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On the other hand, comparing the first and second periods in terms of the governmental coalition, the allocation of power and the improvement of the coalition process can be mentioned. First, from the aspect of power allocation, the first stage handed over to the opposition party the vice governor of social integration, which is responsible for the three countries of health, welfare, environment, and women's family. In the second stage(Cho Sung-Ho et al., 2017), In this way, the opposition party is able to share power with the opposition party. At the same time, it introduced the coalition chairperson system, which further strengthened the power of political parties participating in the coalition. In addition, by establishing a unified political arbitration committee to facilitate the conflict situation that occurred under the coalition government, the coalition government made soft landing. In the future, we will suggest ways to improve the local autonomy system to revitalize the Gyeonggido coalition politics and to practice it. First, diversification of organization. Second, the introduction of local ministers. Third, the metropolitan city should strengthen its capacity. Fourth, it is a reorganization of local electoral system.

Whole-of-government (WOG) approaches have emerged as a blueprint for contemporary peace and state-building operations. Countries contributing civilian and military personnel to multinational interventions are persistently urged to improve coherence and enhance coordination between the ministries that form part of the national contingent. Despite a heated debate about what WOG should look like and how to achieve it, the causal mechanisms of WOG variance remains under-theorised. Based on 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, this study compares Swedish and German WOG approaches in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). I argue that coalition bargaining drove the fluctuation in the Swedish and German WOG models. Strategic culture was an antecedent condition. In both cases, COIN and the war on terror clashed with foundational elements of the Swedish and German strategic cultures, paving the way for a non-debate on WOG on the political arena. Finally, bureaucratic politics was an intervening condition that obstructed or enabled coherence, depending on the ambition of the incumbent coalition government to progress WOG. Overall, the results suggest that coalitions face limitations in implementing a WOG framework when the nature of the military engagement is highly disputed in national parliaments.

The purpose of this article is to detect the lack of coincidence regarding foreign affairs in the electoral programs of the two members of the Spanish center-left coalition1. The main assumption of this article is that the Socialist Party maintains its foreign affairs program, while Unidas Podemos, the coalition partner, does not because it focuses its priorities on other areas of its political agenda at the sacrifice of foreign policy. This article explores the tensions and resignations experienced in the field of foreign policy by the two government partners. It also explains how both political forces had to revise their proposals in order to allow the formation of a new government. This article hypothesizes that the resignations have been greater by Unidas Podemos, and that the Socialist Party has been able to maintain the core of its doctrine on foreign policy, security, and defense. The main challenge that this government will face in the upcoming months is the enlargement of the agreement between Spain and the United States regarding the establishment of the U.S. Army at the Spanish military bases of Rota and Morón. Regarding the methodology, we analyzed the top articles literature to compare the political action of several European coalition governments in developing its foreign affairs policy.

Coalition governments are common in the European political landscape in various tiers ofgovernment. However, such coalitions were an exception in the history of the Valencian Autonomy until 2015, which marked a new stage with the so-called El Botànic governments. Which factors explain this change in the Valencian political system? What are the features of such coalition governments? Can this model be applied to other political systems? This paper addresses these and other issues. First, it looks at what led to coalition governments in both 2015 and 2019. Second, it studies the model of coalition government. The hypothesis tested is this: El Botànic is a coalition government whose success in terms of stability and governmental action is framed within a specific Valencian political context.

Amidst the arrival of the Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) in Kosovo, the new coalition government of Vetevendosje and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under the leadership of Prime Minister Kurti (Vetevendosje) collapsed after a vote of no confidence on 25 March 2020. On the surface, the vote, initiated by LDK, was the consequence of a conflict over the appropriate Corona strategy. A two-month power struggle under the extraordinary circumstances of Corona-related restriction followed, resulting in a new LDK-led government in early June. The political crisis in Kosovo in the early-phase of Corona has to be analyzed against the background of a political crisis with legacies in the post-conflict period, the polarization between Vetevendosje and other parties, and the strong influence of external actors in Kosovo. In this forum article, I ask how the discourse on the “state of emergency” and the pandemic has influenced power struggles in Kosovo and how the conflicts have challenged the democratic competition and institutions. My main argument is that the pandemic indeed did not lead to any form of cooperation, but the political competitors used the pandemic for an intensification of their power struggle, which—for now—led to the restoration of a government of established elites, supported by diplomatic interventions from external actors.

Voters in many advanced democracies increasingly dislike their political opponents, a phenomenon that is known as affective polarisation. The growing animosity between electorates is particularly c...

One of the forms of the government in the parliamentary democratic system is the coalition government. The coalition is definied as the cooperating of more than one political party within the framework of common aims and principles, and the way of forming a government based on unity of power by working communication and cohesion with each other for these collective goals. Turkey is known to have a history of the coalition between 1961-1965, 1974-1979 and 1991-2002. The concept of coalition as a parliamentary democratic system is generally said to be equivalent to instability by regarding the functions of the governments in Turkey. In this study, coalition is defined first and then the types of the coalition and the coalition governments established in Turkey are briefly explained. After that, the coalition governments established between 1991 and 2002, which are the main part of the study, are analyzed in terms of their democratic attitudes and stability. The effects of the political events of the period on the coalition governments are also discussed within the analysis. Research questions in the study were determined as “Are managements of coalition efficient in terms of stability?”, “Is there a relationship between the coalition governments and the existing political events between 1991-2002?”. Library resources, internet-based articles and newspapers were used as sources in this study to analyze the answers to these questions.

This article argues that new governance spaces evidence a paradigm shift that has irretrievably changed how formal governmental relations with Britain’s Muslim communities are established, facilitated and maintained. It is a paradigm shift that is driven by the ideology of neoliberalism and the efficacy of the market. Having begun under New Labour, this shift was further catalysed by the election of the Conservative-led Coalition government in 2010 and successive Conservative-majority governments since premised on the basis of the ‘problematisation’ of Muslims and the religion of Islam. This article evidences that in addition to transforming the nature of formal governmental relations, so too has it transformed who ‘represents’ Britain’s Muslims as indeed the issues engaged. Drawing on participatory approaches that afford unprecedented access to the political spaces and mechanisms within which formal governmental relations with Britain’s Muslims were facilitated, this article uses critical analyses of three social issues—counter extremism, Islamophobia and child sexual exploitation—to illustrate the article’s overarching narrative.

