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Background: Asylum Seekers are a high-risk group from a health perspective. The US is the largest recipient of asylum applications in the world. Multiple articles exist on asylum seekers’ health, but, anecdotally, the majority originate from Europe and elsewhere. We sought to assess the current health and medical literature on asylum seekers in the US, where asylum seekers are a distinct population from refugees. This limited representation in the scientific literature can impact the care they receive. We analyzed the existing literature on asylum seekers in the US via a Scoping Review of the literature from 1946 to 2020 that discussed the health of asylum seekers in the US. Refugees were excluded given their legal status which distinguishes the protections they receive. Results: A total of 114 articles were identified; 48 (42.1%) of which were empirical studies; (66 (57.9%) were editorials or commentaries. Analysis of empirical studies revealed enhanced focus on mental health (60.42%), on African asylees (45.83%). The majority of the editorials and commentaries focused on detention and the medico-legal process (31.82% and 30.3% respectively). Conclusion: Empirical data on the health of asylum seekers in the US context is very limited. Research gaps include domains that span the medical, social, and legal fields. Research expansion requires increased dedication from the research community, funding, and the ethical engagement of these vulnerable populations. This is especially important given the unprecedented migration and displacement of populations in the 21st century.

The open Russian military invasion of Ukraine supported by Belarus launched in February 2022 has changed the usual state of affairs and caused the economic, humanitarian, and migration crises. Several millions of Ukrainian people had to move to safer regions of the country, and a significant share of them (mostly women, children, and elderly people) have left abroad in search of safer living conditions, which has become the worst migration crisis since the World War II. Many Ukrainian citizens have been forced to move to Russia. Poland hosts the largest number of Ukrainian citizens among the EU countries (about 60% of all refugees), much less left for Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany. Almost every European country helps Ukraine in some way or another, hosting its residents and providing asylum. The aim of this article is to investigate the tendencies and changes of forced migration in Ukraine in the conditions of war. The collective protection of displaced persons allows immediate assistance to many people in conditions of emergencies and reduces pressure on the system of asylum provision authorities. This decision provides the right to Ukrainians to live, work, and receive assistance in the EU countries avoiding the lingering process of asylum application submission and long waiting for the respective decision. The article highlights the comparison of standards for providing temporary protection of displaced persons in the EU countries that have accepted most of them. Certainly, the situation with the mass movement of people or leaving abroad will have negative consequences for Ukraine. The return of forcibly displaced from Ukraine will depend on what way of legal stay abroad they choose (status of “forced” tourist, refugee, or temporary protection). Moreover, the duration of hostilities and effi ciency and complexity of actions taken by state and local authorities to implement economic and social reforms will have much effect. The article offers various development scenarios for Ukraine and ways and incentives for returning Ukrainian citizens to their Motherland.

The worst contemporary refugee crisis that occurred during the summer of 2015 challenged the basic values of the European Union. There had never been a time when the need for a consistent approach, both from the individual Member States and the EU as a whole, was more urgent. The Union’s response during 2015’s refugee crisis was unreliable, fragmented, and it largely affected the Western Balkan countries that are now aspiring to become EU Member States. This paper analyses how the EU’s response to the refugee crisis has affected and still affects the countries in the Western Balkans, which are all in different stages of their European integration. The refugee crisis created many challenges for the Western Balkan countries which are all weak democracies and which have unstable institutions. This paper also analyses the numerous domestic costs connected to these countries when faced with the refugee crisis. Finally, the paper argues that, although largely harmonised with the EU acquis, the legislative and institutional frameworks for migration management in Western Balkan countries need further adjustment.

This study compares the balance of newspaper and television news coverage about migration in two countries that were differently affected by the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015 in terms of the geopolitical involvement and numbers of migrants being admitted. Based on a broad consensus among political elites, Germany left its borders open and received about one million migrants mainly from Syria during 2015. In contrast, the conservative British government was heavily attacked by oppositional parties for closing Britain’s borders and, thus, restricting immigration. These different initial situations led to remarkable differences between the news coverage in both countries. In line with news value theory, German media outlets reported much more on migration than did their British counterparts. In line with indexing theory, German news coverage consonantly reflected the consensual view of German political elites, while British news media reported along their general editorial lines.

This article investigates refugee categorisations in humanitarian admission programmes. Official selection categories and the way they are enacted at the frontline have significant implications for refugees’ unequal (im)mobility and (in)security as they determine who can safely and legally travel to Europe. Based on original ethnographic data, the analysis examines how different political actors mobilise humanitarian and security ‘orders of worth’ to justify how selection categories prioritise some refugees’ security and mobility over others’ in times of perceived crisis. Contrasting Germany’s admission programmes from Lebanon (2013-2015) to those from Turkey (2016-) demonstrates a shift from an overall humanitarian, to a combination of humanitarian and state security orders of worth. The focus on categorisation and justification practices advances a grounded understanding of how inequalities in refugees’ (in)security and (im)mobility emerge and shift in the course of changing crisis definitions.

