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Is North Korea ready and willing to give up its nuclear weapons? Proponents of arms control and sustained engagement with North Korea maintain that Pyongyang's desire to acquire nuclear weapons stemmed from ingrained insecurity vis-a-vis the United States or more specifically, the threat that the US poses to fundamental regime security. However, the primordial source of Kim Jong Il's existential insecurity stems largely from the abnormal, structural idiosyncracies of his regime and not, as many naively believe, the hardline policies of the Bush administration. Accordingly, the Kim Jong Il regime's fundamental dilemma boils down to the fact that the domestic political costs of giving up its nuclear capabilities are just as high as the costs of retaining them. Debunking the myth that the US, rather than North Korea, poses the greater challenge to South Korean security is as important as ensuring that North Korea dismantles its nuclear arsenal.

This article examines the current state of the national security debate in South Korea in the context of rapid democratization, a growing desire on the part of South Korea to pursue a more balanced and independent foreign policy posture even as it retains its core alliance with the United States, and the confluence of political and strategic forces that have combined to create unprecedented change in South Korea's security perceptions. While the missile defense issue continues to remain as a relatively minor facet of South Korea's overall national security debate, it illustrates the extent to which South Korean views have shifted since the end of the Cold War but particularly since the advent of the Kim Dae Jung government (1998–2003) and continuing well into the administration of Roh Moo Hyun. Specifically, the article traces the changing contours of South Korea's national security paradigm, Seoul's “New Thinking” on key foreign policy and national security issues, the missile threat and missile defense,...

Changing political attitudes in South Korea, and the appearance of some divergence of view between Washington and Seoul on the nature of the threat posed by North Korea are impelling a re-examination of the US-South Korea alliance. At the same time, although still concerned with deterring an invasion from Pyongyang, the alliance must now also deal with the possible conse quences of a catastrophic collapse of the North Korean state. Changing threat perceptions, developments in military technology and doctrine associated with the 'revolution in military affairs', as well as the emergence of new issues such as terrorism, all require a redefinition of the alliance. While the changing geo-strategic environment and the wider regional role of the alliance will all be factors in the modifications made to the Washington-Seoul security relationship, the key to South Korea's future alliance choices will be the nature of the path taken to eventual Korean unification.

In sharp contrast to land-dominant forces with only limited technological capabilities, key armed forces such as the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA), Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF), and the South and North Korean militaries have built up significant power projection capabilities since the 1980s. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and assets (including a potential nuclear weapons capability) have surfaced as key security concerns since the early 1990s and for its part, China has begun to implement its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) strategies that may enable the PRC to have very robust power projection capabilities by 2020 or 2030. If one includes Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs into the broader strategic equation, Asia may well face an increasingly volatile arms race over the next 20–30 years. Seen within this context, the role of air power is likely to assume growing importance in East Asia's projected force modernization programs, given the ...

The future of European and Asian security can no longer be separated owing to pervasive globalization, the rise of East Asia as a new geopolitical hub, and the increasing web of interests that binds the United States, the European Union (EU), and East Asia together. Of the three key relationships‐the transatlantic, the transpacific, and the Eurasian‐the latter remains the weakest owing to a combination of historical, political, and economic reasons. Improving this relationship from the strategic, economic, and conceptual dimensions will bring significant dividends to the two regions. Operationalizing this challenge, however, is going to be cumbersome and time consuming given the historical lack of strategic interaction between East Asia and Europe.

Multipolar East Asia and Implications for Regional and Korean Security by Chung Min Lee Despite recent encouraging developments such as economic growth, démocratisation and reconciliations in Asia, difficulties loom ahead. Weapons procurement, notably of ballistic missiles, and the modernisation of defence capabilities are particularly apparent in the region. They are linked both to prosperity, as well as to concerns about China and about nuclear proliferation (for instance in India, Pakistan and North Korea). In spite of an assertive atitude, American non-proliferation means seem limited. Washington thus veered towards a more conciliatory approach to North Korea, which has been of some concern to Seoul. Some doubt has been cast over the credibility of the US commitment to South Korea's security including by means of nuclear weapons in case of North Korean attack. The end of the cold war has not fundamentally changed the Korean peninsula's dilemma. Reunification seems inevitable in the future, depending on political changes in the North., En Asie, derrière les phénomènes récents encourageants (croissance, démocratisation et réconciliations) se profilent de nouvelles difficultés. Les acquisitions d'armes, en particulier de missiles balistiques, et la modernisation des appareils de défense sont manifestes dans la région. Elles sont liées à la prospérité et aux perceptions de menaces émanant de la Chine et de la prolifération des armements, notamment nucléaires (Inde, Pakistan et Corée du Nord). Malgré un discours offensif, les moyens de lutte américains en la matière apparaissent limités. Ainsi, envers Pyongyang, Washington est passé d'une position « musclée » à une posture plus conciliante, ce qui n'a pas manqué d'inquiéter Séoul. La fermeté de l'engagement américain, notamment à utiliser l'arme nucléaire en cas d'attaque du Nord, ne semble désormais plus assurée. La fin de la guerre froide n'a pas fondamentalement modifié la donne coréenne, toutefois la perspective de réunification apparaît inévitable à terme, conditionnée par des changements politiques au Nord., Lee Chung Min. Multipolarité et prolifération en Extrême-Orient : implications pour la sécurité régionale et coréenne. In: Politique étrangère, n°3 - 1995 - 60ᵉannée. pp. 659-670.