Summary Subject and purpose of work: This article analyzes the factors depicted in the literature as essential for the emergence of far-right parties and assesses the importance of unemployment, immigration and political establishments in the failures of the far-right wing parties in Sweden and Finland in early 2000s. Materials and methods: Multi-methods approach is used in this study including case studies and a novel technique based on Boolean algebra. Results: The findings of this paper lead to the conclusion that the correlation between unemployment rates and the electoral strength of far-right parties is weak and does not support simplistic thesis such as high unemployment leads to extremism. Moreover, despite objectively favorable conditions in terms of high immigration rates, the presence of non-European immigrants in a country does not in itself explain the emergence of far-right parties. Conclusions: The study points to the importance of political factors such as the differences between the mainstream parties and tackling the immigration issue by the Liberal Party in Sweden and the wide ideological span of the coalition government and the role of Finland’s special relationship with the USSR that militated against the emergence of far-right parties in these countries.

The birth of the yellow-green ‘government of change’ − formed by the Five-star Movement (M5 s) and the League in 2018 − was a significant novelty in Italian politics. Concerns about its populist character co-existed with enthusiastic expectations concerning its capacity to overhaul politics. In what respects did the Conte I government mark a significant departure from its predecessors? To answer this question, we rely on data concerning legislative activity to analyse the executive’s capacity to implement its policy agenda. Given the uneasy alliance upon which the coalition was based, we also attempt to evaluate whether or not the coalition agreement signed by the coalition partners actually worked as a focal point for government action. We find that, despite rhetorical claims about radical change, the Conte I government was less pro-active than its predecessors. We also find that the League was better able to affect the Government’s policy priorities than was the M5s.

The American Democratic leadership in the White House and Congress in 2009–10 and the British Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government in 2010–12 each pursued a strategy of rapidly assembled multiple adjustments to the prevailing policy framework for health care rather than attempting a “big-bang” strategy of sweeping institutional change. Despite their relative modesty, each set of reforms encountered a highly conflictual and tortuous process of legislative passage. Subsequently, the reforms failed to gain broad public acceptance and were variously hobbled (in the United States) and transformed (in the United Kingdom) in the course of implementation. These two cases thus offer some common lessons about the potential and the pitfalls of such complex “mosaic” reforms.

Durante la XVIII legislatura, i leader della maggioranza parlamentare italiana hanno accettato di formare un governo di coalizione attraverso il "Contratto per il governo del cambiamento". L'approvazione di questo documento ha rappresentato una novità significativa nella politica italiana e, di conseguenza, merita un'attenta considerazione. Il saggio si concentra sulla forma giuridica del "Contratto" e prende in considerazione i suoi effetti sul funzionamento del Parlamento e del Gabinetto italiano.

Garašanin's Progressive Government proposed to the National Assembly, which was held in Niš in May 1884, to adopt amendments to several laws of a political nature after the demise of the Timok rebellion. These were the bills amending the law: on the press, on the associations and choirs, on the municipality, and on the gendarmerie. By adopting these repressive laws, the progressives practically prevented the work of political parties, reinforced police surveillance over the municipalities, and increased the gendarmerie forces further. The lost war with Bulgaria in 1885 marked the beginning of the political breakdown of the Progressives and King Milan, who was close to them, although they repeatedly disagreed with his political actions. However, their departure from the political scene did not begin immediately after the lost war, as many expected, but took another year and a half for the Progressives, and three years for King Milan. On the other hand, the Radicals began to believe in the possibility that the defeat that they experienced during the Timok rebellion could come to a victory, that is, to power. A long-standing march against the Radical Party was halted, as King Milan realized that he could not rule with the constant ignorance of the will of the people. The broad popular masses led by the People's Radical Party should have approached the throne and the dynasty and together with the representatives of the Progressive Party alleviate the difficult situation created by the war against Bulgaria, and later provide the crown prince with a safer ruler. The royal attempt to persuade the Radicals to agree with the Progressives failed, as representatives of the Radical Party at the assembly held in February 1886 in Niš resolutely refused an agreement with the Progressives. In April 1886, they signed an agreement with the Liberals, which contained a joint program of work of both parties. The most important points of this program, which was a reflection of the compromise on both sides, concerned the change of the Constitution in the internal and the improvement of relations with the Russians in foreign policy. In June 1887, a liberal-radical government was formed, the first coalition government in the political history of Serbia.

The article aims to identify the specifics of the position of Germany on humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011. Germany abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Germany did not support a military solution to the conflict as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 8 of the Resolution. Germany did not intend to sponsor foreign troops. It has taken a different position than its main allies – France, Great Britain, and the United States. The reason is not due to disagreements with allies in the Alliance, but due to domestic political pressure on the coalition government. Another interesting explanation for government policy is the economic indicators according to which Libya did not play an important role in the German economy.It can be concluded that the USD / FDR government decided to abstain from the UN vote on Resolution 1973 because it was not a priority for Germany and because Guido Westerwelle believed that the goals of France, Britain and the United States could be achieved without intervention, only through sanctions. Germany's limited role in the Libyan crisis and its special NATO policies suggest that German politicians, faced with the financial crisis and its potential consequences in Europe, deliberately sought to limit Germany's international obligations and therefore refused to participate in securing the no-fly zone. However, Germany's reputation among its Western allies was almost shattered. The Merkel government's retention has surprised not only its closest allies – France, Britain and the United States – but also accused Berlin of playing on Russia's side. Germany became considered an unreliable ally. However, the decision not to take part in the operation in Libya indicates that Germany will continue to evaluate each military operation on its own terms, rather than reflecting British and French policies.

