Search

China offers a natural laboratory for comparing the development of only children and children with siblings. We examined potential differences in the way that they expected a protagonist to allocate resources between two recipients with different social relationships, e.g. a sibling vs. a stranger, a friend vs. a stranger, and a sibling vs. a friend. Four- to six-year-old children participated in a third-party Resource Allocation Task and an Emotion Judgment Task. Children with siblings were more likely than only children to expect resources to be shared with a sibling over a friend. In addition, as compared to only children, children with siblings expected someone experiencing non-sharing behaviour to feel sadder. These findings suggest that the difference in kin-preference between children with siblings and only children is due to their respective life experiences.

Recent work has probed the developmental mechanisms that promote fair sharing. This work investigated 2.5- to 5.5-year-olds' (N = 316; 52% female; 79% White; data collected 2016-2018) sharing behavior in relation to three cognitive correlates: number knowledge, working memory, and cognitive control. In contrast to working memory and cognitive control, number knowledge was uniquely associated with fair sharing even after controlling for the other correlates and for age. Results also showed a causal effect: After a 5-min counting intervention (vs. a control), children improved their fair sharing behavior from pre-test to post-test. Findings are discussed in light of how social, cognitive, and motivational factors impact sharing behavior.

A considerable body of research has shown that preschoolers who have a better understanding of emotions also have better social competence. In the present study, we focused on the potential roles that verbal ability and working memory may play in the relationship. A total of 187 4- to 6-year-old preschoolers completed: (i) the Test of Emotion Comprehension for emotion understanding; (ii) the Counting and Labelling test for working memory; and (iii) the Core Vocabulary scales of the WPPSI for verbal ability. Two teachers assessed each participant's social competence. The results showed that preschoolers' emotional understanding is a predictor of their social competence but verbal ability fully mediated the relationship. Furthermore, verbal ability positively predicted children's social abilities only when they also had superior working memory. These findings help us to understand how verbal ability and working memory affect the relationship between emotion understanding and social competence in preschoolers.

Children (N = 278, 34-71 months, 54% girls) were told which of two figurines turned on a music box and also observed empirical evidence either confirming or conflicting with that testimony. Children were then asked to sort novel figurines according to whether they could make the music box work or not. To see whether children would explore which figurine turned on the music box, especially when the observed and testimonial evidence conflicted, children were given access to the music box during their sorting. However, children rarely explored. Indeed, they struggled to disregard the misleading testimony both when sorting the figurines and when asked about a future attempt. In contrast, children who explored the effectiveness of the figurines dismissed the misleading testimony.

We examined differences among children in their endorsement of an adult's claim, their subsequent empirical investigation of that claim, and their resolution of any potential conflict between the claim and their empirical investigation. American and Chinese preschool (N = 171, M = 4.71 years) and elementary school (N = 128, M = 7.59 years) children were presented with five, different-sized, Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. Children typically selected the biggest doll. Children then heard either a false, counter-intuitive claim (i.e., smallest doll = heaviest) or a claim confirming their initial intuition (i.e., biggest doll = heaviest). Children frequently endorsed the experimenter's claim even when it was counter-intuitive. The experimenter then left the room. During the experimenter's absence, older children who had heard the counter-intuitive as opposed to the confirming claim explored the dolls more than younger children, especially when subtly prompted to explore. Moreover, only older children who heard the counter-intuitive claim simultaneously picked up the smallest and biggest doll, a more deliberate test of the experimenter's claim. By implication, children engage in selective exploration following a surprising claim. Older children's more systematic explorations of what they have been told may reflect improvements in their ability to test such claims and in their greater sensitivity to the fact that unexpected claims can and should be empirically investigated.

