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What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Our objective was to determine whether social media influences vaccination through informational and normative influences among Democrats and Republicans. We use a probability-based longitudinal study of Americans (N = 1768) collected between December 2022 and September 2023 to examine the prospective associations between social media use and vaccination as well as informational and normative influence as mediating processes. Greater social media use correlates with more frequent vaccination (cross-lagged coefficients: COVID-19 = 0.113, p < 0.001; influenza = 0.123, p < 0.001). The underlying processes, however, vary between Democrats and Republicans. Democrats who use social media more are more likely to vaccinate because they encounter information about new pathogens. In contrast, Republicans who use social media more are more likely to vaccinate because they think that people who are important to them receive the recommended vaccines. Our findings underscore the potential for social media campaigns to promote vaccination, among both Democrats and Republicans by paying attention to the specific processes in each audience., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Several studies have shown that exposure to colors affects cognitive and affective processes. In this paper, we tried to find if colors affect the perception of political messages and activate partisan biases. We focus our study on the Spanish cultural environment. In a prestudy ( n = 991), participants identified red as progressive, blue as conservative, and gray as neutral. In two subsequent experiments ( n = 840; n = 938), we analyzed how these three colors influenced the interpretation of political messages and confronted them with issues ownership. The results show that the colors can activate partisan biases but do not have the same strength as issues ownership., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Past studies on how political value (i.e., ideology) and identity (i.e., party identity) predict support for candidates often fail to consider both the perspectives of citizens and candidates, introducing omitted variable problems. To address them, this paper introduces the multiple matching perspective, which considers how citizens' ideology and political identity are matched (i.e., moderated) by a candidate's ideology and party affiliation. Four studies using this approach reveal: 1. The effect of ideology match is large, robust, and consistent. 2. candidates' ideology plays more role than candidates' party identity except during the final stage of a presidential race. 3. Citizens' party identity can guide them to support a candidate based on the candidate's ideology (Republicans will support conservatives), but it is less so for the reverse of it (conservatives do not always support Republicans). Therefore, this approach helps theory-building in political psychology by uncovering novel effects of ideology and partisanship., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Collective nostalgia is a form of nostalgia that is contingent upon thinking of oneself in terms of a particular social identity. Research has focused in particular on collective nostalgia for a nation's past. Here, I propose that conservatives and others on the right side of the political spectrum experience stronger collective nostalgia for their nation's past than liberals and those on the left. I first explain the roots of this prediction in conservative political philosophy, review empirical evidence in favor of that idea, and summarize findings that show the significance of this link for policy support. Finally, I review and discuss evidence that qualifies the link between conservatism and collective nostalgia., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The author declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Did the presidency of Donald Trump affect Americans' intergroup attitudes? Converging evidence from recent experimental and longitudinal studies suggests that Trump's political rise led his supporters to increase their reported prejudice toward traditionally minoritized racial and religious groups in the USA., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests No interests are declared., (Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

This is a registered report for a study of racial and ethnic variation in the relationship between negativity bias and political attitudes. Pioneering work on the psychological and biological roots of political orientation has suggested that political conservatism is driven in large part by enhanced negativity bias. This work has been criticized on several theoretical fronts, and recent replication attempts have failed. To dig deeper into the contours of when (and among whom) negativity bias predicts conservatism, we investigate a surprisingly overlooked factor in existing literature: race and ethnicity. We propose that political issues represent threat or disgust in different ways depending on one's race and ethnicity. We recruited 174 White, Latinx, and Asian American individuals (in equal numbers) to examine how the relationship between negativity bias and political orientation varies by race/ethnicity across four domains: policing/criminal justice, immigration, economic redistribution, and religious social conservatism.

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

Three studies explore the possibility that attitudes toward "diversity" are multidimensional rather than unidimensional and that ideological differences in diversity attitudes vary as a function of diversity subtype. Study 1 ( n = 1,001) revealed that the factor structure of attitudes toward 23 diverse community features was bidimensional. Factors involving demographic and viewpoint diversity emerged. Conservatives reported more positive attitudes toward viewpoint diversity, and liberals more positive attitudes toward demographic diversity. Study 2 ( n = 1,012) replicated Study 1 findings, and extended Study 1 results by showing attitudes toward the general concept of diversity predicted attitudes toward demographic diversity but not viewpoint diversity. In Study 3, 386 participants rated how relevant a set of features was to their prototypical understanding of diversity. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) revealed people discriminate between viewpoint, demographic, and consumer diversity. Conservatives perceived viewpoint features as more relevant to "diversity," whereas liberals perceived demographic features as more relevant.

This teaching case explores the complexities of teaching students about race and racism, a struggle complicated by political efforts to restrict the discussion of critical educational theories. It emphasizes the political ideologies that faculty must consider as they teach in an academic setting. The case narrative illuminates the complexity of diverse and divisive political ideologies that veer from scholarship into emotion. This case offers questions for further reflection on solutions to these challenges.

