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Individuals in many cultures believe in omniscient (all-knowing) beings, but everyday representations of omniscience have rarely been studied. To understand the nature of such representations requires knowing how they develop. Two studies examined the breadth of knowledge (i.e., types of knowledge) and depth of knowledge (i.e., amount of knowledge within domains) that preschoolers, elementary-school children, and adults (N = 180) attributed to an all-knowing being. Preschoolers often reported that an omniscient mind would lack many types of knowledge, and they completely failed to understand the depth of omniscient knowledge. With increasing age, children approached an understanding of omniscience--attributing broader and deeper knowledge to an omniscient agent--but only adults firmly understood the depth of omniscient knowledge. We identify socio-cultural and cognitive factors that correlate with children's understandings of omniscience. Findings demonstrate that childhood representations of fallible, limited, human minds both make possible and constrain developing representations of radically non-human minds.

This prospective longitudinal study provides evidence of preschool-age precursors of hostile attribution bias in young school-age children, a topic that has received little empirical attention. We examined multiple risk domains, including laboratory and observational assessments of children's social-cognition, general cognitive functioning, effortful control, and peer aggression. Preschoolers (N = 231) with a more advanced theory-of-mind, better emotion understanding, and higher IQ made fewer hostile attributions of intent in the early school years. Further exploration of these significant predictors revealed that only certain components of these capacities (i.e., nonstereotypical emotion understanding, false-belief explanation, and verbal IQ) were robust predictors of a hostile attribution bias in young school-age children and were especially strong predictors among children with more advanced effortful control. These relations were prospective in nature--the effects of preschool variables persisted after accounting for similar variables at school age. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for future research and prevention.

The emotional reactivity hypothesis holds that, over the course of phylogeny, the selection of animals with less reactive temperaments supported the development of sophisticated social-cognitive skills in several species, including humans (Hare, 2007). In the ontogenetic human case, an emotional reactivity hypothesis predicts that children with less reactive temperaments will reach certain milestones in theory-of-mind (ToM) development more quickly. We examined relations between temperament and false-belief understanding in 102 preschool-age children from China and the United States. Temperament was measured via parental ratings of behavior as well as with physiological measures of children's reactivity (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis reactivity gauged via salivary cortisol). In accord with an emotional reactivity hypothesis, children with certain reactive temperaments--specifically, those who were more aggressive and those who were both socially withdrawn and physiologically reactive--evidenced poorer social-cognition. However, our findings also force amendment to the ontogenetic emotional reactivity hypothesis. For the majority of children in both countries, physiological reactivity predicted more advanced ToM, perhaps by facilitating social engagement and attention to social stimuli. Moreover, children who were withdrawn from social interaction yet nonreactive, especially Chinese children of this temperament, evidenced advanced ToM. Thus, some forms of social disengagement may foster social-cognitive development in certain sociocultural contexts. (Contains 3 tables and 1 figure.)

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory-of-mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3)--lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity--predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding 2 years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind.

How and when do children develop an understanding of extraordinary mental capacities? The current study tested 56 preschoolers on false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks about the mental states of contrasting agents--some agents were ordinary humans, some had exceptional perceptual capacities, and others possessed extraordinary mental capacities. Results indicated that, in contrast to younger and older peers, children within a specific age range reliably attributed fallible, human-like capacities to ordinary humans and to several special agents (including God) for both tasks. These data lend critical support to an anthropomorphism hypothesis--which holds that children's understanding of extraordinary minds is derived from their everyday intuitive psychology--and reconcile disparities between the findings of other studies on children's understanding of extraordinary minds.

Children aged 4-7 years (N = 120) played four rounds of a find-the-sticker game. For each round, an informant looked into two cups and made a claim about which cup held a sticker. At the end of each round, children guessed the sticker's location, and then the sticker's actual location was revealed. For three of the rounds, the informant accurately reported the sticker's location. But critically, for one round-either Round 1, 2, or 3-she was inaccurate. Children continually adjusted their trust in the informant as they obtained more information about her accuracy. Relations between the informant's pattern of accuracy and children's trust were robust, neither mediated nor moderated by children inferences about her intent or traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When preschoolers are presented with a label for an entity that conflicts with its appearance, they sometimes rely on the new label rather than on the entity’s appearance to categorize the entity and to infer its properties. We examined whether children’s learning from such claims is short-lived or long-lasting and whether the persistence of their learning depends on the degree of fit between those claims and the available perceptual evidence. Children aged 3–5 years ( N = 71) were asked to categorize hybrids. These hybrids combined 75% of the features from one animal or object with 25% of the features from a different animal or object. After categorizing each hybrid, children heard an informant provide a contrary label. Immediately after they were provided with this new label, children often recategorized the entities accordingly, especially when the label matched the hybrid’s predominant features. Children’s endorsement of the informant’s label proved to be long-lasting when it matched the hybrid’s predominant features, typically persisting even after 5 weeks. In contrast, children’s endorsement often faded over time when the informant’s label did not match the hybrid’s predominant features. Overall, children were more skeptical of testimony that was more discrepant with the perceptual evidence available to them, and they were less likely to continue endorsing it after a delay. The findings have implications for our understanding of how children eventually come to represent and believe in counter-perceptual and counterintuitive concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory-of-mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3) - lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity - predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding 2 years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• People with disabilities are often judged for non-normative behavior they can't control. • Children 4.5 years and older accounted for the role of disability in persons' non-normative behavior. • Children as young as 4 years of age mentioned physical or auditory limitations in their reasoning for the non-normative behavior of people with disabilities. • Children are aware of and capable of learning about disability concepts in the preschool years. People with disabilities may behave in non-normative ways because they cannot act otherwise. This study explored whether U.S. children aged 3.00 to 8.99 years (N = 105) differ in their evaluations of people who commit norm violations when those persons have perceptual or physical disabilities. Across 12 scenarios, children were asked to explain different characters' non-normative behaviors and to evaluate each character's naughtiness. Characters were typically developing, had a physical disability, or had a hearing disability. Disabilities were described to participants but were not visually depicted. Across moral and conventional norm violations, children aged 4.5 years and older judged characters with disabilities as less naughty than characters without disabilities, whereas younger children (3 and 4 years) judged all characters as equally naughty. Children's explanations for characters' non-normative behaviors (acknowledging characters' physical/auditory limitations and inferring negative attributes) significantly predicted their naughtiness judgments; this was true for participants across the sampled age range. Thus, preschool children demonstrated flexibility in their moral judgments across a variety of everyday behavioral violations, tempering their negative evaluations of persons who committed non-normative behaviors when those persons had unseen disabilities that could reasonably account for their actions. Parents and teachers may be able to build on these early moral intuitions to foster greater acceptance of persons with disabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]