In the UK, as in many other countries, welfare reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has had a detrimental effect on gender equality. Between 2010 and 2015 the UK Coalition government initiated far-reaching cuts to public spending, as well as an increase in welfare conditionality. These reforms have hit women harder than men as they are more likely to rely on welfare benefits and services due to unpaid care responsibilities. Many have suggested that the way in which issues are represented by policymakers can limit what can be conceived as appropriate policy solutions. In line with this, Bacchi’s What’s the problem represented to be? (WPR) approach is used in this article to interrogate the way in which welfare was problematised by the UK Coalition government. Findings suggest that the Coalition’s represented reform as necessary to make work pay, with ‘work’ promoted as paid work and unpaid care work (predominantly undertaken by women) ignored. It also highlights the ways in which the Coalition’s promotion of paid work silenced the necessity and value of care, allowing for the implementation of welfare reforms which have disproportionately disadvantaged women and exacerbated gender inequality.

The Hungarian coalition government (Fidesz-KDNP), dwarfed by the much larger Fidesz party, has not only dominated the domestic political landscape since 2010 but also embarked on a widespread organ...

The year began with the spectre of disunity hanging over the Morrison Coalition government, now reduced to a minority government for the last six months of its parliamentary term. Despite the PM referring to his side of politics as a “Muppet show”, as the months ticked by the government gradually got down to the business of governing, focusing on economic and budgetary management, while attempting to defuse as many political issues as it could prior to the election. The Treasurer Josh Frydenberg (the Liberals' third in six years) began to impose his own initiatives in his expansive new role. The Labor opposition was celebrating the fact that government was losing control of parliamentary business, as getting the required numbers to pass legislation was becoming a roulette wheel of uncertainty. Ostensibly, the parliament, the media, the public service and perhaps the electorate were all waiting for the Coalition government to be consigned to history after just two tumultuous parliamentary terms. But Morrison, ever his own man, did not follow the script and events took a very different path, partly by design and partly by accident.

[EN]How do electoral incentives and institutional constraints vary as democracies consolidate? Are incumbents more inclined to behave opportunistically during transitions, or when the rules of the game are well established? Using Chile as a case study and exploiting panel data on public works investment at the municipal level, the article examines if the strategies to obtain electoral rewards have changed over time. From the first democratic elections and until the constitutional reforms of 2005, those municipalities where the coalition government won in national and local elections were systematically privileged before municipal polls. After the reforms, we find no sign of partisan preference but investment kept on rising during ballot years, indicative of the persistence of political budget cycles. Indeed, we identify stronger cycles as democracy was consolidated. The article concludes discussing the role played by institutional constraints and incentives shaping distributive politics. ANID Fast Track Competition, Project COVID-0419 (National Research and Development Agency, Chile).

Coalition government has been exceptional in Greece since the consolidation of democracy in 1974 but in the aftermath of the global financial crisis its occurrence has become more frequent. Most Greek government coalitions are surplus connected coalitions assembled to address an economic or national crisis and do not involve formal coalition agreements. Their formation takes place after a brief bargaining phase strictly circumscribed by precise constitutional rules under the aegis of the president of the republic. Greek coalitions are governed primarily by ad hoc fora of party leaders that make key decisions and resolve inter-coalitional conflict. The prime minister and key ministers dominate policy arguments, albeit taking into account the wishes of party leaders. The termination of coalitions is by and large due to party leaders’ strategic considerations, though the importance of policy disagreement among the partners is becoming a more significant consideration. While the post-crisis overhaul of the Greek party system has not greatly affected the main characteristics of the coalition life cycle, there is evidence that greater experience with coalition government may be leading to some tentative institutionalization of power-sharing practices and greater acceptance of such practices among political elites.

This Focus review provides an overview of climate politics and policy under the Turnbull (2015–2018) and Morrison (2018) conservative Coalition governments following the dismantling of carbon pricing in 2014. Without effective policies to reduce emissions in place, Australia will fail to meet its 2030 Paris emissions reduction target. Climate policy failure is framed in these terms. The paper outlines Australia's climate policy challenge and the macroconstraints upon action, before detailing commentary and analysis of climate politics and policies post 2015. In reviewing accounts of the Turnbull and Morrison government's climate policy efforts, the paper draws attention to the handbrake of conservative politics upon decisive action. It finds that Australia's climate policy is not only structurally constrained by its reliance upon fossil fuels, but has been politically constrained by conservatives within the Coalition government since 2015. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy

Politically, Kelantan is unique compared to other states in Malaysia. Manifestations of the doctrine of competition between UMNO and PAS occurred in this last fortress of the Malay states (the last bastions of Malayness). Different political doctrines has caused relations between PAS-led Kelantan State Government and Federal Government, the UMNO-led Alliance, is always hot. But the doctrine of competition began to simmer down, upon the occurrence of the May 13, 1969 event, which allows both parties to come up with a government known as the PAS-Alliance Coalition Government (1973-1974) and later to be replaced by the Barisan Nasional (National Front) Government in 1974. PAS position in the National Front only lasted for three and a half years, when a political turmoil brewed up and has caused the party's expulsion. The expulsion of PAS from the National Front has caused the defeat of PAS to lose Kelantan State Legislative Assembly in the 1978 General Election. This provides the opportunity to the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional to rule Kelantan for 12 years and engage itself in extensive political strategies to defend its position from being constantly attacks by the PAS opposition quarters. However, due to some internal and external problems in the UMNO, PAS has won back the administration of the state of Kelantan by winning State Legislative Assembly in the 1990 general election.

‘Public health’ investigates the determinants of health, born during the Enlightenment in the seventeenth/eighteenth century. But ‘public health’ is also policies, aiming at the improvement of a population’s health. There is a mutual interchange between public health as science and as politics. A brief historical background is followed by an analysis of the impacts of political changes during the first two decades of the twenty first century in Sweden. In 2005, a policy document accepted by all political parties except for the Moderate Party highlighted socio-economic factors and structural reforms to decrease the health gaps in the population. The general election in September 2006 resulted in a new majority in the parliament and a center-right coalition government, including the Moderates and three parties that had approved of the 2005 document. In 2007 a “new public health policy” was introduced. Its priority lists stressed individual behavior and the new policy should be incentives to work instead of “allowances”. The Public Health Institute got instructions in accordance with the new policy. The ten years following this policy change has seen public health policies and attitudes to research shifting almost year by year. The new policy met a counter-stream from the very beginning. Influenced by Michael Marmot’s WHO Commission on health inequalities, regional commissions started in Sweden, Recommendations how to decrease social health gaps was adopted with almost no opposition by regional health boards in 2012–2013. But new problems were now occupying politicians and media—how to finance the growth of the old, multi-sick part of the population and increasing costs for new medical technologies and drugs. Public health as an academic discipline was in the middle of this fluctuating political landscape with direct effects on what has been considered worth listening to or support by public money.