Popular models on the threat-politics association suggest that threats cause right-wing political preferences. Failed replications, crossnational variation, and examples of threats causing left-wing preferences suggest this relationship is more complicated. We introduce a model of the reciprocal threat-politics relationship that reconciles prior conflicting findings and raises new questions., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Given overwhelming evidence that current levels of meat consumption jeopardize human and planetary health, there is a need for governmental action to reduce meat consumption (i.e., Meat Curtailment Policies, or MCPs). However, few such policies are actually being implemented, in part due to fear of backlash. Better understanding the ideological underpinning of backlash is thus crucial for designing strategies that can further the much needed transition towards more plant-based diets. To address this issue, this study unravels the diverse ideological notions informing backlash in discourse against MCPs. Data consists of three news articles in right-wing publications and over 2700 corresponding comments, posted on Facebook in response to policy proposals to reduce animal protein consumption in the Netherlands. Analysis of the data is based on a framework for ideological discourse analysis, which enables the identification of ideological notions through recognizing semantic and formal structures in text. The research reveals that next to the well documented notions related to neoliberalism (e.g., freedom of choice) and carnism (e.g., meat is normal), populist notions are a significant ideological basis of backlash. In addition, ideological notions related to populism, such as anti-elitism, are interlocked with carnism and neoliberalism. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of the socio-political nature of backlash against MCPs. It suggests that while notions related to carnism can explain how people justify their meat consumption, such notions are only partly relevant for explaining resistance to MCPs. Such resistance is not just an individual response, but a theme around which groups of people converge, through shared ideologies., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals' perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain's low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.

The moral foundations theory (MFT) is an influential multifactorial model that posits how decision-making in the moral context originates from a set of six intuitive moral foundations: care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, and liberty. The established measure of these foundations-the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)-has been used extensively in a range of empirical projects. However, recent analyses of its factor structure and the internal consistency of each of the foundation clusters have called its validity into question. In this paper, data from a large sample of British voters were used to re-examine the factor structure of the MFQ. As opposed to a 6-factor structure, only three meaningful clusters emerged in an exploratory principal factors analysis (Study 1; N = 428): traditionalism, compassion, and liberty. This structure was broadly confirmed in an independent sample (Study 2; N = 322). Concurrent validity was established via correlations with measures of 'social change' and 'systemic inequality' insecurities (Study 1) and voting behaviour and preferences (Study 2). Significant differences on each of the three factors of the revised MFQ (MFQ-r) were observed between the voters of different political parties (Study 1) and sides of the Brexit issue (Study 2). Implications for moral foundations theory and its measurement are discussed., (© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

This paper explores the leadership styles of fourteen elected female politicians in executive government positions, as communicated through the official Instagram accounts that were in use during the COVID-19 pandemic. Seven of them are, or were, heads of government, six are or were mayors, and one is the president of an autonomous region in Spain. These women are Angela Merkel (Germany), Jacinda Ardern (New Zealand), Sanna Marin (Finland), Mette Frederiksen (Denmark), Erna Solberg (Norway), Katrin Jakobsdottir (Iceland), Tsai Ing-Wen (Taiwan), Anne Hidalgo (Paris), Virginia Raggi (Rome), Ada Colau (Barcelona), Claudia López (Bogotá), Claudia Sheinbaum (Mexico City), London Breed (San Francisco) and Isabel Díaz Ayuso (Madrid Region). A comparative content analysis of 2,330 units was conducted over a 6-month period. The study analyses the hard or soft leadership style conveyed by the women politicians selected in relation to four variables: political ideology, generational affiliation, level of government and techniques used in communication. The results show that the values of the variables affect leadership styles; therefore, the assumption that all female politicians have a single leadership style is erroneous and related to gender stereotyping.

Understanding changes in the structure of public opinion is necessary to evaluate both contemporary claims about political divisions in Brexit Britain, as well as to uncover any long-term mapping of public opinion on the depolarization and subsequent polarization of elites from the birth of New Labour to the aftermath of the Great Recession. I assess trends from British Social Attitudes surveys, utilizing recent conceptual and methodological distinctions between different features of public opinion change. I find that the public, on average, moved to the left during the early 1990s, to the right during New Labour, and back to the left from 2010. Such oscillations are even more pronounced for positions along a welfare dimension. In contrast, average positions along a libertarian-authoritarian dimension were constant until around 2010, when the public became more liberal. Polarization of left-right opinion has increased in recent years but does not match that estimated between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, while low and stable levels of polarization are estimated along libertarian-authoritarian and welfare dimensions. Overall trends are dis-aggregated by social class, educational attainment, party identification, strength of partisanship, interest in politics, and position on Europe. Further, the relationships between positions along these three ideological dimensions vary systematically across time and between groups., (© 2021 London School of Economics and Political Science.)

