Mannerheim (1867–1951), the Marshal of Finland. By looking at the debate concerning the construction of the Museum of Contemporary Art next to the Mannerheim equestrian statue in Helsinki, Tepora analyzes the public dispute as a moral panic that sprung from the 1990s recession, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and joining the European Union. Arguing for the study of non-totalitarian personality cults, Tepora shows how the opposing sides in the debate either arose to defend the conservative Mannerheim image as an unchanging emotional figure or recoded the figure to reflect their liberal and cosmopolitan perspectives. This chapter shows how the social and political changes in Finnish society in the early 1990s were reflected in the images of C. G. E. Mannerheim (1867–1951), the Marshal of Finland. By looking at the debate concerning the construction of the Museum of Contemporary Art right next to the Mannerheim equestrian statue in Helsinki, Tepora analyzes the public dispute as a moral panic that sprang from the 1990s recession, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and joining the European Union. Arguing for the study of nontotalitarian personality cults, Tepora shows how the opposing sides in the debate either rose to defend the conservative Mannerheim image as an unchanging emotional figure or recoded the figure to reflect their liberal and cosmopolitan perspectives.

If identity is developed in relation to the Other, as researchers in the social sciences claim, then a nation’s sense of self must also be, to some degree, contingent on its understanding of what constitutes the Other. This constructive perspective is all the more useful if we consider nations to be “imagined communities” (Anderson). In this respect, the American identity is probably the best example of a “self” understood through “otherness.” Research in various disciplines has shown that Americans have long defined themselves through a binary narrative of “us” versus “them” (Butler; Coe-Neuman; Campbell; Edwards; Schlesinger). Whether it takes the form of the American Indians of the Frontier, the British during the American Revolution, the immigrants in the early 20th century, the Nazis, the Communists, and more recently the terrorists, this Other has three constant characteristics: it is always deemed a threat, somewhat uncivilized and evil, and serves to define national identity by demarcating an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign”, “civilization” from “savagery” and “good” from “evil” (Butler; Campbell; Ivie; Slotkin). As the embodiment of the nation, the president is central to this construction of the U.S. national identity and he takes on the role of storyteller-in-chief. As Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he also has the responsibility to protect the nation and define which threats may attack it. Scholars in communication have shown that the principal image of the enemy in presidential discourse is the “Savage Other” (Ivie; Coe; Neuman). This enemy can be categorized as either “primitive” or “modern.” The former is portrayed as a decentralized enemy living in a primitive society of instability and chaos, devoid of civilization, whereas the latter is considered a centralized evil agent that has “some semblance of civilization” but is nonetheless savage because their aim is to destroy America’s civilized order (Butler). We will begin by showing how one of the distinctive features of America’s enemies has been their evil nature, a charge which reflects the fusion of religious and secular elements that typifies U.S. presidential rhetoric. Then, after looking over the history and definition of the “savage other”, we will discuss how the period since the end of the Cold War, now lacking in “identifiable monolithic enemies” (Edwards), is characterized by a resurgence of the figure of the “primitive savage” presented through a series of animal and sexual images and scenery that turn the evil Other into a predator, not unlike the Indian of the Frontier, while making America the heroic figure of the story. Then, we will show how America’s enemy is also strategically framed as a “modern savage” in the months and weeks leading up to major conflicts, such as the Iraq war. Only an enemy capable of destroying America’s order can constitute a powerful enough threat justifying a full-blown war. Finally, we will try to assess Donald Trump’s disruptive use of the enemy image which, contrary to all his recent predecessors, he applies to entities located both inside and outside the national space, such as immigrants or news media deemed “the enemy of the people.” We will conclude by hypothesizing that President Trump’s highly gendered and racialized enemy rhetoric is emblematic of a nationalist discourse of exclusion and purification of the social body motivated by a fear of fluidity of various identities in an increasingly multicultural society, hence