Search

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his administration's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S. commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded the region's prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed with great interest-not to mention a fair amount of trepidation-around the world, not least in Southeast Asia.The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for U.S.-Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern.Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Policies toward AsiaThe Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama's Asia policy, christened the "pivot" and later the "rebalance," saw the United States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined-and eventually led-discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched as the "gold standard" for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional states coming on board in the future.With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January, Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears, they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared similar concerns. Candidate Trump's decision to adopt a cantankerous line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the United States from the TPP and review the country's security commitments to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about possibly reviewing Washington's long-standing one-China policy. Days after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict.Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump's approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits and observers were expecting. …

While Malaysia has often been portrayed in the popular media as a progressive and pluralist country, some scholars have argued that an upsurge in religious conservatism - manifesting itself in exclusivist Islamist narratives - has created the conditions from which extremist ideas associated with ISIS draw support and sympathy. Yet even as legitimate concern for the appeal of ISIS and the return of foreign fighters grows, the very existence of these conservative and exclusivist religiopolitical narratives articulated by Malaysian Islamists operating in and referenced to a distinctly Malaysian context in fact limits the appeal of ISIS in Malaysia. By focusing specifically on the nexus between religion and ethnicity in Malaysia, and the historical development of a modern yet traditionally rooted expression of Malay-Islamic identity in contradistinction to "Westernization", this article reveals the underpinnings of Malay Muslim religiopolitical legitimacy and contrasts them to the narratives of ISIS, outlining that ISIS's failure to adequately contextualize its narratives has significantly blunted the terrorist organization's appeal.

The results of Malaysia's general election held on 8 March 2008 was nothing short of monumental. By winning five state legislatures and denying the incumbent governing coalition its hitherto routine two-thirds parliamentary majority, the performance of the opposition, swayed by the contribution of the new media, raised hopes that Malaysian politics had turned a corner. Following the elections, the popular discursive terrain in Malaysia was awash with talk of a “new politics” that had emerged, and that transcended the traditional narratives of race, religion, and communalism. The purpose of this paper is to examine the veracity of these claims in relation to the nature and conduct of politics in Malaysia. It argues that, three years after the 2008 elections, the communal narrative remains as forceful a factor in Malaysian politics despite the presence of a multi-ethnic opposition coalition and the hope engendered by the emergence of the new media as an equalizing factor that has eroded the incumbent's traditional hegemonic control over information.

Note • The author would like to thank M. Ladd Thomas, Sheldon Simon, and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This project received valuable assistance from Saroja Dorairajoo, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Anthony Davis, Don Pathan, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, Panitan Wattanayagorn, Surat Horachaikul, Kavi Chongkittavorn, as well as others from the Thai intelligence establishment and the Malay-Muslim community who have requested to remain anonymous. Parts of this article were based on research conducted under the auspices of a project generously supported by the East-West Center, Washington, D.C. International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Interpretation

The spat of recent violence in Southern Thailand has drawn international attention once again to the political and security situation in the Malay-Muslim provinces of Thailand's restive Southern region. In this regard, this article suggests that in the search for solutions, the Thai government cannot afford to be pre-occupied with Muslim militancy while ignoring the role of other forces and interest groups, or the sensitivities of the Muslim population at large. Doing so, this article contends, will foster the very environment it should aim to eliminate--one that continues to alienate its Malay-Muslim community, strains relations with important neighbors, and encourages exploitation from foreign terrorist networks seeking a foothold in Southeast Asia.­

The politicisation of Islam has become a key feature of the Malaysian political terrain, and finds dominant expression in the so-called ‘Islamisation race’ between UMNO and PAS. This article analyses the religio-political dialectics and responses that defined the UMNO–PAS rivalry during the 22-year administration of Mahathir Mohamad. It focuses primarily on the contradictions and inconsistencies that have riddled strategies undertaken by UMNO to undermine PAS during this period. It suggests that UMNO's representation of PAS as parochial fundamentalists belies the fact that the struggle to define the role of Islam in contemporary Malaysia has created fissures within UMNO itself, resulting in an incoherent strategy against the Islamic opposition that serves only to intensify rather than check the process of the politicisation of Islam initiated by PAS.