Introduction: Research has consistently revealed positive correlations between political liberalism and Openness to Experience, and between conservatism and Conscientiousness. Most of this research has made use of domain-level models of the Big Five personality traits. Recent work suggests, however, that each Big Five trait domain can be divided into distinct aspects or facets, which offer more nuanced characterizations of each trait., Methods: Across four studies (Ns ranging from 1,123 to 116,406), the present research examined the degree to which distinct lower-level traits would be associated with meaningful differences in political orientation. United States residents completed two different hierarchical Big Five personality measures (the Big Five Aspect Scales and the Big Five Inventory-2), as well as a range of measures of political orientation., Results: Across both personality measures, liberal political orientation showed distinct positive associations with the lower-level traits Openness/Aesthetic Sensitivity, Intellect/Intellectual Curiosity, Compassion, and Withdrawal/Depression, as well as distinct negative associations with Orderliness/Organization, Politeness, and Assertiveness., Discussion: By examining individual differences at a higher level of granularity, these data provide insight into specific motivations that predispose individuals toward different ends of the political spectrum., (© 2021 Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider "facts" in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection , people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.

Although the study of political behaviour has been traditionally restricted to the social sciences, new advances in political neuroscience and computational cognitive science highlight that the biological sciences can offer crucial insights into the roots of ideological thought and action. Echoing the dazzling diversity of human ideologies, this theme issue seeks to reflect the multiplicity of theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding the nature of the political brain. Cutting-edge research along three thematic strands is presented, including (i) computational approaches that zoom in on fine-grained mechanisms underlying political behaviour, (ii) neurocognitive perspectives that harness neuroimaging and psychophysiological techniques to study ideological processes, and (iii) behavioural studies and policy-minded analyses of such understandings across cultures and across ideological domains. Synthesizing these findings together, the issue elucidates core questions regarding the nature of uncertainty in political cognition, the mechanisms of social influence and the cognitive structure of ideological beliefs. This offers key directions for future biologically grounded research as well as a guiding map for citizens, psychologists and policymakers traversing the uneven landscape of modern polarization, misinformation, intolerance and dogmatism. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo . We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo , the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Contemporary debates about addressing inequality require a common, accurate understanding of the scope of the issue at hand. Yet little is known about who notices inequality in the world around them and when. Across five studies ( N = 8,779) employing various paradigms, we consider the role of ideological beliefs about the desirability of social equality in shaping individuals' attention to-and accuracy in detecting-inequality across the class, gender, and racial domains. In Study 1, individuals higher (versus lower) on social egalitarianism were more likely to naturalistically remark on inequality when shown photographs of urban scenes. In Study 2, social egalitarians were more accurate at differentiating between equal versus unequal distributions of resources between men and women on a basic cognitive task. In Study 3, social egalitarians were faster to notice inequality-relevant changes in images in a change detection paradigm indexing basic attentional processes. In Studies 4 and 5, we varied whether unequal treatment adversely affected groups at the top or bottom of society. In Study 4, social egalitarians were, on an incentivized task, more accurate at detecting inequality in speaking time in a panel discussion that disadvantaged women but not when inequality disadvantaged men. In Study 5, social egalitarians were more likely to naturalistically point out bias in a pattern detection hiring task when the employer was biased against minorities but not when majority group members faced equivalent bias. Our results reveal the nuances in how our ideological beliefs shape whether we accurately notice inequality, with implications for prospects for addressing it., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing interest.

There is currently a debate in political psychology about whether dogmatism and belief superiority are symmetric or asymmetric across the ideological spectrum. Toner, Leary, Asher, and Jongman-Sereno (2013) found that dogmatism was higher among conservatives than liberals, but both conservatives and liberals with extreme attitudes reported higher perceived superiority of beliefs. In the current study, we conducted a preregistered direct and conceptual replication of this previous research using a large nationally representative sample. Consistent with Toner et al.'s findings, our results showed that conservatives had higher dogmatism scores than liberals, whereas both conservative and liberal extreme attitudes were associated with higher belief superiority compared with more moderate attitudes. As in their study, we also found that whether conservative or liberal attitudes were associated with higher belief superiority was topic dependent. Contrasting Toner et al.'s findings, our results also showed that ideologically extreme individuals had higher dogmatism. We discuss implications of these results for theoretical debates in political psychology.

