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Purpose: The paper aims to understand how state and non-state domestic terrorism impacts MNEs in foreign markets. Despite the burgeoning literature on terrorism within international business (IB), most research has focused on international terrorism, or terrorism generally. Consequently, there has been limited research examining how domestic or local based terrorism impacts foreign firms. Design/methodology/approach: This is a conceptual paper. Findings: Domestic terrorism is the most common form of terrorism in the world today and involves the state and non-state actors. Non-state domestic terrorism can be low intensity or high intensity. High intensity non-state-domestic terrorism typically involves regular and protracted political violence, along with inter-communal violence. This can expose MNEs to considerable operational, governance and legitimacy pressures. Originality/value: The paper contributes to the gap in IB terrorism research with regards domestic or local based terrorism. Drawing on IB theory and critical terrorism research, the paper addresses the nature and impact of domestic terrorism within IB. The authors' paper shows the operational, governance and legitimacy pressures of both state and non-state domestic terrorism for MNEs in host markets. While most IB scholars consider the threat of non-state terrorism for international firms, this study shows how domestic state terrorism benefits and constrains foreign firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Middle East Journal of Legal & Jurisprudence Studies / Mağallaẗ al-Šarq al-Awsaṭ li-l-ʿulūm al-Qānūniyyaẗ wa-al-Fiqhiyyaẗ is the property of Manar Elsharq for Studies & Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 1981 massacre of political dissidents could be considered the most extensive atrocity committed by the Iranian government after the 1979 Revolution. Yet, this massacre is one of the least investigated aspects of state-sponsored violence in contemporary Iran. In this article, we aim to shed light on the nature and scope of this forgotten massacre. The central thesis of this article is twofold. First, we claim that the 1981 massacre was a mass atrocity characterized by the extra-legal use of state violence. To substantiate this claim, we draw on first-hand archival material and empirical evidence that were collected during fieldwork. Secondly, we claim that the 1981 massacre played a major role in establishing the legal foundations of the theocracy that has remained in power for more than four decades. On a political level, this massacre took place within a crisis that was caused by post-revolutionary circumstances. During this crisis, the clerical rule seized power by suspending the pre-revolutionary legal order. On a legal level, the execution of political dissidents was carried out within a legal vacuum. The practices of Islamic Revolutionary Courts filled this legal vacuum and paved the way for the ratification of the first Islamic Penal Code (1982). The manifestation of state violence during the 1981 massacre embodies the fundamental characteristics of a political system that has built its foundations upon the disintegrated bodies and ruins of its political others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Sociología is the property of Universidad de Chile and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Recial is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Centro de Investigaciones, Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article is an empirical examination of 'victimhood' in the context of the widespread, deadly and destructive electoral violence that affected Zimbabwe in 2008. It contends that an examination of the behaviour of victims of state-sponsored political violence enhances our comprehension of 'victimhood' as a factor in the perpetuation of political violence. The victims were largely ignored by the justice system, the political leadership and the community, all of whom were under the coercive spell of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The trivialisation of their situation, and the absence of legitimate avenues for redress, forced many victims to seek direct revenge. The article traces how this fomented and reproduced the already violent political atmosphere in Norton town during the 2008 election period. It relies on interviews with opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) victims of violence in Norton to consider how they attempted to make sense of their pain by claiming victimhood and exacting physical revenge against their tormentors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advances an interdisciplinary and multifactorial socio-cultural approach to the fascistization of the Ustaša in interwar Yugoslavia, leading to terrorism and racial cleansing. It concentrates on the life-trajectories of Mijo Babić and Zvonimir Pospišil, two nationalist activists notoriously known as the first Ustaša terrorists. Drawing on the previously unknown political memoirs of Pospišil and Babić, the article argues that the two activists bridged several phases of cumulative radicalization in the Ustaša organization, from the adoption of political violence at the grass-root level in the 1920s to international terrorism in the 1930s and then state-sponsored genocide in the first half of the 1940s. The article points out that Ustaša underwent most forms of political radicalization to terrorism identified by McCauley and Moskalenko, but it also adds to their typology a case of radicalization to mass violence in the regime phase. Ustaša's trajectory thus illustrates a rare process of transition from the radicalization of an oppositional, non-state group to mass radicalization leading to racial genocidal policies under a fascist-totalitarian regime. It is hoped that the biographical approach to radicalization advanced by the article contributes to a better understanding of politically motivated terrorism and mass violence in post-1918 Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports the political violence, censorship, and state terrorism in the first years of the Brazilian military dictatorship in United States' press, especially through the coverage of The New York Times. The research aims to offer