Fundamentalism is a behavioural question, a psychology which cannot be fought with armadas, but only with other ideas. King Hassan II When the only tool you have is a hammer, you treat everything like a nail Abraham Maslow This article assesses the Malaysian government's confrontation with Islamic militancy in its domestic political sphere. It suggests that while the operational capacity of the Malaysian state and security forces has successfully and effectively crippled militant Islamic organisations on the home front, the long‐term success in the battle against Islamic militancy lies not in operational capacity but in the realm of the ideological contest, and it is here that the current focus on the intensification of state control and surveillance as the best means to counter militant Islam may well prove to be a misplaced strategy that will undermine the key objective of undercutting sympathy and support for those militant groups purporting to engage in an Islamic struggle. It further suggests t...

The long-term, undocumented migration flow of Indonesians into Malaysia is arguably the second largest flow of illegal immigrants after the movements across the U.S.-Mexico border. The issue of the migration of illegal Indonesian Labour to Malaysia has been a persistent source of friction in Malaysia-Indonesia relations for the past twenty years. The latest round of protests by Indonesian politicians, the media, and the public in response to harsh laws recently enacted by Kuala Lumpur against illegal foreign workers threatened once again to plunge bilateral relations into another downward spiral of animosity and diplomatic sabre-rattling. Tensions have been exaggerated by the securitization of the illegal Indonesian migrant worker problem by the Malaysian media and certain government officials. Given the vast number of Indonesian labourers in Malaysia and the crucial role they play in the Malaysian economy, unless the root causes of this problem are acknowledged and addressed coherently by both parties, the i ssue of illegal Indonesian migrant labour will continue to be an obstacle to better bilateral ties. The regular recurrence of the problem of illegal Indonesian labour migration into Malaysia and the elusiveness of viable solutions has opened the way for scholarly research to be undertaken to illuminate the fundamental issues involved that impede the search for solutions. Be that as it may, there remains a paucity of scholarship that attempts to study the social, political, economic, and diplomatic undertones to a problem that has emerged as one of the most enduring problems for contemporary Malaysia--Indonesia relations. Most studies that have been done on this subject have taken two forms. Some have devoted much effort at listing the social-economic problems arising from the influx of Indonesian labourers, and in particular illegal economic migrants, into Malaysia. (1) Others have studied the geographical and demographical dimensions to this problem, focusing on the origins of these Indonesian illegals, the problems they encounter in making their way to, and finding employment in, Malaysia, and the exploit ation that they are forced to undergo as a result of their status. (2) Few have attempted to place the illegal Indonesian migrant worker problem in the broader historical context of political trends in Malaysia--Indonesia relations, or to make recommendations on the crucial issues that need to be addressed in the search for solutions. (3) It is in this regard that this study considers the political undercurrents to the phenomenon of illegal Indonesian labour in Malaysia. The article seeks to explore: (1) the evolution of the so-called "illegal Indonesian migrant worker" problem, (2) the various unilateral and bilateral attempts at finding a solution, (3) some possible considerations that should be taken into account in this search for solutions, and (4) the underlying problems which have impeded, and might continue to impede, progress towards a comprehensive resolution based on the interests of both states. Origins of Indonesian Migration into the Peninsula Migration from the Indonesian archipelago to the Malay peninsula has long been a feature of the interaction and exchange that defines the identity of the Indo-Malay World. Malay historical records such as Sejarah Melayu, Hikayat Hang Tuah, and Sejarah Melayu dan Bugis (otherwise known as Tuhfat al-Nafis) document the movement, via both trade and war, of peoples across the Indo-Malay archipelago and how cultures crossed as a consequence of this. In the more recent colonial past, British and Malay authorities in the peninsula also welcomed migrant workers from Indonesia to meet the manpower requirements of colonial economic enterprise. (4) Because of shared racial and to some extent cultural traits, Indonesian migrant workers were favoured by the Malay aristocracy and royalty in the nineteenth century as demographic buffers against the influx of Chinese and Indian labour that was occurring under colonial economic policy. …