This essay takes a new look at the destruction and the rebuilding of the house of commons during the 1940s. It argues that behind the home front bravado of the Palace of Westminster steadfastly enduring the blitz lay secret plans for rehousing MPs away from aerial bombardment, contingency scenarios that were then updated after 1945 in the event of attack on London by atomic weapons. The essay also suggests that threats to the security of parliament, together with the necessity to rebuild the Commons, were turned by the coalition government into an opportunity to refashion parliamentary politics in such a way that the two‐party system was restored, along the traditional lines of government and opposition that had become blurred since 1931.

Political communication between the authorities and the opposition within the multi-party system of the modern Republic of Bulgaria, in terms of social and functional values, supports the mobilization of intellectual potential, social energy and initiatives of both individual citizens and various social organizations, groups, while accelerating and deepening further development of society as a whole. The article presents the objective identification of political communication, specific features of public speeches and a double-natured projection of political speeches in the vertical perspective of “power - opposition”. While positioning Bulgaria by the criterion of the democracy degree in the communication between the authorities and the opposition, we should take into account the amplitude differences: the peculiarities of the transition of Bulgaria after 1989, political configuration (the influence of the two-party system), the specifics of the political confrontation of the communicative process, which reveals their intransigence and difference in the positions. The specific confrontation between the main political actors (SDS and BSP) has been developing by the very destructive axis of “democracy – communism”. The eight-year activity of the coalition government of SDS (20012009) has led to an extreme expansion. Its intensity has been somewhat leveled by the ideological identity, but still it couldn’t soften the communicative confrontation between the authorities and the opposition. The activities of the three governmental offices of the GERD Party and Prime Minister’s B. Borisov office since 2009 have clearly highlighted the new differences in communicative with the opposition, provoking systemic intransigence. The authorities’ resistance to the opposition sometimes borders on arrogance. This creates a closed circle in which the authorities and the opposition wait for each other’s actions to quickly react to the miscalculations of the enemy in the media space, to compromise in order to set the new rules.

The article discusses the Sino-Australian relations during the Liberal Coalition government in 2013-2017. The author reviews the conceptual frameworks of Australia’s foreign policy and gives a retrospective of the main in Sino-Australian relations. The purpose of the study is to analyze the main problems affecting the development of political ties and assess their impact on Sino-Australian economic cooperation. The main research method is the narrative method allowing to collect facts from various sources and assemble them into a sequence of relevant events. The author comes to the conclusion that China is an important trading partner of Australia. Its economic and military power has a great influence on the formation of Australian foreign policy in the region. The liberal government represented by Tony Abbott in 2013-2015 and Malcolm Turnbull in 2015-2017 takes Australia - US alliance and strengthening the defense ties with Japan as a basis of its foreign policy. It later became the cause of the deterioration of Sino-Australian relations. Nevertheless, the cooling of political relations did not affect the trade and economic cooperation. China and Australia have signed the Free Trade Agreement and increased trade turnover.

As cultural content, Polònia constitutes an unusual case. We are dealing with one of the highest audience-share television programmes in Catalonia in recent years. Moreover, it is uncommon in the Spanish political-media system, where satire does not enjoy such a social acceptance by audiences. The purpose of this study consists of analysing how a parody of a Francoist regime newsreel (NO-DO) serves the purpose of ridiculing and satirising the extreme-rightist discourse of Vox political party. We employ a visual re-framing approach to the topic, examining keyframes of three Polònia pieces related to the formation of the leftist coalition government between the Socialist Party and Unidas Podemos, the dialogue roundtable about the Catalan political conflict and the feminist celebration of the International Women’s Day. The results refer to the re-articulation of the representation of power icons in the Catalan political sphere. Polònia mocks an alleged victimisation of the rightist discourse concerning the Catalan conflict, feminism and immigration. Those topics resonate in the old Francoist discourse of NO-DO. We relate those results to the building of national identities amid a political conflict, in the sense of how Polònia addressed a specific target with cultural and political cues. At the same time, the parodic satire of TV3 Polònia is considered in the context of (post)modern iconoclastic tradition.

The COVID-19 crisis caught Spanish leaders unprepared. Despite this, the coalition government that led the country based its actions on scientific expertise and on international institutions’ suggestions. The imposed lockdown and the economic meltdown that it provoked were confronted with a series of unprecedent measures such as a minimum living income wage provided by the government. These actions combined with a change in the rhetoric, invoking the language of war, and the fact that most of the pressure was held by technical workers such as doctors, researchers and epidemiologists, made the popularity of the government quite stable. Nevertheless, the contextual political situation in the country affected political support and public debate. The ideological confrontation surpassed the legislative arena, and every step and measure were widely criticised by the opposition parties, criticising the unilateralism of the National Government. Despite this, the extensive use of royal decrees and executive legislation helped the country to overcome the situation and to gain experience for the probable next waves. © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Darren Lilleker, Ioana A. Coman, Milos Gregor and Edoardo Novelli.

This chapter concludes the Brexit story. It starts by offering an explanation of the middle-class Conservative Brexiteers. The historical backdrop to their Leave votes is argued to be the multiple challenges to traditional middle-class authority that encompass an expansion of middle-class occupations, the culture wars going back to the 1960s and the loss of Empire. The historical narrative that ended with 9/11 in Chapter 8 is then continued, first with New Labour up until the coalition government of 2010, and then the subsequent period up until the Referendum. As austerity bites and political alienation grows, immigration and race become ever more salient. Given this, together with the denial of racism by everyone from politicians to convicted racists, space is devoted to the complex connections among ‘immigration, racism and xenophobia’ and how all this impacts ‘living with difference’. The chapter ends with a summary account of the multiple crises comprising the Brexit conjuncture.