The European ‘refugee crisis’ has seen the Mediterranean described as: a hot spot in need of better governance and border policing; the world’s deadliest border; and as a humanitarian catastrophe. In Germany, the initial default option was to treat the various articulations of crisis as localized. Keeping the Mediterranean (and thus the crisis) at arm’s length was facilitated by the Dublin II regulations stipulating that asylum claims would only be processed in the state where they were first made. Only in 2015, when large numbers of refugees arrived, the Mediterranean was rearticulated as concerning ‘us’ rather than ‘them’. Focusing on German asylum and refugee debates, this article traces such semantic shifts to show how, counter-intuitively, becoming Mediterranean is enabled by a tacit process of de-Europeanization which instrumentally calls for European solutions only when the ‘crisis’ reaches the national level.

In 2019, Canada introduced legislative changes that made asylum seekers ineligible for protection if they have made a previous refugee claim in a country that Canada shares an information-sharing agreement with. Such agreements are currently in place with the US, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand. This article offers a critical assessment of the new ineligibility ground, arguing that the policy is designed to deter secondary refugee movements, particularly those across the Canada–US border which have considerably intensified since 2017. Based on the ‘first safe country’ rule, the new ineligibility ground enables Canada to exclude some asylum seekers from refugee protection without offering any alternative effective protection in Canada. This article demonstrates that the policy is inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under international refugee law.

This article discusses the role of Canada’s Designated Country of Origin (DCO) policy in the illegalization of asylum seekers. The policy allows the government to designate countries in which it is presumed that citizens do not face risks of persecution, torture, or similar abuse. Refugee claimants from DCOs are thus subject to accelerated processing timelines with reduced rights. Canada has implemented the policy as a way to deal with a backlog of asylum applications, increase efficiency, and exclude fraudulent refugee claims. Based on a primary field research conducted between October 2015 and May 2017 in three provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, this article argues that the DCO policy is likely to have the unintended effect of shifting asylum seekers into an irregular status.

This article describes global shifts in migration and population demography and the simultaneous increase in nationalism and xenophobia. The literature lays out a need for more research examining how young people from immigrant or refugee backgrounds are being affected by contemporary trends in nationalism and xenophobia across diverse national contexts. This article concludes with an overview of five papers addressing the topic in the special section.

Do crackdowns by destination countries deter refugees? Much of the existing literature conflates containment measures (forcibly restricting refugees in their home region or country) and deterrence policies (discouraging refugees by making the destination appear less attractive). In addition, empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on Western countries and analyzed the effects of acceptance rates or policy reforms on the number of asylum applications lodged. In contrast, this paper examines whether rights violations deter asylees and refugees by leveraging a global dataset drawn from reports by the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. I find that deportation, detention, and encampment do not decrease asylum applications or refugee arrivals, and may actually raise them in some cases. While reduced access to the labor market may deter very small numbers of asylees and refugees, there are other sound reasons for destination countries to eschew restrictive employment policies.

Abstract. Background: There are concerning rates of suicidality among asylum seekers and refugees in Australia, and tailored suicide prevention initiatives are needed. Aims: We aimed to evaluate the impact of a tailored suicide prevention education program for people working with asylum seekers and refugees. Method: Attendees of the education program completed self-report questionnaires at pretraining, posttraining, and 4–6 months follow-up. Results: Over 400 workers, volunteers, and students across Australia took part in the education program. A series of linear mixed-effects models revealed significant improvements in outcome measures from pretraining ( n = 247) to posttraining ( n = 231). Improvements were maintained at follow-up ( n = 75). Limitations: Limitations of this research were the lack of a control group and a low follow-up response rate. Conclusion: Findings suggest that a 2 days tailored suicide prevention education program contributes to significant improvements in workers’ attitudes toward suicide prevention, and their confidence and competence in assessing and responding to suicidal distress.

This paper focuses on the integration of refugees and immigrants into Greek society through the provision of housing. This topic is a hot one due to the fact that many refuges have arrived in Greece during the previous years and there is a need to remain for a long time. Thus, the provision of housing is imperative. However, due to the economic crisis, the creation of such spaces is expensive and unachievable. As a result, alternatives should be examined. For this purpose, different policies of the smooth integration of refugees and immigrants in European countries can provide such solutions. Three case studies were selected across Europe and they have been compared to the Athenian paradigm. Through this research, proposals about their successful integration have been derived. In that way, it will be possible to provide specific plans that reorganize various areas in Athens in order to make this vision a reality.