the importance of claiming clear demarcation. L’identité se construit en relation à un « Autre » au niveau individuel comme national. Ce point de vue constructiviste est illustré par la définition d’une nation comme des « communautés imaginées » (Anderson). Or, l’identité américaine est sans doute le meilleur exemple d’un « Soi » compris à travers l’altérité. La recherche dans diverses disciplines démontre combien les Américains se définissent au travers d’un récit binaire qui oppose un « nous » à un « eux » (Butler ; Coe-Neuman ; Campbell ; Edwards ; Schlesinger). Qu’il prenne la forme des Indiens du Far West, des Britanniques pendant la guerre d’indépendance, des immigrés au début du 20e siècle, ou des nazis, des communistes, ou des terroristes, cet « Autre » a des caractéristiques constantes : il est toujours perçu comme une menace, il est dépeint comme sauvage et maléfique, et il sert à définir l’identité nationale en fixant une limite entre « intérieur » et « extérieur », « Soi » et « Autre », « domestique » et « étranger », « civilisation » et « sauvagerie », « bien » et « mal » (Butler ; Campbell ; Ivie ; Slotkin). Au cœur de cette construction se trouve le président qui, en tant qu’incarnation de la nation, prend le rôle de « conteur en chef ». Des chercheurs en communication ont montré que l’image principale de l’ennemi dans les discours présidentiels est celle de « l’Autre sauvage » (Ivie ; Coe ; Neuman). Cet ennemi peut être classé en deux catégories : « primitif » et « moderne ». Le premier est présenté comme un ennemi décentralisé qui vit dans une société primitive dépourvue de toute civilisation, où règne le chaos, tandis que le second, dit « moderne », a « un semblant de civilité » mais est, par son action, sorti du monde civilisé, incarné par les valeurs américaines (Butler). S’appuyant sur la recherche dans les domaines de la communication, de la linguistique cognitive, de la sociologie, des sciences politiques et de la philosophie politique, cet article se focalise sur la façon dont les présidents américains ont construit l’image des ennemis de la nation depuis la fin de la guerre froide, à travers des métaphores, analogies, et tropes spécifiques. Tout d’abord, nous verrons que l’un des traits distinctifs des ennemis de l’Amérique est leur nature maléfique, une caractéristique qui reflète la fusion du discours religieux et laïque. Puis, nous examinerons que la période post-guerre froide, qui n’offre plus un ennemi « monolithique identifiable », se caractérise par la résurgence de la figure du « sauvage primitif » présenté à travers une série de caractéristiques qui font de « l’Autre sauvage » un prédateur, ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler l’image de l’Indien du Far West, tout en donnant à l’Amérique le rôle de héros. Nous montrerons également que les tentatives de reconstruction d’un « sauvage moderne » répondent aux besoins politiques de posséder un ennemi assez puissant pour constituer une menace et justifier une guerre à part entière. Enfin, nous évaluerons l’utilisation subversive de l’image de l’ennemi par Donald Trump qui, contrairement à ses prédécesseurs, l’associe à des entités localisées tant à l’extérieur qu’à l’intérieur de l’espace national. Nous évoquerons la possibilité que la rhétorique du président Trump soit emblématique d’un discours nationaliste d’exclusion et de purification du corps social, motivé par la peur de la fluidité dans un monde de plus en plus multiculturel, qui met en exergue, des lignes de démarcation identitaire claires.

International audience; This paper focus on the bilateral relations between France and Spain during the 1986-2001 years, from the Spanish accession to the EEC to the beginning of the 2000 decade. Our working hypothesis is the birth during this period of a privileged relation between the two nations in the context ofthe European Community/European Union and in the post-Cold War era, represented by the relation between François Mitterrand and Felipe González. This work also highlights the limits of this partnership. The sources used are the French national archives (archives of the French presidency),diplomatic archives (France and Spain), archives of the EU and the press.; Esta comunicación trata de hacer un enfoque sobre la relación bilateral entre Francia y España durante los años 1986-2001, de la adhesión de España a la CEE hasta el inicio de la primera década del siglo XXI. Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo es el nacimiento durante este periodo de una relación privilegiada entre ambas naciones en el marco de la Comunidad/Unión Europea y en el contexto de la posguerra fría, representada por la pareja François Mitterrand-Felipe González. La contribución analiza también los límites de esta relación, basándose en las fuentes del archivo nacional francés (archivo de la Presidencia), los archivos diplomáticos (Francia/España), los archivos de la Unión Europea y la prensa

