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International audience; This article examines the performance and party system diffusion of Euroscepticism of the French Front National (FN) during recent European crises. The article argues that Europe’s successive crises since 2008 have been essentially ‘absorbed’ by the FN into its existing Eurosceptic framework which is guided by its radical right-wing ideology. While allowing the FN to successfully mobilize issues and grievances about the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism is, however, significantly impeding its strategy of governmental credibility. The article identifies the main political outcomes of these crises and finds differences in impact between the different EU crises on party competition over Europe. These findings provide insight into the relationship between the radical Right, Euroscepticism, and party competition. They also inform our current knowledge of Euroscepticism in French politics, and changes that EU crises have triggered, according to party system location and whether FN influence can be postulated.

Since the 1990s, the term ‘populism’ has become increasingly linked to reconstructed radical right parties in Europe such as the French Front National and UKIP. Through its many uses and misuses in mainstream discourse, this association has created a mythology around such parties and their appeal to the ‘people’. This development has facilitated the return of nationalism and racism to the forefront of the mainstream political discourse and simultaneously obscured the deeper causes for such a revival.This article explores the ways in which populist hype, based on a skewed understanding of democracy as majority, has divided the ‘people’ along arbitrary lines, tearing communities apart at the expense of more emancipatory actions. Based predominantly on electoral analysis and discourse theory, with a particular focus on the role of abstention, the aim of this article is to examine the process through which, by way of its involuntary and constructed association with the radical right, the ‘people’, and the working class in particular, have become essentialised in a nationalist project, moving further away from a narrative of class struggle towards one of race struggle.

International audience; A lot has happened in France since the book was published. Reflecting on recent changes in French politics, I will examine in this presentation the impact that the electoral success of the Front National has had on the party system and how mainstream actors –predominantly on the right of the political spectrum– have adapted gradually to the challenges by this new competitor in the electoral market. I will consider the contextual variables and changing political opportunity factors which have overseen those strategic interactions between partisan actors in France, and to which extent the FN has continued to exert its impact in the 2017 elections. I will argue that the factors behind the rise and electoral success of Emmanuel Macron's LREM in 2017 were largely exogenous to the role and impact of the FN.

International audience; Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Bild der abrahamitischen Religionen in den Präsidentschaftswahlprogrammen des Front National (2012 und 2017) im Vergleich zu anderen erfolgreichen rechtsextremen populistischen Parteien in EU-Ländern Nord- und Westeuropas. Die Analyse zeigt einerseits eine gemeinsame Tendenz, den Islam negativ darzustellen, andereseits auch Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Parteien in bezug auf die Darstellung des Judemtums und/oder Israel sowie der Bedeutung, die dem Christentum für die nationale oder europäische Identität zugemessen wird, die jeweils interessante Parallelen zu den nationalen diskursiven Traditionen und der Geschichte der jeweiligen Partei aufweisen.; This article analyses the image of the three abrahamic religions in the recent political programs of the French Front National (2012 und 2017) in a comparative perspective with other successful populist radical right-wing parties in EU-Countries of continental Western and Northern Europe. It will be shown that even if there is a common tendency of representing Islam negatively and avoiding overt antisemitism, there are differences with regard to Judaism and/or Israel as well as to the weight of Christianity for the national and/or European culture, which have interesting parallels with the national discourse traditions and the particular radical right-wing history of these parties.; Cet article analyse l’image des trois religions abrahamites dans les programmes politiques récents du Front National en la comparant avec celle créée par d’autres partis d’extrême droite populiste de pays de l’Union Européenne appartenant à l’Europe occidentale continentale et à la Scandinavie qui ont été couronnés d’un certain succès lors des élections récentes. Il sera montré que, même si l’on peut constater une convergence quant à l’image négative créée de l’islam ainsi que dans la tendance d’éviter un antisémitisme ouvert, il y a, toutefois, des différences en ce qui concerne le judaïsme et/ou Israël et le poids attribué au christianisme dans la culture nationale et/ou européenne. On y peut observer des parallèles intéressants avec les traditions discursives nationales ainsi que l’histoire de ces partis d’extrême droite.