When presented with a claim that contradicts their intuitions, do children seize opportunities to empirically verify such claims or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told? To answer this question, we conducted a replication of Ronfard et al. (conducted in the People's Republic of China) in two countries with distinct religious and political histories (Study 1: Belarus, N = 74; Study 2: Turkey, N = 79). Preschool children were presented with five different-sized Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. All children selected the biggest doll. Half of the children then heard a (false) claim (i.e., that the smallest doll was the heaviest), contradicting their initial intuition. The remaining children heard a (true) claim (i.e., that the biggest doll was the heaviest), confirming their initial intuition. Belarusian and Turkish preschoolers typically endorsed the experimenter's claim no matter whether it had contradicted or confirmed their initial intuition. Next, the experimenter left the room, giving children an opportunity to check the experimenter's claim by picking up the relevant dolls. Belarusian and Turkish preschoolers rarely explored the dolls, regardless of the type of testimony they received and continued to endorse the counterintuitive testimony they received. Furthermore, in Study 2, Turkish preschoolers continued to endorse smallest = heaviest even when doing so could have cost them a large reward. In sum, across two different cultural contexts, preschool children endorsed a counterintuitive claim and did not spontaneously seek evidence to test it. These results confirm and extend those of Ronfard et al.

The early use of person perception terms was examined via an analysis of the spontaneous speech of four young children in conversation with their parents at home. All four children were producing such terms early in their third year. Like their parents, children used the terms in two distinguishable ways: to attribute a trait to a person or to characterize a person's ongoing action. Most of these terms were evaluative, whether positive or negative. Parents often made direct comments to their children about both their traits and ongoing actions; children made similar comments about themselves. Parents also used person perception terms to make comments about others who were not party to the conversation; children did likewise. A considerable proportion of the trait terms that children produced served as interpretive comments on someone's actions or preferences. Our findings suggest that from an early age, children are trait theorists. Not only do they describe ongoing actions using trait vocabulary, they interpret those ongoing actions by attributing traits.

When learning about the existence of unobservable scientific phenomena such as germs or religious phenomena such as God, children are receptive to the testimony of other people. Research in Western cultures has shown that by 5 to 6 years of age, children--like adults--are confident about the existence of both scientific and religious phenomena. We examined the beliefs of secular and Christian children growing up in China as well as the beliefs of their parents. All participants--secular and Christian children, as well as their parents--were confident about the existence of the scientific phenomena. No such consensus emerged for religious phenomena. Whereas secular children and their parents were skeptical, Christian children and their parents were confident about the existence of the religious phenomena. Moreover, a similar pattern was found for Christian children in preschools and for Christian children with more extensive exposure to the secular state curriculum. Indeed, for religious phenomena, a positive association was found between the beliefs of Christian children and their parents, highlighting the potential influence of parental input in a predominantly secular society. Overall, the results indicate that children's religious beliefs are related to the beliefs of their parents, even when those beliefs go against the majority view.

What does it take know a moral truth or principle? Although testimony is an undisputed source of empirical knowledge of contingent facts, it is less clear whether it is possible to acquire "second-hand moral knowledge" (Jones, 1999; Wolff, 1998). In the present studies, 3- to 5-year-old Chinese (N = 124) and U.S. American (N = 90) children were asked to judge whether novel, distress-inducing actions were morally permissible, both independently and after either 1 or 3 adult informants had made counterintuitive judgments. Although participants made appropriate moral judgments independently, children from both countries were affected by the counterintuitive testimony provided by the adult informant(s). Moreover, Chinese children were especially receptive to such counterintuitive claims. These findings demonstrate that intuitive moral judgments based on perceived harm are common across 2 cultural groups, but adult testimony can potentially shift those judgments.

The development of emotion understanding in young Chinese preschoolers was examined. The overall developmental trend, as measured by the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC), proved similar to that found among preschoolers in Western Europe. However, Chinese children performed better at understanding the distinction between real and apparent emotion and worse at understanding the connection between reminders and emotion. Children's theory of mind and verbal ability were significant predictors of their ability to understand emotion.