The article examines the trends of anthropologization and anthropocentrism in constitutional law, which act as a fundamental trend in the development and improvement of the constitutional and legal status of man, individual and citizen. Emphasis is placed on the importance of these trends through their assistance to the state in meeting the intentions, aspirations, needs, interests, attitudes of man, manifested at the local level of functioning of state-organized society, within the territorial community, in local government and in everyday life through establishment, development and improvement of the constitutional and legal status of a person (individual) and a citizen. It is argued that in the process of implementing the trends of anthropologization and anthropocentrism in constitutional law, the state applies a number of methodological approaches to man (personality) through the development, formation, legalization, application, protection, protection, guarantee and implementation of its constitutional status, namely: a) the constitutional and legal status of a person (individual) and a citizen organically passes into the municipal legal status of a person (individual) and is realized through the phenomenology of municipal human rights; b) an individual approach to each person (personality) that exists and functions in the territory of the state is possible in the praxeological sense – only under conditions of public self-government (municipal) power and the application of municipal legal status of a person (individual); c) the adjustment of public administration and state rule-making should take into account the above paradigmatic guidelines. It is proved that the basis of these trends in constitutional law is the philosophical maxim "man is the measure of all things", which is transformed into a paradigm of management and rule-making activities of the state through the establishment of appropriate constitutional status of man (person) and citizen (including other legal states), foreignness, statelessness, refugees, etc.), which determines the essential aspects of human- state interaction, as well as demonstrates the real relationship of the state to man.

The article examines the features of the status of a person as the main beneficiary of local self-government. It was revealed that based on the essence of the term "beneficiary", it refers to those persons who receive certain benefits, income or dividends not due to the active exercise of their rights, but to some extent "passively" due to their status or activities of others. It is has established that the very understanding of a person as a beneficiary of local self-government demonstrates a new emphasis in understanding how the municipal government should act and in whose interests. The center of such activity should be a person as a member of the territorial community, and his interests should be satisfied through the adequate activities of local governments determined by such interests. Person as the main beneficiary of local self-government appears: a citizen of Ukraine, a foreign citizen or a stateless person (stateless person) or a refugee; member of the territorial community; a resident of a village, settlement, city or association of villages, settlements, cities it is determined. A new approach to understanding the status of a person – a beneficiary of local self- government in a broad and narrow sense (in a broad sense – in the exercise of local self- government of all its powers, in the narrow – the exercise of local authorities in relation to vulnerable groups). It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine through the prism of the powers of local governments provides clear recipients (beneficiaries), which are mainly those categories of the local population who need various financial, material or other support and assistance – including socially vulnerable or vulnerable members of the territorial community. Thus, a person is a member of a territorial community, and his interests must be satisfied through the adequate activities of local self-government bodies determined by such interests.

Since its open-door policy for welcoming asylum seekers in 2015, Germany has experienced a resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiments and a backlash against the safeguarding of human rights. Such perceptions of asylum seekers and their accommodation are shaped in urban neighborhoods, where street-level bureaucrats try steering such perceptions. While much literature has discussed how immigrant affairs departments promote intercultural encounter or acceptance of diversity, we know relatively little so far if and when urban planners steer perceptions of migration-related diversity. Yet, urban planners work closely with residents in urban regeneration programs and were confronted with residents’ anxieties about the potential impact of the asylum seeker accommodation when large reception centers were opened in 2015. The article aims to fill a gap in the literature. Based on two in-depth case studies it shows how structural contexts inform whether urban planners span disciplinary boundaries and act as broker between residents and the state in order to steer perceptions of asylum seeker accommodations. The article is based on field research and qualitative interviews in two large German cities. The article contributes to literatures on perceptions of migration and diversity, urban planning and urban regeneration, street-level bureaucracy, boundary spanning and brokerage.

Widespread fear that hosting refugees will mean more terrorism in host states is at theheart of the ‘refugee crisis’. Yet, we lack rigorous evidence for such claims. This articletheoretically unpacks how and under what conditions transnational refugee movementsplausibly lead to different types of terrorist outcomes. Combining original data witha multi-pronged approach involving a treatment-placebo design as well as instrumentalvariable estimation, we provide systematic and robust evidence that sheds new light onthe security implications of transnational forced migration. Our findings challenge theclaim that hosting refugees heightens the risk of “importing” terrorist attacks againstnationals of host countries, especially in developed countries. However, in these coun-tries refugees themselves are particularly prone to becoming the targets of retaliatoryterrorist attacks by natives, driven by fear. Dominant policy responses to the refugeecrisis that raise fears and suspicions are therefore not only ill-suited, but potentiallycounterproductive.