The increasing popularity of populist parties in Europe, demonstrated in particular by their electoral success, is attracting increasing attention from the academic community. Although the phenomenon of populism is nothing new and has already been reviewed from a number of different perspectives, it still represents a diverse field for deeper analysis. The thesis deals with the case of the French National Front and its changes during its most successful election campaigns, that is in the presidential elections in 2002 and 2017. Specifically, the thesis also focuses on political communication and especially on the change it has gone through at its management level. By comparing the performance of both leaders and their agenda, the work allows a closer insight into the problem of transforming the ideological base as well as the ways of political communication. The outcome of this work is the analysis comparing the election campaign of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine, the current party leader. The work also contributes to the debate around dédiabolisation, or the de-demonization of the National Front launched under the leadership of Marine Le Pen.

Populist movements have been on the rise across Europe and the Americas. In France, the far right-wing party, Le Front National, has experienced recent growth in electoral success. Scholars of the Front National have in part attributed the party’s success to its increased use of populist rhetoric. This thesis examines the populist rhetoric used between the Front National’s past president Jean-Marie Le Pen and current president Marine Le Pen in order to test these scholarly claims. Based on their campaign speeches for the 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 French presidential elections, I conducted a quantitative dictionary-based analysis on the difference in use of populist, xenophobic, and economic rhetoric between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. My results show that there has been only a relatively small increase in the use of populist rhetoric between the two leaders. Consequently, I argue that the perceived increased use of populist rhetoric in the Front National has more to do with the saliency of populism than numerical fact.

International audience; Based on a case study of the French Front National (FN), this paper examines the territorialization of national-populist parties. We adopt a sub-national approach and ask to which extent the FN engages in different ideological and organizational strategies to take advantage of territorialized opportunities. We draw on a comparative qualitative analysis of two emblematic French regions with the highest electoral returns for the FN, namely Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Hauts-de-France. We find that the FN is adapting its supply of national-populism to different arenas and contexts where cultural and economic issues vary in salience and in the resonance they find in the political process. In doing so, the FN seems to be successfully meeting the needs and interests of the local constituencies that it targets. However, this may produce greater ideological and organizational heterogeneity, possibly hampering the party’s electoral prospects nationally.

International audience; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called ‘losers’ of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience; This chapter examines the impact of the Front National (FN) on parties and the party system in France. We begin by looking at competition for votes across successive stages of the FN’s development since the mid-1980s. We ask to what extent the FN has altered the dimensionality of the French policy space by introducing new cultural issues. We then consider the strategic responses fashioned by mainstream parties. We examine policy convergence, campaign narratives, and the use of institutional engineering as a means to reduce the influence of the FN. Finally, we examine changes in the party system and the dynamics of inter-party competition, focusing on recent strategic shifts under Marine Le Pen and whether the désenclavement of the FN will create opportunities for new coalitions and alignments.

This article aims to develop a conceptual framework to address the economic dimension of right-wing populism. Moving beyond classic left-right economics and the divide between economic and cultural approaches, it argues that the political economy of right-wing populists is intertwined with cultural values in the construction of the ‘true’ people as an economic community whose well-being is in decline and under threat, and therefore needs to be restored. Looking at populist traditions across Europe and the United States, the paper emphasizes the significance of ‘producerist’ frames in economic populism. This is illustrated through an empirical analysis of differences and similarities in the economic policies and discourses of three established right-wing populist parties based in Europe (FN, SVP and UKIP), and the Tea Party and Donald Trump in the United States. We find that economic populist frames are common to all of the parties under scrutiny, albeit subject, however, to different interpretations of the producerist antagonism and groups. Our findings confirm that the intersection between economic populism and producerism provides a new—and fruitful—perspective on right-wing populism, while simultaneously demonstrating the relevance of a transatlantic approach to the study of the populist phenomenon.