Although children often believe an adult's claims, they may have opportunities to check these claims by gathering relevant empirical evidence themselves. Here, we examine whether children seize such opportunities, especially when the claim is counterintuitive. Chinese preschool and elementary schoolchildren were presented with five different-sized Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. Almost all children selected the biggest doll. Half of the children then heard a false, counterintuitive claim (i.e., smallest = heaviest). The remaining children heard a claim confirming their initial intuition (i.e., biggest = heaviest). Children in both age groups typically endorsed the experimenter's claim even when it was counterintuitive. However, during the experimenter's subsequent absence, elementary schoolchildren explored the dolls more if they had received counterintuitive rather than confirming testimony whereas preschool children rarely explored, no matter what testimony they had received. Thus, with increasing age, children seize opportunities to test counterintuitive claims. [Supplemental materials are located at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000455.supp.]

Prior research in England has indicated that, unlike prereaders, young children who have learned to decode simple words view print-based information as a more authoritative source of knowledge than purely oral information. We predicted that children in Norway--who start to receive formal reading instruction at a relatively late age--would be slower to display this bias toward print-based information. Accordingly, we tested 4- to 6-year-olds (N = 96) in Norway. As expected, these children showed a delayed emergence of the bias toward print over speech. Unexpectedly, however, children who had successfully gained a basic reading ability prior to any exposure to formal reading instruction in school were no more trusting of print than were their prereading peers. These results suggest that the ability to decode simple words is an important condition for selective trust in print-based information but that exposure to formal reading instruction in school may also be necessary.

Young children share fairly and expect others to do the same. Yet little is known about the underlying cognitive mechanisms that support fairness. We investigated whether children's numerical competencies are linked with their sharing behavior. Preschoolers (aged 2.5-5.5) participated in third-party resource allocation tasks in which they split a set of resources between 2 puppets. Children's numerical competence was assessed using the Give-"N" task (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Wynn, 1990). Numerical competence--specifically knowledge of the cardinal principle--explained age-related changes in fair sharing. Although many subset-knowers (those without knowledge of the cardinal principle) were still able to share fairly, they invoked turn-taking strategies and did not remember the number of resources they shared. These results suggest that numerical cognition serves as an important mechanism for fair sharing behavior, and that children employ different sharing strategies (division or turn-taking) depending on their numerical competence.

Children in the United States come to distinguish historical from fictional story figures between the ages of 3 and 5 years, guided by the plausibility of the story events surrounding the figure (Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, 2009; Woolley & Cox, 2007). However, U.S. children vary in their reactions to stories that include fantastical events. Secular children with no religious education think of such stories and their protagonists as fictional, whereas children who have had a religious education are more prone to think of them as historically true. In the current studies, we asked if a sample of children in Iran who are regularly exposed to religious narratives in their daily lives resemble religious children in the United States. As expected, Iranian 5- and 6-year-olds systematically categorized figures in realistic stories as real, but they were also prone to think of figures in fantastical stories as real. We suggest that children's willingness to conceive of figures in fantastical stories as real is explained by their exposure to religious narratives alleging that miracles have actually happened.

To adult humans, the task of forming an impression of another social being seems effortless and even obligatory. In 2 experiments, we offer the first systematic cross-cultural examination of impression formation in European American and East Asian preschool children. Children across both cultures easily inferred basic personality traits, such as "nice" and "mean," about unfamiliar peers from behavioral information, whether or not they were specifically prompted to do so. Children were able to identify peers they had seen before, to remember the traits associated with these peers, and to anticipate future behaviors consistent with the traits they had attributed. Thus, for basic traits, the ability to make behavior-to-behavior predictions, via an intervening trait inference, is present in young children across diverse cultures.

As children listen to a simple action-based narrative, they construct a dynamic representation of the protagonist's movements, visual perspective, and goal-directed thoughts. We examined children's representations of more complex narratives in which the protagonist will encounter an unexpected outcome upon reaching his or her goal. Three studies involving 105 children between 3 and 6 years of age showed that children shifted in the mental states they attributed depending on the distance of the protagonist from the unexpected outcome. Even though children consistently recognized that the protagonist did not know about the surprise at any point, they increasingly attributed feelings and thoughts consistent with the surprise. The studies highlight the degree to which children's mental state attributions are dynamic rather than fixed by their current theory of mind.