Objective: The impact of cognitive function and decline on political ideology is unknown. We studied the relationship between cognition and both political orientation and political policy choices in a population of older persons., Design: Longitudinal investigation., Setting: A retirement community and its surroundings in Southern California., Participants: 151 members of a longitudinal investigation of aging and dementia in the oldest-old (the 90+ Study), mean age 95 years., Measurements: Participants self-reported their political ideology (7-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative) and policy preferences for federal spending on public schooling, aid to the poor, and protecting the environment, as well as on preferences on immigration rates, death penalty, and university admission. The same political survey was mailed to participants twice: at time one and 6-months later. Cognitive function based on neurological examination and cognitive testing was classified as normal (55%), cognitive impairment/not dementia (CIND) (33%), or dementia (12%). We calculated rank correlations between ideology and policy choices, stratified by cognitive status, and agreement between Surveys 1 and 2., Results: Political ideology/orientation was highly consistent over a six-month period (84% agreement) among the 122 who returned the second survey, with no significant relationship to cognitive status. Among cognitively impaired (CIND and dementia), however, there was significant loss of consistency between an individual's political orientation and their policy choices. Level of political engagement was high for participants, with more than 90% voting in the 2016 presidential election., Conclusion: In this population of older persons, political identification on the liberal-conservative spectrum was resilient despite cognitive decline, but its meaning and function were changed. For the cognitively impaired it remained a self-defining label, but no longer operated as a higher order framework for orienting specific policy preferences. There appeared to be loss of coherence between the political orientation and political policy choices of cognitively impaired individuals. Given the high level of political engagement of these individuals, these results have substantial public policy implications., (© 2021 The American Geriatrics Society.)

Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how six types of threat (e.g., economic, violence, and surveillance) are associated with multiple political beliefs (e.g., cultural, economic, and ideological identification) in 56 countries/territories. Multilevel models with individuals nested in countries revealed that the threat-political belief association depends on the type of threat, the type of political belief, and the country. Economic-related threats tended to be associated with more left-wing economic political beliefs and violence-related threats tended to be associated with more cultural right-wing beliefs, but there were exceptions to this pattern. Additional analyses revealed that the associations between threat and political beliefs were different across countries. However, our analyses identified few country characteristics that could account for these cross-country differences. Our findings revealed that political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but that the relationship is not simple.

Piketty's propositions for arresting inequality are discussed through the lens of racism/casteism. We focus on the case of India's George Floyds-the persistence of caste and tribe oppression under economic growth in India-through the insights of our long-term ethnographic research. We show that inequalities are intimately tied to dynamics of capitalist accumulation in which racial/ethnic/caste/tribe and gender difference is crucial. We argue for an analysis that truly integrates ideology and the dynamics of political economy. The wider implications, we argue are political; they lie in the question of what is to be done. Despite his ambitions to decenter economics, Piketty remains trapped in the logic of economics for what he proposes are essentially economic reforms within capitalism. Moreover, ideological change cannot be a matter of choice only, and cannot be challenged solely at the level of ideas around economic inequality. It will also have to be fought as a direct contest of oppressive ideologies such as racism, casteism, and patriarchy, leading to new counter-hegemonic positions. We will argue that this takes us from a global history of ideology to a global anthropology of praxis. A first step is to genuinely center conversations with disciplines like anthropology, sociology, and subaltern history studying people and voices from below and from the margins, and the perspectives of scholars and activists from below and from the margins., (© 2021 London School of Economics and Political Science.)

Background.: A mixed-methods case study exploring access to competitive employment for persons with serious mental illness (SMI) revealed limited access to work and low employment success across two northern communities., Purpose.: To explore possible explanations for why low employment rates persist despite existing employment services and supports., Methods.: A total of 46 individual or group interviews were conducted with persons with SMI, vocational providers, and decision-makers regarding access to competitive employment in the case communities. Data were systematically analysed for dominant ideas, interests and institutions using a neo-institutional framework., Findings.: Participants described access to employment to be constrained by provider competition, limited supports, and a lack of consideration of difference-ideas and interests associated with neoliberal influences within provincial employment supports policy., Implications.: Enabling participation in meaningful employment for people with SMI will require occupational therapists to appreciate and contest the oppressive nature of neoliberal policies on local programs and services.

Previous work proposes that dispositional fear exists predominantly among political conservatives, generating the appearance that fears align strictly along party lines. This view obscures evolutionary dynamics because fear evolved to protect against myriad threats, not merely those in the political realm. We suggest prior work in this area has been biased by selection on the dependent variable, resulting from an examination of exclusively politically oriented fears that privilege conservative values. Because the adaptation regulating fear should be based upon both universal and ancestral-specific selection pressures combined with developmental and individual differences, the elicitation of it should prove variable across the ideological continuum dependent upon specific combinations of fear and value domains. In a sample of ~ 1,600 Australians assessed with a subset of the Fear Survey Schedule II, we find fears not infused with political content are differentially influential across the political spectrum. Specifically, those who are more fearful of sharp objects, graveyards, and urinating in public are more socially conservative and less supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of death are more supportive of gay rights. Those who are more fearful of suffocating and swimming alone are more concerned about emissions controls and immigration, while those who are more fearful of thunderstorms are also more anti-immigration. Contrary to existing research, both liberals and conservatives are more fearful of different circumstances, and the role of dispositional fears are attitude-specific.