The thesis is focused on the development and transformation of the National Front, largely after Marine Le Pen took up the position of the party's boss in 2011. An analysis of the direction of the party will be conducted to answer research questions, with the main emphasis on the development of the party from 2011. The analysis will be made with the reflection of the events of recent years, especially considering the influence of Marine Le Pen on the events around the party and her own actions. Based on these facts, in combination with the theoretical part of the thesis, the work has the ambition to answer research questions, including a question in the title of the thesis itself. The thesis is divided into several parts. In the first part, after the introduction into the problems of thesis, the aim of thesis is revealed, followed by methodology and overall overview of the structure of work. Another (theoretical) part defines key concepts. The following part deals with the general historical development of the party. The final part of the thesis focuses on the transformation of the National Front under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and, in the context of the theoretical part, attempts to answer research questions and outlines possible options for future development.

While the left and extreme left have gained support during the crisis, there is no doubt that it is the extreme right which has seen its fortunes improved the most dramatically in many European liberal democracies. Yet their success was not limited to their electoral rise and a more long-lasting victory has taken place in the ideological field, where the discourse of the extreme right occupies now a prominent place in the mainstream liberal democratic agenda. It is therefore no longer surprising to see extreme right leaders such as Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen being invited to give talks in prestigious universities across the globe or appear on prime time television, even outside of electoral campaigns. Increasingly, their ideas are seen in the media and within the ranks of mainstream parties as ‘common sense’, or at least acceptable.The growing acceptance of this ‘common sense’ is the result of very carefully crafted strategies put in place by extreme right thinkers since the 1980s. For over three decades now, in order to change perceptions and renew extreme right-wing ideology, New Right thinktanks such as the French GRECE believed it was necessary to borrow the tactics of the left, and more specifically the Gramscian concept of hegemony: cultural power must precede political power. This article will demonstrate the impact these ideas have had on the Front National in particular, and how this change has originated in the association of populist rhetoric with the neo-racist stigmatisation of an ‘Other’. While France will be used as a case study, it will be argued that similar strategies have been adopted successfully by many parties in Europe.

The 2014 European elections confirmed the prominence in the media of what is commonly called the far right. While parties such as the Front National and UKIP were successful in the elections, their performance has since been exaggerated and they have benefited from a disproportionate coverage. Aiding their apparently ‘irresistible rise’, their normalisation was greatly facilitated by their description as ‘populist’ parties. However, while this term ‘populism’ has been almost universally accepted in the media, it remains a hotly debated concept on the academic circuit, and its careless use could in fact prove counterproductive in the assessment of the current state of democracy in Europe.Instead of focusing on the reasons behind the rise of these parties, similarities and differences already widely covered in the literature, this article hypothesises that a skewed and disproportionate coverage of the European elections in particular, and the ‘rise’ of ‘right-wing populism’ in general, have prevented a thorough democratic discussion from taking place and impeded the possibility of other political alternatives.

Frankreich wählt - im April und Mai 2017 den Präsidenten der Republik, im Juni die Abgeordneten der Nationalversammlung. Dabei steht eine Partei besonders im Fokus: der rechtsextreme Front National (FN). Demoskopen prognostizieren, dass Parteichefin Marine Le Pen in die Stichwahl um das Präsidentenamt einziehen und dem FN auch bei den Parlamentswahlen einige Mandate sichern wird. Frankreich und der Front National - warum geht diese Gleichung immer mehr auf? Um zu verstehen, warum gut ein Viertel der französischen Wählerinnen und Wähler für diese Partei stimmt, muss man den Blick zunächst auf Marine Le Pen richten. Die FN-Vorsitzende will das politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche System Frankreichs "von innen" verändern. Um die dazu nötige Macht zu erlangen, hat sie die Partei "entdiabolisiert" und den FN inhaltlich neu verortet. Entscheidend für die längerfristigen Erfolgsaussichten der Partei sind allerdings grundlegende Konfliktlinien, die sich in der französischen Gesellschaft verändert haben. Dadurch eröffnet sich Raum für den FN. Marine Le Pens größter Erfolg besteht darin, diese Wandlungsprozesse zu erkennen und gezielt zu adressieren. Gleiches haben die etablierten Parteien des Landes versäumt. Um den Vormarsch des FN zu stoppen, müssen auch sie auf die Veränderungen reagieren. Noch hindert das französische Wahlsystem den FN daran, die Macht zu erlangen. Doch gelingt es den anderen Parteien nicht alsbald, sich personell zu erneuern und neben der gesellschaftlichen Mitte auch wieder (vermeintliche) Randgruppen anzusprechen, droht der FN in Frankreich auf absehbare Zeit die stimmenstärkste Partei zu bleiben. (Autorenreferat)