Resumen En este estudio se analiza la política de ampliación de la OTAN durante la Posguerra Fría, y las razones del actual estancamiento de la denominada política de puertas abiertas. Si bien es probable que todos los Estados balcánicos acaben integrados en la OTAN, otros Estados han sido configurados por parte de Rusia como el muro infranqueable de este proceso ampliador. En este sentido, Georgia y, de forma clara, Ucrania han marcado un punto de inflexión en la relación entre la OTAN y Rusia. El "factor Rusia" siempre ha determinado el avance de la Alianza Atlántica hacia el Este de Europa, pero actualmente los miembros de la OTAN, principalmente los socios europeos más relevantes, podrían verse afectados por graves implicaciones de orden político, económico y geoestratégico (energía, coordinación para combatir el terrorismo yihadista, etc.) si su relación con Rusia empeora. Por ello, se considera adecuado que la estrategia de la ampliación en esta etapa atienda a todas las variables, revise sus objetivos y no se realice de forma precipitada, dado que la reconstrucción de la relación con Rusia es fundamental para que exista un equilibrio euroasiático. Abstract This study analyzes NATO's enlargement policy during the post-Cold War and the reasons for the current stagnation of the so-called "open door policy". While it is likely that all Balkan states end up incorporated into NATO, other states have been regarded by Russia as the insurmountable wall of this enlargement process. In this sense, Georgia and, clearly Ukraine, have marked a turning point in the NATO-Russia relationship. The "Russian factor" has always determined the advance of the North Atlantic Alliance towards Eastern Europe, but currently NATO members, especially the most relevant European partners, could experience serious political, economic and geostrategic effects (energy, coordination to combat jihadist terrorism) if its relationship with Russia worsens. Thus, it is suggested that the expansion strategy at this stage covers all the variables, reviews its objectives and is not pursued hastily because reconstructing the relationship with Russia is fundamental to the existence of a Euro-Asian balance. Resumo Neste estudo analisa-se a política de ampliação da OTAN durante a Pós-guerra Fria, e as razões do atual estancamento da denominada política de portas abertas. Se bem que é provável que todos os Estados balcânicos acabem integrados na OTAN, outros Estados têm sido configurados por parte de Rússia como o muro infran-queável deste processo ampliador. Neste sentido, Geórgia e, de forma clara, a Ucrânia têm marcado um ponto de inflexão na relação entre a OTAN e a Rússia. O "fator Rússia" sempre tem determinado o avanço da Aliança Atlântica ao Leste da Europa, mas atualmente os membros da OTAN, principalmente os sócios europeus mais relevantes, poderiam verse afetados por graves implicações de ordem política, econômica e geoestratégica (energia, coordenação para combater o terrorismo jihadista, etc.) se sua relação com a Rússia piora. Por isso, se considera adequado que a estratégia da ampliação nesta etapa atenda a todas as variáveis, revise seus objetivos e não se realize de forma precipitada, já que a reconstrução da relação com a Rússia é fundamental para que exista um equilíbrio euroasiático.

