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A widely accepted argument among students of presidential regimes is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party does not control a majority of seats in congress. This argument, however, fails to take into account three variables that should affect the performance of minority presidential governments: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the strength of the executive veto and the formation of executive coalitions. Based on a new typology of presidential regimes, I propose the hypothesis that the most conflictive form of minority government is that in which the president’s party does not control the median legislator, the president lacks effective veto power, and no majority or median minority executive coalition is formed. This hypothesis is supported by data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1979-2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss a new set of institutional formulas oriented to strenghtening the Congress with the aim of promoting good governance in a regime of separation of powers between the Congress and the President. We adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter’s preference can produce highest satisfaction or social utility. Proportional representation in Congress tends to establish a close correspondence between the median legislator’s and the median voter’s preferences. Cooperation between the median party in Congress and the President for both legislative decisions and Cabinet formation can reduce the ‘gridlock interval’ and favor socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that these formulas are gaining acceptance. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]