Social science researchers are predominantly liberal, and critics have argued this representation may reduce the robustness of research by embedding liberal values into the research process. In an adversarial collaboration, we examined whether the political slant of research findings in psychology is associated with lower rates of scientific replicability. We analyzed 194 original psychology articles reporting studies that had been subject to a later replication attempt ( N = 1,331,413 participants across replications) by having psychology doctoral students (Study 1) and an online sample of U.S. residents (Study 2) from across the political spectrum code the political slant (liberal vs. conservative) of the original research abstracts. The methods and analyses were preregistered. In both studies, the liberal or conservative slant of the original research was not associated with whether the results were successfully replicated. The results remained consistent regardless of the ideology of the coder. Political slant was unrelated to both subsequent citation patterns and the original study's effect size and not consistently related to the original study's sample size. However, we found modest evidence that research with greater political slant-whether liberal or conservative-was less replicable, whereas statistical robustness consistently predicted replication success. We discuss the implications for social science, politics, and replicability.

As Covid-19 spreads across the world, governments turn a hopeful eye towards research and development of a vaccine against this new disease. But it is one thing to make a vaccine available, and it is quite another to convince the public to take the shot, as the precedent of the 2009 H1N1 influenza illustrated. In this paper, we present the results of four online surveys conducted in April 2020 in representative samples of the French population 18 years of age and over (N = 5018). These surveys were conducted during a period when the French population was on lockdown and the daily number of deaths attributed to the virus reached its peak. We found that if a vaccine against the new coronavirus became available, almost a quarter of respondents would not use it. We also found that attitudes to this vaccine were correlated significantly with political partisanship and engagement with the political system. Attitudes towards this future vaccine did not follow the traditional mapping of political attitudes along a Left-Right axis. The rift seems to be between people who feel close to governing parties (Centre, Left and Right) on the one hand, and, on the other, people who feel close to Far-Left and Far-Right parties as well as people who do not feel close to any party. We draw on the French sociological literature on ordinary attitudes to politics to discuss our results as well as the cultural pathways via which political beliefs can affect perceptions of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Objective: Junk-food marketing contributes significantly to childhood obesity, which in turn imposes major health and economic burdens. Despite this, political priority for addressing junk-food marketing has been weak in many countries. Competing interests, worldviews and beliefs of stakeholders involved with the issue contribute to this political inertia. An integral group of actors for driving policy change are parliamentarians, who champion policy and enact legislation. However, how parliamentarians interpret and portray (i.e. frame) the causes and solutions of public health nutrition problems is poorly understood. The present study aimed to understand how Australian parliamentarians from different political parties frame the problem of junk-food marketing., Design: Framing analysis of transcripts from the Australian Government's Parliamentary Hansard, involving development of a theoretical framework, data collection, coding transcripts and thematic synthesis of results., Settings: Australia., Participants: None., Results: Parliamentarian framing generally reflected political party ideology. Liberal parliamentarians called for minimal government regulation and greater personal responsibility, reflecting the party's core values of liberalism and neoliberalism. Greens parliamentarians framed the issue as systemic, highlighting the need for government intervention and reflecting the core party value of social justice. Labor parliamentarians used both frames at varying times., Conclusions: Parliamentarians' framing was generally consistent with their party ideology, though subject to changes over time. This project provides insights into the role of framing and ideology in shaping public health policy responses and may inform communication strategies for nutrition advocates. Advocates might consider using frames that resonate with the ideologies of different political parties and adapting these over time.

Research links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects ( n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals' tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

People increasingly self-segregate into politically homogeneous communities. How they do this remains unclear. We propose that people use ambient cues correlated with political values to infer whether they would like to live in those communities. We test this hypothesis in five studies. In Studies 1 ( n = 3,543) and 2 ( n = 5,609), participants rated community cues; liberals and conservatives' preferences differed. In Studies 3a ( n = 1,643) and 3b ( n = 1,840), participants read about communities with liberal or conservative cues. Even without explicit information about the communities' politics, participants preferred communities with politically congenial cues. In Study 4 ( n = 282), participants preferred politically congenial communities and wanted to leave politically uncongenial communities. In Study 5 ( n = 370), people selectively navigated their communities in a politically congenial way. These studies suggest that peoples' perceptions of communities can be shaped by subtle, not necessarily political, cues that may facilitate growing political segregation.