Children ages 18 and 24 months were assessed for the ability to understand and learn from an adult's nonverbal expression of agreement and disagreement with a speaker's claims. In one type of communicative exchange, a speaker made 2 different claims about the identity or location of an object. The hearer nodded her head in agreement with one claim and shook her head in disagreement with the other claim. In a second type of exchange, the speaker asked 2 different questions about the identity or location of an object. The hearer nodded her head in response to one question and shook her head in response to the other. The 24-month-olds grasped the implication of these gestural responses, by inferring the correct name or location of the object. The 18-month-olds showed a limited grasp of their implications. Thus, in learning from others' testimony, toddlers focus not only on the claims of a single speaker but also on whether that information is accepted or rejected by another hearer. In particular, they detect and act on social cues of assent and dissent. (Contains 1 table, 1 figure and 3 footnotes.)

Much recent evidence shows that preschoolers are sensitive to the accuracy of an informant. Faced with two informants, one of whom names familiar objects accurately and the other inaccurately, preschoolers subsequently prefer to learn the names and functions of unfamiliar objects from the more accurate informant. This study examined the inference process underlying this preference. We asked whether preschoolers make narrow inferences about informants, broader trait-based inferences, or more global evaluative inferences. We further asked what inferences preschoolers make about a potential informant based on distinctions in the unrelated domain of physical strength. The results indicate that preschoolers make relatively narrow inferences when observing individual differences in accuracy even though they are prone to global evaluative inferences when observing individual differences in strength. Preschoolers' burgeoning understanding of others as expert language users may underlie their selective endorsement of a more accurate informant. (Contains 2 figures and 1 table.)

Across two experiments, preschool-aged children demonstrated selective learning of non-linguistic information from native-accented rather than foreign-accented speakers. In Experiment 1, children saw videos of a native- and a foreign-accented speaker of English who each spoke for 10 seconds, and then silently demonstrated different functions with novel objects. Children selectively endorsed the silent object function provided by the native-accented speaker. In Experiment 2, children again endorsed the native-accented over the foreign-accented speaker, even though both informants previously spoke only in nonsense speech. Thus, young children demonstrate selective trust in native-accented speakers even when neither informant's speech relays meaningful semantic content, and the information that both informants provide is non-linguistic. We propose that children orient towards members of their native community to guide their early cultural learning. (Contains 2 footnotes, 1 table and 1 figure.)

Three- and 4-year-old children were asked to judge which of a set of 3 lines was the longest, both independently and in the face of an inaccurate consensus among adult informants. Children were invariably accurate when making independent judgments but sometimes deferred to the inaccurate consensus. Nevertheless, the deference displayed by both age groups proved to be circumscribed. When asked to solve a practical problem--selecting the longest strip to build an adequate bridge--both groups relied on their own perceptual judgment, regardless of whether they had deferred to the inaccurate consensus. Confirming earlier meta-analytic findings with adults, the rate of deference was greater among Asian American children as compared with Caucasian American children. (Contains 2 tables and 1 figure.)

An understanding of ownership entails the recognition that ownership can be transferred permanently and the ability to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Two experiments explored the development of this understanding in 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year olds, using stories about gift-giving and stealing. The possibility that children use simple biases to identify owners, such as a first possessor, current possessor or a loan bias, was also investigated. Five-year olds appropriately acknowledged a permanent transfer of ownership in the case of giving but not stealing. Four-year olds allowed permanent transfers but struggled to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Many 4-year olds allowed adults, but not children, to keep property that had been stolen. Two- and 3-year olds exhibited a first possessor bias for both stories. We conclude that, by 5 years of age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership transfer whereas younger children are prone to biases. (Contains 3 tables and 2 figures.)

To determine whether children retain a preference for a previously accurate informant only in the short term or for long-term use, 3- and 4-year-old children were tested in two experiments. In both experiments, children were given accuracy information about two informants and were subsequently tested for their selective trust in the two informants (Experiment 1: immediately, 1 day and 1 week later; Experiment 2: immediately, 4 days and 1 week later). Both age groups preferred to trust the accurate informant not only immediately after receiving accuracy information but also at subsequent time-points. Children who were immediately able to explicitly identify the accurate informant were significantly more likely to seek and accept information from her 1 week later. However, even when they had not been asked to explicitly identify the accurate informant both age groups still maintained their preference for her. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously choose a previously accurate informant up to 1 week after exposure to information regarding her accuracy.

