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The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war's legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical issues are an integral part of business life and daily life. Business ethics concern the ground rules of individual, company and societal behavior. With industrialization, business activities have become more complex and this occasionally causes violations of rights. The number of private military companies increased rapidly in the conflict areas after 1990. The purpose of this study is to examine the activities of private military companies in terms of business ethics and to emphasize the necessity of a human-centered thinking system. In the study, firstly, the definition of private military companies was made and then the differences between private security companies were mentioned. Then, the definition of business ethics was made. Finally, the situation of private military companies in terms of business ethics has been evaluated by considering some experienced events. In the 21st century, non-ethical activities such as operations of private military companies, severe human rights violations, ill-treatment of prisoners of war, torture and rape were recorded in various official reports in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, it cannot be said that private military companies are very successful in practice morally and legally. These new companies, known in the past as names such as legionnaires or mercenaries, but nowadays referred to as private military companies or private military contractors, have reached an annual turnover of over $ 200 billion and the number of employees expressed in hundreds of thousands. However, the uncertainty of the positions and responsibilities of private military companies in armed conflicts brings along many moral and legal problems. Along with the law, violations of rights can be prevented by addressing people's moral worlds, hearts and consciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been gaining increasing media and scholarly attention particularly due to their indispensable role in the wars in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Nevertheless, theoretical insights into the agency problems inherent when hiring PMSCs and how to optimally incentivize them are scarce. We study the complex relationship between intervening state, host state, and PMSC, taking into account the diverging interests of all involved parties as well as potential agency problems. We develop a theoretical model to characterize a state's optimal choice whether to perform a task associated with an intervening mission itself, or hire a PMSC and optimally design the contract. We find that it might be optimal to hire PMSCs even if they are expected to do a worse job than the intervening state would do itself. Furthermore, the government's reputation in rewarding PMSCs for a good performance is crucial and might render it optimal to only deal with a limited number of PMSCs — who are not necessarily always the most efficient providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of armed security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to widespread criticism of their insufficient control through international laws and conventions. This article suggests that one reason for this omission has been the (re)construction of actors who provide armed force for profit in international legal discourses. During most of the 20th century, armed persons who participated in foreign conflicts for monetary gain were identified as ‘mercenaries’. They were outlawed through international legal documents such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on Mercenarism and given restricted rights in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Today, the same types of actors are increasingly defined as ‘private security contractors’, and new discourses and international agreements are emerging that attribute to them legality and legitimacy. The aim of this article is to examine the changing legal constructions of armed security providers since the 1970s and the consequences with respect to their control. The article argues that the (re)construction of actors who supply armed force for money in international legal discourses has been made possible by three main discursive strategies: the distinction between persons and corporations providing armed force for profit, the changing focus from the motivations of these actors to their relationship to a ‘responsible command’, and the shift from a concern about the actors to one about certain activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact of private military and security companies (PMSC) on human rights. Examples from Afghanistan and Iraq to illustrate the impact of (PMSC) on human rights are also highlighted. PMSC have attracted international attention for being involved in grave human rights violations. Meanwhile, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations were able to circumvent political constraints on the use of force, because of the availability of experienced security and military personnel for hire.

This study draws attention to one of the most significant but least examined aspects of the global security environment: the transnational private security business. The importance of private military companies (PMCs), which have tactical warfare capabilities equivalent to those of the militaries of developed countries, has increased since the inception of the Iraq War in 2003. The weakness of state security forces in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the need to downsize and outsource an already overtasked US military, has left security gaps in these countries. Some argue that filling these gaps with PMCs is an economically feasible, politically viable, and flexible option for US policymakers. Our study tests this argument by asking about the political effects of PMCs, profit-focused corporations that operate largely outside national and international law, on the sovereignty and legitimacy of the fragile states in which PMCs operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]