The term ‘populism’ has become ubiquitous in today’s politics and media. No longer a clichéd spectre haunting Europe, populism appears to have become a practical reality in the wake of Brexit, Donald Trump’s victory in the United States, and the French presidential elections. It appears that the people have spoken and that their wish is for reactionary right-wing politics. Through a mix of discourse analysis and psychoanalysis, and taking examples from the United Kingdom, the US and France where populist waves have appeared to weaken and even break liberal defences, this article argues that the seemingly irresistible rise of the 'populist right' has acted as a political logic. In this view, the disproportionate coverage of such a rise, with its accompanying potent mobilisation of affect, including its implied characterisation as the alternative to the status quo, has pre-empted the contestation of some troubling norms animating the regimes of liberal representative democracy and political economy. By doing so, the hype around right-wing populism has impoverished democratic discussion, leaving little space for the essential reassessment of the system itself, instead aligning the debate along a rather stale and unproductive divide between a liberal human rights elite and loosely-defined middle class on the one hand, and a reactionary 'people' subject to authoritarian passions on the other.

International audience; The Front national (FN) has established itself as a major force in French politics since the mid-1980s. The French FN epitomizes the mobilization strategy of the West European populist radical right, which combines ethno-nationalist xenophobia with anti-establishment populism. This potent ideological frame has allowed the party to win between 10 and 18% across all national elections since 1984. The electoral consolidation of the FN has been accompanied by the progressive building of an effective nationwide organization and by the development of the party’s local base of power. In line with the literature on party organization (e.g. Janda 1980, Katz and Mair 1993, 1994, Harmel and Svâsand 1993, Harmel et al. 1995), this chapter disaggregates the FN’s organization into several dimensions and looks at how the party has adapted to changing political circumstances over time. We consider aspects of party institutionalization and organization, as well as the FN’s governmental status, centralization of power and coherence. The focus is primarily on the agenda of modernization pushed by Marine Le Pen since her accession in 2011. Our analysis suggests generational turnover among party elites and candidates, with the rise of a younger cohort of national leaders. We also find an embryonic process of professionalization amongst the party’s grassroots, together with the reinvigoration of its pool of local representatives, which has recently allowed the party to expand its local power base. Finally, we find that the FN has severed its ties with extreme-right groups, and that the 2011 leadership election represented a first notable step towards greater intra party democracy. Despite significant changes, however, we find no evidence of a more substantial move towards party ‘normalization’, neither ideologically nor organizationally. Our analysis points to the continuation of Le Pen’s familial model of autocratic leadership and the persistence of a highly centralized hierarchical party organization. We conclude that the FN has not broken away from the traditional populist party. Reflecting on recent changes in the internal balance of power, our analysis suggests instead that the FN has undergone a process of ‘Marinization’ whereby Marine Le Pen has successfully replaced her father as the new iconic leader of the French radical right.