The uptake and implementation of universal health coverage (UHC) is primarily a political, rather than a technical, exercise, with contested ideas and diverse stakeholders capable of facilitation or resistance-even veto-of the policy uptake. This narrative systematic review, undertaken in 2018, sought to identify all peer-reviewed publications dealing with concepts relating to UHC through a political economy framing. Of the 627 papers originally identified, 55 papers were directly relevant, with an additional eight papers added manually on referral from colleagues. The thematic analysis adapted Fox and Reich's framework of ideas and ideologies, interests and institutions to organize the analysis. The results identified a literature strong in its exploration of the ideologies and ideas that underpin UHC, but with an apparent bias in authorship towards more rights-based, left-leaning perspectives. Despite this, political economy analyses of country case studies suggested a more diverse political framing for UHC, with the interests and institutions engaged in implementation drawing on pragmatic and market-based mechanisms to achieve outcomes. Case studies offered limited detail on the role played by specific interests, though the influence of global development trends was evident, as was the role of donor organizations. Most country case studies, however, framed the development of UHC within a narrative of national ownership, with steps in implementation often critical political milestones. The development of institutions for UHC implementation was predicated largely on available infrastructure, with elements of that infrastructure-federal systems, user fees, pre-existing insurance schemes-needing to be accommodated in the incremental progress towards UHC. The need for technical competence to deliver ideological promises was underlined. The review concludes that, despite the disparate sources for the analyses, there is an emerging shared narrative in the growing literature around the political economy of UHC that offers an increasing awareness of the political dimensions to UHC uptake and implementation., (© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

The present paper explores the advantages of using framing theory, social representations theory and differences in ideology to analyze polarized issues in the press. Framing uncovers the structure/format of news articles and social representations explores their meanings. These two theoretical positions are connected through the concept of ideology - a set of beliefs that shape position taking regarding social issues. Using this integrated framework, we will analyze the highly polarized topic of violence and drug trafficking in two ideologically different newspapers in Sinaloa, Mexico - Noroeste (journalistic ideology) and El Debate (elite ideology) (total N = 547 articles). This will be accomplished using three steps - a descriptive analysis, application of the framing scale and submitting the articles to ALCESTE software. The results show differences in framing and social representations of violence and drug trafficking according to ideology. Each newspaper presented different news frames (journalistic - attribution of responsibility and conflict frames; elite - human-interest and morality frames). However, at the level of representations (content) there were ideological differences in the representation of violence but not of drug trafficking, suggesting a common element in these representations, beyond ideological differences. These findings contribute to (1) the clarification of the concept used and (2) towards an analytical framework of press analysis - analyzing format and content and considering differences in press ideology.

This study uses questionnaire surveys to examine the real impact of incorporating traditional cultural elements into the practice of ideological and political education in colleges and universities. The integration of traditional cultural elements into these practices is the research object of this paper. It realizes the sharing of teaching resources for the integration of traditional culture into the practice of ideological and political education in colleges and universities and examines the impact of network distance education on students' learning interests using SQLServer development tools and network distance education technology. The study's conclusions demonstrate that students can enjoy the allure of traditional culture virtually by setting up a network distance education platform and implementing resource sharing. The study's findings offer theoretical evidence in favor of using network distant education to incorporate traditional cultural components into the practice of teaching politics and ideologies in higher education institutions.

With the rise of authoritarian politics across the globe, echoes of a fascist past are with us once again signaling a looming and dangerous threat to education and democracy. This essay argues that is it crucial to engage fascism both as a language of white supremacy and a politics of disconnection. If fascism is to be addressed both politically and educationally, it is crucial to address its underlying political, educational, and economic elements comprehensively as part of a broad politics. Any viable mode of resistance to fascism in its upgraded forms must not only make education central to politics but also analyze the problems it produces and its root causes in their interconnections and as part of a wider totality of power and exclusion. Fascism is normalized in a capitalist order when its diverse economic, political and social problems appear fragmented, disconnected, and are treated in isolation. This essay argues against this form of normalization and critiques the relationship between fascism and capitalism and its politics of diversion by examining how a number of crucial issues are often wrongly dealt with in isolation. It concludes by demonstrating how a politics that is comprehensive and interrelated provides a language to rethink how fascism can be made visible and resisted.

A study of the politics of naming public spaces in Tehran reveals a masculinist discourse lying behind the process. The majority of streets, plazas, universities and even parks have non-feminine names, and a considerable number of streets with feminine names were renamed after the Islamic Revolution. The analytical lens of this study focuses on the ideological stratification the government displays via the intentional naming of public spaces with official responses seemingly trying to determine the appropriate place for women. The streets are believed to be dominated by men. The way in which Iran names public spaces intensifies such an ideology. This paper aims to broaden the literature on toponymy by pursuing a relatively new path that considers the structure of power embedded in place-naming in Tehran.

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two preregistered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.