This article reports on the development and systematic evaluation of an innovative early years programme aimed at encouraging young children to respect differences within a deeply divided society that is emerging out of a prolonged period of violent conflict. The programme, the Media Initiative for Children--Northern Ireland, has been the product of a partnership between a US-based organization (the Peace Initiatives Institute) and NIPPA--The Early Years Organisation, and has been supported by academic research and the efforts of a range of voluntary and statutory organizations. It has attempted to encourage young children to value diversity and be more inclusive of those who are different from themselves through the use of short cartoons designed for and broadcast on television as well as specially prepared curricular materials for use in pre-school settings. To date the programme has been delivered through 200 settings to approximately 3500 pre-school children across Northern Ireland. This article describes how the programme was developed and implemented as well as the rigorous approach taken to evaluating its effects on young children's attitudes and awareness. Key lessons from this are identified and discussed in relation to future work in this area. (Contains 1 figure, 6 tables, and 3 notes.)

In three experiments, children's reliance on other people's testimony as compared to their own, first-hand experience was assessed in the domain of ontology. Children ranging from 4 to 8 years were asked to judge whether five different types of entity exist: real entities (e.g. cats, trees) whose existence is evident to everyone; scientific entities (e.g. germs, oxygen) that are normally invisible but whose existence is generally presupposed in everyday discourse; endorsed beings (e.g. the Tooth Fairy, Santa Claus) whose existence is typically endorsed in discourse with young children; equivocal beings (e.g. monsters, witches) whose existence is not typically endorsed in discourse with young children; and impossible entities (e.g. flying pigs, barking cats) that nobody believes in. Children make a broad dichotomy between entities and beings that they claim to exist (real entities; scientific entities; and endorsed beings) and those whose existence they deny (equivocal beings and impossible entities). They also make a more fine-grained distinction among the invisible entities that they claim to exist. Thus, they assert the existence of scientific entities such as germs with more confidence than that of endorsed beings such as Santa Claus. The findings confirm that children's ontological claims extend beyond their first-hand encounters with instances of a given category. Children readily believe in entities that they cannot see for themselves but have been told about. Their confidence in the existence of those entities appears to vary with the pattern of testimony that they receive.

Being able to evaluate the accuracy of an informant is essential to communication. Three experiments explored preschoolers' (N=119) understanding that, in cases of conflict, information from reliable informants is preferable to information from unreliable informants. In Experiment 1, children were presented with previously accurate and inaccurate informants who presented conflicting names for novel objects. 4-year-olds--but not 3-year-olds--predicted whether an informant would be accurate in the future, sought, and endorsed information from the accurate over the inaccurate informant. In Experiment 2, both age groups displayed trust in knowledgeable over ignorant speakers. In Experiment 3, children extended selective trust when learning both verbal and nonverbal information. These experiments demonstrate that preschoolers have a key strategy for assessing the reliability of information.

Examined in 2 studies the ability of 2- and 3-year-olds to learn to use tools via imitation. Found that when shown a correct solution to a tool-using task, all children managed at least a partial solution. When shown an incorrect followed by a correct solution, 2-year-olds produced a partial solution and most 3-year-olds produced a full solution. (Author/KB)

Examined preschool children's recall of deictic verbs of motion presented within stories either consistently or inconsistently with the protagonist's viewpoint. Found that 3- and 4-year-olds accurately recalled verbs of motion (come, go, bring, take) that were consistent with the protagonist's viewpoint but made substitution errors of inconsistently presented verbs. Suggested that preschoolers interpret narrated movements similarly to adults. (Author/KB)