International audience; The Front National (FN) is a significant vehicle of populist Euroscepticism in the French party system. Opposition to the EU has become central to the party’s programmatic mix of anti-establishment populism, ethno-nationalism and economically leftist protectionist policies, reinforcing the FN’s role as principal anti-EU force in French politics. Amid growing voter discontent with the ruling parties and the EU, the FN has reached new electoral heights in the 2014 European elections, channelling most of the Eurosceptic vote. Adopting a supply-side and case study approach, this paper looks at the contours and shifts in FN populist politics of Euroscepticism in the context of the recent EU financial and migration crises. Changes in the Eurosceptic appeal fashioned by the FN are assessed from a variety of party communication sources to disaggregate the oppositional elements that characterize the ‘hard’ anti-EU stance of the party. Looking more specifically at the influence of the European economic and refugee crises, the analysis suggests that the novel issues provided by those crises have resonated strongly with the party’s agenda and that they have been successfully absorbed by the FN, allowing the party to capitalize on growing anti-EU and anti-establishment sentiment in recent elections. Finally, the paper claims that the FN has achieved a hegemonic Eurosceptic position since 2014 and that this has produced significant changes in the dynamics of party competition over the EU, resulting primarily into the mainstreaming of FN Euroscepticism in the party system.

This paper explores the development of four electorally consolidated populist parties, i.e. the Italian FSM and Northern League, Podemos in Spain and the French FN. Adopting a supply-side approach based on the ‘thin-ideology’ paradigm, we propose a fine-grained analysis of the populist claims by those parties comparatively. We argue in particular that populism must be considered as both ideology and political strategy, and that populist parties are context-specific forms of political mobilization. Whilst parties such as the FSM, the LN, the FN and Podemos exhibit core people-centered and anti-elite features of populism, there is little research on the conceptualization by those parties of the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’. We examine the ideational processes whereby populist parties construct idiosyncratic notions of the “people” and the “elite”, and the chains of equivalence they employ to reorganize the political forces in their socio-political environment. An important source of variation in the supply of populism across all four cases can be found in the competitive positioning of those parties and their location in the party system. The second part of this paper looks at populism as political strategy and a context-specific form of political mobilization, which includes also the role of charismatic leadership and party organization. To examine these aspects, we adopt a common analytical framework which we apply to each of our four populist cases successively.

International audience; This paper explores the development of four electorally consolidated populist parties, i.e. the Italian FSM and Northern League, Podemos in Spain and the French FN. Adopting a supply-side approach based on the ‘thin-ideology’ paradigm, we propose a fine-grained analysis of the populist claims by those parties comparatively. We argue in particular that populism must be considered as both ideology and political strategy, and that populist parties are context-specific forms of political mobilization. Whilst parties such as the FSM, the LN, the FN and Podemos exhibit core people-centered and anti-elite features of populism, there is little research on the conceptualization by those parties of the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’. We examine the ideational processes whereby populist parties construct idiosyncratic notions of the “people” and the “elite”, and the chains of equivalence they employ to reorganize the political forces in their socio-political environment. An important source of variation in the supply of populism across all four cases can be found in the competitive positioning of those parties and their location in the party system. The second part of this paper looks at populism as political strategy and a context-specific form of political mobilization, which includes also the role of charismatic leadership and party organization. To examine these aspects, we adopt a common analytical framework which we apply to each of our four populist cases successively.