Does international terrorism affect attitudes toward refugees? Does terrorism mobilize the public to pressure legislators to restrict refugee policy? Are these effects long- or short-lived? To answ...

The Rohingya is a stateless minority group in Myanmar, suffering from ethnic and religious armed conflicts, state persecution, and displacement. Since the escalation of violent conflicts in the early 2010s, they have fled the country and sought refuge in neighbouring countries, and in the biggest numbers, in Bangladesh. Living in densely populated refugee camps, Rohingya children receive very limited access to education and are exceptionally vulnerable to illnesses, violence and trafficking. This discussion paper describes the conditions and contexts under which education is offered, and identifies the serious problems and gaps in provision for Rohingya children in Bangladeshi refugee camps.

What is the effect of residing in ethnic enclaves on immigrants’ future political participation? We study a comprehensive refugee placement reform that was implemented in Sweden in the mid-1980s in...

International migration is inextricably connected to a wide range of issues and dilemmas that confront governments and peoples across the globe today. Increasing racism and neo-Nazi violence in Germany, ‘ethnic cleansing’ in former Yugoslavia and police brutality towards blacks in Los Angeles, are all recent examples of problems that are linked to migration in one way or another. Migration, however, is as old as humanity itself, and has played a crucial role in shaping the world throughout history. But while it has been a constant feature of human history, the causes, characteristics, patterns and directions of migration have never remained constant; they have always influenced and been influenced by changing economic, social and political conditions within and between states. The aim of this chapter is to chart the major developments in international migration and to examine their implications.

After the “Arab Spring” uprisings, an optimistic strand in the field of media and social change emerged which presents the role of social networking websites as key tools for Muslim and Arab women to change the dominant representations about themselves in the media and literature as oppressed and sexually objectified by their men (Nahed Eltantawy 2013). While I acknowledge the role of online social media spaces as resources for social change, this paper incorporates feminist scholarship on gender, postcolonialism, and representation (Abu-Lughod 2002; Chandra Mohanty 2003; Aihwa Ong 1999) to critically evaluate social networking websites as spaces that actually promote stereotypical and/or hegemonic understandings of Syrian refugee women's issues. As an example of what Ong (1999) calls “self-orientalization,” I analyze the discourses of the Facebook campaign “Refugees Not Captives” (RNC) and argue that this campaign's messages transfer to and interact with mainstream global media coverage of the Syrian refugee crisis. My main goal is to show how what may appear to be a local authentic online campaign aiming to encourage feminist actions to end the suffering of Syrian refugee women is, in fact, disconnected from the offline realities of these women and the activist groups who work with them on the ground. My concern is to critique a form of feminist online campaign that claims to represent the voices of women who generally do not have the economic and educational privileges to access the online spaces to speak for themselves. Methodologically, this article is part of a broader study based on my fieldwork during the summer of 2013 in Jordan, where I conducted ethnographic research as well as thirty-three in-depth interviews with Syrian refugee women and activists, including the representative of the RNC campaign. My paper discusses how the discourses of both this online campaign and the Western media reinforce hegemonic orientalist representations of Syrian women, as well as marginalizing both refugee women's voices and the voices of activists that do not fit dominant representations of Muslim women.

Refugees/asylum-seekers are socially constructed as being economically, politically and culturally threatening to the nation-state in which they seek asylum. Evidence of this social construction can be found in media, statements by public officials and in opinion polls. By synthesizing the results of research we can identify the commonalities amongst discourses from different nation-states. This allows us to see how refugees/asylum- eekers serve nation building in general. A case study of South Africa is used to show how this discourse relates to the South African nation-building exercise, with particular references to the xenophobic violence of May 2008. What emerges from the case study is that despite evidence that this framework is a good fit for thinking critically about instances of xenophobia in South Africa, there is also evidence of a counter discourse about refugees/asylum-seekers that casts them as deserving of compassion and generosity.

Migration is not a new phenomenon, although last decades of migration and the reasons behind why people migrate might differ from previous years. This has brought a problem to light, a problem which might put the whole legitimacy aspect of representative democracy out of play. Studies have shown that immigrants in different places around have less activity in electoral participation compared to native citizens. Recently researchers and theorists with Ann Phillips being the front figure of politics of presence, have argued for descriptive representation to increase the electoral participation among immigrants. Thus, this study aims to examine the relation of electoral participation among immigrants and the descriptive representation of immigrants in municipal level by implementing a comparative case study. Furthermore, this study examines what existing literature presents as evidence which can explain the results found in the comparative case study. This study finds that although there is a correlation between descriptive representation and voter turnout among immigrants, it cannot alone explain the difference in the variation found. The results of the case study show a variety of answers that explains the variation of electoral participation. Ranging from politics, citizenship, and native country as an answer, to descriptive representation. In conclusion the results of the scoping study finds that substantial representation as an answer is rarely found in research papers, and that further studies need to take that factor in the calculation when examining which reasons might lie behind promoting immigrants’ electoral participation.