Objective: We investigate how the relations between the Big Five personality traits and political preferences develop over a campaign., Method: We rely on a six-wave nationwide longitudinal survey from the 2008 U.S. election that included 20,000 respondents (M age  = 49, SD = 15; 53% women, 47% men; 82% White, 8% Black, 6% Hispanic/Latino, 1% Asian, 1% Native American, 2% other). Survey weights were applied to approximate a representative sample of the U.S., Population: Ns for reported analyses range from 5,160 to 12,535., Results: First, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience were significantly associated with changes in outcomes over time, such that individuals higher in Conscientiousness and lower in Openness tended to become more conservative, identify as more Republican, and evaluate John McCain more favorably relative to Barack Obama. Second, the effects of personality on candidate evaluations were mediated by partisanship and ideology. Finally, we find that the relations between traits and late-campaign candidate evaluations are stronger than those between traits and early-campaign candidate evaluations., Conclusions: Personality plays an important, dynamic role in the formation and change of political preferences over the course of political campaigns-a role not entirely visible in cross-sectional analyses., (© 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)

Baron and Jost (this issue, p. 292) present three critiques of our meta-analysis demonstrating similar levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives: (a) that the studies we examined were biased toward finding symmetrical bias among liberals and conservatives, (b) that the studies we examined do not measure partisan bias but rather rational Bayesian updating, and (c) that social psychology is not biased in favor of liberals but rather toward creating false equivalencies. We respond in turn that (a) the included studies covered a wide variety of issues at the core of contemporary political conflict and fairly compared bias by establishing conditions under which both liberals and conservatives would have similar motivations and opportunities to demonstrate bias; (b) we carefully selected studies that were least vulnerable to Bayesian counterexplanation, and most scientists and laypeople consider these studies demonstrations of bias; and (c) there is reason to be vigilant about liberal bias in social psychology, but this does not preclude concerns about other possible biases, all of which threaten good science. We close with recommendations for future research and urge researchers to move beyond broad generalizations of political differences that are insensitive to time and context.

Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias-the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one's political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust ( r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals ( r = .235) and conservatives ( r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.

Results of a questionnaire with a sample of EFL instructors at some Saudi universities showed that the instructors just follow the assigned textbook and do not integrate any global themes in their EFL courses. Therefore, this article aims to proposes a model for integrating global themes in the EFL college classroom, especially in reading and speaking instruction. The aim of the model is to help EFL students learn about the ideologies, cultures and customs of other countries; address current global problems; compare the similarities and differences the peoples of the world share; focus on the interrelatedness of human beings; recognize stereotypes western people have about Islam, Muslims, Arabs, women; and listen to multiple perspectives. The model proposes 4 areas of global themes that can be integrated in EFL reading and speaking: (i) global systems (political, economic, cultural, ideological, ecological, health, social, technological, educational, ideological and judicial; (ii) diverse human values such as conflict resolution, cooperation and teamwork; (iii) current global issues issues (terrorism, fundamentalism, violence…etc); and (iv) the history of contact and interdependence among peoples. It also proposes the integration of 4 types of goals: knowledge, skills, values and participation goals. Examples of concepts, and types of objectives related to the global themes, resources for locating global themes; stages of teaching the global themes and instructor's role are provided.

Hate speech is a major problem, especially in the political environment, where it generates polarization and social conflict. There are no experimental laboratory studies that have analyzed the mechanisms of action of hate speech using biometric records to evaluate the implicit negative emotion caused by these discourses, despite the essential importance of emotion in this problem. This work investigates the interaction between the ideology of the source and the audience (progressive vs. conservative) and the type of message (hate vs. non-hate) on cognitions (perception of the veracity of the message and the source) and negative emotion (biometric and self-reported). Biometric emotion was assessed by recording heart rate variability and electrodermal response. The results highlight the importance of evaluating implicit biometric responses that reveal inaccessible data with other methodologies: conservatives show more emotion in their biometric records than in self-reported ones. With these measures, hate desensitization effects are also detected in both audiences. With self-reported measures, more negative emotion is detected in progressive audiences only when the source is contrary to their ideology; on the other hand, conservatives show less negative emotion in all cases. These results are interpreted as a consequence of normative pressure and endogroup cognitive biases.

Studies on collective memory have recently addressed the distinction between cultural and communicative memory as a way to understand how the source of a memory affects its structure or form. When a groups' memory is mediated by memorials, documentaries or any other cultural artifacts, collective memory is shaped by cultural memory. When it is based mostly in communication with other people, its source is communicative memory. We address this distinction by studying two recent events in Argentinean history: the 2001 economic-political-social crisis (communicative memory) and the 1976 coup (cultural memory). We also examine the political ideology and the type of memory involved in collective memory. The memory of the studied events may occur during the lifetime of the rememberer (Lived Memory) or refer to distant events (Distant Memory). 100 participants responded to a Free Recall task about the events of 2001 in Argentina. Narrative analysis allowed comparing these recalls with our 1976 study. Results show: 1) Cultural memories are more contextualised, more impersonal and less affective. 2) Communicative memories are more personal and affective. Study shows how collective memory form changes when it has a different prevalent source.