Compared performance of children with autism, with learning disabilities, and normally developing 4-year-olds on reasoning problems with and without instruction to use imagery. Found that instruction to use imagery led to persistent logical performance. Children with autism displayed a distinctive response pattern, performing around chance levels, showing a simple response bias, and rarely justifying their responses. (Author/KB)

Examined deception and false-belief understanding in preschoolers following noncompliance. Found that over half of 3- and 5-year olds touched a prohibited toy during experimenter's absence and most denied it. Almost all preschoolers looked into a forbidden box, most denied it, and a minority consistently feigned ignorance of contents. False-belief understanding was linked to looking denial but not to feigning ignorance. (Author/KB)

Examined whether young children can identify breaches of a permission rule and their sensitivity to the implications of such rules. Found that preschool children show considerable facility in reasoning about permission rules and can justify their choices. Results suggest that, when children violate a permission rule, they do so knowingly. (MOK)

Three experiments examined 24- though 39-month-olds' understanding of pretend episodes, such as a puppet pouring pretend milk into a container and then tipping it over a toy animal. The children understood the linkage between the two actions and realized that the toy animal would become "wet." (MDM)

Two experiments assessed preschoolers' ability to understand pretend transformations. Subjects were two-, three-, and four-year-olds who viewed episodes in which either one or two similar props were altered in a pretend fashion. In both the single and double transformation, children demonstrated that they could keep track of the pretend transformations. (MDM)

English-speaking and Dutch-speaking children were asked to pick the big, tall, or long members of pairs of bricks. Comprehension improved with age but older children in both groups were prone to choose the taller (but smaller) of two objects when asked to point to the bigger one. (SED)