Aims: This study aimed at comparing several health outcomes in young adulthood among child refugees who settled in the different immigration and integration policy contexts of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Methods: The study population included refugees born between 1972 and 1997 who immigrated before the age of 18 and settled in the three Nordic countries during 1986–2005. This population was followed up in national registers during 2006–2015 at ages 18–43 years and was compared with native-born majority populations in the same birth cohorts using sex-stratified and age-adjusted regression analyses. Results: Refugee men in Denmark stood out with a consistent pattern of higher risks for mortality, disability/illness pension, psychiatric care and substance misuse relative to native-born majority Danish men, with risk estimates being higher than comparable estimates observed among refugee men in Norway and Sweden. Refugee men in Sweden and Norway also demonstrated increased risks relative to native-born majority population men for inpatient psychiatric care, and in Sweden also for disability/illness pension. With the exception of increased risk for psychotic disorders, outcomes among refugee women were largely similar to or better than those of native-born majority women in all countries. Conclusions: The observed cross-country differences in health indicators among refugees, and the poorer health outcomes of refugee men in Denmark in particular, may be understood in terms of marked differences in Nordic integration policies. However, female refugees in all three countries had better relative health outcomes than refugee men did, suggesting possible sex differentials that warrant further investigation.

The mission of the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN), as stated in its Constitution, is ‘to advance the rights of refugees and other people in need of protection in the Asia Pacific region’. This article describes and analyses APRRN’s internal governance and resourcing and the manner in which it is going about achieving its mission. It argues that APRRN’s organisational strength is inadequate to support all that it is trying to do. The article concludes by considering what APRRN could do to improve the likelihood of achieving success in the pursuit of its mission and reflecting on the lessons of the APRRN case study for wider civil society.

This project is collaborative research between Oregon State University and University of Washington, Seattle.