This chapter deals with Spanish populist discourse by analyzing parliamentary speech of Pablo Iglesias, the leader of the political party Podemos. In the context of economic crisis and subsequent discontent that crystallized in the 15-M Movement (Spanish Revolution), Podemos achieved nation-wide appeal in record time from its foundation in 2014 until it became part of the coalition government with the Socialist Party in 2020. My starting point is that left-wing political parties display more radical language in moments of greater tension, when they seek to establish their electoral brand by differentiating themselves from other parties on the ideological spectrum. However, in Iglesias’ discourse we observe a clear influence of popular culture rhetoric (e.g., music, poetry, religion, cinema, and series), and a progressive transition from initial antagonism to a more pragmatic agonism once his party became part of the Establishment. To show this, I study cultural influences on the lexicon, metaphors, and conceptual frames in a selection of parliamentary presentations by Pablo Iglesias, from his arrival at the Spanish Congress of Deputies in 2016 until his entry into the Government as Vice-Prime Minister.

RESUMEN El año 2020 en Uruguay estuvo marcado por el despliegue de la agenda del nuevo gobierno de centro derecha en el contexto de la pandemia del COVID-19. Este artículo analiza este proceso prestando especial atención a la dinámica política de la nueva coalición de gobierno y la oposición, en el contexto regional de ascenso de partidos conservadores. El artículo muestra que el nuevo gobierno logró aprovechar el contexto de la pandemia para desplegar exitosamente su agenda de reformas tanto en términos de eficacia, de la cohesión de la coalición que lidera y de la evaluación de la opinión pública. A comienzos de 2021, el deterioro de los indicadores sanitarios, sociales y económicos plantea un escenario más complejo para el gobierno.

In modern realities, a new wave of interest in socialist ideas is emerging, which is reflected not only in the economy, but also in the spheres of culture and art (the case of rapper Pablo Hasel, his Marxist and pro-Soviet discourse received great publicity and public resonance). The locomotive of progressive social reforms in Spain in the current situation is the left-wing populist party Unidas Podemos. Appearing on the wave of violent popular protests (the movement of the indignant - indignados), the political technology project has evolved significantly over the 7 years that have passed since its institutionalization. The party was able to fully integrate into the political system of the country, finally shifting the logic of its functioning from the bipartisan track towards a multiparty system. Unidas Podemos took advantage of the irreconcilable confrontation between the right-wing People's Party (Partido Popular, NP) and the left-wing Spanish Socialist Labor Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE), forcing the latter to conclude a coalition pact. The strategy of coercion fully paid off, and Unidas Podemos was able to go directly to the execution of their pre-election promises. At the moment, against the backdrop of the pandemic, the coalition and especially Unidas Podemos are in dire need of real achievements to maintain and strengthen their electoral positions that meet the aspirations of the majority of Spaniards. It is investment in education, healthcare, small business will have to become a kind of safety cushion in case cardinal deterioration of the situation in the world financial markets. The main goal is to prevent a repetition of the 2008-2011 scenario, when from crisis Spain came out at the expense of reducing the welfare of the majority, and state support was provided only to banks and large corporations. At the same time, despite the pronounced social orientation carried out transformations, it cannot be argued that their practical the implementation will produce the desired result. Risks of recurrence are high negative experience of the times of the Second Republic, when the same socialists in within the coalition governments artificially slowed down the progress of reforms, and they themselves were not systemic and were only cosmetic changes to cover up the unsightly consequences of economic stratification of society.

1. Introduction: The 2012 election results Among the 18 political parties which contested Lesotho's 26 May 2012 National Assembly elections, the All Basotho Convention (ABC) led by Thomas Motsoahae Thabane, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), by Mothetjoa Metsing and the Basotho National Party (BNP) under Thesele 'Maseribane's leadership fortuitously, yet neither unconstitutionally nor surprisingly, won governmental power and thus jointly rule the country as aptly a triumvirate. Until the actual voting day there was nothing discernibly common between any of these political parties. Indeed, they had squared up against each other as mutually hostile entities frantically trying to maximise their individual chances of winning the elections. Section 87(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho reads: "The King shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of the National Assembly who appears to the Council of State to be the leader of the political party or coalition of political parties that will command the support of the majority of the members of the National Assembly". With 30, 26 and five seats respectively in the National Assembly, the ABC, LCD, and BNP achieved the required absolute majority by one seat to claim governmental power. This development ended the one-party dominance that had been for decades a feature of Lesotho's democracy. Catapulted to state power by an overwhelming majority vote in previous elections, then ruling LCD was an unrestrained force. It used its parliamentary majority to forestall debates on important national issues and passed bills as law before they had been properly scrutinised by its opposition counterparts (Makoa 2005: 69). The LCD lost governmental power in a bizarre fashion to a third of its splinter parties since being formed 15 years ago, the Democratic Congress (DC). Its erstwhile leader and then Prime Minister Mosisili, together with the majority of LCD members of parliament (MPs) resigned from the party and formed, inside the house of parliament in February 2012, the DC, which immediately took over the administration of the country as the ruling party. The LCD had similarly been formed in June 1997 to the chagrin of the opposition by the late Ntsu Mokhehle, then prime minister and leader of the then ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), who continued to rule until 1998 under the banner of his newly formed LCD. Together, the ABC, LCD and BNP captured 61 of the total 120 parliamentary seats, a minimum required to form government. After the elections results had been announced the ABC, LCD and BNP triumvirate presented itself as a coalition. The newly formed DC led by the former Prime Minister Pakalitha Bethuel Mosisili had won only 47 parliamentary seats. A coalition with the small political parties remaining outside the ABC, LCD and BNP partnership would yield only 59 parliamentary seats. Able to muster the number, the ABC, LCD and BNP thus coalesced into a bloc in accordance with the provisions of Section 87(2) of the constitution and claimed the governmental power that had clearly eluded the DC. The three parties are in coalition of a type variously dubbed office-driven, office seeking or office-oriented, that is, the one that "is motivated by the quest for office", (Kadima 2006: 5) rather than by a convergence in parties' ideologies or policies--the payoffs, spoils or benefits being cabinet positions. The quest for office and state power was clearly the key motivation and a bond that holds the formation together. Not only have cabinet positions been shared among these parties but also some of the government ministries have been subdivided and parceled into separate ministerial units ostensibly to increase their number so as to meet the individual demands of the members of the triumvirate. The combined number of the coalition government's cabinet ministers and deputy ministers is a whopping 30, a far cry from the previous administration's 23 and thus a greater budgetary burden for a nation that is buffeted by grinding poverty. …