Aquest article té com a objectiu esbrinar les causes de l’ascens electoral de la formació ultradretana Front National. En primer lloc, estudia l’evolució política de l’esmentat partit mostrant-ne els canvis i les continuïtats de la seva estratègia, programa i discursos. Un cop analitzats el contingut de l’oferta política del nou Front National i el context polític i social de França, mostra les raons per les quals la formació ultradretana aspira a la presidència de la República Francesa. Per fer-ho, es recolza en diverses enquestes post-electorals i estudis sobre l’electorat del Front National., This article aims to find out and analyze the causes of the electoral rise of the French far-right formation Front National (FN). First, it studies the political evolution of the party, showing the changes and continuities of its strategy, program and speeches. After analyzing the content of the new political offer by the National Front and the political and social contexts in France, it shows the reasons why the right-wing formation has become a strong contender for the presidency of the French Republic. To do so, it relies on several post-election surveys and studies about the National Front electorate., Este artículo tiene por objeto analizar las causas del ascenso electoral de la formación ultraderechista francesa Front National (FN). En primer lugar, estudia la evolución política de dicho partido a fin de mostrar los cambios y las continuidades de su estrategia, su programa y sus discursos. Una vez analizados el contenido, la oferta política del nuevo Front National y el contexto político y social de Francia, muestra las razones por las cuales la formación ultraderechista se ha convertido en una firme aspirante a la presidencia de la República Francesa. Para ello, se apoya en varias encuestas postelectorales y estudios sobre el electorado del Front National.

International audience; Marine Le Pen's far-right Front National party continues to influence political discourse on both sides of the political spectrum in France, having won a record 6.8 million votes in the first round of France's 2015 regional elections. In the United States, Donald Trump has attracted a fervent political following, successfully playing on voters' sense of economic insecurity and adopting inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric. The panelists will shed light on what is driving populism in both countries and what it means for the future of our two democracies.

Aquest article té com a objectiu esbrinar les causes de l’ascens electoral de la formació ultradretana Front National. En primer lloc, estudia l’evolució política de l’esmentat partit mostrant-ne els canvis i les continuïtats de la seva estratègia, programa i discursos. Un cop analitzats el contingut de l’oferta política del nou Front National i el context polític i social de França, mostra les raons per les quals la formació ultradretana aspira a la presidència de la República Francesa. Per fer-ho, es recolza en diverses enquestes post-electorals i estudis sobre l’electorat del Front National., This article aims to find out and analyze the causes of the electoral rise of the French far-right formation Front National (FN). First, it studies the political evolution of the party, showing the changes and continuities of its strategy, program and speeches. After analyzing the content of the new political offer by the National Front and the political and social contexts in France, it shows the reasons why the right-wing formation has become a strong contender for the presidency of the French Republic. To do so, it relies on several post-election surveys and studies about the National Front electorate., Este artículo tiene por objeto analizar las causas del ascenso electoral de la formación ultraderechista francesa Front National (FN). En primer lugar, estudia la evolución política de dicho partido a fin de mostrar los cambios y las continuidades de su estrategia, su programa y sus discursos. Una vez analizados el contenido, la oferta política del nuevo Front National y el contexto político y social de Francia, muestra las razones por las cuales la formación ultraderechista se ha convertido en una firme aspirante a la presidencia de la República Francesa. Para ello, se apoya en varias encuestas postelectorales y estudios sobre el electorado del Front National.

In the academic literature and the media the positions of political parties on European politics are represented as a field polarized in pro-European and eurosceptics. Euroscepticism is thus considered a dimension of the political competition that absorbs the left-right cleavage. Is it appropriate to include in a single political front parties which are alternative to each other on the ideological and programmatic angle? The article addresses this issue by comparing the manifestos for the European elections of 2014 of three political forces differently positioned along the left-right axis: the Front National, the Five Star Movement and The Other Europe with Tsipras. Evidence of this analysis goes in a different direction from that currently prevailing in literature: euro-criticism and opposition to the integration principle cannot be overlapped, and the differences between left and right are not reabsorbed by an europeanism or anti-europeanism cleavage. The criticism towards EU stated by the radical right, the radical left and a political movement that defines itself as extraneous to the traditional political categories, such as the FSM, takes on the traits of a request for a return of the political, opposed to the apparent becoming technics and administration of the national and supranational politics.