Seit Jahrzehnten ist die Geschichte des Sudan, dem drittgrößten Land Afrikas mit rund 46 Millionen Einwohnern, von gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den nördlichen, muslimischen und arabischen Militäreliten der Hauptstadt Khartum auf Kosten der Zivilbevölkerung geprägt. Seit der Unabhängigkeit Sudans im Jahr 1956 kam es zu 16 Putschversuchen, von denen sechs erfolgreich waren. Das war mehr als in jedem anderen Land auf einem Kontinent, der selbst mehr Staatsstreiche erlebt hat als jede andere Region der Welt. Zwei Bürgerkriege zwischen der Regierung in Khartum und den südlichen Regionen forderten rund 1,5 Millionen Opfer. Darüber hinaus hat der anhaltende Konflikt in der westlichen Darfur-Region mehr als 200.000 Menschen getötet und zwei Millionen Menschen vertrieben. In diesen Konflikten bedeuten Grenzen wenig. Die Kontrolle über Ressourcen und Untertanen ist das Hauptziel, und in den Grenzgebieten entstehende Kräfte streben nach Rache an den verachteten Eliten der Metropolen. Die geopolitische Bedeutung des Sudan in einer instabilen Region an der Grenze zum Roten Meer, der Sahelzone und dem Horn von Afrika sowie sein landwirtschaftlicher Wohlstand zogen regionale und globale Akteure an und behinderten den erfolgreichen Übergang zu einer zivil geführten Regierung und einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Neben Großbritannien, der ehemaligen Kolonialmacht, kämpften Russland, die USA, Saudi-Arabien, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate und weitere Nachbarländer um Einfluss im Sudan, darunter Äthiopien, Tschad und Süd-Sudan. Auch sie waren von politischen Unruhen und Konflikten betroffen und litten unter der Last der sudanesischen Flüchtlinge, die vor den Kämpfen in die Nachbarländer flohen. Bereits die britischen Kolonialherren nutzten bestehende Unterschiede, um die Bevölkerung nach ethnischen und regionalen Zugehörigkeiten aufzuteilen, eine Praxis, die bis heute Bestand hat. Der Aktivismus der Milizen vertiefte die Spaltungen unter den Rebellenanhängern. Diese "Teile-und-herrsche"-Politik entsprach einer bewährten Taktik afrikanischer Regierungen in ethnischen Bürgerkriegen, bei der die Milizen häufig ausgenutzt wurden, um ethnische Migration zu fördern und zu erleichtern, indem sie in die nationale Armee integriert wurden. Auch transnationale, fest verwurzelte kriminelle Netzwerke im Drogen-, Waffen- und Menschenhandel standen bereit, das Chaos auszunutzen. Dies machte den Sudan zu einem der fragilsten Länder der Welt. Der Zusammenbruch des Sudan würde nicht nur seine Nachbarn erschüttern, sondern könnte auch zahlreiche andere afrikanische Länder in Mitleidenschaft ziehen, darunter fragile Staaten in der Sahelzone sowie in Ost- und Nordafrika. Die Nebenwirkungen einer solch unkalkulierbaren Konfliktzone und das daraus resultierende Chaos würden auch Westeuropa treffen, das bereits unter dem Zustrom von Flüchtlingen aus Syrien und anderen Kriegsgebieten im Nahen Osten und in Afrika leidet. For decades, the history of Sudan, Africa's third largest country with around 46 million inhabitants, has been marked by violent clashes between the northern, Muslim and Arab military elites of the capital Khartoum at the expense of the civilian population. Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, there have been 16 attempted coups, six of which were successful. That was more than in any other country on a continent that has itself seen more coups than any other region in the world. Two civil wars between the government in Khartoum and the southern regions claimed around 1.5 million victims. In addition, the ongoing conflict in the western Darfur region has killed more than 200,000 people and displaced two million people. In these conflicts, borders mean little. Control of resources and subjects is the primary objective, and forces arising in the borderlands seek revenge on the despised metropolitan elites. Sudan's geopolitical importance in a volatile region bordering the Red Sea, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, as well as its agricultural prosperity, attracted regional and global actors and hampered the successful transition to civilian-led government and sustainable development. In addition to Great Britain, the former colonial power, Russia, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other neighbouring countries were fighting for influence in Sudan, including Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan. They, too, were affected by political unrest and conflict and suffered under the burden of Sudanese refugees fleeing the fighting to neighbouring countries. The British colonial rulers had already used existing differences to divide the population according to ethnic and regional affiliations, a practice that survives to this day. Militia activism deepened divisions among rebel supporters. This divide-and-conquer policy corresponded to a well-established tactic used by African governments in ethnic civil wars, often exploiting the militias to encourage and facilitate ethnic migration by integrating the militias into the national army. Transnational, well-entrenched criminal networks involved in drug-, arms- and human trafficking also stood ready to take advantage of the chaos. This made Sudan one of the most fragile countries in the world. Sudan's collapse would not only shake its neighbours, but could also upset several other African countries, including fragile states in the Sahel, and East and North Africa. The side effects of such an incalculable conflict zone and the resulting chaos would also affect Western Europe, which is already suffering from the influx of refugees from Syria and other war zones in the Middle East and Africa. Depuis des décennies, l'histoire du Soudan, troisième plus grand pays d'Afrique avec environ 46 millions d'habitants, est marquée par de violents affrontements entre les élites militaires du Nord, musulmanes et arabes de la capitale Khartoum aux dépens de la population civile. Depuis que le Soudan a obtenu son indépendance en 1956, il y a eu 16 tentatives de coup d'État, dont six ont réussi. C'était plus que dans tout autre pays sur un continent qui a lui-même connu plus de coups d'État que toute autre région du monde. Deux guerres civiles entre le gouvernement de Khartoum et les régions du sud ont fait environ 1,5 million de victimes. En outre, le conflit en cours dans la région occidentale du Darfour a tué plus de 200 000 personnes et déplacé deux millions de personnes. Dans ces conflits, les frontières ont peu d'importance. Le contrôle des ressources et des sujets est l'objectif principal, et les forces qui surgissent dans les régions frontalières cherchent à se venger des élites métropolitaines méprisées. L'importance géopolitique du Soudan dans une région instable, bordant la mer Rouge, le Sahel et la Corne de l'Afrique, ainsi que sa prospérité agricole, ont attiré des acteurs régionaux et mondiaux et ont entravé la réussite de la transition vers un gouvernement dirigé par des civils et le développement durable. Outre la Grande-Bretagne, l'ancienne puissance coloniale, la Russie, les États-Unis, l'Arabie Saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et d'autres pays voisins se battaient pour l'influence au Soudan, notamment l'Éthiopie, le Tchad et le Soudan du Sud. Eux aussi ont été touchés par les troubles politiques et les conflits et ont souffert sous le fardeau des réfugiés soudanais fuyant les combats vers les pays voisins. Les dirigeants coloniaux britanniques avaient déjà utilisé les différences existantes pour diviser la population en fonction des affiliations ethniques et régionales, une pratique qui survit à ce jour. L'activisme des milices a approfondi les divisions entre les partisans des rebelles. Cette politique, de diviser pour régner correspondait à une tactique bien établie, utilisée par les gouvernements africains dans les guerres civiles ethniques, exploitant souvent les milices pour encourager et faciliter la migration ethnique en intégrant les milices dans l'armée nationale. Des réseaux criminels transnationaux bien établissent impliqués dans le trafic de drogue, d'armes et d'êtres humains étaient également prêts à profiter du chaos. Cela a fait du Soudan l'un des pays les plus fragiles au monde. L'effondrement du Soudan ébranlerait non seulement ses voisins, mais pourrait également bouleverser plusieurs autres pays africains, y compris des États fragiles du Sahel et d'Afrique de l'Est et du Nord. Les effets secondaires d'une zone de conflit aussi incalculable et le chaos qui en résulte affecteraient également l'Europe occidentale, qui souffre déjà de l'afflux de réfugiés de Syrie et d'autres zones de guerre au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique.