According to the palliative function of ideology hypothesis proposed by System Justification Theory, endorsing system-justifying beliefs is positively related to general psychological well-being, because this fulfils existential, epistemic, and relational needs. We discuss and address three main issues: (1) the role of societal inequality, (2) comparisons by social status, and (3) cross-sectional versus longitudinal research. We used a longitudinal survey of representative online samples (N = 5,901) from 18 countries. The results supported the main argument proposed by the theory, in that system justification was positively and significantly related to life satisfaction and negatively related to anxiety and depression. The pattern of results suggested that the palliative function of system justification is more homogeneously distributed across individual and collective measures of social status than proposed by the theory, because the function was unaffected either by society-level inequality or by individual-level social status. These results allow us to infer that one of the reasons for the high stability of social arrangements is located in the psychological domain of palliative effects., (© 2018 The British Psychological Society.)

Numerous studies have indicated that the need for closure predicts political preferences. We examined a potential moderator of this relationship: political-identity centrality, or the extent to which individuals' political preferences are central to their self-concept. We tested three hypotheses. First, we predicted that need for closure would be more strongly related to political identity (symbolic ideology and party identification; Hypothesis 1) and issue positions (operational ideology; Hypothesis 2) among individuals who see their political preferences as more self-central. Then we predicted that the stronger relationship between need for closure and issue positions among individuals high in centrality would be accounted for by stronger relationships between need for closure and political identity and between political identity and issue positions (Hypothesis 3). Data from a nationally representative survey provide evidence for these hypotheses, suggesting that the relationship between epistemic needs and political preferences differs as a function of how self-relevant politics is.

Nationalistic identities often play an influential role in citizens' voting behavior and political engagement. Nationalistic ideologies tend to have firm categories and rules for what belongs to and represents the national culture. In a sample of 332 UK citizens, we tested whether strict categorization of stimuli and rules in objective cognitive tasks would be evident in strongly nationalistic individuals. Using voting behavior and attitudes from the United Kingdom's 2016 EU referendum, we found that a flexible representation of national identity and culture was linked to cognitive flexibility in the ideologically neutral Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Remote Associates Test, and to self-reported flexibility under uncertainty. Path analysis revealed that subjective and objective cognitive inflexibility predicted heightened authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and system justification, and these in turn were predictive of support for Brexit and opposition to immigration, the European Union, and free movement of labor. This model accounted for 47.6% of the variance in support for Brexit. Path analysis models were also predictive of participants' sense of personal attachment to the United Kingdom, signifying that individual differences in cognitive flexibility may contribute toward ideological thinking styles that shape both nationalistic attitudes and personal sense of nationalistic identity. These findings further suggest that emotionally neutral "cold" cognitive information processing-and not just "hot" emotional cognition-may play a key role in ideological behavior and identity., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Previous studies have shown that voters rely on sexually dimorphic traits that signal masculinity and dominance when they choose political leaders. For example, voters exert strong preferences for candidates with lower pitched voices because these candidates are perceived as stronger and more competent. Moreover, experimental studies demonstrate that conservative voters, more than liberals, prefer political candidates with traits that signal dominance, probably because conservatives are more likely to perceive the world as a threatening place and to be more attentive to dangerous and threatening contexts. In light of these findings, this study investigates whether country-level ideology influences the relationship between candidate voice pitch and electoral outcomes of real elections. Specifically, we collected voice pitch data for presidential and prime minister candidates, aggregate national ideology for the countries in which the candidates were nominated, and measures of electoral outcomes for 69 elections held across the world. In line with previous studies, we found that candidates with lower pitched voices received more votes and had greater likelihood of winning the elections. Furthermore, regression analysis revealed an interaction between candidate voice pitch, national ideology, and election type (presidential or parliamentary). That is, having a lower pitched voice was a particularly valuable asset for presidential candidates in conservative and right-leaning countries (in comparison to presidential candidates in liberal and left-leaning countries and parliamentary elections). We discuss the practical implications of these findings, and how they relate to existing research on candidates' voices, voting preferences, and democratic elections in general.

For centuries, philosophers and social theorists have wondered why people submit voluntarily to tyrannical leaders and oppressive regimes. In this article, we speculate on the evolutionary origins of system justification, that is, the ways in which people are motivated (often nonconsciously) to defend and justify existing social, economic, and political systems. After briefly recounting the logic of system justification theory and some of the most pertinent empirical evidence, we consider parallels between the social behaviors of humans and other animals concerning the acceptance versus rejection of hierarchy and dominance. Next, we summarize research in human neuroscience suggesting that specific brain regions, such as the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex, may be linked to individual differences in ideological preferences concerning (in)equality and social stability as well as the successful navigation of complex, hierarchical social systems. Finally, we consider some of the implications of a system justification perspective for the study of evolutionary psychology, political behavior, and social change.