Despite different perceptions, discourses and approaches, the post-Cold War Arctic is with a high geopolitical stability based on institutional, international cooperation started by the Arctic states and supported by Arctic indigenous peoples, non- governmental organizations and sub-national governments. As a result, there are neither armed conflicts nor serious disputes on national borders. Behind the high geopolitical stability are on the one hand, common interests of the Arctic states to decrease military tension and increase political stability by causing a transformation from confrontation to environmental cooperation. On the other hand, there are certain features of Arctic geopolitics as prerequisites for a transformation, such as firm state sovereignty, high degree of legal certainty, and flexibility in agenda setting. When assessing a state of Arctic geopolitics and IR of the post-Cold War era, there is an ambivalence on how ‘geopolitics’ is defined. Behind are the dualism of military presence based on the nuclear weapons’ systems and the high stability based on international, institutional cooperation between the eight Arctic states. As well as, that there are two major competing discourses: first, the Arctic as a ’zone of peace’ and exceptional in world politics, and second, that there is a race of resources and the consequent emerging conflicts in the Arctic. In addition, there are fresh reminders that Arctic geopolitics is impacted by (grand) environmental challenges and ‘wicked problems’, in particular climate change; and that new multi- dimensional dynamics has made Arctic geopolitics global. The article aims to draw up a holistic picture of the post-Cold War Arctic, and discuss what might be special features of Arctic geopolitics in globalization. The article examines and discusses the transformation of approach from classical geopolitics to critical geopolitics by applying main approaches of geopolitics to the Arctic/Arctic geopolitics.

Thomas Niles served as a United States foreign service officer from 1962 to 1998. His service included three terms as ambassador: to Canada, the European Community, and Greece. He reflects here on the continuities in the diplomatic profession, and, in particular, on embassies, during a period of notable historic change. While many of the protocols and responsibilities of embassies remained more or less the same as they had been for over a century, there were hints that those, too, were about to change in unforeseen ways, even calling into question the central role of embassies as representing and serving the nation-state, as the other articles in this issue discuss. Nevertheless, to this ambassador, at least, even dramatic changes in technology, politics, and culture rarely happen all at once; and the institutions and the people adapting to them may be more cautious or durable than they sometimes appear in retrospect.

El propósito de este artículo consiste en cuestionar los principios de realidad que hicieron posible la intervención militar de Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña en Irak. Se defenderán tres tesis. Primera, el realismo político que justificó la intervención militar en Irak es un realismo paradójico y falso, pues en vez de propiciar las condiciones sostenibles de la seguridad internacional, generaliza la inseguridad. Segunda, la amenaza del fundamentalismo islámico es una creación del monólogo del universalismo occidental sobre el mundo islámico y esconde la amenaza mucho más seria del mismo universalismo. Tercera, la «guerra contra el terrorismo» ha generalizado la creación de enemigos imaginarios que permite ocultar y gestionar las contradicciones reales del mundo competitivo en el cual se definió. En este sentido la «guerra contra el terrorismo» se convierte en una guerra contra todos, destinada a administrar y reproducir las condiciones de la inseguridad generalizada contra la cual pretende luchar. The purpose of this article is to question the reality principies that made US and UK military intervention possible in Iraq. Three theses are set forth. First, the political realism that justified military intervention in Iraq is both paradoxical and false since, instead of propitiating sustainable conditions of international security, it is in fact generalizing the insecurity. Secondly, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is a creation of the western world's monologue of universalism with respect to the Islamic world which camouflages the far more serious threat which that very same universalism constitutes. Thirdly, the «war against terrorism» has generaüzed the creation of imaginary enemies which makes it possible to conceal and manage the real contradictions endemic to the competitive world in which it was defined. In this sense, the «war against terrorism» becomes a war against everyone, aimed to administer and reproduce the conditions of generalized insecurity which it supposedly seeks to combat.

The prevalence of the discourse of ideological geopolitics during the Cold War meant that both Turkey and the EU belonged to the West by virtue of their ideological orientation. In the absence of this prevalent geopolitical discourse, both the EU and Turkey have spent the 1990s trying to locate themselves geographically. Drawing on the literature on critical approaches to political geography and international relations, this article seeks to answer the question of whether the EU's post-Cold War security discourse on the Mediterranean in general and on relations with Turkey in particular point to a return to the earlier discourse of civilisational geopolitics. The article also presents a reading of Turkish policy makers’ attempts to resist EU's representation of Turkey in ‘non-Europe’ (as with the ‘Middle East’ or the ‘Mediterranean’) as boundary-producing practices which have served to underline the boundaries between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’.