more details about how the paper's coverage affected the change in public opinion inside and outside Brazil, with the hardening of the Brazilian dictatorship with the AI-5, that also documented institutionally the process of transition between the ideas of "revolution" and "military dictatorship", considering also, in this context, the Alliance for Progress' policies, idealized by the president Kennedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does government violence deter political challengers in one context but inflame them in the next? This paper argues that repression increases opposition activity at low and moderate levels but decreases it in the extreme. There is a threshold level of violence, where the opposition becomes unable to recruit new members, and the rebellion unravels—even if the government kills more innocents. We find empirical support for this proposition in disaggregated data from Chechnya and a meta-analysis of sub-national conflict dynamics in 71 countries. The data suggest that a threshold exists, but the level of violence needed to reach it varies. Many governments, thankfully, are unable or unwilling to go that far. We explore conditions under which this threshold may be higher or lower and highlight a fundamental trade-off between reducing government violence and preserving civil liberties. JEL Classification: D74, F51, H56. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does political violence spread around election times within countries? Although election times are periods possibly most vulnerable to the contagion of violence, we know very little about how election violence spreads spatially. We argue that government-sponsored election violence in one area will increase the levels of election violence inflicted by antisystemic actors in another area with similar political or socioeconomic characteristics. Government violence in one area increases the expectation that repression would soon start in another area that looks similar to the targeted area, prompting opposition groups in these areas to take action preemptively. We test our arguments using subnational data on India's election violence from 1991 to 2009, finding that government election violence in one state increases opposition-led election violence in another state with similar political and socioeconomic characteristics in India. Our results are robust when using a stationary causal directed acyclic graph approach and recover the bias-corrected spatial effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideological violence, according to previous research, tends to spike following what may be perceived as an electoral success of an ideologically-affiliated political camp. Despite a growing number of examples across the globe, the extent to which ideological success in electoral processes impacts terrorism within constituencies remains under-researched. This exploratory analysis seeks to examine how majority-minority outcomes in the electoral process influence terrorism in democratic states. This study employs a longitudinal case study approach for the Republic of India, using publicly available data from the Census of India and open-sourced data on terrorist activity. We find that economic stress most strongly impacts the likelihood that supporters of the political majority will engage in terrorist activity, followed by social cohesion, measured through religious homogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Millars: Espai i Història is the property of Millars: Espai i Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this short essay, I explore the recent reassessment of ruined sites haunted by the echoes of State terrorism across the Southern Cone of Latin America, asking what is at stake in the conservation of former detention centers and focusing on Villa Grimaldi in Chile. The site was initially transformed into a green park but has subsequently become a museum in which remains of the original buildings and artifacts from the repressive past are publicly accessible. I draw on perspectives that claim that even ruins that portray past acts of inhumanity do not necessarily need to evoke melancholic or traumatic retrospection; rather, they are sites of alternative pasts and futures. The transition from the original green park design to a more prominent use of the ruins speaks of an invitation to reassess the past, addressing marginal aspects of emblematic memories, including the political conflict that underpinned the repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years, far-right extremism and terrorism have been receiving more and more attention from scholars in both Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). CTS has proved itself to be particularly strong for the production of research focused on (de)constructing threats, assessing counter-terrorism measures and their impact on society, and scrutinising power relations imbricated in the production of terrorism and counter-terrorism (da Silva and Martini [45]; Jackson [21]). Keeping in mind that "academics often come from a middle or upper-class backgrounds that lend certain perspectives" (Gentry [14], 94), or that, at least, they belong to academic institutions which are (re)articulated on class hierarchies, is CTS ready to see class in far-right extremism and terrorism? It is now becoming a cliché for works on the far-right to start with the acknowledgement that, in recent years, academic interest in far-right extremism and terrorism has been growing exponentially - as attested to by this special issue. [Extracted from the article]