Recent work has probed the developmental mechanisms that promote fair sharing. This work investigated 2.5‐ to 5.5‐year‐olds' (N = 316; 52% female; 79% White; data collected 2016–2018) sharing behavior in relation to three cognitive correlates: number knowledge, working memory, and cognitive control. In contrast to working memory and cognitive control, number knowledge was uniquely associated with fair sharing even after controlling for the other correlates and for age. Results also showed a causal effect: After a 5‐min counting intervention (vs. a control), children improved their fair sharing behavior from pre‐test to post‐test. Findings are discussed in light of how social, cognitive, and motivational factors impact sharing behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children (N = 278, 34–71 months, 54% girls) were told which of two figurines turned on a music box and also observed empirical evidence either confirming or conflicting with that testimony. Children were then asked to sort novel figurines according to whether they could make the music box work or not. To see whether children would explore which figurine turned on the music box, especially when the observed and testimonial evidence conflicted, children were given access to the music box during their sorting. However, children rarely explored. Indeed, they struggled to disregard the misleading testimony both when sorting the figurines and when asked about a future attempt. In contrast, children who explored the effectiveness of the figurines dismissed the misleading testimony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A considerable body of research has shown that preschoolers who have a better understanding of emotions also have better social competence. In the present study, we focused on the potential roles that verbal ability and working memory may play in the relationship. A total of 187 4- to 6-year-old preschoolers completed: (i) the Test of Emotion Comprehension for emotion understanding; (ii) the Counting and Labelling test for working memory; and (iii) the Core Vocabulary scales of the WPPSI for verbal ability. Two teachers assessed each participant's social competence. The results showed that preschoolers' emotional understanding is a predictor of their social competence but verbal ability fully mediated the relationship. Furthermore, verbal ability positively predicted children's social abilities only when they also had superior working memory. These findings help us to understand how verbal ability and working memory affect the relationship between emotion understanding and social competence in preschoolers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined differences among children in their endorsement of an adult's claim, their subsequent empirical investigation of that claim, and their resolution of any potential conflict between the claim and their empirical investigation. American and Chinese preschool (N = 171, M = 4.71 years) and elementary school (N = 128, M = 7.59 years) children were presented with five, different-sized, Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. Children typically selected the biggest doll. Children then heard either a false, counter-intuitive claim (i.e., smallest doll = heaviest) or a claim confirming their initial intuition (i.e., biggest doll = heaviest). Children frequently endorsed the experimenter's claim even when it was counter-intuitive. The experimenter then left the room. During the experimenter's absence, older children who had heard the counter-intuitive as opposed to the confirming claim explored the dolls more than younger children, especially when subtly prompted to explore. Moreover, only older children who heard the counter-intuitive claim simultaneously picked up the smallest and biggest doll, a more deliberate test of the experimenter's claim. By implication, children engage in selective exploration following a surprising claim. Older children's more systematic explorations of what they have been told may reflect improvements in their ability to test such claims and in their greater sensitivity to the fact that unexpected claims can and should be empirically investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When presented with a claim that contradicts their intuitions, do children seize opportunities to empirically verify such claims or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told? To answer this question, we conducted a replication of Ronfard et al. (conducted in the People's Republic of China) in two countries with distinct religious and political histories (Study 1: Belarus, N = 74; Study 2: Turkey, N = 79). Preschool children were presented with five different-sized Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. All children selected the biggest doll. Half of the children then heard a (false) claim (i.e., that the smallest doll was the heaviest), contradicting their initial intuition. The remaining children heard a (true) claim (i.e., that the biggest doll was the heaviest), confirming their initial intuition. Belarusian and Turkish preschoolers typically endorsed the experimenter's claim no matter whether it had contradicted or confirmed their initial intuition. Next, the experimenter left the room, giving children an opportunity to check the experimenter's claim by picking up the relevant dolls. Belarusian and Turkish preschoolers rarely explored the dolls, regardless of the type of testimony they received and continued to endorse the counterintuitive testimony they received. Furthermore, in Study 2, Turkish preschoolers continued to endorse smallest = heaviest even when doing so could have cost them a large reward. In sum, across two different cultural contexts, preschool children endorsed a counterintuitive claim and did not spontaneously seek evidence to test it. These results confirm and extend those of Ronfard et al. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studying trust in the context of human–robot interaction is of great importance given the increasing relevance and presence of robotic agents in the social sphere, including educational and clinical. We investigated the acquisition, loss, and restoration of trust when preschool and school-age children played with either a human or a humanoid robot in vivo. The relationship between trust and the representation of the quality of attachment relationships, Theory of Mind, and executive function skills was also investigated. Additionally, to outline children's beliefs about the mental competencies of the robot, we further evaluated the attribution of mental states to the interactive agent. In general, no substantial differences were found in children's trust in the play partner as a function of agency (human or robot). Nevertheless, 3-year-olds showed a trend toward trusting the human more than the robot, as opposed to 7-year-olds, who displayed the reverse pattern. These findings align with results showing that, for 3- and 7-year-olds, the cognitive ability to switch was significantly associated with trust restoration in the human and the robot, respectively. Additionally, supporting previous findings, we found a dichotomy between attributions of mental states to the human and robot and children's behavior: while attributing to the robot significantly lower mental states than the human, in the Trusting Game, children behaved in a similar way when they related to the human and the robot. Altogether, the results of this study highlight that similar psychological mechanisms are at play when children are to establish a novel trustful relationship with a human and robot partner. Furthermore, the findings shed light on the interplay – during development – between children's quality of attachment relationships and the development of a Theory of Mind, which act differently on trust dynamics as a function of the children's age as well as the interactive partner's nature (human vs. robot). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the development of selective trust has shown that young children do not indiscriminately trust all potential informants. They are likely to seek and endorse information from individuals who have proven competent or benign in the past. However, research on trust among adults raises the possibility that children might also be influenced by the emotions expressed by potential informants. In particular, they might trust individuals expressing more positive emotion. Indeed, young children's trust in particular informants based on their past behaviour might be undermined by their currently expressed emotions. To examine this possibility, we tested the selective trust of fifty 4- and 5-year-olds in two steps. We first confirmed that children are likely to invest more trust in individuals expressing more positive emotion. We then showed that even if children have already formed an impression of two potential informants based on their behavioural record, their choices about whose claims to trust are markedly influenced by the degree of positive emotion currently expressed by the two informants. By implication, the facial emotions expressed by potential informants can undermine young children's selective trust based on the behavioural record of those informants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]