International audience; The reading of Tunisian political reality in 2019 gives the feeling that the parties are mired in “political” calculations, unable to develop an economic and social vision that can get the country out of the economic slump that has worsened year by year since 2011. The government seems to have abandoned economic and social problems to focus on power struggles. However, in view of the 2019 election results, it is clear that voters have sent a message of rejection to the government elites represented by Ennahdha, Nidaa Tounes and his offspring. This mistrust was embodied in the affirmation of a “populist moment” that resulted in the victory of Kais Saïed in the presidential election. However, this victory does not mean that we are dealing with an institutionalization of populism in Tunisia. The revolutionary and democratic refoundation desired by the President of the Republic hardly seems conceivable with regard to the parliamentary configuration. It remains to be seen what will be the capacity of a coalition government, probably undermined by the political calculations of its various components, to provide solutions to the economic and social regression. Both the political configuration and the mode of operation of Tunisian institutions seem to lead to an institutional deadlock, the outcome of which is not very clear. This situation risks undermining an already weak state which, unable to enforce the laws, has never been able to question the logic of the Tunisian economy's rentier system, a logic which contributes to fueling the informal economy and corruption. This situation leads many Tunisians to think that the political class is exclusively interested in access to political-administrative functions which are assimilated to pretences and which allow them to benefit from an immunity closely associated with impunity. Hence the development of both anti-parliamentarism and endemic protest movements calling for a state of justice, that is, a state that respects the dignity of citizens regardless of their social and regional origin. Since the fall of Ben Ali's regime, the forms of allegiance of the governed to the rulers have not fundamentally changed and remain fragile: they are exclusively linked to the capacity of the state to create the conditions for relative economic prosperity and to redistribute the material resources that contribute to the population's better living. However, the Tunisian state can no longer satisfy material demands without increasing its debt, the evolution and control of which is under the watchful eye of the IMF.

Multi-year budget frameworks are often considered as instruments for controlling spending, including in the context of the European Union. This paper shows that the effects of multi-year budgeting depends on several conditions, some of which, may lead to more rather than less spending. The analysis is based on a model of a finance minister’s decision to enforce a previously accepted budget ceiling in subsequent negotiations with a spending minister. The analysis takes account of uncertainty about preferences in these negotiations, positive transaction costs to the finance minister, and the possibility of political mediation through the prime minister. The findings of this paper show that compliance with budget frameworks improves under temporarily stable preferences (e.g. the absence of external shocks), more homogenous preferences within the government (e.g. majoritarian governments in contrast to coalition government), preference similarity between the finance minister and the prime minister (in case of mediation), and increasing transaction costs. In other circumstances, multi-annual frameworks will not be able to block any upward pressure on expenditures.

This chapter examines the functioning and communication of arrangements for power-sharing between political parties in the middle years of the Weimar Republic. It looks at the formation of coalitions at Reich and state level; the role played both by the development of a specific parliamentary culture and by pressures stemming from symbolic and real conflicts beyond the control of the Reichstag and provisional legislatures; the place of the press and press policy; and the slide towards growing political fragmentation, especially after 1928. It also broadens the analysis of coalition-building to encompass the temporary and highly unstable alliances forged between rival forces at the time of direct elections. This includes both the two-round presidential election campaign of March–April 1925, and the two national referendums fought by popular demand during the Weimar period, one in June 1926 over the issue of confiscation of the property of former princely households, and the other in December 1929 over a right-wing proposal to reject the Young Plan.

In 2013 and 2019, the local government legislation of the province of Punjab in Pakistan saw two rounds of major changes – each of which led to a new local government Act being passed. In 2013 the changes were driven by constitutional and judicial requirements and in 2019 by the political will of Pakistan’s new coalition government. This article analyses and compares the functional assignment (FA) architecture of the two Acts against a set of parameters. The study finds that marginal improvements to the FA architecture introduced by the 2019 Act are offset by continuing inconsistencies and lack of clarity over ‘who does what’ in the functions assigned to local governments. The authors suggest that improving the functionality of local governments requires full implementation of the design features of the new system, including institutional strengthening of provincial-level entities which regulate and oversee the local government system.