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Seit Jahrzehnten ist die Geschichte des Sudan, dem drittgrößten Land Afrikas mit rund 46 Millionen Einwohnern, von gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den nördlichen, muslimischen und arabischen Militäreliten der Hauptstadt Khartum auf Kosten der Zivilbevölkerung geprägt. Seit der Unabhängigkeit Sudans im Jahr 1956 kam es zu 16 Putschversuchen, von denen sechs erfolgreich waren. Das war mehr als in jedem anderen Land auf einem Kontinent, der selbst mehr Staatsstreiche erlebt hat als jede andere Region der Welt. Zwei Bürgerkriege zwischen der Regierung in Khartum und den südlichen Regionen forderten rund 1,5 Millionen Opfer. Darüber hinaus hat der anhaltende Konflikt in der westlichen Darfur-Region mehr als 200.000 Menschen getötet und zwei Millionen Menschen vertrieben. In diesen Konflikten bedeuten Grenzen wenig. Die Kontrolle über Ressourcen und Untertanen ist das Hauptziel, und in den Grenzgebieten entstehende Kräfte streben nach Rache an den verachteten Eliten der Metropolen. Die geopolitische Bedeutung des Sudan in einer instabilen Region an der Grenze zum Roten Meer, der Sahelzone und dem Horn von Afrika sowie sein landwirtschaftlicher Wohlstand zogen regionale und globale Akteure an und behinderten den erfolgreichen Übergang zu einer zivil geführten Regierung und einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Neben Großbritannien, der ehemaligen Kolonialmacht, kämpften Russland, die USA, Saudi-Arabien, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate und weitere Nachbarländer um Einfluss im Sudan, darunter Äthiopien, Tschad und Süd-Sudan. Auch sie waren von politischen Unruhen und Konflikten betroffen und litten unter der Last der sudanesischen Flüchtlinge, die vor den Kämpfen in die Nachbarländer flohen. Bereits die britischen Kolonialherren nutzten bestehende Unterschiede, um die Bevölkerung nach ethnischen und regionalen Zugehörigkeiten aufzuteilen, eine Praxis, die bis heute Bestand hat. Der Aktivismus der Milizen vertiefte die Spaltungen unter den Rebellenanhängern. Diese "Teile-und-herrsche"-Politik entsprach einer bewährten Taktik afrikanischer Regierungen in ethnischen Bürgerkriegen, bei der die Milizen häufig ausgenutzt wurden, um ethnische Migration zu fördern und zu erleichtern, indem sie in die nationale Armee integriert wurden. Auch transnationale, fest verwurzelte kriminelle Netzwerke im Drogen-, Waffen- und Menschenhandel standen bereit, das Chaos auszunutzen. Dies machte den Sudan zu einem der fragilsten Länder der Welt. Der Zusammenbruch des Sudan würde nicht nur seine Nachbarn erschüttern, sondern könnte auch zahlreiche andere afrikanische Länder in Mitleidenschaft ziehen, darunter fragile Staaten in der Sahelzone sowie in Ost- und Nordafrika. Die Nebenwirkungen einer solch unkalkulierbaren Konfliktzone und das daraus resultierende Chaos würden auch Westeuropa treffen, das bereits unter dem Zustrom von Flüchtlingen aus Syrien und anderen Kriegsgebieten im Nahen Osten und in Afrika leidet. For decades, the history of Sudan, Africa's third largest country with around 46 million inhabitants, has been marked by violent clashes between the northern, Muslim and Arab military elites of the capital Khartoum at the expense of the civilian population. Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, there have been 16 attempted coups, six of which were successful. That was more than in any other country on a continent that has itself seen more coups than any other region in the world. Two civil wars between the government in Khartoum and the southern regions claimed around 1.5 million victims. In addition, the ongoing conflict in the western Darfur region has killed more than 200,000 people and displaced two million people. In these conflicts, borders mean little. Control of resources and subjects is the primary objective, and forces arising in the borderlands seek revenge on the despised metropolitan elites. Sudan's geopolitical importance in a volatile region bordering the Red Sea, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, as well as its agricultural prosperity, attracted regional and global actors and hampered the successful transition to civilian-led government and sustainable development. In addition to Great Britain, the former colonial power, Russia, the USA, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other neighbouring countries