This chapter addresses how gender is constructed in terms of style, rhetoric, discursive strategies and agenda positions in the case of the three established populist leaders: Pia Kjærsgaard, Marine Le Pen and Siv Jensen. In addition, we explore whether the Nordic countries constitute a sui generis framework supporting specific representations, gender constructions and self-representation of populist female leaders, which are influenced by context, opportunity, political culture and mainstream media constructions of repertoires of women politicians. The case studies thus focus particularly on similarities and differences in the representation and self-representations of these three right-wing populist women leaders. Based on a theoretical framework outlined by the role of women in politics and by gendered constructions of female politicians, this chapter looks at: 1) how female populist leaders represent themselves; and 2) how mainstream media coverage represents them in politics. This dual emphasis creates the backdrop for a fruitful comparative analysis of right-wing populist women leaders’ representations and self-representations in Western Europe and allows us to address issues that refer to gendered representations and stereotypes of feminine and masculine nature and relationships to hegemonic masculinities in politics (e.g. Messerschmidt 2010). Based on a theoretical framework outlined by the role of women in politics and gendered constructions of female politicians, this chapter looks at: 1) how female populist leaders represent themselves; and 2) how mainstream media coverage represents them in politics. This dual emphasis creates the backdrop for a fruitful comparative analysis of right-wing populist women leaders’ representations and self-representations in Western Europe and allows us to address issues that refer to gendered representations and stereotypes of feminine and masculine nature and relationships to hegemonic masculinities in politics (e.g. Messerschmidt 2010).

Islamophobia and New Populism in Contemporary Western Europe: France and the Netherlands Bc. Martina Kočařová The Master thesis Islamophobia and New Populism in Contemporary Western Europe: France and the Netherlands explores current transformations of populism in contemporary Western Europe. The main objectives of the thesis are following: First, to verify a hypothesis implying that islamophobia has become a new feature of the contemporary populism, which has been consequently changing in terms of its content. Thus, it can hardly be classified as another form of the 'far right' politics. In this context, one may observe its shift towards the centre of the political party system. Second, based on the above outlined assumption, we aim to study whether the populist parties can be considered 'populist' in spite of the new features they have recently adopted. The theoretical framework of our research refers to Paul Taggart's conceptualisation of populism applying it on the cases of the French National Front under the lead of Marine Le Pen and the Dutch Party for Freedom and his leader Geert Wilders.

In Reaktion auf die Pariser Attentate vom 13. November 2015 appellierte der französische Premierminister Manuel Valls an "alle Patrioten", in "geheiligter Union" zusammenzustehen. Erstmals empfing Präsident François Hollande zu den parteiübergreifenden Krisengesprächen auch den rechtspopulistischen Herausforderer Front National (FN), den die bürgerliche Rechte wie die Linke bislang aus dem Kreis der republikanischen Parteien ausgeschlossen hatten und der sich auch selbst abseits der geschmähten "politischen Klasse" gehalten hatte. Bei den Regionalwahlen am 6. und 13. Dezember 2015 stellt der FN gleichermaßen für die bürgerliche rechte Opposition wie für die regierenden Sozialisten und übrigen linken Parteien den Hauptgegner dar: Nicht zuletzt aufgrund des alles beherrschenden Themas Sicherheit sehen Demoskopen den FN als Favoriten im ersten Wahlgang. Wahlentscheidend wird folglich nicht nur die Frage, welche Partei am besten ihre Wähler zur Stimmabgabe zu mobilisieren vermag, sondern auch, wer welche Wahlallianzen und Absprachen für den zweiten Wahlgang zustande bekommt. Dies ist auch aufschlussreich für die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2017.

Contains fulltext : 62474.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) In this article we study Front National voting behaviour from a micro and macro perspective, by taking into account individual and contextual characteristics simultaneously. We test five theories that offer explanations as to why certain social categories, such as e. g. lowly educated people, people with a low income or younger people, are more likely to vote for the Front National. An unfavourable out-group attitude, an authoritarian attitude and a nonconformist attitude turn out to be unique for the Front National electorate, whereas identification with France and political dissatisfaction can be found among other electorates to the same extent. Between regions, large variance exists in Front National support which is explained partly by the number of immigrants present, but only indirectly by the unemployment level.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.