Do Tigers like Politics?Aishwarya Maheshwari1* and Rajeev Maheshwari21Department of Wildlife Sciences, College of Forestry, Banda University of Agriculture and Technology, Banda-210001, Uttar Pradesh, India (ORCID: 0000-0002-6338-4254).*Corresponding author: aishwaryamaheshwari@icloud.com2Independent Political Analyst, India.In the geopolitically globalised world, political decisions and anthropogenic activities have a direct influence on the survival of wildlife and their interactions with human (1, 2 ). In such scenario, continuous decline in wildlife has generally been as “non-political” amongst political parties (2, 3 ). In the disastrous deterioration of wildlife, increase in number of a globally threatened flagship species (such as tiger Panthera tigris ) appears a rare phenomenon in India (4 ). Moreover, such recovery of a large predator entails with healthier natural ecosystems, as a whole and indicates sensible and timely political decisions.Wildlife conservation is a global environmental concern and inherently politically complex in most parts of the world (5, 6 ). Political parties are the key actors shaping wildlife policies both at national and international level (2, 7 ). As relation between wildlife and politics has for long been a close one in India (3, 8 ). The pre-historic Hindu mythological beliefs are evident with association of the Gods and Goddesses with different vahanas (animal vehicles) in antiquity and epics such as Ramayana and Mahabharata gave protection to wild species (8 ). In recent decades, world has come to recognize the central importance of wildlife to humanity in terms of the crucial contribution it makes to the cultural, economic, spiritual and social well-being of communities worldwide (9 ). For example, recent recognition of India’s tiger census in 2018 has earned the Guinness Book of World Records for being the world’s largest camera-trap wildlife survey and based on the recent knowledge accumulated over the years, India has over 80% of world’s tiger population (4, 10 ). Tiger population in India has remarkably increased over the previous decade, with over 110% since 2006, systematic all India tiger estimation exercise revealed recent numbers ranging around 2603 to 3346 (4 ). The knowledge that such nationwide exercises acquire is made available to policy makers so that accountable decisions can be made through integrated approach of the politics, science and society.The purpose of this article is to assess the relationship between ruling political party and estimated tiger population in India. In particular, we seek to determine if and how tiger numbers vary in terms of the ruling political party in the tigers occupying states in India. In addition, Jhala et al. (2019) stated, “Sustained conservation efforts through continued “political will” have resulted in an increase in tiger numbers”, and we attempted to assess ruling parties and tiger population dynamics with this article.We compiled data on tiger population and the ruling political party in 20 states of the respective year, in which the tiger population report was released. We considered the ruling party, whose Chief Minister is in the office, in case of a coalition government is formed. Furthermore, if elections were taken place in the same year when tiger population repot was released, two parties were considered for that particular year. There have been four cycles of all India tiger estimation project since 2006, estimated tiger populations 1411, 1706, 2226 and 2967 in 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 respectively. If there are elections or any change of the ruling party government, we credited both the parties in that particular year except the President’s rule (as it doesn’t belong to any political party).In 2006, of 20 ruling political parties, the Indian National Congress (INC) was leading with 6.5 tiger occupied states (comprising total tiger population 630) followed by the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) (four states with 356 tigers) and the CPI (1.5 states and 33 tigers). Similarly, in 2010 the INC was leading with five tiger occupied states with 424 tigers, closely followed by the BJP ruling 4.5 states with almost doubling the tiger numbers (815) in comparison with the INC ruling states (adding two prominent BJP ruling states Uttarakhand and Karnataka) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) (2 states with 141 tigers). Once again, in 2014, the INC was leading with 6.5 tiger occupied states (1175 tigers), closely followed by the BJP’s five ruling states (500.5 tigers). In contrast, in 2018, the BJP taken over with huge victory with 8.5 tiger occupied states (1688.5 tigers) and the INC trailed in three states with 603.5 tigers (Table 1).We acknowledge that our approach has possible short-comings such as selection of the ruling political party for the same year in which the tiger numbers were released, whereas the tiger estimation exercise might have been taken under the political regime of previous another party. This problem is difficult to avoid in assessing party specific political agenda would be focusing on a broad policy dimension. Our results suggest that there is no relationship between major ruling political party and tiger population in any of the 20 states in India. Tiger appears to be apolitical, as this study did not approach identity in any instance. Perhaps our most important implication pertains to the ideological foundation of each apolitical party in periodically monitoring tiger population.This brief study contributes to the nascent literature on bringing together both tiger numbers and ruling political parties by presenting a new approach that we applied to 20 tiger harbouring states in India. Unlike Western political system, green parties are lacking in India and wildlife has difficulties with getting involved in political discourse. However, India has achieved its target of doubling the tiger count four years ahead of 2022 (4 ) which reflects favourable conservation policy and “political will” for tigers in India.ReferencesJ.A. McNeely, M. Gadgil, C. Leveque, C. Padoch, K. Redford (lead authors). 1995. Characterization of biodiversity. In: Heywood, V.H., Watson, R.T., and Baste, I. (eds.). Global biodiversity assessment. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp. 715–821.T. Hodgetts, D. Burnham, A. Dickman, E. A. Macdonald, D. W. Macdonald. 2019. Conservation Geopolitics. Conservation Biology 33:250-259. doi:10.1111/cobi.13238V. K. Saberwal. 2000. Conservation as politics: Wildlife conservation and resource management in India, Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, 3:166-173. doi: 10.1080/13880290009353954Y. V. Jhala, Q. Qureshi, A. K. Nayak (eds). 2019. Status of tigers, co-predators and prey in India 2018. Summary Report. National Tiger Conservation Authority, Government of India, New Delhi & Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun. TR No./2019/05.Jean-Louis Martin, V. Maris, D. S. Simberloff. 2016. Limits challenge society and conservation science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113: 6105-6112, doi:10.1073/pnas.1525003113S. J. Song, R. M. M’Gonigle. 2001. Science, power, and system dynamics: The political economy of conservation biology. Conservation Biology, 15:980–989C. A. Simon, B. S. Steel, N. P. Lovrich. 2018. State and local government and politics: Prospects for sustainability, 2nd edition, Oregon State University Corvallis.M. Rangarajan. 2001. India’s wildlife history. Permanent Black and Ranthambore Foundation, New Delhi.Ph. Chardonnet, B.des Clers, J. Fischer, R. Gerhold, F. Jori, F. Lamarque. 2002. The value of wildlife. Scientific and Technical Review of the Office International des Epizooties, 21:15-51.Millward. 2020. Indian tiger study earns its stripes as one of the world’s largest wildlife surveys. https://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/news/2020/7/indian-tiger-study-earns-its-stripes-as-one-of-the-world’s-largest-wildlife-surve-624966Table 1. Tiger harbouring states and their numbers during four phases of All India Tiger Monitoring exercise.

Aunque en la reciente historia política española se han dado diferentes situaciones parlamentarias que auguraban la formación de un gobierno estatal de coalición, ello no ha sucedido en ninguna de ellas. Los efectos de los procesos electorales de 2015 tanto en el ámbito estatal como en el autonómico, unidos a la fallida investidura de Pedro Sánchez en septiembre de 2019, han hecho más necesario aún intentar comprender por qué el gobierno de coalición no aparece como un resultado normal en la política española.