were fighting for influence in Sudan, including Ethiopia, Chad and South Sudan. They, too, were affected by political unrest and conflict and suffered under the burden of Sudanese refugees fleeing the fighting to neighbouring countries. The British colonial rulers had already used existing differences to divide the population according to ethnic and regional affiliations, a practice that survives to this day. Militia activism deepened divisions among rebel supporters. This divide-and-conquer policy corresponded to a well-established tactic used by African governments in ethnic civil wars, often exploiting the militias to encourage and facilitate ethnic migration by integrating the militias into the national army. Transnational, well-entrenched criminal networks involved in drug-, arms- and human trafficking also stood ready to take advantage of the chaos. This made Sudan one of the most fragile countries in the world. Sudan's collapse would not only shake its neighbours, but could also upset several other African countries, including fragile states in the Sahel, and East and North Africa. The side effects of such an incalculable conflict zone and the resulting chaos would also affect Western Europe, which is already suffering from the influx of refugees from Syria and other war zones in the Middle East and Africa. Depuis des décennies, l'histoire du Soudan, troisième plus grand pays d'Afrique avec environ 46 millions d'habitants, est marquée par de violents affrontements entre les élites militaires du Nord, musulmanes et arabes de la capitale Khartoum aux dépens de la population civile. Depuis que le Soudan a obtenu son indépendance en 1956, il y a eu 16 tentatives de coup d'État, dont six ont réussi. C'était plus que dans tout autre pays sur un continent qui a lui-même connu plus de coups d'État que toute autre région du monde. Deux guerres civiles entre le gouvernement de Khartoum et les régions du sud ont fait environ 1,5 million de victimes. En outre, le conflit en cours dans la région occidentale du Darfour a tué plus de 200 000 personnes et déplacé deux millions de personnes. Dans ces conflits, les frontières ont peu d'importance. Le contrôle des ressources et des sujets est l'objectif principal, et les forces qui surgissent dans les régions frontalières cherchent à se venger des élites métropolitaines méprisées. L'importance géopolitique du Soudan dans une région instable, bordant la mer Rouge, le Sahel et la Corne de l'Afrique, ainsi que sa prospérité agricole, ont attiré des acteurs régionaux et mondiaux et ont entravé la réussite de la transition vers un gouvernement dirigé par des civils et le développement durable. Outre la Grande-Bretagne, l'ancienne puissance coloniale, la Russie, les États-Unis, l'Arabie Saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et d'autres pays voisins se battaient pour l'influence au Soudan, notamment l'Éthiopie, le Tchad et le Soudan du Sud. Eux aussi ont été touchés par les troubles politiques et les conflits et ont souffert sous le fardeau des réfugiés soudanais fuyant les combats vers les pays voisins. Les dirigeants coloniaux britanniques avaient déjà utilisé les différences existantes pour diviser la population en fonction des affiliations ethniques et régionales, une pratique qui survit à ce jour. L'activisme des milices a approfondi les divisions entre les partisans des rebelles. Cette politique, de diviser pour régner correspondait à une tactique bien établie, utilisée par les gouvernements africains dans les guerres civiles ethniques, exploitant souvent les milices pour encourager et faciliter la migration ethnique en intégrant les milices dans l'armée nationale. Des réseaux criminels transnationaux bien établissent impliqués dans le trafic de drogue, d'armes et d'êtres humains étaient également prêts à profiter du chaos. Cela a fait du Soudan l'un des pays les plus fragiles au monde. L'effondrement du Soudan ébranlerait non seulement ses voisins, mais pourrait également bouleverser plusieurs autres pays africains, y compris des États fragiles du Sahel et d'Afrique de l'Est et du Nord. Les effets secondaires d'une zone de conflit aussi incalculable et le chaos qui en résulte affecteraient également l'Europe occidentale, qui souffre déjà de l'afflux de réfugiés de Syrie et d'autres zones de guerre au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique.

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