"Plotters: the UK terrorists who failed" by Lizzie Dearden is a comprehensive and engaging book that explores failed terrorist plots in the UK since 2017. The book provides rich biographical and contextual details on the motivations, decisions, and errors of individuals from diverse ideological backgrounds. It offers valuable examples for researchers and educators, drawing from sources such as trials, government reports, and interviews. The book also highlights the incompetence and pitiable nature of many would-be terrorists, often thwarted by their own mistakes and indiscretions. While the book's tone can be alarmist at times, it raises important questions about the construction of political violence and the need for further engagement with journalists and commentators in terrorism research. Overall, "Plotters" offers an insightful and illuminating account of the lives and actions of failed terrorists and their associates. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Revista de Antropología Social is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios de Derecho is the property of Estudios de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Following the terrorist bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Africa was immediately drawn into the global counter-terrorism efforts. This is evident in Susan Rice's comments that Africa is the "soft underbelly for global terrorism" and a "veritable incubator for terrorism's foot soldiers" (Smith [15], 390). Arguably, state actors in Africa have often directed or dictated the tone of terrorism research by engaging various individuals in seminars, symposiums and workshops on security or terrorism. Bart Schuurman underscores the state-centric nature of terrorism studies in a review of 3,442 terrorism articles published between 2007 and 2016 (Schuurman [13]). [Extracted from the article]

Despite the growing threat of right-wing terrorism as a security concern in many countries, no empirical research has examined the variables that are associated with increases or decreases in right-wing terrorist incidents at a national level of aggregation. The present study examines the applicability of indicators informed by macro-level criminological theories related to immigration, economic conditions, and social demographic composition to the study of right-wing terrorism. A dataset of right-wing terrorist incidents in North America and Western Europe from 1990–2016 was created using secondary sources. Data on indicators related to socioeconomic conditions within countries were retrieved from the World Bank's World Development Indicator database. The results show that indicators informed by criminological theory are less useful when the analyses are aggregated across countries, but provide more insight when examining relationships within individual countries. Future research should therefore take into consideration each country's unique social, political, and economic contexts when studying terrorism at a national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autocrats use repression to deter opposition. Are they successful in the long run? The author argues that state repression can have long-lasting alienating effects on citizens' political attitudes and coercive effects on their political behavior. The article evaluates this proposition by studying the long-term effects of state terror during China's Cultural Revolution. It shows that individuals who grew up in localities that were exposed to more state-sponsored violence in the late 1960s are less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system today. These anti-regime attitudes are more likely to be passed down to the younger generation if family members discuss politics frequently than if they do not. Yet while state repression has created anti-regime attitudes, it has decreased citizens' contentious behavior. These findings highlight the dilemma that authoritarian rulers face when they seek to consolidate their rule through repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the propensity for host governments and the groups they sponsor to engage in violence in areas that host refugee populations. Drawing on arguments that governments strategically delegate violence to affiliated groups for "plausible deniability" purposes, it argues that, due to concerns over self-settled refugees' welfare burden as well as the concern that these refugees will choose to live in border areas that are more vulnerable to (or useful for) militant activity, host governments, and their proxies are likely to target violence in areas with more substantial refugee self-settlement. At the same time, it anticipates that host governments will "outsource" this violence to surrogate groups where sizable camp-settled populations are present, due to a heightened risk of suffering international audience costs. Findings from a large-N sample of countries in Africa provide some evidence of the hypothesized outsourcing effect. While the presence of sizable camps alongside large self-settled populations is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of violence by host governments, it significantly increases the likelihood of violence committed by host-aligned proxies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anthropology Magazine is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2014 an intense debate over the state of terrorism literature was published. Sageman [2014. The stagnation in terrorism research. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 565–580. doi:] claimed that the field had stagnated, mainly due to lack of data sharing between government departments that have access to valuable information that could inform our understanding, and researchers who have the skills and expertise to make sense of this. However, others were more positive regarding the literature, highlighting areas where progress has been made [e.g. McCauley, & Moskalenko (2014). Some things We think We've learned since 9/11: A commentary on Marc Sageman's 'The stagnation in terrorism research'. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 601–606. doi:; Stern (2014). Response to Marc Sageman's 'The stagnation in terrorism research'. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 607–613. doi:; Taylor (2014). If I were you, I wouldn't start from here: Response to Marc Sageman's The stagnation in terrorism research'. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 581–586. doi:]. Here we re-visit the literature and identify advances that have been made since 2014. We explore ongoing challenges for terrorism researchers and practitioners, and options for ways forward to ensure evidence-based responses to terrorist individuals and groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In chapters three and four, Martini highlights how international terrorism was separated from other matters through the creation of new regulations and bureaucratic bodies, granting extraordinary powers to the members of the international community. Alice Martini has written a seminal book for anyone interested in global and transnational perspectives on terrorism. Furthermore, the opposition between the civilized international community and the uncivilized terrorists (and the countries harboring them) became a core feature of the international narratives about terrorism, leading to the criminalization of religious terrorism. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Polemos is the property of Croatian Sociological Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar (RUHM) is the property of Centro de Estudios de la Guerra and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor-proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that revolutionary leaders are more willing to commit mass killing than nonrevolutionary leaders. Revolutionary leaders are more ideologically committed to transforming society, more risk tolerant, and more likely to view the use of violence as appropriate and effective. Furthermore, such leaders tend to command highly disciplined and loyal organizations, built in the course of revolutionary struggles, that can perpetrate mass killing. This study uses time series cross-sectional data from 1955 to 2004 to demonstrate that revolutionary leaders are more likely to initiate genocide or politicide than nonrevolutionary leaders. The violent behaviors of revolutionary leaders are not limited to the immediate postrevolutionary years but also occur later in their tenure. This demonstrates that the association of revolutionary leaders and mass killing is not simply indicative of postrevolutionary instability. This article also provides evidence for the importance of exclusionary ideologies in motivating revolutionary leaders to inflict massive violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant literature on intrastate conflict independently explores terrorism and civil war. However, both terrorism and civil war are probably parts of a continuum of intrastate conflict with the former at one end and the latter at the other end in terms of intensity. I argue that two factors play important roles in rebels’ decision-making calculus, namely, the size of their support base and state strength. Terrorism, as a strategy of the weak, is optimal when the rebel groups have little support among their audience and the state is strong. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is an ideal strategy when such groups have a greater support base and the state is weak. The theoretical argument is tested on a dataset of Myanmar and six countries of South Asia and for 1970–2007. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Measures towards post-conflict or post-authoritarian justice have historically relied on the merging of the concepts of silence, violence and impunity in order to create a single promise of justice. Scholars and practitioners in the field usually defend a trifold agenda of breaking the silence about violations of human rights, denouncing systematic violence in the past and fighting impunity as the only way of ensuring that violence never happens again. This trope was mobilized in Brazil in 2014, when the report of the country’s National Truth Commission (CNV) was released. However, in the Brazilian case, truth-seeking also produced its own form of ‘silence’. Whereas the CNV commendably denounced 377 perpetrators as the ‘demons’ responsible for implementing a state of terror during the last dictatorship (1964–1985), it also created a depoliticized and victimized idea of leftist militants as mere dreamers who fought for liberty and democracy in the past. By representing leftist militants as freedom fighters, the CNV silenced their fundamental ideas (and actions) regarding the concept of revolutionary violence and its radical programme of structural change. In this article, I provide an explanation that connects the CNV’s ‘silencing’ of this political project to the unreflective merging between the concepts of silence, violence and impunity in the literature. Via a narrative analysis of the CNV’s report and a critique of transitional justice debates, I argue that the silence on the political project of the radical left in Brazil echoes transitional justice’s silence about the complexities of violence in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Ayer: Revista de Historia Contemporánea is the property of Asociacion de Historia Contemporanea and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article puts forth the concept of colonial state terror as a category for the analysis of political violence in the Puerto Rican colonial conflict by US and Puerto Rican governments and pro-state organizations. To this end, the article is divided into four parts. First, it provides a short historical overview of Puerto Rico's colonial history; second, it explores US colonialism through the concept of the colonial state of exception; third, it explicates the concept of colonial state terror; and fourth, it develops a brief history of the uses of colonial state terror in the long history of US colonialism in Puerto Rico. In doing so, this article seeks to contribute to the development of a more nuanced research agenda focused on the relationship between colonialism, political violence, law and processes of depoliticization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethnography of state terror is "high risk" research and there are real personal dangers for anyone who conducts fieldwork on this issue. Managing such dangers has particularly become an issue for those conducting primary research with perpetrators of state terror--the "rank and i le" who apply the electric cattle prods and pull the triggers--and all of the researchers I know who have taken this path have been threatened in one form or another. This article reviews the core literature and latest developments in managing the physical dangers inherent in the ethnography of political violence and state terror, particularly fieldwork or primary research with the actual perpetrators themselves, makes practical recommendations for managing such dangers, and presents some ideas for developing risk management plans or protocols for researcher survival in perilous field sites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]