This chapter describes developments that have affected the organisation and performance of British police forces in the wake of more general trends, which, on the whole, have been unhelpful to them. It discusses the attempt of the British state to devolve responsibility for law and order, which contrasts markedly with previous trends towards centralisation of police services. Traditionally the Conservative party had sought to protect the police from the vagaries of overt political interference, while offering them moral and financial support. The ‘austerity’ strategy embarked upon by the Coalition government in 2010 extended to all public services, including the police. The challenge to the police was best evidenced in the recommendation that chief officers should be given the power of compulsory severance of sworn officers when this was deemed necessary. Examples of highly innovatory developments in policing at local level have also been provided by Police and Crime Commissioners.

The UK coalition government introduced the Community Organisers Programme in 2010, providing state funding to train community organizers in England for the first time. This article presents a case study in the north of England, exploring the implementation of the programme. It illustrates the challenges and contradictions faced by trainee community organizers and suggests lessons for community practitioners and policymakers of all political complexions in the United Kingdom and other countries.

PROLOGUEnBy the 1890's, Queensland was a place of ever-burgeoningnoptimism. Great, if at times undefined hopes for thencolony's future filled this era with a peculiar vitalitynthat was both the product of earlier decades and thenprogeninr of Queensland's ethos in later years. Justnrecognition, it seems, has been given to the outstandingngovernment leaders of the late nineteenth and earlyntwentieth centuries: S.W. Griffith, T. Mcilwraith, W. Kidston and T.J. Ryan have all received biographicalntreatment, as have Premiers of lesser significance likenR. Philp and A. Morgan. These men were, of course,npublic figures in their day, each attracting a particularnquota of admiration, envy, sympathy and dislike from thenpeople of the colony. Consequently, when the historiannseeks to investigate the lives and careers of suchnindividuals, much of the information he draws upon isnembedded in this matrix of contemporary thought.With the above in mind, one discovers an extraordinarynomission in the current array of biographies on Queensland government leaders. Thomas Joseph Byrnes (1860-1898) wasnPremier for a mere five months, from April 1898 to thentime of his death ln September of that year. Yet, despitenthis brief tenure of office, he inspired a large body ofneulogistic literature that was produced both during hisncareer and, intermittently, for a number of years afternhis premature demise. Byrnes was the first nativenborn Premier of Queensland and, indeed, was the youngestnman thus far appointed, being but thirty-seven when he assumed leadership. This neglected Liberal politiciannis the only Queensland Premier to be honoured with twonmemorial statues, and - in the distinguished company ofnSir Charles Lilley and T.J. Ryan - had a medal fornscholarship posthumously endowed in his name.Byrnes was the child of poor, Irish-Catholicnimmigrants. A brilliant, diligent student, he won ansuccession of state and private awards which took him from the Bowen State Primary school to Brisbane Grammar,nand thence to the University of Melbourne where henobtained an Arts-Law degree. After his return tonQueensland, he became Minister for Justice in the newly formed Coalition Government of 1890: from then on, untilnhis unexpected death in 1898, Thomas Byrnes' star seemednin the ascendant.The man's native birth and family back ground, hisndiligence and academic success, his political promisenand premature death together form the constant theme ofnthe panegyrical writings which Byrnes inspired. Thisnliterature, ramified by public honours like thencommenorative statues and medal, comprises what RonaldnLawson has termed the qByrnes Legendq; the motif ofnthe Legend is success, the admirable success and self bettermentnsupposedly attainable by anyone who is willingnto work both honestly and hard. n

BackgroundIn recent years, landscapes in many countries have been transformed by efforts to fight global warming, specifically the shift towards renewable energies such as wind power. This development has been met by growing opposition from local citizens and their initiatives. There is an ongoing debate about whether and how such protests have a real impact on the development of energy landscapes.MethodsDrawing on the rare case of a state government scaling back ambitious targets for the expansion of renewables, the authors were able to analyse the impact of protests in the context of regional spatial planning and, particularly, state policy-making on energy. Conceptually drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and using the method of causal-process tracing, the qualitative study investigates related interactions and decision-making processes in the federal state of Saxony, Germany, between 2011—when targets were increased—and 2013—when targets were scaled back.ResultsThe findings show that the protests grew significantly when the raised expansion targets for renewables were translated into a higher number of potential wind farm sites. The protests, which primarily referred to landscapes, were well-organised and creative. Activists worked through a range of channels across various contexts and several levels of the politico-administrative system, in particular approaching regional spatial planners and a wide range of politicians. In the end, the protests (along with other factors) significantly contributed to the readjustment by the Saxon coalition government of its energy and climate policy and thus to a slowdown of energy-related landscape change.ConclusionsThe study confirms that the influence of protesters can greatly exceed the previously studied participation in the planning of sites and the approval process for individual wind farms. Also highlighting other relevant co-influential factors, the paper contributes to the development of a middle-range theory of the impact of local opposition to wind power in the context of energy landscapes.

This chapter outlines the aim and structure of the book. The aim of this edited volume is to explore the relationship between constitutionalism and populism in the Italian context. The Italian experience with populism is interesting to both domestic and comparative lawyers for many reasons. First, the country has a long-lasting tradition of anti-parliamentarism over the course of its history as a unitary state. After the 2018 general election, Italy turned into the first European country in which two self-styled populist parties with very different agendas and voting constituencies formed a coalition government. Second, the Italian case is of the greatest interest because the country is a founding member of the European Communities. Therefore, the constitutional implications of populist politics have to be considered not only within the national framework but also in the wider context. Bearing in mind this framework, the edited volume develops a comprehensive analysis of constitutional issues related to the rise of Italian populism.

This chapter surveys the promise of ‘Liberal Democracy’ from the foundation of the Social Democratic Party to the arrival of the coalition government. In that period the Liberal Democrats came into being as a political force, and established themselves as the third party at Westminster, before entering government in coalition with the Conservatives in 2010 and suffering a consequent electoral backlash. To what extent was the new party able to develop a coherent and popularly-understood ‘promise’ of Liberal Democracy? Ultimately, the Liberals, and later the Liberal Democrats, did not consistently adhere to a fixed ideology. The instability of the Liberal Democrats’ broader philosophical promise represented a key issue in terms of their failure to deliver a distinctive agenda in the coalition government.